Year Zero: Berlin 1945

by David McCormack

  Like a gigantic coiled spring, the two massive Soviet Fronts tensed themselves to unleash their pent up energy. The only thing holding them back was the weather which was unseasonably mild and wet. On 8 January, the forecasters predicted that colder weather promising firmer going was expected in Poland. This came as good news to Stalin, as only two days before, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had sent an urgent message requesting an acceleration of Soviet offensive plans in order to relieve the burden on the Western Front. Without delay, Stalin charged his head of operations, General Aleksei Antonov with making the necessary arrangements for the accelerated offensive schedule with the front commanders. Whist this late change made Stalin appear more than accommodating, it placed a huge strain on already overstretched logistic services. The planned Vistula-Oder and East Prussian operations would now have to be launched consecutively rather than simultaneously. Notwithstanding, the difficulties caused by the speeding up of his offensive timetable, Stalin could be well satisfied that the Allies would look favourably on his willingness to come to their aid.

  On 12 January 1945, Konev launched his assault from the Baranow bridgehead against General Fritz-Hubert Graeser's 4th Panzer Army. Poor weather had grounded his aircraft, yet despite this setback he remained confident of victory. On the first day of the offensive, Konev's mechanised forces made good progress. However, the pace slackened as German resistance stiffened in the Kielce-Chmielnik area. Reacting quickly, Konev committed some of his mechanised reserves. These additional forces then enabled him to achieve a breakthrough into open country. On 17 January, the Warte was crossed, opening the way to the conquest of the valuable industrial area around Katowice. Konev intentionally left the German forces a 'Golden Bridge' as an escape route, thus ensuring that the mines and factories would be taken intact.

  To the north, Zhukov launched his main attack from the Magnuszew bridgehead on 14 January, two days after Konev's attack. The assault was preceded by a thunderous artillery barrage which as General Vasily Chuikov noted, 'Made the earth heave and shake as if in fever'. In total, some 315,000 rounds were dumped on positions occupied by the German 9th Army. The attack went in immediately after the barrage was lifted, and quickly succeeded in opening up gaps in the German defence. By the end of the first day, forward elements had crossed the Pilica. A twelve kilometre deep wedge had been driven into the German lines.

  Zhukov's secondary attack launched from the Pulawy bridgehead was even more of a success, with troops crossing the Zwolenka and penetrating German defences up to a depth of twenty-two kilometres on the first day. As German forces were locked into a battle for Radom, General Heinz Guderian warned Hitler that the Eastern Front could not hold out without major reinforcements. There were none forthcoming, Hitler making it clear that for the time being, the Eastern Front would have to take care of itself. On 15 January, Soviet fighter-bombers and anti-tank units broke up a determined German counter-attack by the 19th and 25th Panzer Divisions aimed at relieving the shattered remnants facing the Magnuszew bridgehead. After successfully blunting the German attack, Zhukov's troops broke out to threaten the Polish capital. Like a steamroller, the advance crushed everything in its path, General Kurt von Tippelskirch reporting that, 'Units of the 9th Army still holding on the Vistula near Warsaw and south of it were in grave danger'. The shattered Polish capital would fall to the Red Army within days.

  Hitler responded to the loss of Warsaw by lashing out at his own commanders. He was wholly convinced that German reverses on the battlefront were due to a lack of will. To remedy this situation, he sought to impose his own iron will upon the crumbling Eastern Front by increasingly interfering in the conduct of operations. This irrational approach robbed the German defence of tactical flexibility. By insisting on holding onto ground everywhere, Hitler doomed his defending formations to encirclement and destruction.

  Whilst Hitler's behaviour becoming ever more irrational, Stalin's became increasingly cautious. For the supreme Soviet warlord, the fruits of victory appeared to be tumbling into his hands too quickly. Stalin was conscious that defeat had been snatched from the jaws of victory during the Battle of Warsaw in 1920. As such, he was determined that overconfidence should not once more lead to disaster. A Stavka (Soviet High Command) directive issued on 17 January redefined the objectives for the two main fronts involved in the Berlin Strategic Operation. Zhukov's front was to secure the Poznan-Bydgozcz line no later than 2-4 February. Meanwhile, Konev's forces were to advance towards Breslau, reaching the River Oder no later than 30 January. However, events soon overtook the latest directive.

