Greeks active in the royal cult did not necessarily believe that the kings they honoured with libation and sacrifice were equivalent to the Olympian gods. Rather, such divine honours acknowledged the kings’ exceptional worldly power, their ability to mete out punishment and bestow material favours: tasks far more present and real, it seemed at times, than the immortal gods ever were.
A major change in the Seleucid royal cult took place under Antiochus III, who established the royal cult as an imperial institution, chiefly regulating its quality and content, and personally appointing high priests to oversee the cult at the satrapal level. In 193 BC, for example, Antiochus stated that his wife Laodice was to be honoured as a goddess, and he sent instructions throughout the empire to this effect.58
Chapter Four
The Battle of Raphia
Ptolemaic preparations
At the end of the campaign season of 219, Antiochus accepted the truce offer from Ptolemy IV. Leaving behind a strong garrison in Koile Syria under Theodotus the Aetolian, he retired to Seleucia Pieria with the remainder of his army. He dismissed his troops to winter quarters, sending many of his military settlers back to their homes in Syrian tetrapolis, and dispatched envoys to Sosibus, who was then stationed in Memphis, the old capital of the pharaohs. Seleucid envoys returned claiming a friendly reception, giving Antiochus further confidence that a negotiated settlement was at hand.
Yet Sosibus was in Memphis for a reason: he did not want Seleucid envoys to see what was happening in the capital city of Alexandria. Sosibus and Agathocles had decided on a bold course of action: they would raise a new, massive army and seek a final showdown over Koile Syria. To this end, they enlisted a host of mercenary generals: Echecrates of Thessaly, Phoxidas of Melita, Eurylochos of Magnesia and Socrates the Boeotian. All these men had a long history of service with the Macedonian army.
The Ptolemaic army, like its Seleucid counterpart, was based around a phalanx manned by the descendents of Greco-Macedonian military settlers. Some 25,000 were mustered from across Egypt, an impressive levy, but one that fell somewhat short of the 20,000 strong phalanx and 10,000 Silver Shields then deployed by Antiochus.1
Sosibus and his aides therefore scrambled to bulk up the Ptolemaic army with mercenary hires. Some 8000 Greek mercenaries were trained to fight as heavy phalangite infantry, along with a squadron of Greek mercenary horsemen. Some 3000 Cretans were hired to provide the light infantry, and they were reinforced by another 1000 ‘neo-Cretans’ who fought with Cretan equipment and tactics.2 A total of 2000 Thracians were recruited from abroad, and these joined a brigade of 4000 Thracian military settlers, descendants of previous mercenary hires rewarded with land grants.
The audacious Ptolemaic build-up required more than mercenary hires. Indeed, 218/17 BC was a difficult year to increase military strength, as the mercenary labour market was saturated with demand. To the north, Macedon and its Achaean allies were at war with the Aetolian League. Rome and Carthage had just renewed their epic hostilities in the west. While the mercenary market in the Mediterranean was bifurcated between east and west, Carthage’s demand for soldiers to fill her enormous armies likely further reduced the mercenaries available to Ptolemy IV.
Sosibus and his fellow ministers therefore undertook an unprecedented step: they recruited and trained 20,000 native Egyptians to fight as heavy infantry. Previously, the Ptolemies did not employ native Egyptians in their armies, aside from a small internal police force.3 This was a major difference between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid regimes: the Seleucids had always been willing to deploy armed subjects in large native contingents in order to exploit the manpower of their more warlike peoples. Traditionally, however, the Ptolemies had exploited their Egyptian subjects economically, maintaining them as heavily taxed and unarmed peasants in order to fund armies manned by Graeco-Macedonian settlers and Greek mercenaries.
In addition to the Egyptians, another 3000 Libyans from Ptolemy’s western realm were trained as heavy phalangites, and 2300 Libyans and Egyptians were recruited into the cavalry. The total Ptolemaic force came to 70,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, a triumph of diplomatic obfuscation and hasty military mobilization.4
While the green Ptolemaic army drilled in Alexandria, wearisome peace talks were taking place in Seleucia Pieria. When the four-month truce expired in the spring of 218 BC, it became apparent that Ptolemy IV and Sosibus were not interested in negotiation but were simply buying time. Antiochus collected his royal army of 58,000 men and proceeded to hook around the Lebanon mountains and attack up the Phoenician coast, still defended by the trustworthy Ptolemaic general Nicolaus the Aetolian.
