17 St Vincent to Nelson 7 and 8.8.1801; St Vincent I pp. 131–3
18 Nelson to St Vincent 7.8.1801 and Nelson to Admiralty 10.8.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 446–7 and 451–2
19 Nelson to St Vincent 10.8.1801; Nicolas IV p. 449
20 Nelson to Emma 11.8.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 454–5
21 Nelson to Emma 4.8.1801; Morrison II p. 160
22 Wareham pp. 145–7.
23 Owen to Nelson 9.8.1801; Add. 34,918 ff. 123 and 125.
24 Nelson to Bedford 10.8.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 452–3
25 Troubridge to Nelson 13.8.1801; CRK/13
26St Vincent to Nelson 10, 11 and 12.8.1801; St Vincent I pp. 133–6
27 Nelson to St Vincent 13.8.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 456–7
28 Nelson to Davison 13.8.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 458–9
29 Collingwood to Edward Collingwood 13.8.1801; Owen ed. Miscellany VI PP. 173–5
30 St Vincent to Nelson 14.8.1801; St Vincent I pp. 135–6
31 Nelson to Admiralty ; to St Vincent 16.8.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 464–7
32 St Vincent to King 17.8.1801; George III p. 594
33 Addington to Nelson 17.8.1801; CRK/1, St Vincent to Nelson 17.8.1801; St Vincent I pp. 136–7. Nelson to Squadron Captains 18.8.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 471–2.
34 Nelson to Emma 18.8.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 473–4
35 Hood to Cornwallis 31.8.1801; Manuscripts of Cornwallis p. 395
36 St Vincent to Nelson 18.8.1801; St Vincent I pp. 137–8. Addington to Nelson I9.8.1801; CRK/1
37 Nelson to Addington 21.8.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 474–6
38 Nelson to Admiralty 23.8.1801; Nicolas IVB pp. 476–7
39 Troubridge to Nelson 13.8.1801; CRK/13. Owen to Nelson 21.8.1801; CRK/9. Owen to Nelson 22.8.1801; Add. 34,918 f. 189. Nelson to Owen 23.8.1801; Nicolas IV p. 476.
40 Nelson to Lutwidge and St Vincent 24.8.1801. Nelson to Admiralty 25.8.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 477–80.
41 Nelson to Stewart 26.8.1801; Cumloden Papers.
42 St Vincent to Nelson 19 and 26.8.1801; St Vincent I pp. 138–40. Troubridge to Nelson 28.8.1801; CRK/13
43 Nelson to Davison 31.8.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 481–2
44 St Vincent to Countess of Malmesbury 20.8.1801; St Vincent I p. 209
45 Nepean to Nelson 28.8.1801; Add. 34,918 f. 200
46 Haslewood to Nelson 25.8. , 31.8. and 2.9.1801; Add. 34,918 ff. 193, 210, 215
47 Nelson to Davison 18.12.1801; Nicolas IV p. 556
48 Troubridge to Nelson 20.9.1801; CRK/13
49 Troubridge to Nelson 9 and 12.9.1801; CRK/13
50 Nelson to Hercules Ross 12.9.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 487–8
51 Nelson to Davison 14.9.1801; Nicolas IV p. 489
52 Nelson to Admiralty 14.9.1801; to St Vincent 15.9.1801; Nicolas p. 487–90
53 St Vincent to Nelson 14, 21 and 22.9.1801; St Vincent I pp. 144–5
54 Nelson to Stewart 23.9.1801; Cumloden Papers
55 W. Owen to Nelson 26.9.1801; CRK/9. Nelson to Owen 1. 10. 1801; Nelson to Admiralty 3.10.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 500–2. Burrows, E. H. Captain Owen of the African Survey, 1774–1857, Rotterdam, 1979, pp. 31–2.
56 Nelson to St Vincent 29.9.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 499–500
57 St Vincent to Nelson 2 and 5.10.1801; St Vincent I p. 146
58 Nelson to Lutwidge 3.10.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 503–4
59 Nelson to Admiralty 3 and 4.10.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 502–5
60 Nelson to St Vincent 4?.10.1801; Nicolas IV p. 505. George III to Addington 20.9.1801; Aspinall, George III p. 613.
61 Addington to Nelson 8.10.1801; Nelson to Davison 9.10.1801, to Addington and St Vincent 10. 10. 1801; Nicolas pp. 506–8. Nelson to Lutwidge 14.10.1801; Nicolas IV p. 511
62 Nelson to Admiralty 14 and 15.10.1801; Nicolas IV p. 511
63 St Vincent to Nelson 20 and 24.10.1801; St Vincent I pp. 147–8
64 Addington to Nelson 26.10.1801; Add. 34,918 f. 290.
65 Nicolas IV pp. 520–1
66 Nelson to St Vincent 29.9.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 499–500. Nelson to Lord Mayor, Addington, St Vincent 20.11.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 524–7
67 Nelson to St Vincent 21.11.1801; Nicolas IV p. 527
68 St Vincent to Addington 3.1.1802; ST VINCENT I pp. 105
69 Addington to Nelson 27.11.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 525–6
70 Cumloden Papers. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Graham Eden Hamond (1779–1862) commanded the Blanche in the battle. Hamond Papers; William R. Perkins Library, Duke University.
