by Sheri Fink
Interview with Christina Schmitz published in MSF’s magazine, Ins and Outs, Volume 7 number 9, November/December, 1995 (reports that MSF had thirteen local staff and collaborated with about 130 local medical staff; describes how she locked the shelter door assuming they’d be back the next day).
Rohde, Endgame, pp. 137–169, covers the events of July 11; Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, p. 288, provides a beautiful and chilling description of the NATO air strikes.
van Laerhoven, Bob, Srebrenica, Chapter 5 (transcript of interview with Ilijaz not long after the time of the attacks).
Documents
U.N. Srebrenica Report, sections: 297–301 (confusion over air support requests morning of July 11), 302–303 (resumption of attack on Srebrenica on July 11 and shelling of Dutchbat B Company), 304 (Serb forces enter Srebrenica), 305–306 (NATO air strikes and the decision to halt them), 308 (“very easy target”)
MSF unpublished documents: MSF Srebrenica final situation report covering July 6–21, 1995 (decision to evacuate hospital, locals invoke Vukovar; MSF’s evacuation from Srebrenica); MSF security plans (e.g., 1994 plan by Isabel Ollieuz); MSF telexes on July 11 with information on number of patients and people (65/30,000) in Potočari.
Hospital documents: Hospital staff list, “Spisak radnike u Opštoj bolnici u Srebrenici,” March 7, 1994, lists 125 local hospital workers.
Krstić judgment describes panic in Potočari.
Other Materials
Film, The Fall of Srebrenica, 1996 with footage of people fleeing was used to describe the scene. Video taken by Belgrade TV journalist Zoran Petrović (including missing pieces broadcast on Dutch IKON TV April 11, 2002, and viewable on the Website domovina.net).
Notes
PAGE 290 The yard of Srebrenica Hospital… The mysterious fog in the sky and the inhabitants’ widespread belief that it was the work of NATO were described by several of the inhabitants interviewed and mentioned in the situation report Christina sent to MSF Belgrade at 06:51 UTC. The NIOD (III/6/18) asserts that the phenomenon was in fact caused by Bosnian Serbs, ordered by Gen. Ratko Mladić to set fire to haystacks, creating a smokescreen to to obscure potential targets.
PAGE 290 In Zagreb, Croatia… It is also notable that while Karremans expected air strikes (one of two air options; it had to be initiated by higher levels of the U.N. command structure and would not have been as dependent on moment-to-moment action on the ground), only close air support was ever on the table. Close air support required a target list with smoking guns. To this day, there is confusion over why Karremans apparently believed that air strikes were coming, when no such option had been decided upon at higher levels (Zagreb, Sarajevo) of UNPROFOR command.
PAGE 292 “What do you want?” This exchange is presented as Ilijaz recalled it.
PAGE 293 “Christina,” he begins… This interchange is presented as it was recounted by the translator, Damir Ibrahimović, who later survived the fall of Srebrenica by walking through the woods to Tuzla. Christina did not recall the specific conversation, but agreed that she wouldn’t have guaranteed anyone’s protection.
PAGE 293 “No,” she answers. In some security crises, local staff members of humanitarian agencies have preferred to remain in their homes with their families.
PAGE 294 Another local aid worker… These interchanges were recalled in detail by the local aid worker (Muhamed Duraković), but only in general terms by Christina, who said that she feared misuse of the telex for military purposes. Interviewed years after the incident, Dr. Daniel O’Brien also could not recall having been asked for morphine, but was almost certain that nothing but pentazocine remained in the medical stocks.
PAGES 294–295 Ilijaz crosses the street… Roughly a half dozen hospital staff were interviewed about the meeting and recalled it, but each had different memories of when it occurred and what was said by whom. Ilijaz insists that he advised men to go through the woods and women who hadn’t been part of the military to seek refuge at the Dutchbat compound. Someone else recalls him advocating a different position. This telling reflects the various opinions that were expressed.
PAGE 297 “Come on,” he says. This is Ilijaz’s version of the exchange. Naim recalls telling Ilijaz, “We have a 1 percent chance if we go to the forest, but if we go to Potočari, we haven’t got any chance.”
PAGE 304 They go back out. The account of Boro’s entry into Srebrenica is based entirely on his recollections.
