The first called for a surprise Brandenburg raid by night, supported by Chetniks, all the attackers disguised in Partisan uniforms. Their mission would be to capture Tito if possible, kill him if not. The second idea was more convoluted and comprised two corpses (probably murdered prisoners of war) to be dressed in British battledress and dropped by parachute near Jajce. With their deaths attributed to faulty parachutes, one was to be carrying a letter addressed to Tito personally, which on opening would explode and kill the Partisan leader. However, both of Kirchner’s proposals were overruled by Rendulic who appears to have been piqued by the fact that Brandenburgers were operating in his combat zone but outside his control. Instead the town of Jajce was included in the list of objectives of Operation ‘Kugelblitz’. The heavy-handed attempt failed, of course.
During December Hauptmann Böckl arrived from Greece at the head of his own small unit of similar purpose that included approximately eighty Bosnian Muslims in its ranks. His unit and Kirchner’s were subsequently merged as Verband Wildschütz (‘Poacher’), its strength approximately 200 men, one half remaining under Kirchner’s command, the other under Böckl. During February 1944, Böckl was relieved of his post at Pfuhlstein’s request and replaced by Major Ernst Benesch who began to expand the size of the intelligence-gathering unit. Interestingly, the name of the listed commander of Verband Wildschütz – Benesch – was replaced by a pseudonym on 18 August 1944, in an order issued from divisional headquarters entitled ‘Camouflage for Verband Wildschütz’:
The Verband Wildschütz has been renamed ‘Wehrwirstschaftsstab 85’ for further camouflage. Commander: Major Benesch, who now appears under the name Major Neumann.8
While heavily engaged in Yugoslavia, the Brandenburger order of battle for January 1944 showed a division still split between different theatres of operations.
Brandenburg Division.
Division Staff (Berlin)
Commander: Generalmajor Alexander von Pfuhlstein.
1st General Staff Officer: Major Frankfurth.
Ia: Hauptmann Wülbers (from 31 May 1943).
IIa and Division Adjutant: Hauptmann Helmut Pinkert.
1st Regiment Brandenburg (Temporarily Hauptmann Gerlach while Major Walther on leave) in Greece.
Regimental units: One company from Signals Battalion ‘Brandenburg’. (Artillery battery attached in 1944).
1st Battalion (Hauptmann John).
1st, 2nd and 3rd Companies.
2nd Battalion (Hauptmann Pinkert).
5th, 6th, 7th Companies.
3rd Battalion (Hauptmann Wandrey).
9th, 10th, 11th (Heavy), 12th Companies.
2nd Regiment Brandenburg (Oberstleutnant Franz Pfeiffer) in Montenegro. Regimental units: One company from Signals Battalion ‘Brandenburg’. (Light Artillery battery attached in 1944).
1st Battalion (Hauptmann Steidl).
1st, 2nd, 3rd Companies.
2nd Battalion (Hauptmann Oesterwitz).
5th, 6th, 7th Companies.
3rd Battalion (Hauptmann Renner).
9th, 10th, 11th Companies.
3rd Regiment Brandenburg (Oberstleutnant F. Jacobi) in Soviet Union/Italy/France.
Regimental units: One company from Signals Battalion ‘Brandenburg’.
1st Battalion (Hauptmann Gerhard Pinkert).
1st, 2nd, 3rd Companies.
2nd Battalion (Hauptmann Bansen).
5th, 6th, 7th (Heavy), 8th Companies plus Italian 3rd ‘M’ Assault Battalion ‘9 September’.
3rd Battalion (Hauptmann Wasserfall).
9th, 10th, 11th, 12th Companies.
4th Regiment Brandenburg (Oberstleutnant von Hugo) in Yugoslavia.
1st Battalion (Hauptmann Hollmann, later replaced by Hauptmann Gerlach). 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Companies.
2nd Battalion (Oberleutnant Lau) merged with 1st Battalion, 1 August 1944.
6th, 7th, 8th Companies plus 9th (Legionnaire) Company.
3rd Battalion (Hauptmann von Koenen).
11th, 12th, 13th Companies.
Verband Wildschütz.
Independent Companies
Fallschirmjäger Company. This latter parachute unit was later expanded into the ‘Fallschirmjäger Battalion’ of four companies in March 1944, based in Stendal and commanded by Hauptmann Weithoener.