71 Nelson to Sir Brooke Boothby 1.5.1802; Nicolas IV pp. 12–13
72 Baird to Nelson 27.1.1803; CRK/1
73 Nelson to Suckling 15.4.1802; Nelson to Mrs Bolton 11. 6 1802; Nicolas V pp. 10 and 15
74 Ball to Emma 30.4.1802; Morrison II p. 187
75 Diary entry 4.1.1810 at Bath; Bickley, F. ed. The Diaries of Sylvester Douglas, Lord Glenbervie, London, 1928, II, p. 50.
76 Guerin, Horatia Nelson, pp. 24–58 is very hostile and a powerful corrective to the usual gushing romantic nonsense.
77 Nelson to McArthur 23 and 28.4.1802; 7.5.1802; 11.6.1802; Nicolas V pp. 11–15.
78 Nelson to St Vincent 28.1.1803; endorsed by Nelson 25.2.1803; Nicolas V pp. 40–1. Nelson gave up some of his own share to ensure that Stewart took the same proportion as a junior flag officer. Clearly he had impressed Nelson as much as Nelson had impressed him.
79 e. g. over Malta see; Ziegler, Addington pp. 120, 124. Nelson to Boothby 1.5.1802; Nicolas V pp. 12–13. Nelson to Addington 17.7.1802; Nicolas VII p. ccxii.
80 Nelson to Addington 31.1.1802; Nicolas V p. 3
81 Addington to Nelson 19.2.1802 and 30. 5. 1802; Morrison II pp. 185–6. and CRK/1. See Ziegler at pp. 139–40 for Addington’s Episcopal appointments.
82 Nelson to Addington 23.2.1802, 25.3.1802; Nicolas V pp. 6 and 8–9
83 Nelson to Addington 30.6.1804; Ziegler p. 226
84 Nelson to Troubridge 17.2.1802; Nicolas V p. 5
85 Nelson to Sutton 15. 1. and 6.2.1802. Nicolas V p. 2
86 Nelson to St Vincent 16.6.1802; Nicolas V p. 16
87 Ziegler, p. 101
88 Nelson to Boothby 1.5.1802; Nicolas V pp. 12–13
89 Stewart to Nelson 10.10.1802; Morrison II pp. 198–9. Nelson to Stewart 12. 10. 1802; Cumloden Papers
90 Nelson to Davison 11 and 14.9.1802; Nicolas V pp. 29–31
91 Minto II p. 258
92 Nelson to Addington 4. 12. 1802, covering his Memorandum on Malta; Nicolas V pp. 36–7. Ziegler p. 182
93 Minto 23.2.1803; Minto II pp. 273–4
94 Nelson to Addington 8.3.1803; Nicolas V pp. 47–9. Curiously Vincent misdates this letter to 1802, pp. 472–4
95 Ziegler, Addington p. 184, citing the original note
96 Nelson to Addington 23.4.1803; to Rose 15.5.1803; Nicolas V pp. 59–60, 65
97 Nelson to Murray 22.3.1803; Nelson to St Vincent 24.3.1803; Nelson to Berry 26.3.1803; Nicolas V pp. 50–1
98 Glenbervie I p. 338. Farington II p. 20. The busts were modelled by Whig artist Mrs Darner. Foreman, Georgiana, p. 47.
99 Ziegler, Addington p. 184.
Bonaparte sees ‘the writing on the wall’: a caricature by Gillray
CHAPTER XIII
Master of the Mediterranean 1803–5
On 6 May 1803 Nelson achieved a long-held ambition: he was appointed Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. With war inevitable, he waited for orders at Merton.1 As soon as they arrived, he hurried down to Portsmouth, boarding his flagship HMS Victory on 18 May, the day war was declared.
Many of the causes of the war lay in the Mediterranean. After a succession of alarming, expansionist French moves – annexing Leghorn and Elba, dominating Spain, negotiating with the Barbary states, securing favourable access to the Black Sea and Russian trade, looking to resume unfinished business in Egypt, even extending the Republican empire to India – Malta proved to be the sticking point, as Nelson had anticipated. To give it up, as required by the Treaty of Amiens, would cripple Br
itish political influence, economic activity and strategic power in the Mediterranean. That would be to buy peace at too high a price.
