A prominent exception to this increasing dependence was Rhodes, an island city-state that maintained its independence through a well-organized navy. When an earthquake struck Rhodes in 222 BC, the mighty Hellenistic kings scrambled to outdo each other in lavishing relief aid upon the shattered island.72 The reason for such competitive generosity was not difficult to discern: despite the damage, the Rhodian navy remained a potent force in the Mediterranean.
Most other Greek city-states realized that they must unite or perish. A number of federal leagues emerged, uniting city-states with one another for protection. The two most prominent were the Achaean league in the Peloponnesus and the Aetolian League, based in central Greece. The power of both leagues quickly eclipsed that of Athens and Sparta, the traditional hegemons of southern Greece since the fifth century. Cities in these leagues managed their own domestic affairs but combined their military and financial resources to conduct foreign policy. These leagues traditionally had limited interaction with the Seleucid Empire, as their primary focus was countering the menacing presence of the neighbouring Macedonian king.73
Sources
This book is billed as a biography, yet it cannot promise a biography in the modern sense of the world. The biography of a modern political leader would likely try to delve into the psychological nature of the subject and his motivations. It might explore how experiences in childhood and youth found themselves reflected in later adult life, or how public actions were shaped and shaded by private emotions and relationships. It would give access to introspective moments away from the public spotlight and explore personal relations with family, friends, and even enemies. In support of these goals, most modern biographies have tremendous amounts of data to draw upon: diaries, letters, memoirs, interviews, and public speeches. But evidence for the ancient world is sparse, even for a king as powerful as Antiochus III.
No ancient biography of Antiochus III survives. This is perhaps fortunate. Ancient biography was notoriously unreliable, frequently combining gossip, slander, and unfounded suppositions. The genre was usually more concerned with moralizing than systematically analysing political or individual developments. For ancient figures with surviving biographies, the infamous Roman emperor Nero for example, it can be difficult to distinguish reliable information from the literary constructs of the biographer. A modern biographer of Antiochus III carries no such baggage.
Unfortunately, our information about Antiochus comes from references in just a handful of ancient sources.74 The most important of these sources is Polybius, a Greek historian who wrote between 160 and 140 BC.75 At once a victim and an admirer of Roman imperialism, Polybius was a high-ranking official in the Achaean League, who spent almost two decades as a hostage in Rome after 167 BC. His book was designed to explain to fellow Greek aristocrats that resistance to Rome was futile, even if honourable co-existence might be possible.
While enduring a genteel captivity in Rome (he was granted significant freedom of movement around Italy), Polybius befriended a number of important senators, and busied himself writing a history that would explain Rome’s domination of the Mediterranean. Even though his ‘universal’ history has not survived intact (indeed, most of the details concerning Antiochus’ life after 200 BC are lost), Polybius rates as one of the most important and most reliable historians of antiquity. He was the prime source for later historians, most notably the Roman historian Livy (Titus Livius), who authored an epic history of Rome between 27 BC and AD 15. Livy had access to Roman historians active during Antiochus’ lifetime (including Fabius Pictor and Claudius Alimentius), as well as Roman archival records from the third and second century BC. Still, for eastern affairs, Livy relied overwhelmingly on Polybius.
Polybius had access to two particularly important connections concerning the Seleucid Empire. The first, a Seleucid prince named Demetrius, was the grandson of Antiochus III. Demetrius also spent time as a hostage in Rome, where he became close friends with Polybius (the two men were kept in gentlemanly captivity). No doubt Demetrius gave Polybius sound information concerning family history and the arrangement of current Seleucid institutions. Polybius’ second contact was Scipio Aemilianus, a young Roman nobleman who had ties to two of the most noted aristocratic families in Rome: he had been born into the patrician Aemilii, and adopted into the patrician Cornelii Scipiones. While Scipio Aemilianus was too young to recall the war between Rome and Antiochus III, he likely provided access to documents and oral family core regarding the Roman generals who conducted the war against Antiochus: Scipio Africanus and Scipio Asiaticus, his adoptive grandfather and great-uncle.