CHAPTER 28: HEGIRA
Note
The account of the doctors’ exodus through the woods took Ilijaz Pilav’s personal recollections as a base, related in dozens of interviews. Interviews with others who traveled with him, including Naim, Fatima, Ajka, Nijaz, Avdo, Dževad, HadŽo, Asim and Hakija, confirmed many of the details. Their memories were checked against other accounts, and the timing of certain events had to be estimated. People’s recollections of a time when they were suffering from extreme stress and prolonged sleep deprivation will undoubtedly have many errors, particularly in terms of the sequence of events, so this chapter must be viewed as a best approximation of what actually happened.
Interviews
Ajka Avdić, Dr. Dževad Džananović, Hadžo Gadžo, Dr. Avdo Hasanović Dr. Fatima Klempić-Dautbašić, Dr. Gerry Kremer, Asim Lučanin, Stephane Oberreit, Dr. Daniel O’Brien, Hakija Meholjić, Dr. Ilijaz Pilav, Naim Salkić, Nijaz Salkić, Christina Schmitz.
Published Literature
de Barros-Duchêne, Srebrenica, pp. 111–124; NIOD Report: (Rumors of the fall of Žepa, panic the night of July 11, details of the deportations and separation of men in Potočari on July 12 and 13; the story of the Dutchbat medical orderly who found the woman being raped; story by MSF worker Emira Selimović that bodies were found and Christina was asked to go see them; the story of the first group of wounded and medical staff that were supposed to be evacuated, but were forced back to Bratunac instead and some taken away).
van Laerhoven, Srebrenica, Chapter 6 (Serb megaphone calls during the group’s rest by the river on July 12; lining up to walk again on July 13; Ilijaz’s view of the final battle). Rohde, Endgame, p. 194, describes the appearance of Serb troops who barged into Potočari on July 12.
Documents
U.N. Srebrenica Report section 394 (Serb radio reports the imminent fall of Žepa).
Krstić judgment (decision to inform the column on the evening of July 11 that they are going to Tuzla; information on the artillery attack that split the line near the main road on the twelfth and the tactics, including the use of megaphones and stolen Dutch uniforms, used to draw men to surrender; details of the atrocities that took place in Potočari, the deportations, the forced evacuation of the Dutchbat compound; the men on the list remain missing.)
MSF: Christina’s situation reports to Belgrade about July 12 in Potočari, e.g., 6:12 P.M. (reporting that thirty-five men are being guarded in a nearby house); 9 P.M. (“It’s horrifying outside… ”), and July 13, e.g., 11:30 A.M. (being asked to look at dead bodies, situation of patients, zero hospital mortality); a note back from Belgrade advising her not to investigate the dead bodies; 4:25 P.M. (she’s going back to Srebrenica); 5 P.M. (she insists the male medical staff stay with her).
Transcript of interviews with MSF local staff members and doctors in late 1995, including Emira Selimović (story about the man giving the baby to Christina).
Other Materials
Zoran Petrović footage showing men in Sandići field being forced to call for their relatives; shooting anti-aircraft guns into the hillsides. Film entitled Fall of Srebrenica (Tuzla, 1996), shows the medical staff members entering free territory.
Notes
PAGE 307 Ilijaz agrees and informs Ramiz… There is not complete agreement among interviewees as to where in the column the medical staff members were. Ilijaz Pilav says they were always in the front, whereas others recall they were in the middle until the first ambush near Kravica, and after that in the front. The same goes for Dudić’s brigade. Ilijaz believ
es that Dudić was in the middle, but the NIOD report says that his brigade was the last.
PAGE 308 Ilijaz’s group continues away from the sounds… The part of the Zvornik-Vlasenica road that runs between Nova Kasaba and Konjevići.
PAGE 309 They run through the tall fern… Jusef Sulejmanović, Senahid Salihović, RedŽo Babić, Mehmedalia Dedić, and Rešid Bektić. Sadik Ahmetović stayed in the back in the first shelling during the day.
PAGE 309 “What are you doing here?” One Srebrenica soldier interviewed for this book (Mensur Gadžo) said that he was part of a detail of soldiers assigned by military authorities to keep an eye out for the doctors and protect them, in gratitude for their work (there was a similar protection unit for commanders). Ilijaz denies knowing of such a unit and believes the medical group fended for themselves.