Nicolaus based his defence of the Phoenician seaboard on the Porphyrion pass, where the Lebanon mountains and the coastline formed a natural chokepoint, aiming to prevent Antiochus from pivoting north out of the Biqua Valley up the coast toward the Phoenician city-state of Sidon.
Antiochus prepared a three-pronged assault of this pass, with three specially formed battalions of light troops. One force would attack the pass directly and pin the blockading force. Another unit would attempt to infiltrate through the Lebanon mountains, as a distraction to the defenders in the pass. The main effort, led by Theodotus the Aetolian, would storm the slope just above the pass, and then turn the Ptolemaic blocking position. The plan worked perfectly. Antiochus’ men killed 2000 of the defenders and captured 2000 more. One of the prisoners was likely Nicolaus the Aetolian himself, for by the next time we hear of him he is fighting as a mercenary general in Seleucid service. Antiochus’ forces quickly surged north, where he detached units to capture Sidon. The King, however, turned south and cut across the Jordan River Valley to target Ptolemaic outposts on the Arabian frontier. More Ptolemaic officers soon defected, including the governor (hyparchos) Keraias and the Thessalian mercenary captain Hippolochus, who brought with him a contingent of 400 cavalrymen. Antiochus rewarded both defectors lavishly, hoping to turn more Ptolemaic commanders.5
These military successes led to a further diplomatic victory. Various Arab tribes living in the arid lands at the edge of Ptolemaic territory sensed the tide shifting in favour of the Seleucids and came over to Antiochus in quick succession. His new allies provided roughly 10,000 light infantry to supplement his forces.6
Antiochus’ blitz during 218 BC had been extraordinarily successful. He occupied virtually the entirety of Koile Syria and chased Ptolemy’s forces to the border of Egypt. Now he was on the defensive, fighting more to cement his territorial gains than to obtain further conquests: there is no evidence that he wished to conquer the whole of Egypt. As the fighting season ended, Antiochus put his army into winter quarters.
The Battle of Raphia
In the early spring of 217 BC, the King learned that Ptolemy IV was finally marching from Alexandria with an army of 70,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, the impressive new army his advisors had worked for over a year to raise and train. Antiochus assembled his forces, 68,000 men with his newfound Arab allies, and moved south to confront the Ptolemaic counterattack. He marched down the Gaza coast, narrowed by coastal highlands near the town of Raphia. (Indeed, modern-day Rafa serves as a border checkpoint between Palestinian Gaza and Egypt.) Here, geography funnelled the two armies into one other and towards a decisive conclusion to the conflict.
Yet as the armies closed, both sides hesitated. The stakes in a set-piece battle were high, and neither had reason to hasten to a confrontation immediately. Antiochus may have hoped Ptolemy might lose his nerve and retreat back to Egypt, ceding the region to him. The two kings were roughly the same age, but Antiochus now had several years of successful campaigning under his belt, while Ptolemy IV was taking to the field for the first time. His troops were inexperienced and newly trained, the enormous Egyptian phalanx of 20,000 men was unproven.
The two armies initially encamped from each other at a distance of two kilometres (ten stades). After several days, Antiochus moved his camp forward to within one kilometre of enemy lines. Both sides linger
ed across from each other for five days, skirmishing all the while over control of watering holes.