The government had been preparing for war. In February the appropriately named sloop Weazle reconnoitred the Maddalena and otherisland groups on the coast of Sardinia, looking for sources of woodand water and to see ‘how far those places may be capable of sheltering a Fleet’.2 This was the ideal location for the watch on Toulon. In early March the government ordered the current Commander in Chief, Rear Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton, to intercept and destroy the French fleet if it appeared to be heading for Egypt.3 He was at sea before the outbreak of war.4
Addington’s strategic choices were severely limited. It was 1801 all over again. France, including Belgium, Holland, parts of Germany and Italy, possessed a mighty army, led by a military dictator bent on further aggression, not least to stoke the fires of nationalism and spread the cost of his army. Britain could recover her command of the sea, impose a blockade and sweep up the newly recovered French colonies, aside from Louisiana, which Bonaparte cynically sold to the United States, well aware that he could hold it. The rest of Europe would remain on the sidelines. Austria was exhausted and nervous, Russia uncertain and Prussia hoped to make something of the inevitable conflict. The only threat to France would come if two of these powers went to war. While their mutual distrust equalled their fear of France this was unlikely.
Negotiations had been tried, accommodation attempted, but both failed. This time the Anglo-French struggle would be a war to the finish – total war, which only one regime would survive. For a man of modest political talent, Addington showed remarkable courage in taking on a massive, seemingly unwinnable war. He was forced to plan for a long war, one in which British economic power would wear down France. It could only be waged as a counter-attacking conflict. France’s only hope of victory lay in an invasion of Britain, and Addington hoped they would make the attempt. It would be a mistake of the same nature as Egypt, opening the way for a decisive counter-stroke. Only after the annihilation of the French army at sea would the rest of Europe act.
With the income tax reformed and reimposed, Addington was confident that Britain could outlast France, while Nelson was the one British commander with the insight, energy and commitment to exploit a fleeting opportunity to crush the French. Bonaparte could not secure peace without crossing the Channel, and this left him stuck at Boulogne. Every month he waited made his presence more ridiculous. He could not hope to put to sea without being seen, engaged by the inshore squadron of Edward Owen, and wiped out by Lord Keith’s fleet. It was this conundrum that made Nelson so confident the French fleet would be forced to come to sea. He knew they would not come out from Brest, where his old friend Cornwallis kept them tightly bound with a close blockade of astonishing commitment and professionalism. The Mediterranean, by contrast, was further from home, so although Nelson was taking a risk by leaving the way open off Toulon, it was done to secure the destruction of the enemy.
This cautious strategy governed the first year of Nelson’s command.It unravelled in 1805 when Pitt forced the pace of diplomatic activity, creating the Third Coalition and giving Bonaparte a chance to escape, reconstruct his motives into an ex post facto strategy of genius, and secure a fresh lease on power with vastly greater resources through the inevitable failure of the Austrians and Russians at Ulm and Austerlitz.5 A little more patience might have paid dividends.
To command the Mediterranean theatre required self-sufficiency, decisiveness and political courage, since it was a theatre where time and distance left much more for the admiral to decide than in the Downs, the Baltic or the Grand Fleet. With bases at Gibraltar and Malta, the British could divide the theatre into three areas: the eastern and western basins and the Adriatic. All were vital, but as long as the enemy fleet could be kept in the western basin, the other two areas only required cruiser squadrons. Consequently Nelson spent his time with the battle fleet in the triangle Naples–Gibraltar–Toulon, with a near-perfect central base on the Sardinian coast. The greatest danger was that the enemy fleet would escape to the Atlantic, to attack British trade and possessions or support an invasion of England or Ireland.
Britain’s options in the theatre, though less dramatic, remained impressive. Naval power could cripple the movement of troops and economic activity by pressing close to the coast. Though the French could complete their conquest of Italy at will, they could not escape the Continent without a fleet. The presence of the fleet bolstered British diplomacy, encouraged friendly neutrals, and limited the impact of French threats. The blockade of France and her satellites led to widespread ruin, which greatly reduced the value of French territorial expansion as a mechanism for waging war with Britain.
Nelson worked closely with British ministers at Naples, the Ottoman Porte and Madrid; together with a constellation of minor diplomatic office-holders, they provided vital intelligence. As contact with London was intermittent, instructions tended to be general, and permissive. This left far more to the man on the spot than in the other major fleet commands, and explains why Nelson was the ideal commander. It was not his mastery of the Mediterranean or his importunity that gained him this command, but his instinct for acting on his own judgement and his political courage. He did not need to be supervised, or to refer back to London.