PAGE 310 “Hey, your pictures!” Ilijaz later heard that the man carrying his and Fatima’s photographs was shot and killed by the river. Some of those who crossed the river after Ilijaz and saw his photographs assumed that Ilijaz had been killed.
PAGE 311 Ilijaz asks some brigade commanders… This information is from the NIOD report, which says that the front and back weren’t in direct communication because of a problem with walkie-talkie frequency mismatch.
PAGE 311 They rely on news coming from each new group… The NIOD report contends that the reason the Serb attack was not launched immediately was that the Serb army did not know about the existence of the column until midday on the twelfth, and only then deployed all available units to attack it. This (rather than a deliberate choice to attack the middle of the column, which is also a possibility) could explain why groups toward the front of the column crossed the road with ease.
PAGES 311–312 Ilijaz tries to sleep awhile… This particular incident, not specifically recalled by Ilijaz, is noted in the Human Rights Watch report Chemical Warfare in Bosnia? The Strange Experiences of the Srebrenica Survivors, Human Rights Watch, November, 1998, Volume 10, Number 9 (D). The report speculated on use of BZ or other psychochemical incapacitant by the Serbs. Testimonial evidence was compelling but hard evidence was lacking, in part because of lack of funding to do chemical testing. HRW called for more investigation and making public the results of an investigation rumored to have been carried out by the U.S. government.
PAGE 312 The air is still and quiet… One of the Srebrenica military, Mensur Gadžo, claims that on Mt. Udrč he suggested taking the doctors by another route. The doctors were undecided until Branka Stanić (the young Croat physician) had the last word: “I was there for the whole war, and I want to be with them now.” The NIOD report suggests that all civilians on the journey were taken under the wing of one of the military units.
PAGE 314 Earlier in the evening… Naval captain Andre Schouten.
PAGE 319 “What are these buildings doing here?” Naim tells another version of this story in which Ilijaz had the hallucination while the medical group was together and Fatima slapped him awake.
PAGE 323 “Doctor, it looks like the only normal people left…” The conversation was recalled by both of them, but Hakija thought it took place at night. Hakija Meholjić insists that he saw the medical staff members take pills, refuse to share them with others, and fail to treat the injured. The medical staff members deny this.
PAGE 323 If we survive this together… Ilijaz didn’t specify exactly when in their journey he had this thought.
PAGE 326 Sometime around 2 P.M…. According to the Krstić decision: “On 16 July 1995, Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurević, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, reported that, in view of the enormous pressure on his Brigade, he had taken a unilateral decision to open up a corridor to allow about 5,000 unarmed members of the Bosnian Muslim column to pass through.” The NIOD reports that other elements of the Bosnian army attacked the Serb lines from behind, which explains the confusing appearance of the battle to Ilijaz and the amount of firepower displayed.
CHAPTER 29: FREEDOM
Interviews
Dr. Ejub Alić, Dr. Dževad Džananović, Dr. Avdo Hasanović, Stephane Oberreit, Dr. Fatima Klempić-Dautbašić, Dr. Ilijaz Pilav, Christina Schmitz
Documents
List of Srebrenica hospital workers, “Spisak: Medicinski radnika—prognanika iz Srebrenice,” July 21, 1995, Ministry of Health, Tuzla-Podrinja Canton, Bosnia-Herzegovina.
MSF documents: Christina’s situation reports to MSF Belgrade from Potočari, July 14–21. MSF Srebrenica final situation report covering July 6–21, 1995.
CHAPTER 30: SADIK
Interviews
Sadik Ahmetović, Dr. Benjamin Kulovac, Dr. Boro Lazić, Sanja Lazić
Published Literature
Physicians for Human Rights, Medicine Under Siege in the Former Yugoslavia 1991–1995, pp. 58–61.
Documents
Transcript of interview with Sadik Ahmetović performed in the fall of 1995 by Laurence de Barros-Duchêne.
Krstić judgment describing the offensive on Žepa.