Despite the accounts of Polybius, it is also necessary to rely on later literary sources, many of which were written in the second century AD during the intellectual ‘second sophistic’ period of the High Roman Empire. One of the most prolific writers of this period was Plutarch, who wrote from c.75 to 120 AD. A Greek with Roman citizenship, Plutarch penned many works, including a series of linked biographies comparing Greek and Roman notables. Although he did not write a biography of Antiochus III, his biographies of the Roman statesmen Titus Quinctius and Marcus Porcius Cato ‘the Elder’ shed significant light on the confrontation between Antiochus and Rome.76 Another Greek historian of High Imperial Rome was Appian of Alexandria, a Roman citizen and procurator who was writing c. 150 AD. His primary opus was a lengthy history of Rome delineated mostly by various periods of conflicts, including a section on Seleucid conflicts entitled Syrian Wars.77
Last, we have the history of Justin, who wrote in Latin in the third century AD. Justin, however, was summarizing a much earlier work, written by the Roman historian Pompeius Trogus nearly two hundred years earlier. Trogus was quite interested in the history of the Near East and delved deeply into the sweep of Seleucid history: it is regrettable that only Justin’s ‘cliff notes’ of his work survive.78
These historical narratives are important but still limiting; several other types of evidence are critical to understanding the Seleucid Empire. The first is epigraphy, the study of inscriptions. Multiple inscriptions survive that record decrees and letters from Antiochus III; these sources allow us to hear Antiochus III in his own voice, even if that voice is in the formal, regal language of royal correspondence.79 Additionally, a series of astrological diaries, maintained by the astronomer priests of Babylon, provide a non-Greek view of Seleucid rule and prove helpful on questions of chronology.80 These diaries comment on grain prices, military activities, and the activities of the king and his officials within the city. Surviving material evidence such as coins give us a sense of what Antiochus might have looked like, and illustrate the dynastic image he wished to project to his people.81 In an age with no printed material and severely limited literacy, coins were one of the most effective forms of political propaganda.
Chapter Two
The War with Molon
The teenage king
The exact date of Antiochus’ accession to the throne is unclear, but it occurred after July 223 BC, when his brother Seleucus III (referred to as king in Babylon) died during the campaign season. Babylonian astronomical tablets record the year 222 BC as Antiochus’ first full year on the throne.1 The year of Antiochus’ birth is also unclear. Polybius indicates that he was just over fifty in the year 191 BC, which would indicate that he was born in 241 BC or slightly earlier. By any calculation, Antiochus was a young man, likely around nineteen years old, when he became the king of the Seleucid Empire.2
According to Polybius, Antiochus had been sent to live ‘in the interior’ while a youth, which suggests either the royal city of Seleucia-on-the-Tigris or possibly Babylon. An early stay in Babylon during adolescence might explain the close relationship he developed with the great Babylonian temple of Esagila. During this time, there is no evidence that Antiochus was given any significant responsibilities as a cadet brother of the king, although he probably enjoyed a number of empty honours and notional titles.3
The death of Seleucus III led to a power vac
uum and serious rebellion in the east, which was in full force by the summer of 221 BC. The revolt was lead by Molon, the satrap of Media, joined by his brother Alexander the satrap of Persia.4 Together, these two brothers controlled two of the most important eastern provinces, the heart of the old Achaemenid Empire. Soon, Molon was also styling himself as king, and even minting coins with the appellation ‘King Molon’. The revolt of Molon and Alexander was similar to the revolt of the Parthian and Bactrian satraps in the late 230s, representing the centrifugal tendencies of the empire’s peripheral regions in times of dynastic instability.
While Alexander the Great had proven that a nineteen-year-old king could be decisive, canny, and cruel, he was the exception rather than the rule. Groomed from an early age to succeed his father, Alexander had been entrusted with important military commands and consequential decisions by the age of sixteen. Antiochus III had none of this grooming or experience. He was the little brother of the king, a symbolic royal lieutenant rather than a trusted advisor, and the untimely death of Seleucus III thrust him unprepared into his new position. With little to no training in court manoeuvres, he was likely not aware of the position’s full power or influence.