16th (Light) Company (Oberleutnant Hettinger), in Pisa, Italy, at the end of 1943 before returning to Germany.
Translator Company.
Divisional Units
Signals Battalion (Hauptmann Eltester) headquarters in Berlin, divided between the regiments.
Lehrregiment ‘Brandenburg’ (Major Martin).
1st Battalion based in Brandenburg an der Havel.
2nd Gebirgsjäger Battalion based in Baden bei Wein and later Veldes/Oberkrain.
3rd Battalion created in 1944 in Stein.
4th Battalion created in 1944 in Domzale.
Küstenjäger Battalion based at Langenargen/Bodensee (Rittmeister Conrad von Leipzig).
2nd, 3rd, 4th (Heavy) Companies.
Küstenjäger Kompanie Rhodos (Leutnant Bertermann).
Legionärbataillon ‘Alexander’ (Hauptmann Alexander Auch).
1st ‘White Company’ and 2nd ‘Black Company’.
Pfuhlstein managed to finally get his full training regiment during March 1944. His original proposal was intended to streamline the flow of replacements and reinforcements and had been for the establishment of four battalions. Instead he had been granted just two; the 1st Lehr Battalion in Brandenburg an der Havel, concerned with basic training and 2nd Lehr Battalion that focussed on Gebirgsjäger training. On 5 March 1944, a request was received from the Wehrmacht Operations Staff for all existing elements of the Lehrregiment to provide troops for the establishment of an ‘Alarm Regiment’ that was originally intended for despatch to Hungary as the country teetered on the brink of surrender to the Allies. It appears that this deployment never actually took place although the resultant organisation gave Pfuhlstein the full training pool that he had desired originally:
Lehrregiment ‘Brandenburg’ (‘Alarm Regiment’): Oberstleutnant Martin.
Regimental Headquarters: Veldes.
18th Heavy Training Company (Veldes).
1st Battalion: (Veldes, formerly located in Freiburg).
2nd (Gebirgs) Battalion: (St Vein an der Save).
3rd Battalion: Hauptmann Grawert (Stein).
4th Battalion: Oberleutnant Bistrick (Domzale-Hannsburg).
Training Battalion ‘U’: Hauptmann Auch (Hungarian Volksdeutsche).
The Alarm Regiment’ was initially deployed against an expected Allied landing near Trieste and the Istrian Peninsula and they took up positions by 12 May 1944. Once the perceived threat dissipated, they returned to Germany.
In Yugoslavia, Tito’s Partisans remained locked in combat with German, Chetnik and Ustaše forces. Though the Balkans region had become like a bleeding wound in the side of the Wehrmacht, it could not be relinquished as it provided nearly 50 per cent of Germany’s petroleum, 100 per cent of its chrome supplies, 60 per cent of its bauxite and 21 per cent of its copper. Yugoslavia had to be held to safeguard this vital source of resources as well to maintain lines of communication with German forces in Greece. However, the Wehrmacht was not strong enough to dominate a country of such difficult terrain and limited transportation options. Correspondingly, German troops occupied major urban areas while the Partisans took greater control of much of the rugged countryside. It was an appalling situation that resulted in frequent brutal but inconclusive battles and a general sense of despondency amongst German troops stationed in the area.
Unable to kill the Partisan beast, Generaloberst Rendulic then attempted to cut off its head. Early plans by the SD and Skorzeny’s SS Jagdverbände to capture Tito during January 1944 (Operation ‘Theodor’) had been cancelled but still yielded valuable intelligence about the Partisan leader and the location of his headquarters. Meanwhile Kirchner of Verband Wildschütz was still on Tito’s
trail and, using his Chetnik contacts, he eventually tracked his quarry to Potoci and then onwards to Drvar. Kirchner avoided cooperation with Ustaše units as their reputation for wanton cruelty only served to alienate themselves and their allies from the general populace. He established a small camp near Bos Grahovo and finally found the area of the Drvar caves in which Tito had established his headquarters; Partisan radio broadcasts, intercepted by German signals intelligence, provided confirmation of Kirchner’s reports. This combined information would later form the basis of an ambitious operation to kill or capture Tito during May 1944.
