On the first day of publication of the series, the Blade had been flooded with e-mails, letters, and phone calls. At first, most of the messages were negative—critical of the newspaper running such a dark story at a time when the United States was engaged in Iraq. “You are the reason we lost the Vietnam War,” read one message. “The Blade is the reason why there are 58,000 names on the wall at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial,” declared a caller. But by the end of the series, with the former Tigers and the people of the Song Ve Valley interviewed about the impact of the war crimes on their lives, the feedback began to change. “Thank you for telling the truth,” wrote one Marine veteran who served in the war. “This is a story that needed to be told.” Another said Tiger Force soldiers should be prosecuted. “We were in Vietnam,” said one veteran. “We wouldn’t have tolerated that.”
At first, the Army refused to comment on the series. But eight days later, on October 30, the Army announced that it was reviewing the case because of pressure from the media and calls to the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi. In February 2004, military lawyers began interviewing veterans, including Rion Causey and Dennis Stout, as part of an expanding investigation. Army officials also started poring over the records of the Tiger Force investigation from the 1970s, comparing the information to what was published in the newspaper series. On September 5, 2004, the Blade published a story that a military lawyer reviewing the case for the Army recommended that Hawkins be brought back to active service for an Article 32 hearing—the equivalent of a military grand jury—for his actions during the Tiger Force rampage. As of the publication of this book, the Army has still not acted on the recommendation.
Whether the military should press for a hearing nearly four decades later is open to debate, a question better answered by legal scholars and military historians. Perhaps the more critical question with far greater consequences is whether the Army has learned anything from the rampage so many years ago. Whether the Army acknowledges the longest series of atrocities by a U.S. fighting unit in the Vietnam War or continues to bury its past. To do the latter would come at an enormous price. Part of the culture of any military institution is what it has learned and failed to learn from prior mistakes, providing an institutional memory with clear-cut rules and guidance. Covering up war-crime cases such as those of Tiger Force may save the institution from being embarrassed but does little to prevent such cases in the future.
What institutions fail to recognize is that the real consequences are not in the publicity but in the human costs. The tragedy of Tiger Force extends beyond the Vietnamese whose lives were shattered. The soldiers themselves have paid an incredibly deep price—day after day, year after year. “It’s in the middle of the night, when the demons come, that you remember, that you can’t forget,” says Bill Carpenter.
Driven by zealous commanders, many of the Tiger Force soldiers ignored the rules of war. They went berserk. Instead of abiding by what was right, they opened up on unarmed men, women, and children, and almost forty years later, they are still suffering emotionally and spiritually. In the words of Tiger Force sergeant Ernest Moreland, “The things you did, you think back and say, ‘I can’t believe I did that.’ At the time, it seemed right. But now you know what you did was wrong. The killing gets to you. The nightmares get to you. You just can’t escape it. You can’t escape the past.” He said he tries to reconcile his past deeds with his morality today, but in that struggle, he rarely—if ever—finds peace.
So many of the Tiger Force soldiers have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. The symptoms include flashbacks and nightmares. But for those who committed atrocities or failed to stop such actions, the condition can be worse. In addition to the trauma, they are often saddled with a strong sense of guilt that can complicate the deeper feelings of fear and isolation. “It’s another layer that needs to be addressed,” said Dr. Dewleen Baker, director of a PTSD research clinic in Cincinnati. “It’s not that easy. How do you reconcile killing civilians? It’s hard, especially when you have a core set of values.”
In the Tiger Force case, the burden of responsibility has fallen on the soldiers—for now. Their names have been linked to one of the biggest war-crimes cases of the Vietnam War. But so far, the Army has not accepted responsibility and continues to conceal the records.