The naïve young man was thus unable to manage the boisterous court environment he inherited from his late brother. Court politics had lately devolved into a feud between two chief advisors: Hermeias and Epigenes, two courtiers who understood that the stability of their own power was linked to the favour of the young and inexperienced king. While the two disagreed on certain substantive policy points, their conflict seems driven largely by intense and ultimately murderous personal rivalry.
Both Hermeias and Epigenes were leading figures under the rule of Antiochus’ older brother. Hermeias had governed Seleuicia-on-the-Tigris while Seleucus III campaigned north against Attalus and his breakaway kingdom. Hermeias may have become Antiochus’ most powerful advisor because he was the senior official closest to him when he was still a cadet prince resident in Babylon, and would have been able to ingratiate himself almost immediately when Antiochus was proclaimed king unexpectedly.5 Hermeias dominated the physical court where the young King lived. Like all monarchs of the day, Antiochus depended utterly upon the loyalty of others to ensure his day-to-day survival. A myriad of courtiers, chamberlains, pages and slaves fulfilled every need: cooked for him, tasted his food to guard against poison, poured his wine, opened doors as he passed, emptied his chamber-pot, and ushered in mistresses. This array of staff was carefully controlled and orchestrated by Hermeias. In addition, Hermeias held the loyalty of the royal bodyguard, which gave him the power of coercion and resources for potential assassination should the need arise.
The second advisor, Epigenes, was a leading general who had accompanied Seleucus III on his final campaign. Following the assassination of the King, he regrouped the army and marched the militiamen in the phalanx back to their homes in the Syrian tetrapolis. Epigenes was popular within the army, making him a much needed ally. While his reputation as a capable military man earned him the young King’s trust and respect, Epigenes lacked contacts within the inner court, strings that Hermeias pulled with ease.
A third figure in the young King’s reign stood outside the court: Antiochus’ elder cousin Achaeus, who had been assigned a command in Asia Minor. Achaeus, like Epigenes, had accompanied Seleucus III on campaign, but afterward he had remained in Asia Minor with a sizable force. Proving his loyalty to the new King by refusing the army’s attempt to proclaim him king,6 he was rewarded with an extraordinary command and tasked with recovering territory lost to the Attalids. Achaeus carried out his task with alacrity and soon backed Attalus I into his citadel of Pergamon. Achaeus’ successes in Asia Minor would provide a bright spot of success in Antiochus III’s grim first year as king.
The first matter of royal policy to decide was the location of Antiochus’ first personal military campaign. Epigenes recommended that the King lead the army against Molon, in part because he hoped that the King’s presence would convince the rebels to desert. Hermeias, concerned about the potential consequences of Antiochus’ limited military experience, advocated an incursion against the softer target of Ptolemy IV in Koile Syria; for the King himself to march against Molon would lend dignity and legitimacy to a rebel and traitor, he argued. Experienced mercenary generals ought to deal with such a character. A king, he flattered Antiochus, should only fight against another king.
In support of his position, Hermeias produced a letter, possibly forged, claiming that it was intercepted correspondence between Achaeus and Ptolemy IV. In the letter, Ptolemy encouraged Achaeus to revolt against Antiochus and offered him material support. The letter (which despite Hermeias’ unsavoury reputation was likely genuine, as Ptolemy IV would have had every reason to incite Achaeus to rebellion) would serve as a perfect pretext for going to war. Ultimately, Antiochus sided with Hermeias. Two generals, Xenon and Theodotus Hemiolios, were tasked with removing Molon, and preparations were made for a royal campaign into Koile Syria.