In southern Greece, the 1st Regiment was released from coastal guard duties but remained around Piraeus and Athens under LXVIII Army Corps control, on missions against the growing surge of Andartes activity. The German policy of taking and executing hostages as reprisal for Andarte action had served their enemy well and generated hordes of recruits for the guerrilla bands. The German-sponsored Security Battalions also grew in strength, but did little to placate a volatile situation in Greece while suffering an increasing rate of desertion to the enemy as the Reich’s military situation continued to deteriorate. Walther’s regiment began fighting communist guerrillas south-east of Athens and suffered casualties, including the 3rd Battalion adjutant, Palestinian Oberleutnant Walter Minzemay, killed on 3 January. They fought inconclusively against their shadowy enemy throughout January and were finally moved out of Greece during the following month to Prilep, Macedonia, and thence onward to Albania where they were subordinated to Second Army and held in operational reserve for countering an expected landing on the Dalmatian coast. Hauptmann Wandrey returned to Germany for training, his 3rd Battalion taken over by Oberleutnant Seuerblich in time for it to be moved to Šibenik, Croatia, where Walther also established his own headquarters. Seuerblich’s battalion, along with the 2nd Battalion that had transferred to Benkovac, were involved in a series of anti-Partisan sweeps beginning with Operation ‘Baumblüte’ on 18 March. Operations ‘Bora’ and ‘Denkzettel’ followed over succeeding weeks and the Brandenburgers suffered serious casualties. The 1st Battalion moved to Tirana and was also part of major drives against the Partisans that took a heavy toll in killed and wounded, including Hauptmann John injured on 20 May. At that point, the listed strength of all nine battalions of Walther’s 1st Regiment totalled only 824 men.
There were still numerous Brandenburg personnel in Italy at the beginning of 1944. Bansen’s 2nd Battalion/3rd Regiment had arrived there from the Eastern Front during November 1943 and the regiment’s remaining battalions joined them in June, finally withdrawn from months of fighting against the Red Army. While officially resting and rehabilitating, they were also engaged in anti-Partisan operations, perhaps of less intensity than those they had experienced in the swamps of the Pripet marshes, but equally deadly for the unwary.
Before the arrival of the two other battalions, Bansen’s men appear to have been involved in the hunt for Allied prisoners of war that had taken the opportunity escape following the Italian surrender. Despite an appalling and misguided order issued by MI9 to British prisoners instructing them to remain where they were following the departure of Italian guards – and allowing equally surprised German troops to arrive and imprison them once again – hundreds of Allied ex-prisoners still roamed behind German lines. However, their expectations of meeting advancing friendly forces were soon dashed. Heavy winter snows had aided the stubborn German defence of the Gustav Line stretching across the narrowest part of the Italian peninsula and an Allied landing south of Rome at Anzio during January 1944 had been successfully contained. Despite Abwehr intelligence completely failing to detect the imminent landing, the timid advance of Allied commanders, who could have advanced virtually unopposed into Rome if they had moved immediately after landing, thwarted their attempt to bypass German defences. Frontal attacks on the lynchpin of the Gustav Line, Monte Cassino, during February were repulsed, the mountain being held by German troops until May. With no Allied victory in sight and unable to reach friendly troops, escaped prisoners were either in hiding in the mountainous interior or being helped by welcoming Italian civilians and guerrilla bands.
Some of the Allied escapees who were recaptured received extremely harsh treatment by German units, including elements of Bansen’s 2nd Battalion. The Brandenburger unit had moved from the Avezzano area that they had occupied at the end of 1943 to Ascoli during early March, Bansen occupying the Villa Marina as his headquarters. On 10 March 1944, Leutnant Fischer’s company, stationed at Montalto, recaptured three British prisoners of war and an Allied parachutist in civilian clothes and shot them after interrogation by Fischer and his deputy Leutnant Rommel. Taken to a bridge near Montalto, they were executed and their bodies dumped into the river. Two American escapees were also shot at the same time by 6th Company commanded by Leutnant Hossfeld. The following day a raid on the village of Pito near Norcia found three British escapees, one of whom, Warrant Officer Barker, attempted to escape through a window and was shot dead. The remainder were captured and later executed on the outskirts of the village. The Germans recaptured several other Allied prisoners dressed in civilian clothes and who were also summarily executed, believed to have been by men of Bansen’s battalion though confirmation is lacking.