U.N. Srebrenica Report sections 415–431 (the capture of Žepa)
EPILOGUE
Interviews
Dr. Ejub Alić, Mubina Alić, Francis Boyle, Arthur Caplan, Dr. Eric Dachy, Rex Dudley, Kris Janowski, Dr. Boro Lazić, Sanja Lazic, Dr. Fatima Klempić-Dautbašić, Dr. Bernard Kouchner, Dr. Nedret Mujkanović, Stephane Oberreit, Dr. Ilijaz Pilav, Pierre Salignon, Christina Schmitz, Dr. Ernlie Young
Published Literature
Barry, “A bridge too far”; Coady, “The ethics of armed humanitarian interventions,” p. 34; Fink, “Physician groups and the war in Kosovo”; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 102; Marmon et al., “The diplomat/physician in the emerging international system”; Power, A Problem from Hell, p. 419. NIOD report III/6/6 (U.S. officials received daily briefings from Dutch officials); RFE/RL December 20, 2002 (“Bosnian Muslims seek UN compensation for Srebrenica”); Physicians for Human Rights, War Crimes in Kosovo, pp. 95–97 (summary of medical neutrality concept); TimeEurope, September 11, 2002 (“A Bosnian Serb official investigation claims “exhaustion,” not massacre, killed thousands in Srebrenica,” by Anis Alić and Dragan Stanimirović), Voice of America, September 4, 2002 (“International officials denounce Serb Srebrenica report,” by Stefan Bos).
Documents
Krstić judgment.
MSF unpublished documents: Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, New York/Paris, January 31, 2003: “Dutch inquiry fails to answer key questions into Srebrenica Massacre: MSF calls for the US and the UK to carry out investigations.” Doctors Without Borders, November 11, 2000, “Why MSF is calling for a parliamentary commission on Srebrenica.” Doctors Without Borders briefing document, November 2001, “Parliamentary hearings on Srebrenica: the arguments, omissions and contradictions.”
U.N. Srebrenica Report, sections: 486 (question of countries possessing advance knowledge about the attack on Srebrenica), 501 (call for U.N. member states to examine their responsibility for Srebrenica by their “prolonged refusal to use force in the early stages of the war”).
Asemblée Nationale (France), November 22, 2001, “Report by the Parliamentary Committee on the events in Srebrenica: Conclusion.”
Asemblée Nationale (France), November 22, 2001, #3413, “Rapport d’information dépose en application de l’article 145 du Règlement: Par la mission d’information commune sur les événements de Srebrenica,” pp. 183–192.
Dutch Parliament, January 27, 2003, the Hague, “Introduction by the Chairman of the Committee of Inquiry into Srebrenica at the presentation of the final report, ‘Missie Zonder Vrede’—‘A Mission Without Peace.’”
International Commission for Missing Persons, “Tracking Chart for Srebrenica Cases as of July 2 (2004).”
Other Materials
Information on those indicted and arrested comes from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia website: www.un.org/icty accessed July 9, 2004.
Photographs released by the United States government showing land disturbances n
ear Srebrenica in July 1995 suggestive of mass graves.
Notes
PAGE 340 The last week of August… After more than a year of lobbying by the American Committee to Save Bosnia (a coalition of grassroots and national organizations) and the Action Council for Peace in the Balkans (composed of prominent citizens) led by State Department resignees Stephen Walker and Marshall Harris, both houses of the U.S. Congress passed, by veto-proof margins, legislation to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. The Senate vote immediately followed the fall of Srebrenica, and several previously undecided Senators cited it as a major reason for their affirmative votes. According to Walker, “If lifting the embargo worked, Clinton’s responsibility for facilitating genocide—and (Senate majority leader Bob) Dole’s leadership in ending it—would stand in stark contrast in the election.”
PAGE 340 By the time that international leaders… Some analysts suggest that it was Clinton’s election-year political need to conclude a quick peace deal with Serbian President Slobodan Milošević that led him to halt the Croatians and Bosnians at the moment they had command of roughly the amount of territory allotted to them in the latest “Contact Group” peace plan.
PAGE 347 Dutch officers argued… Radio Netherlands, November 19, 2002, by Marina Brouwer. www.nrw.nl/hotspots/html/sre021119.html (accessed November 20, 2002).
PAGE 347 As just one example… This is a four-page document marked “secret” to P-Mr. Kantor from INR-Douglas P. Mulholland. Subject: Bosnia: Actions contributing to genocide. United States Department of State. January 11, 1993.
PAGE 350 On another topic… Even the International Committee of the Red Cross, which guards its humanitarian neutrality extremely closely out of a belief that this allows it to function on all sides of every war, broke its characteristic silence and repeatedly denounced violations of humanitarian law in Bosnia—condemning such violations should in no way be considered a violation of humanitarian neutrality.