Command and control
Scipio Africanus, whose tactical brilliance was expected to carry the day, fell ill in the weeks prior to the battle, and Lucius Scipio commanded at Magnesia without the benefit of his brother’s proven military genius. He did rely on the tactical experience of King Eumenes II, who commanded the combined cavalry, as well as that of an energetic legate, Domitius Ahenobarbus, given control of the Roman right. The Ahenobarbi were a prominent Roman family, and their prestige would only increase over the course of the republic and early empire (the emperor Nero was an Ahenobarbus by birth). After the battle, partisans of the Ahenobarbi credited Domitius with the victory, a political move made easier by Lucius’s subsequent trial for embezzlement and expulsion from the senate in 184 BC. Nonetheless, Lucius Scipio was fully in command, and his dispositions suggest military competence, if not brilliance.12
The Great King personally commanded his army, aided by his most loyal and experienced lieutenants. He positioned himself on his right wing, accompanied by 1000 troops of the royal agema, talented Iranian horsemen from Media. The King’s son and designated successor, Seleucus, commanded the left wing, presumably with 1000 horsemen of the royal cavalry as his bodyguard. Young Seleucus had with him an older cousin and mentor Antipater, who had fought with Antiochus at Raphia and Panium.13 The Seleucid centre was entrusted to Zeuxis, Antiochus’ most experienced general, and to Minnio, described as Antiochus’ ‘first friend’ (princeps amicorum or protos philos). The elephantarchos Philip assumed responsibility for the twenty-two elephants assigned to support the main phalanx.14
The weather disadvantaged Antiochus. Rain and heavy mists coming off the rivers affected the bowstrings of many of Antiochus’ archers, and fog may have prevented the King from effectively controlling his lengthy battle line; the shorter line of L. Scipio would have been easier to manage under such conditions of limited visibility.15
Battle
Like Darius III before him, Antiochus opened the attack by deploying his scythed chariots. These were relatively novel weapons to the Romans, but Eumenes, stationed among the cavalry on the left, prepared a hasty but effective countermeasure. He sent forward Cretan archers, slingers, and other light infantry of the Pergamenese contingent to snipe at the horses and drivers of the Seleucid chariots, actions that quickly drove the chariots back to their own side. Trying to move back to the Seleucid rear, the panicked teams caused considerable confusion among the cavalry on the Seleucid left.
On the Seleucid right, the heavy cataphracts commanded by the Great King made a spirited assault, assisted by the elite Silver Shields. The heavy cavalry smashed through the open order formation of the legionaries, and the Romans were forced back toward their camp, where they were rallied by the efforts of an energetic military tribune named Aemilius Lepidus.16 Reinforced by the Thracian and Macedonian camp guard, the Roman left wing reformed on the ramparts of the camp, still hard pressed by the cavalry and Silver Shields.
With the battle going in his favour, Antiochus again became caught in the thick of the fighting, and in the process lost his own situational awareness in the fog of war. Pressing toward the Roman camp with the enemy in disarray, he did not know of the major setback on his left flank.
The Seleucid left
Eumenes II, commanding the Roman cavalry as well as his own squadron of 800 Attalid horsemen, realized that the kairos, or ‘right moment’, had arrived. Seeing that the retreating chariots had spooked the cavalry across from him, he ordered a cavalry charge. The Roman and Attalid horse quickly infiltrated the disorganized ranks of the Seleucid cataphracts, and those who fell from their horses wallowed helplessly in their heavy mail suits until they were dispatched. Instead of pursuing the retreating enemy, the Roman cavalry wheeled around to focus on the increasingly denuded flank of the main infantry phalanx. Eumenes II rolled up the Cappadocians and Galatians screening the left flank of the Seleucid phalanx, although his horsemen were unable to penetrate the bristling hedgehog of pikes.
The Seleucid centre
By now the Roman legions and Seleucid phalanx had closed, and the light troops screening both formations hastened to make a withdrawal to the rear. The hastati of the legion paused to pepper the stalled phalangites with javelins, targeting the elephants Antiochus had positioned to the front of the phalanx. The Roman army contained at least 5000 veterans of Scipio Africanus’ Libyan campaign, men who were familiar with fighting Hannibal’s war-elephants.17 They knew to run to the side and aim their javelins into the soft underbelly of the animal, or to run behind and hamstring it with their gladii.