During April, Bansen vacated the Villa Marina, which was taken over by Hauptmann Otto Hettinger as the 16th (Light) Company returned to Italy and headed to Macerata where they were was billeted in a former POW camp at Sporza Costa.9 On 8 April, the company started its move south to the Ascoli Piceno area where they deployed with Hettinger in Villa Marina. The company now had the Italian Fascist Battalion ‘9 September’ placed under its command and became ‘Kampfgruppe Hettinger’. Unfortunately, they too carried on the hunt for Allied escapees and a number were captured and shot, frequently by Italian fascist firing squads under German command. It was an unnecessary – and illegal – part of the Brandenburgers’ history. Meanwhile, Bansen’s 2nd Battalion was placed on the Adriatic Coast under the command of SS und Polizeiführer, Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, responsible for anti-partisan warfare in occupied Italy. There, Bansen was promoted and replaced as battalion commander by Hauptmann Helmut Pinkert.
Parts of the 4th (Heavy) Company of the Küstenjäger Abteilung were also deployed in Italy during this period. They and the Linsen explosive motorboats that they had been designing and testing on Lake Constance were finally entrained for the front line and a planned operation against the accumulated Allied shipping off Anzio beach. They departed by train on 24 March and were originally due to be used in support of a human torpedo (Neger) attack planned by the Kriegsmarine’s Kleinkampfverbände.10 However following cancellation of the Neger deployment, the Küstenjäger finally went it alone on 1 July, launching from La Spezia and heading into the Gulf of Genoa. There, the deficiencies of the little craft were fully revealed as the light spruce hulls were virtually unmanageable in rough seas as opposed to the calm lake in which they had trained. The mission was a disaster and never got anywhere near the enemy. Vizeadmiral Helmuth Heye, head of the Kleinkampfverbände, furiously demanded that naval operations be left to his Kriegsmarine and the explosive motorboats transferred to his command. Members of the 4th Company were presented with a choice: return to the Küstenjäger for redeployment under the command of their popular ‘Conny’ von Leipzig, or join the Kriegsmarine. The company divided itself, many of the men having been involved with the development of the little craft under Brandenburg Major Golbach and wanting to finally use them in action, even if it meant leaving the division. At any rate, by the time that they made their decision to stay or leave, the Brandenburg Division had undergone a final and dramatic metamorphosis.
One of the last major operations that Pfuhlstein took part in as commander of the Brandenburg Division was Margarethe’, the occupation of Hungary (the special forces part of the action codenamed Operation ‘Trojan Horse’). Aware of the way the winds of war were blowing, Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Kállay was
discussing an armistice with the Allies, with the complete approval of the Regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy. Though Hungary supported Germany’s war against the Soviet Union, neither Horthy nor Kállay were particularly sympathetic to fascism and had maintained communications with the Western Allies. Since Italy’s surrender, Hitler had ordered contingency plans created in the event of further Axis satellite states withdrawing from the conflict. After becoming aware of Hungary’s intensifying negotiations, Hitler invited Horthy to the palace of Klessheim near Salzburg, Austria, on 15 March, to apply pressure for greater contributions to the war effort and allow increased deportation of Hungarian Jews to the camps of his ‘Final Solution’. The meeting also forced Horthy’s absence while German troops staged their prepared occupation of critical areas of Hungary.
Pfuhlstein and the Brandenburgers were was heavily involved as four separate Kampfgruppen converged on the country from all points of the compass. From Banat in the south, 1st Regiment ‘Brandenburg’ was attached to ‘Kampfgruppe A’ alongside strong Wehrmacht and SS forces under the command of XXII Gebirgs Corps. The Brandenburger ‘Alarm Regiment’ was originally intended to support the northern advance, but was released as unnecessary before it began. Hauptmann Weithoener’s newly expanded Fallschirmjäger Battalion ‘Brandenburg’ was tasked with capturing Budaörs Airport, on the outskirts of Budapest, which they did by air-landing from Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft augmented by a scattering of Italian Savoia Marchettis. Meanwhile convoys of troops entered the country, one composed of Brandenburgers from the 1st, 2nd and 4th Regiments and elements of the Panzer ‘Lehrdivision’, the conglomeration of Germans arriving in Budapest unhindered and on schedule. Pfuhlstein coordinated his men by use of a Brandenburg signals unit that had been covertly installed in a Budapest hotel room by 16 March.
Hitler's Brandenburgers Page 40