Meanwhile, Theodotus the Aetolian, still nursing a private grudge against the King of Egypt, carried out a daring private mission. In the middle of the night, he entered the Ptolemaic camp, sneaked past the guards, and located the King’s tent. Ptolemy IV, however, had taken the precaution of sleeping in a separate tent, and Theodotus merely wounded two men asleep in the royal headquarters and killed the King’s hapless personal physician. Foiled in his plot to assassinate the King, he quickly returned to the Seleucid camp.7
It is unclear if this brazen assault jolted Ptolemy into action, but shortly afterwards he formed his army for battle. Antiochus immediately followed suit.8
Both sides arranged themselves in a relatively conventional fashion. Heavy infantry held the centre of each battleline. Antiochus’ heavy units consisted of his phalanx of reservists, 20,000 strong along with his 10,000 strong Silver Shields. These were supplemented by 5000 Greek mercenaries fighting as heavy infantry, commanded by Hipparchus, the Thessalian mercenary who had recently deserted to Antiochus. This gave the King 30,000 heavy infantry altogether. Ptolemy’s heavy units were his phalanx of 25,000 military settlers, his phalanx of Egyptian infantry, 20.000 strong, 8000 Greek mercenaries who fought as phalangites, and 3000 Libyan’s armed in the Macedonian fashion. This gave Ptolemy 56.000 heavy infantry, an overwhelming advantage over Antiochus in terms of sheer numbers – even if the quality of these hastily trained troops was still to be tested. Nonetheless, Antiochus was forced to face part of the Ptolemaic heavy infantry with light or medium contingents, either native troops or his recently acquired Arab allies, a fact that put him at a distinct disadvantage in the infantry fight.
Yet Antiochus enjoyed a slight edge in cavalry: 6000 horsemen to Ptolemy’s 5000. His greatest advantage was undoubtedly his 102 Indian elephants. Sixty elephants on his right wing were commanded by an officer named Philip who Polybius is described as Antiochus’ ‘foster brother’ (syntrophos) – presumably a man who had grown with Antiochus while serving as a royal page in the court of Seleucus II. The forty-two elephants on his left wing fell under the command of Myiscus, a former page now graduated into a military command. The presence of both these ex-pages in important commands suggests that Antiochus held full control of his court and could promote favourites to positions of honour and responsibility.
Ptolemy IV only had seventy-three elephants, forty on his left flank and thirty-three on his right. But Ptolemy’s elephants were African elephants, smaller and less aggressive than the Indian breed employed by Antiochus.9 These ‘African’ elephants were not the species of elephant that today lives in sub-Saharan Africa, and which are decidedly bigger and more aggressive than Indian elephants. Rather, Ptolemy employed a species of now-extinct bush elephant that lived in North Africa, and Antiochus had a distinct edge in both the quantity and aggressiveness of his elephant corps.
The quality of the troops also tilted in Antiochus’ favour. His army consisted of battle-hardened veterans victorious in the campaign against Molon, who had also performed well in the recent fighting in Koile Syria. Antiochus made only limited use of foreign mercenaries, who composed less than 10 per cent of his total force; mercenaries made up over 20 per cent of Ptolemy’s soldiers. Also, Antiochus planned to lead the cavalry charge on the right wing himself, and it seems he hoped Ptolemy would be present to counter him. He may have entertained hopes of personally challenging the rival king to a duel.10
The battle began with a clash of titans. According to Polybius, the elephants on both sides crashed into each other and grappled directly with their tusks, channelling their instinctual mating season duels for the purpose of human violence. The size and numbers of Antiochus’ two elephant battalions quickly scattered the Ptolemaic herd, and many of these were subsequently captured by Seleucid forces. Antiochus’ victorious elephants did not play a large role in the battle to come; only three were killed and two were mortally wounded.
Antiochus’ personal presence proved decisive on the Seleucid right flank, and his charging horsemen shattered the cavalry on Ptolemaic left. The young king, however, now made a critical tactical error. The correct action would have been to turn his horse and begin to roll up the Ptolemaic infantry formations on their exposed left flank. This was, admittedly, as Professor El’azar Galili has noted, easier said than done. Antiochus would have had to judge the disarray of the opposing cavalry to time his turning manoeuvre, and the collapsing Ptolemaic left may have been protected by the fortifications around its camp.
Antiochus, however, was not in a position to make calm or collected tactical decisions. Rather, he was on the front line of his cavalry charge, surrounded by the dust and gore. Carried away by the adrenaline rush of battle and perhaps his own lust for glory, he instead indulged in a full on pursuit of the fleeing Ptolemaic cavalry, perhaps hoping to catch Ptolemy IV among the fugitives.
Meanwhile, things were going badly on the Seleucid left. Ptolemy’s Greek mercenaries, 8000 heavy infantry, smashed through Antiochus’ Arab allies, leading to a complete collapse of the Seleucid left flank. The Ptolemaic commander in this sector, a mercenary captain named Echecrates, failed to turn and flank the Seleucid centre. At this point, each side had its left flank badly mauled. The heavy infantry on both sides, however, remained in the centre out of contact, and the clash of the two infantry lines would therefore decide the battle.