After the Blade broke the story of Tiger Force, the reporters said they hoped the Army would assume responsibility for what happened in the Central Highlands in 1967 so that someday some other newspaper—five, ten, twenty years from now—didn’t turn up hidden records from some other series of atrocities committed in Iraq, Afghanistan, or another country. Until the military does so, the dangers of another Tiger Force will always be there.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book grew out of an investigative newspaper series, “Buried Secrets, Brutal Truths,” published in the Blade of Toledo, Ohio, and its sister paper, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, from October 19 through October 22, 2003. As lead reporters on the project, we were granted a nine-month leave of absence to turn the stories into a book just days before the Pulitzer Prize Board recognized our work in the category of investigative reporting. Also sharing in the prize was reporter Joe Mahr, whose effort was invaluable in the stretch.
We want to thank a number of people at the Blade, especially publisher John Robinson Block, for allowing us the time to work on this book, and also Blade correspondent Michael Woods, whose friendship with Henry Tufts led to the Blade acquiring more than twenty-five thousand documents of the Army commander’s personal papers—important records that made the newspaper series and book possible.
Much of our work for the Blade became the foundation for this book, and to that extent, we would like to thank Mahr, a close friend and colleague who helped track down several former Tigers for the series. Blade editors also supported the newspaper investigation, including executive editor Ron Royhab, managing editor Kurt Franck, assistant managing editor Luann Sharp, state editor Dave Murray, copyeditors Ann Weber and Todd Wetzler, and librarians Mary Mackzum and Vesna Radivojevic.
Special thanks to Doug Koerner and Wes Booher for their insightful graphics, maps, headlines, and first-rate contest presentation of the newspaper series to the Pulitzer Prize Board and jurors. When the pressure was mounting, Doug and Wes stood by us. The same measure of thanks goes to Blade legal counsel Fritz Byers.
Kudos to the Blade’s photo department, including photographer Andy Morrison, who accompanied us to Vietnam and whose compelling photos of the Tiger Force survivors added a powerful dimension to the series and to this book. Also thanks to Blade photo editor Dave Cantor.
We’d also like to express our gratitude to former Army captain Billy Kelly, a Vietnam veteran, for his technical expertise during the writing of this book, and to the numerous Tiger Force members who agreed to be interviewed—however painful the memories. A special debt of gratitude to the families of deceased platoon members Donald Wood and Gerald Bruner—soldiers who risked their lives to stop the atrocities.
We would like to recognize the University of Toledo’s College of Arts and Sciences and Department of Communication for granting us office space while we wrote this book, especially the college’s former dean, David Stern; communication professors Richard Knecht, Jacqueline Layng, and Paulette Kilmer; and secretary Pat Damschroder.
Undertaking a book project of this magnitude can be frustrating and challenging, but along the way, several colleagues helped boost our morale and inspire us, including Blade reporter Larry Vellequette, Chicago Tribune reporter Sam Roe, Bowling Green State University journalism professor Melissa Spirek, Miami Herald assistant managing editor Manny Garcia, and attorney Gerardo Rollison.
In Vietnam, we were assisted by interpreter Nyugen Minh Nguyet, who joined us for sixteen days in the Central Highlands, and whose precise translations were crucial to understanding the events that transpired nearly four decades ago. A special thanks to the people of the Song Ve Valley for allowing us into their homes and shari
ng their painful recollections.
We’d like to thank the Collins McCormick Literary Agency, especially PJ Mark, for recognizing the value of the newspaper series just days after publication, and we would also like to express our gratitude to the people at Little, Brown and Company for their editorial support, including Junie Dahn and Karen Landry, and especially Geoff Shandler, our book editor, who truly understood the historical significance of the story and who pushed us to greater heights.
Additionally, a number of journalists deserve mention for seeing the importance of the Tiger Force story and sharing it with the rest of the country, including Seymour Hersh, who penned an article in The New Yorker; the late Peter Jennings, Ted Koppel, and veteran producer Jill Rackmill of ABC, who devoted generous segments to the series; and Terence Smith, media correspondent and senior producer for the Public Broadcasting Service’s NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.