The royal campaign was delayed while an absolutely necessary dynastic task was accomplished: the young King must be married and produce an heir as soon as possible. These tasks were critical for two reasons: given the mortality rates in the ancient world, it was necessary to produce a son as soon as possible with the hope that he might be of age before his father’s death. Second, since the time of Seleucus I and Antiochus I, an adult son served as co-king with his father: this had proven an effective way of managing succession (a similar scheme would later be adopted by the French Capetians). If the king fathered a son at nineteen, there was a good chance that he would have a co-king by the time he reached his late thirties. Given the problematic loyalty of generals like Molon, it would also be a tremendous boon to count on the absolute loyalty of adult sons as independent commanders. Indeed, the best way for the Seleucid king to produce faithful generals was to father them.
With respect to the mother of such an heir, it is unclear how much choice young Antiochus III was given when selecting his bride. He likely gave his uninformed consent to marry a girl he had never met, but the young King was likely unconcerned that the match be one of everlasting romance. Like traditional Macedonian kings, he had the option of contracting plural marriages in the future.7 Furthermore, the young monarch’s position and power allowed him a great deal of extramarital sexual freedom if he so chose.
The bride chosen was Laodice, the daughter of Mithradites II of Pontus. Pontus was a traditional Seleucid ally in the complex game of Antatolian diplomacy, and the Seleucids had a long tradition of intermarriage with the Pontic royal house. The bride herself was a granddaughter of Antiochus II, who had bequeathed his daughter (also named Laodice8) to the king of Pontus, and Laodice III and Antiochus were therefore first cousins. To confuse matters even further, Laodice had a sister also known as Laodice, who was married to Antiochus’ cousin Achaeus around the same time.
The Seleucid fleet commander (nauarchos) Diognetus, who had connections in the Pontic court, escorted Laodice to Seleucia at the Bridge (Zeugma), on the Euphrates River, where Antiochus III had established a temporary residence. After their royal marriage, the couple then travelled to Antioch, where Laodice was formally proclaimed queen (basilissa).9 Antiochus delayed his campaign long enough to father a child, and their first son, also named Antiochus (‘the son’ or ‘the younger’), was probably born around 220 BC.
Preparations were not yet complete for the campaign into Koile Syria when news arrived of a serious setback in the war against Molon and Alexander. Theodotus Hemiolios and Xenon had marched their forces east but had declined to engage the rebels in battle. Polybius reports that they were ‘panic-stricken’.10 The reasons for the retreat are unclear, although it was likely that they became convinced that their forces were unprepared and unequal to the task. Theodotus Hemiolios continued in Seleucid service, which makes it likely that their refusal to fight was based upon the realities on the ground and not cowardice.11 We lack gene
ral information about the size of Molon’s forces and the nature of the army under the two generals, so judging his claim here is difficult. However, given that Molon controlled the best horse-breeding grounds in the empire, as well as levies of Medish and Persian tribesmen, it is likely that he managed to build a sizable force from local recruits available to him.
With this newfound confidence, Molon moved south. He came close to capturing Seleucia on the Tigris, but was prevented by a timely defence of the riverbank by a junior commander named Zeuxis. This show of military competence, at a time when Antiochus III was sorely in need of good generals, would eventually propel Zeuxis to increasingly important commands. Following this setback, Molon retired to Ctisiphon in central Mesopotamia, near modern-day Baghdad.12 Hermeias, however, continued to advise the King not to abandon the planned designs against Koile Syria, and another general was sent east to contain the situation, an Achaean mercenary captain named Xenoitas.
Xenoitas was an aggressive commander, although critics soon murmured that the unexpected command and lofty title of ‘general-in-chief’ (strategos autokrator) had gone to his head. Deserters from Molon, perhaps planted agents, swam across the Tigris and brought intelligence that the rebel army was wavering in its loyalty. Hearing this, Xenoitas hoped that an immediate show of force might cause much of the rebel army to simply melt away. He crossed the Tigris River and marched directly against Molon’s camp. In response, Molon attempted a cavalry raid against the vulnerable troops on the far side of the river, but the horses stumbled into an extensive marshland. A number of riders drowned, and the bogged-down counterattack was quickly aborted. Molon abandoned his camp and retreated. Xenoitas allowed his men, exhausted from the successful river crossing, to loot the camp and refresh themselves with captured provisions; their victory celebration quickly devolved into a riot of heavy drinking.
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