  The collapsing German battlefront reduced 4th Panzer Army and 9th Army to a drifting mass of men. Thousands of beleaguered troops organised themselves into 'Roving Cauldrons' in an attempt to hold off the Red Army and gain the comparative safety of the reorganised German lines. On 20 January, forward elements of Konev's forces crossed the German frontier at Namslau. Two days later, 5th Guards Tank Army seized a bridgehead on the western bank of the Oder near Oppeln. The following night, 16th Guards Mechanised Brigade reached the Oder north of Steinau. By the evening of 23 January, Bromberg had been cleared of German troops, thereby opening the road into Hitler's Reich.

  Caution dominated Stalin's thinking again on 25 January, following an intimation by Zhukov that he intended to continue his advance towards Kustrin. Stalin expressed concern that this advance would widen the gap between the two advancing fronts. Notwithstanding the supreme warlord's concerns, Zhukov went on to persuasively argue his case, pointing out that by delaying, 'It will become more difficult to penetrate the Miedzyrzecz fortified line'. Stalin agreed to think things over. Meanwhile, events took over following the capture of a group of German officers and men by a reconnaissance group from 1st Guards Tank Army. Interrogation of the prisoners revealed that the line was not yet fully manned and that units were still in the process of moving in to fill the gaps. After appraising Stalin of the situation, Zhukov was given permission to continue his advance, with the proviso that he safeguard his right flank. German resistance was quickly overcome. The last major water obstacle before Berlin was now in Zhukov's sights.

  On 31 January, forward elements of General Nikolai Bezarin's 5th Shock Army crossed the frozen Oder to take the village of Kienitz by surprise. Over the course of the day, more units crossed over and expanded the initial lodgement to a width of six kilometres and a depth of two-and-a-half kilometres. Further reinforcements arrived in the form of a motorised battalion of the 219th Tank Brigade. The fragile ice on the river rendered the movement of armoured reinforcements impossible. As such, the lodgement remained vulnerable to counter-attack, however there were no major German formations available to clear up the Soviet bridgehead. An ad-hoc infantry-tank combat group was quickly assembled for an attack against the bridgehead. The attack launched on 1 February was supported by the teenage gunners of the 211th Flak Regiment who laid down a barrage. By sheer chance the attack turned into a meeting engagement as the advancing German troops and armour stumbled into a Soviet attack being launched at the same time. The German assault lost momentum and stalled. Thereafter, the Luftwaffe was responsible for attempting to reduce the Soviet bridgehead.

  Air attacks on Kienitz continued, with the harbour area being given special attention by dive bombers. Those who could, fled. Some inhabitants managed to make it to relative safety in the nearby villages of Wriezen and Ortwig. Many others tried to escape from the harbour area, but were killed in the heavy aerial bombardments. Kustrin had barely been declared a fortress, when elements of the Soviet 219th Tank Brigade burst into the Neustadt on 31 January. The attempt to take Kustrin by storm failed after three Lend-Lease Shermans and a Valentine were destroyed. General Chuikov then elected to lay siege to the so-called gateway to Berlin.

  In early February, there were unmistakable signs that German resistance was stiffening. German garrisons continued to hold out stubbornly in Thorn, Schneidemuhl and Poznan. Soviet radio intercepts also began picking up
increased signals traffic from 11th SS Army and 3rd Panzer Army that appeared to indicate an imminent counter-thrust from East Pomerania and Silesia. The Stavka recognised the danger and subsequently ordered Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front to clear German forces from Pomerania and advance as far as Stettin.