In the end, this work would not have been possible without the dogged persistence of the lead Army investigator who refused to be undermined. Gus Apsey reluctantly talked to us about the case, his loyalty torn at times between the Army he loved and telling the truth about a case that dominated his life for more than three years. He refused to cast aspersions on the Army, even though he was deeply disappointed about the way the case was dismissed without a hearing.
Finally, to our wives, Judi Sallah and Suzyn Weiss, and our children, who were often left on weekends while we wrote the manuscript. Without their love and support, this work would not have been possible.
Michael Sallah and Mitch Weiss
October 2005
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
Main Sources
We talked at length with Gustav Apsey, a Criminal Investigation Command warrant officer and lead investigator in the Tiger Force case. We also interviewed Sam Ybarra’s mother, Therlene Ramos; his wife, Janice Little; former reservation police officers; and numerous friends and family members.
For biographical information on Ybarra, we drew on extensive interviews with family members and friends. We also drew on interviews with Tiger Force soldiers and Army documents related to the Tiger Force investigation, known as the Coy Allegation.
Our account of Apsey’s visit to Ybarra’s home was based on interviews with Apsey, CID agents, and former reservation police officers familiar with the case. We also relied on CID documents about the meeting.
For information about pressure facing the Army in the wake of My Lai, we drew on numerous sources, including newspaper articles, books, and interviews with historians. In addition, we utilized records from the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and documents from the Colonel Henry Tufts Archive at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Army Records
Sam Ybarra’s military personnel record. The file contained a history of Ybarra’s military service, including details about his court-martial.
Army psychiatrist Irwin H. Noparstak evaluated Ybarra on March 13, 1969. The evaluation was included in Ybarra’s court-martial. The document was Exhibit 456 of the Coy Allegation. It contained the following:
Patient claims he knows exactly what he wants from the Army, and he came to RVN to be in an active Airborne unit. To him he neither wants nor can tolerate the type of unit he is in and the type of work he is doing. Patient feels he is an asset to the Army and is suitable if he is placed where he wants to be placed.
This man makes it very clear that he can be an asset and suitable when put in his niche. He is limited, inflexible, lacking in tact, and with a low frustration tolerance. He seemingly must have what he wants now and cannot procrastinate so as to utilize the means to get to an end. Everything is now. His present unit certainly does not fit his demands or talents. I suspect that if his niche was found, if he were transferred to a more appropriate unit for him, that he could become suitable for the Army. As he stands now in HHB Div Arty, he is not suitable.
The sworn witness statement of Sergeant Buford F. McClure. The document was Exhibit 454 of the Coy Allegation. It included the following:
McCLURE: Since I have known Pvt. Ybarra, approximately two months, he has been a constant problem to not only myself but to the officers and NCOs of this battery. He has also been a bad influence and example to the other men in this unit.
The sworn witness statement of Captain Billy Stafford, who recommended Ybarra’s dishonorable discharge. The document was Exhibit 455 of the Coy Allegation. It contained the following:
STAFFORD: He is a very volatile individual and is resentful of any authority. He constantly threatened various noncommissioned officers with bodily harm. The military did not foster such hatred and resentment toward authority. It is my opinion that Pvt. Ybarra should be discharged as an undesirable immediately following his confinement.
The sworn witness statement of Gustav Apsey, who attempted to interview Ybarra on March 20, 1975, and March 21, 1975. The document was Exhibit 22 of the Coy Allegation. It included the following:
APSEY: At 15:30 hours, 20 March 75, the undersigned was advised by Detective Everett Little-Whiteman at the Indian Police Station, San Carlos Apache Indian Reservation, San Carlos, Az., that Ybarra could not be interviewed because he was drunk and passed out in his residence. It was learned that he is drunk beyond his capacity just about every day and is suffering from diabetes and acute cirrhosis of the liver. At 09:30, 21 March 1975, Detective Robert E. Youngdeer related that Ybarra would have to be interviewed at his residence because he refused to come to the police station.
Books
Beattie, Keith. The Scar That Binds. New York: New York University Press, 2000.