Goading the beasts with swords and javelins had a significant effect. Several of the elephants in front ranks of the phalanx panicked. While elephant mahouts were equipped with spiked clubs to dispatch the beast if it threatened friendly ranks, the rampaging elephants managed to wreak havoc on the front ranks, confusion and destruction that rippled through the densely packed phalanx.
As long as the soldiers maintained their discipline and calm, the defensive front of the Seleucid phalanx was impenetrable. With shields tightly packed and pikes bristling forward, they remained invincible even against the most determined Roman swordsman. What use was the Roman’s 26-inch gladius against a 16-foot pike?18 Against an intact phalanx, the Roman infantry could do little more than stand just out of range, hurling javelins and insults.
The gaps opened by the stampede of a few wounded elephants, however, compromised the entire formation. The creatures, agonized by javelin pricks and sword gashes, bowled through the ranks, and Roman swordsmen swirled in between the discombobulated phalangites. Once they closed to fight hand to hand, the Roman soldier enjoyed an immense advantage over his Seleucid counterpart: he had a larger shield, a longer sword, and training that emphasized individual combat.19 As small groups of men of Roman infantrymen carved a way through the ranks of the phalanx, the entire formation disintegrated into a chaotic mass. The collapse of the phalanx ended the battle, and a rout ensued. This confusion and chaos swept over the King himself, who until then believed his most glorious victory was at hand.
Livy reports the Seleucid casualties at 53,000 dead: 50,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry.20 This implausible number may be pure invention, and it is usually dismissed as such by modern military historians. It is highly unlikely that the Romans had the physical stamina to pursue and kill 50,000 men. While the phalanx had been enveloped by Eumenes’ charge, the rest of the Selucid army was in a position to escape once the retreat began.
Assuming that Livy took the figure from a more reliable source like Polybius, the 53,000 may reflect the initial ‘missing in action’ report in the immediate aftermath of the battle. Under this hypothesis, Antiochus rallied his forces to find a residual of only 19,000 men, and this quick calculation would indeed imply 53,000 casualties. But many soldiers fled the crumbling battleline and subsequently made their way back to homes in Anatolia or Syria; some fugitives would have eventually returned to the ranks.
There is no way to determine the actual number of Seleucid dead, but it was significant: possibly as many as 20,000 Seleucid soldiers perished at Magnesia. In addition, the Romans captured 1500 prisoners. Scipio’s initial casualty report returned 349 dead, although wounded men continued to perish in the battle’s aftermath.21
Aftermath
After the Battle of Magnesia, Lucius Scipio occupied Sardis and easily secured the citadel Antiochus had taken with great difficulty nearly twenty years earlier.22 Antiochus attempted to rally his shattered army, but soon realized the gravity of his situation. Critical murmurs found their way back to the King, as reported by the historian Appian:
…his friends began to blame him for plunging headfirst into the dispute with the Romans, and for the incompetence and lack of judgement that he had displayed from the start…. They disparaged him in this most recent folly for rendering the strongest part of his army in such a narrow spot, and pinning his hopes on a huge rabble of green troops. (Appian, Syrian Wars, 37)
&n
bsp; The defeats at Thermopylae and Magnesia had already cost Antiochus too much political capital, and such bankruptcy made him a likely target for assassination by disgruntled courtiers. A peace treaty with the Romans was the best option to quickly end the war.