  On the night of 31 January, rain began to fall along the central sector of the Oder line. Over the following days, an early thaw set in, melting the snow and ice. In Berlin, chief press aide at the Propaganda Ministry, Wilfred von Oven, noted how the sudden change in the weather signalled a change for the better in the threatening situation in the east. His diary entry for 1 February has a distinctly optimistic tone :

  The formerly threatening situation before Berlin has changed in our favour literally overnight. The splashing in the gutters sounds to our ears like the choirs of angels. The Oder and the Warthe, and the marshes of those two rivers and the Netze, together with a multitude of little water-courses have become obstacles which enable us to concentrate our defence on the threatened sectors.

  The Oder ice melted at a satisfying rate, prompting Himmler to talk of a 'miracle'. The Germans themselves contributed to speeding up the process by using explosives. The thaw turned dirt roads in western Poland into quagmires, further disrupting the flow of supplies to the Soviet fronts, whose logistical umbilical cord was already stretched to the limit. The thaw gave Hitler a moat and above all bought time in which the defences on the crucial central sector could be bolstered.

  On 3 February, von Oven noted with some satisfaction the progress being made with defensive preparations during the unseasonably mild weather, 'The thaw continues, mild spring air wafts through the streets of Berlin, and everywhere we are working energetically to build anti-tank obstacles and emplacements for the anti-tank guns'. That morning, the Americans attacked Berlin with a force of 1000 B-17 bombers and 575 P-51 Mustang fighters. This heavy raid destroyed large areas of Friedrichstadt, Luisenstadt, Kreuzberg, Mitte and Friedrichshain. In Mitte, the flooded air-raid shelter at the Adlon Hotel was crowded with Foreign Ministry officials. Press officer Hans Georg von Studnitz recorded his impressions of the raid :

  The attack began at 10.45 am. and ended at 12.30. The Adlon shelter is a foot deep in water which has leaked through from the melting snow above. Many people had to wade about underground for two hours in icy water. Under the heavy explosions the massive shelter swayed and shivered like the cellar of an ordinary house. Finally all the lights went out and we felt that we had been buried alive.

  The bombs used in the raid were mostly high explosive types. Fires raged in some areas for four days. This was the nearest Berlin ever came to experiencing a fire storm.

  Meanwhile, back at the battlefront, the anticipated German counter-attack (code-named Operation Solstice) was launched on 16 February. Despite intelligence gained from radio intercepts, Zhukov lacked detailed information regarding the attack's timing and objectives. Consequently, the assault made by the 11th SS Panzergrenadier Division achieved complete tactical surprise, resulting in a break-through to Arnswalde and the relief of its beleaguered garrison. Hot on the heels of this early success, elements of 11th SS Panzer Army attacked the following day and recaptured Pyritz. However, the hastily assembled and relatively inexperienced units committed to the attack failed to consolidate their early gains. Consequently, the attack lost momentum, due to a combination of stubborn Soviet resistance and the thaw which had turned the battlefield into a quagmire.

  On 17 February, General Walter Wenck was seriously injured in a car accident whilst returning to the front after a meeting with Hitler in Berlin. The loss of this dynamic commander was a severe blow as he had led the attack with characteristic skill and vigour. His replacement, General Hans Krebs ordered the attack to continue, but the initiative had been lost. Following the costly failure of Operation Solstice, all the signs pointed to an impending drive on Berlin by Zhukov and Konev's fronts. Unbeknown to the German High Command, their hastily conceived offensive had an impact on Soviet operational thinking which was totally out of proportion with the results achieved on the battlefield. The surprise German attack prompted the Stavka into considering the need to clear the flanks before launching their drive on Berlin. Between 17-22 February, Zhukov and Rokossovsky received orders to launch a joint attack aimed at Kolberg, Danzig and Gydnia. Rokossovsky attacked on 24 February, and within two days had smashed the German defences along a fifty kilometre front, penetrating to a depth of forty-five kilometres. Zhukov attacked northwards on 1 March, perplexing German planners who expected a full-blooded drive on Berlin. By 5 March, his forces had reached Stargard and Kolberg.