While the destruction of the Toulon squadron was at the core of Nelson’s instructions, his role was far wider. He was to proceed to Malta, link up with the fleet, take over from Bickerton and discuss the situation with Ball, now Governor of the island. He would take station off Toulon ‘to take, sink, burn or otherwise destroy any ships belonging to France, or the citizens of that Republic’, and he should also seize any Batavian [Dutch] ships. He was to watch French proceedings at Genoa, Leghorn and other ports on the west coast of Italy for intelligence of plans to attack Egypt, Turkey or Naples, all places he was to secure. He should give such protection to British trade as was consistent with his other orders; he should also watch Spanish naval preparations – not offering any insult to Spain or her shipping if she remained neutral, but stopping Spanish warships from entering French ports or joining a French fleet. If he had any ships to spare he should place a squadron in the Straits to watch for French warships returning from an ill-fated expedition to St Domingo (modern Haiti). This general advice was the limit of the Admiralty’s strategic and political guidance for the next six months, though it continued to require regular reports.6
On 20 May Nelson left Spithead with a north wind and driving rain, heading for the Grand Fleet rendezvous off Ushant. He was to ask Cornwallis if he needed the Victory before heading to his station. Also on board was Hugh Elliot, the new minister to Naples and brother of his old friend Lord Minto. The voyage established a key relationship for the forthcoming command, the two men being thrown much closer together then they had anticipated by the failure to find Cornwallis. After lamenting the loss of a favourable wind, they left the flagship behind, shifting into the frigate Amphion, commanded by Hardy. Cornwallis, as Nelson knew, would not keep his friend’s flagship, so the whole incident took on the character of a farce.7 It also underlined the Admiralty’s obsession with the Channel fleet.
Once at sea Nelson wrote to Emma only every three or four weeks. He lamented that they were now on different elements, and asked her to take care of ‘our dear child’. He also requested her to send Stephens’ History of the French Revolution, perhaps to check if the author had profited from his advice.8 Occasionally this correspondence was delegated to his secretary John Scott, who knew Emma. Some letters were partly dictated or written by Nelson, partly by Scott.9 The emotional role of the letters was vital – they allowed him to dream of a real home, his ‘wife’ and child. But they did not distract him from his duty any more than his letters to Fanny in the 1790s.
After a brief stop at Gibraltar, to check on Spanish activity at Cadiz and arrange local convoys and patrols against the inevitable French privateers, Nelson hurried on to
Malta. He sent Elliot to his post at Naples, armed with friendly messages for Sir John Acton, the King and Queen, recognising that it would not be in the Neapolitan interest for him to visit. With French troops already in part of the Kingdom, neutrality was the best policy for Naples, but Nelson was determined to keep the French out of Sicily.10 This included censuring the captain of the Cyclops for seizing French ships in Naples harbour, a clear violation of neutrality. The ships were returned, and a public letter sent to Acton for the French minister to read.11 Ferdinand, well aware of his exposed position, was very grateful for British support and Nelson’s presence.12 Nelson also wrote to the British Minister at Turin, offering his assistance to the King of Sardinia and to his Copenhagen colleague William Drummond, recently translated to Istanbul with letters for the Grand Vizier and Capitan Pasha, the senior Turkish naval officer. He wanted news from the eastern Mediterranean, fearing the French were moving into the Balkans.13
Nelson’s return to the Mediterranean was the first indication to many that war had been declared, and while he hoped for prizes he promised Addington that ‘You may rely on my activity in getting off Toulon.’14 He had to assess the situation, analyse the intelligence and develop an effective counter to Bonaparte’s strategy. His main problem was the relative lack of force at his disposal. The Malta garrison was less than five thousand troops, and he had been authorised to send half of these to Messina, but this would expose the island to a counterstroke. His fleet, meanwhile, was no larger than the French fleet at Toulon, and had nothing to counter the possibility of Spanish involvement, or to cover other tasks. He had to block Bonaparte in the Mediterranean, while other fleets cleared the seas and islands of the French, and protected the home base. There would be no reinforcements, few replacements and only limited quantities of dockyard stores.
Arriving at Malta on 15 June, Nelson found that Bickerton was already at sea off Toulon. He spent thirty-six hours ashore, discussing the situation with Ball and writing to the key players in the eastern basin. The senior army officer on the island, General Villettes, agreed to hold twelve hundred British troops, ready to occupy Messina. Nelson soon shaped a course through the Straits of Messina. Though the sight of Vesuvius must have stirred old memories, he could not go ashore without attracting French attention to the Kingdom, so he sent his dispatches and letters by boat. The political news was worrying, but a secret agreement between Elliot and Acton held out the best hope for Sicily. When danger threatened the British would occupy Messina. To forestall an attack Nelson’s fleet would cruise between Elba and Genoa, blocking any French expedition south.
Nelson: Britannia's God of War Page 35