But Ptolemy IV had not fled to the rear with his scattered cavalry. Instead, he had drifted towards the centre of his main phalanx. Despite the setback suffered on his left flank, he was present at the centre of action just as the two heavy infantry formations collided together. He rallied his phalanx as it shoved its way forward, step by step. The superior mass of the Ptolemaic heavy infantry soon overwhelmed the Seleucid centre, and the entire Seleucid infantry line collapsed. Antiochus called off the pursuit too late to salvage the situation, and he had no choice but to retreat ingloriously with his men.
According to Polybius, Antiochus was ‘convinced that in his own share of the battle he was victorious, but that he had been altogether ruined by the sorry cowardice of others’.11 This view was unfair to his men, for Antiochus had failed them as a commander. He lost the battle of Raphia largely because he was trapped in the command philosophy of Alexander the Great, who practised what military historian John Keegan has called ‘heroic leadership’.12 Alexander sought action always at the front line, thus validating his claim to lead the warrior aristocracy of Macedonia. Yet this was a leadership strategy that was inherently risky, and Alexander was nearly killed in battle on multiple occasions. Both Alexander and Antiochus’ tendency to place themselves in the blood and chaos of the fray was dangerous in another respect: it greatly limited the ability to control the tactical evolution of a battle. In this case, it was the fleeing Ptolemy IV who found himself in the position to lead his army to victory, whereas the momentarily triumphant Antiochus sacrificed his control in order to run amok.
Antiochus lost some 10,000 infantry and 300 cavalry in the defeat, and another 4000 were captured; this represented nearly 20 per cent of his combat power. Ptolemy’s losses were light in comparison: 1500 infantry and 700 cavalry, although most of his elephant corps was captured.
After the conclusion of battle, Antiochus retreated with his army back into Syria and evacuated his garrisons in Koile Syria, which were quickly reoccupied by Ptolemaic forces. The defeated King worked energetically to establish a firm defence of southern Syria, concerned that Ptolemy IV might capitalize on their victory by entering the Seleucid homeland while his army was still in disarray. To his relief, ambassadors arrived offering peace terms. The proposed peace agreement reaffirmed the Ptolemaic claim to Koile Syria, but allowed Antiochus to maintain Seleucia Pieria. Thus, despite the humbling defeat at Raphia, Antiochus could still claim partial territorial gain in the war, although these gains essentially reestablished the status quo that existed from before the L
aodicean War.
Ptolemy IV had performed well at Raphia and was able to bask briefly in his victory. The Egyptian priests issued a decree to commemorate his victory, known today as the Raphia stele. In a symbol of unity, copies of the text were posted in Greek, demotic (Egyptian written with the Greek alphabet), and hieroglyphics. The best-preserved copy depicts Ptolemy as an Egyptian pharaoh, though mounted upon a horse in Macedonian manner, rather than atop the chariot Egyptian pharaohs traditionally rode. Grovelling beneath Ptolemy is the miserable Antiochus, depicted as a bound captive begging for mercy. The scene recalls the Egyptian myth in which the pharaoh god Horus defeats, captures and castrates Seth, the god of chaos, in an epic cosmic battle. The inscription celebrated Ptolemy’s victory, although it was not particularly interested in capturing the historical details. Like traditional Egyptian battle narratives, it sought to represent the defeat as effortlessly inflicted upon a miserable and unworthy enemy by a pharaoh engaged in personal combat:
On the first day of the month of Pachon, in the fifth year [of his reign] he marched out from Pelusium and fought with King Antiochus at a town called Raphia near the frontier of Egypt…On the tenth day of the same month he defeated him in a great and splendid manner. Those of his enemies who in the course of this fight drew close to him he slew himself, even as in the past Horus, the son of Isis, had done with his foes. He pressed Antiochus so closely that he was obliged to throw away his diadem and his royal cloak. He fled with his bodyguard and only a few stayed with him after his defeat in a miserable and sad manner. The greater number of his soldiers suffered severe want. He saw the best of his friends perish in a miserable fashion. They suffered hunger and thirst. Everything that he left behind him was seized as booty. Only with the greatest exertion was he able to reach his home, and he suffered bitter grief.13
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