The King dispatched a messenger named Musaios to make initial diplomatic contact with the Romans. The envoy received an audience with L. Scipio and requested safe passage for an embassy to enter the Roman camp for the purposes of peace negotiations. Scipio consented, and Antiochus sent two trusted advisors: the general Zeuxis and his nephew Antipater. These two met privately with King Eumenes, in order to ensure that he would not use his pull with the Romans to sabotage their mission. Eumenes, having picked the winning side, was magnanimous to the Seleucid ambassadors, given that he already expected increased influence in Asia Minor as a by-product of the peace. Shortly afterward, Zeuxis and Antipater met with Lucius Scipio’s military council, a group that included his legates, military tribunes, and senior centurions. After Zeuxis and Antipater spoke requesting peace and alliance, the consul’s brother Africanus, having recovered from his illness, laid down the terms of such a peace:
They must withdraw from Europe and from the whole of Asia on the near side of the Taurus. He must pay 15,000 Euboean talents to cover the expenses of the war, 500 immediately and 2500 once the people had ratified the treaty, and the rest in twelve annual payments of 1000 talents. He must pay Eumenes 400 talents he previously owed him and the undelivered grain according his treaty with his father (Attalus I). In addition he was to give up Hannibal the Carthaginian, Thoas the Aetolian, Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, and Philo and Eubulidas the Chalcidians. As a token of faith, Antiochus will immediately hand over twenty stipulated hostages. (Polybius 21.17.3–9)
Zeuxis and Antipater accepted Scipio’s peace offer. The treaty needed to be ratified in Rome, following the approval of the Roman senate and an official vote by the Roman assembly. Across the east, communities sent envoys to Rome to make sure the resulting treaty accommodated their interests.
L. Scipio’s command ended at the end of 190, and in 189 he was replaced by Manlius Vulso. The new consul, eager for his own military glory, launched an unprovoked assault against the Galatians, on the feeble pretext that they had been allies of Antiochus. Vulso gained his glory, along with huge quantities of booty and a forced indemnity from Galatian communities. But this Gaul-bashing also was a political statement. Hellenistic kings, from Antigonus Gonatas of Macedonia to Antiochus I, had used victory over the Gauls to legitimize their right to rule. Now, with his own victory over the Gallic enemy, Vulso likewise sought to legitimize the new Roman hegemony in the Hellenistic East.
Following the terms of the proposed armistice, the Scipios required Antiochus to provide Roman armies with rations while the peace treaty awaited ratification in Rome. The King sent his oldest living son, Seleucus, to Vulso’s camp near Antioch-in-Pisidia to deliver the rations, but a dispute quickly arose. Seleucus insisted that he would provide rations only to the Roman soldiers, and not the 1500 Attalid troops attached to the Roman army. While the amount of grain needed to feed these troops was relatively small when compared with the rations of 25,000 Romans, it was a humiliation for a Seleucid prince to play grocery-man to the soldiers of an Attalid king. Vulso sternly informed young Seleucus that he would accept no rations for his own forces until grain was delivered to the Attalid allies. Realizing that he was in danger of jeopardizing the terms of the peace, Seleucus acquiesced, thus bowing to the new reality of Roman military dominance.23
Meanwhile, Antiochus attempted to carry on as the king of his realm, exercising his routine powers as he had done before the defeat. In 189 BC, he appointed a new chief-priest (archieros) to the sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis at Daphne, one of the leading holy places in the empire.24 It was through this sort of routine patronage and benefaction that Antiochus held the best hope of restoring his political position after such a crushing military defeat
The King also had to remedy a problem with refugees: what to do with the Aetolians and Euboeans who had supported him and now found life untenable in the wake of the Seleucid defeat. The late Roman historian Orosius (a contemporary of Augustine), reports that Antiochus settled an island on the Orontes River near Antioch, filling it with Aetolians, Euboeans, and Cretans. While Orosius does not provide a date for this action, it should be placed after the end of the Roman war, intended to provide homes for Aetolian and Euboean collaborators, as well as discharged Cretan mercenaries.25
In 188 BC, Manlius Vulso returned from his Galatian adventure, boasting of actions that freed the cities of Asia Minor from a pressing Gallic threat. In reality, however, he did little more than cause a great deal of senseless misery and enrich himself and his soldiers with Gallic treasure. On returning to Apamea, he discovered that Antiochus had diligently forwarded a payment of 1500 talents as well as a shipment of grain. This cash payment was a full 1000 talents short of the amount stipulated by the Scipios, and so Vulso dispatched his brother with a legion to demand the remaining sum. The pro-consul also learned that a Seleucid garrison still held in the city of Perga, nearly two years after the battle of Magnesia. The garrison commander asked for a month to clarify his orders, and the request was granted. On the thirtieth day, the last Seleucid troops in Asia Minor obediently evacuated the citadel. This Seleucid archophylax’s obstinate insistence on holding his position nearly two years after the defeat reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of the Seleucid empire; on one hand, it is a reminder of the administrative and logistical difficulties in managing so many far-flung posts. On the other, it was men like this stubborn garrison commander, oblivious to the catastrophe surrounding him, who held the Seleucid Empire together through its various political crises.26
Finally, after the Seleucid and Attalid envoys had spent a year petitioning the Roman senate, the peace treaty was formally promulgated in 188 BC. Polybius records the terms nearly verbatim, giving the modern reader unusual insight into the mechanics of an ancient peace:
The peace of Apamea (Polybius 21.42, LCL)
There shall be friendship between Antiochus and the Romans for all time if he fulfils the conditions of the treaty.