Bilton, Michael, and Kevin Sim. Four Hours in My Lai. New York: Penguin Books, 1992.
Herring, George. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1996.
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983.
Kimball, Jeffrey. Nixon’s Vietnam War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997.
Kissinger, Henry. Ending the Vietnam War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.
Langguth, A. J. Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975. New York: Touchstone, 2000.
Periodicals
Stars and Stripes story in November 1967 about Ybarra killing the one thousandth enemy soldier of Operation Wheeler
CHAPTER 1
Main Sources
We interviewed numerous Tiger Force members, including William Carpenter, Lieutenant Gary Forbes, Ernest Moreland, Joseph Evans, and Douglas Teeters. We talked at length with childhood friends and family members of Sam Ybarra and Ken Green, including Ybarra’s mother, Therlene Ramos; Brad Daniels; and Green’s Army buddy Leon Fletcher.
For the section about Ybarra’s and Green’s adolescence in Arizona, we drew on information from numerous friends and family members as well as Tiger Force soldiers. During their tour in Vietnam, Ybarra and Green often talked to others about their “hell-raising days” in Globe and Roosevelt.
For the part about the Mother’s Day Massacre, we drew on dozens of interviews with Tiger Force soldiers who fought in the battle, including Forbes and Carpenter. We also relied on information from a duty officer log, the unit history of the 1st Battalion/327th Infantry, maps, and combat records.
Our account of Ybarra convincing Green and Edward Beck to join Tiger Force was based on an interview with Leon Fletcher, who was sitting at the table with the men when they decided to transfer to the platoon.
For the section on the history of Tiger Force, we relied on 1st Battalion/327th Infantry records and documents from the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. For the part about how Tiger Force members were chosen before the Mother’s Day Massacre, we drew on extensive interviews with soldiers and officers.
Army Records
The unit history of the 1st Battalion/327th Infantry between January and December 1967. It contained the following information about the Mother’s Day Massacre:
On 15 May, the elements of the “Above the
Rest” battalion initiated 12 separate contacts. It was the elite Tiger Force that came in contact with the largest size enemy force to date, an estimated VC battalion. The Tiger Force, consisting of 40 men, was enroute to relieve enemy pressure on one of its engaged sub elements at BS702418. At 11:00H, they came under intense enemy fire. The Tigers were in a valley with the enemy in well-constructed fighting positions on the high ground. A tremendous firefight ensued. This elite small group of dedicated young warriors gave no thought to the overwhelming odds and plunged headlong into the battle.
The unit history of the 1st Battalion/327th Infantry shows commanders created Tiger Force in November 1965.
Exhibit 63 of the Coy Allegation, which included CID interviews with 1st Battalion/327th Infantry officers about Tiger Force: “The Tiger Force has killed a substantially larger number of armed insurgents than could be expected from a force its size.” “The unit could be counted on to tackle a mission and deliver outstanding results.” “The Tiger Force is a fighting unit that is light, highly mobile, and extremely effective against the VC and Main Force units.”
Books
Hackworth, David. About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior. New York: Touchstone, 1990.
Just, Ward. To What End. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968.
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983.
Langguth, A. J. Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975. New York: Touchstone, 2000.
CHAPTER 2
Main Sources
We interviewed numerous Tiger Force soldiers and commanders, including William Carpenter, Douglas Teeters, Harold Trout, William Doyle, Joseph Evans, Ken Kerney, Barry Bowman, Captain Bradford Mutchler, and Lieutenant Colonel Harold Austin. In addition, we interviewed friends and family members of Terrence Kerrigan, Manuel Sanchez Jr., and James Barnett.
For information about the unit’s chemistry in May and June 1967, we drew on extensive interviews conducted in connection with the Blade’s four-day series “Buried Secrets, Brutal Truths.” The series ran October 19-22, 2003. We also relied on subsequent interviews in connection with the book. In addition, we drew on statements Tiger Force soldiers made to CID agents during the Army’s four-and-a-half-year investigation of the platoon.
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