  For Hitler, the Red Army's halt on the River Oder signalled a lifeline. Surely the west would come to its senses and realise that the Soviet Union was the real enemy? Wiser heads dismissed Hitler's assertions as sheer fantasy. Guderian saw the lull for what it was - a temporary reprieve. There was however still much to be gained from what little time there was left. For Guderian, replacing the dilettante commander of Army Group Vistula was a priority. Himmler had been an abject failure. His dreams of winning the coveted Knights Cross had come to nothing. In the event, Guderian experienced little trouble in persuading Himmler to relinquish his command. His successor, Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici was a man of a different stripe.

  Heinrici was a noted expert in defence who had achieved considerable success whilst commanding 1st Panzer Army in Hungary. To hold back the massive Red Army forces building up on the Oder, he had at his disposal General Hasso von Manteuffel's 3rd Panzer Army and General Theodor Busse's 9th Army. Between them, these two formations covered a front of 281 kilometres stretching from the Baltic coast to the confluence of the Oder and the Neisse in Silesia. Heinrici's strongest formation was Busse's 9th Army which had succeeded in maintaining communications with Kustrin along a single narrow corridor.

  Heinrici's command did not get off to a good start, as a hastily prepared attack launched towards Kustrin on Hitler's orders ended in a costly failure. The most high profile casualty of the Kustrin débâcle was Guderian who was sacked on 28 March after a particularly stormy Fuhrer conference. Despite Guderian's dismissal, Heinrici still succeeded in gaining approval for a multi-layered defence of the eastern approaches to Berlin. Within a few short weeks, this exceptional defensive tactician and organiser worked miracles in transforming the German defences along the crucial central sector on the Seelow Heights. Heinrici was determined that Zhukov's forces would face a hard fight to secure the easterly approaches to Berlin.

  Chapter Three

  Youthful Indifference – Brigitte Eicke

  In Hitler's Germany, the isolation of the Jewish community was accomplished within two years of the regime coming to power. Even before the promulgation of the Nuremberg laws for the protection of 'Blood and Honour' in 1935, Jews were already being shunned and marginalised. The so-called 'Night of the Broken Glass' in 1938 forever blurred the boundaries between persecutors and bystanders. To some degree, it is possible to understand the apathy of bystanders who saw their Jewish classmates, colleagues and neighbours disappear. Nazi Germany was a totalitarian state which imposed strict codes of conduct upon its regimented population. In his seminal book Perpetrators Victims Bystanders, historian Raul Hilberg noted that, 'It was difficult to revolt against established order in a society where people were more likely to revolt against revolution'. For every Fritz Elsas there were perhaps a thousand people whose daily concerns were far more important to them than the knowledge that murder was being carried out in their name.

  Berlin teenager Brigitte Eicke began writing a diary in December 1942. She didn't share Anne Frank's ambitions to be a writer, her diary simply being a means to practice her shorthand skills as she trained to be a secretary. Nonetheless, her record is an authentic document of life in a world torn apart by war. Whilst Anne's diary is a beautifully crafted tragedy written in a novelistic style, Brigitte adopts a more matter-of-fact approach. By juxtaposing the
ir diary entries, it is possible to bring into focus the sharp contrast in their daily lives :

  Brigitte Eicke – 13 January 1943

  Mother whined as usual, there are some days when we get on terribly.

  Anne Frank – 13 January 1943

  Outside it is terrible. Day and night the poor people are being dragged away, with nothing more than a rucksack and a little money... there's nothing more for us to do than to wait as quietly as possible for the end of our misery. The Jews wait, the Christians wait, and many more wait for their death.

  Brigitte Eicke – 11 May 1944

  Went in BDM uniform to the Admiralspalast to see Madame Butterfly. It was wonderful, my first opera.

  Anne Frank – 11 May 1944

  After the war I definitely want to publish a book with the title 'The House Behind'. It is questionable whether it will appear, but my diary will serve as the basis.

  Brigitte Eicke – 20 July 1944

  Sunned myself on the roof. Failed assassination attempt on the Fuhrer. In the night we heard the speeches of the Fuhrer, Doenitz and Goering. Wonderful.

  Anne Frank – 20 July 1944

  Great news! There was an assassination attempt on Hitler... Sadly 'divine providence' saved the Führer’s life and he survived with a few grazes and scorch wounds.