King Antiochus and his subjects shall not permit the passage through their territory of any enemy marching against the Romans and their allies or furnish such enemy with any supplies. The Romans and their allies engage to act likewise toward Antiochus and his subjects.
Antiochus shall not make war on the inhabitants of the islands or of Europe. He shall evacuate all cities, lands, villages, and forts on this side of Taurus as far as the river Halys and all between the valley of Taurus and the mountain ridges that descend to Lycaonia.
*[With the stroke of a pen, Antiochus ceded his long standing territorial claims to Asia Minor.]
From all such places he is to carry away nothing except the arms borne by his soldiers, and if anything has been carried away, it is to be restored to the same city. He shall not receive either soldiers or others from the kingdom of Eumenes.
*[Antiochus is required to evacuate Asia Minor of troops, although these are permitted leave under arms. Booty must be returned to pillaged communities. He is not allowed to accept deserters from Attalid armies.]
If there be any men in the army of Antiochus coming from the cities which the Romans take over, he shall deliver them up at Apamea. If there be any from the kingdom of Antiochus dwelling with the Romans and their allies, they may remain or depart at their good pleasure: Antiochus and his subjects shall give up the slaves of the Romans and of their allies, and any prisoners of war they have taken, if there be such.
*[The military levies from now ex-Seleucid territories must be allowed to return home. The Romans are not obliged to return Seleucid deserters. Antiochus must return Roman POWs and any escaped Roman slaves taking refuge in his army.]
Antiochus shall give up, if it be in his power, Hannibal son of Hamilcar, the Carthaginian,27 Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, Thoas the Aeto
lian, Eubulidas and Philo the Chalcidians, and all Aetolians who have held public office. He shall surrender all the elephants now in Apamea and not keep any in future.
*[Antiochus must surrender key collaborators to the Romans. The most notable of these was Hannibal, who did not wait for Antiochus to hand him over. He fled, instead, and found shelter with Prusias, the King of Bithynia. In 183, the Romans pressed Prusias to surrender Hannibal, who in despair committed suicide.]
He shall surrender his long ships with their gear and tackle and in future he shall not possess more than ten decked ships of war, nor shall he have any galley rowed by more than thirty oars, nor a skiff to serve in any war in which he is the aggressor.
His ships shall not sail beyond the Calycadnus and the Sarpedonian promontory unless conveying tribute, envoys or hostages.
*[These two clauses utterly dashed Antiochus’ ambition to reassert Seleucid naval power in the Aegean Sea.]
Antiochus shall not have permission to hire mercenaries from the lands under the rule of the Romans, or to receive fugitives.
[This clause was aimed primarily at the Seleucid practice of hiring Galatatian mercenaries. It was widely flouted by Antiochus’ successors, who continued to use Galatians in their armies.]
All houses that belonged to the Rhodians and their allies in the dominions of Antiochus shall remain their property as they were before he made war on them likewise if any money is owing to them they may exact payment, and if anything has been abstracted from them it shall be sought for and returned: merchandise meant for Rhodes shall be free from duties as before the war.
*[Refers to property of Rhodian citizens seized by the King after the outbreak of hostilities with the island.]
If any of the cities which Antiochus has to give up have been given by him to others, he shall withdraw from these also the garrisons and the men in possession of them and if any cities afterward wish to desert to him, he shall not receive them.
Antiochus the Great Page 18