Still more such cases might be cited, but these suggest the essence of the matter. Throughout, the White House, Department of Justice, and other agencies of the Truman government showed far more interest in tracking down McCarthy’s sources than in uncovering alleged Soviet agents or Communist Party members, or in addressing the lax security standards deplored by the LRB. In the view of the Truman administration, the problem with Joe McCarthy was not that he didn’t have inside sources of loyalty data but that he all too obviously did. Which was from a national security standpoint beneficial, as information on such cases was sorely needed.
CHAPTER 24
The Trouble with Harry
IT’S IMPOSSIBLE to understand the McCarthy era and its security wars without first understanding something of Harry Truman—which, however, is no easy task. On this subject, and certain others, Truman is a hard man to figure.
In many standard histories and bios, Truman is depicted as a tough cold warrior who bravely faced down Moscow, being teamed in this respect with his foreign policy vicar Acheson at State. Even more to the present point, we’re told, Truman cleaned up security problems on the home front, long before the blustering Joe McCarthy came barging in with his outrageous charges. The cleanup was supposedly effected through the Truman loyalty program, announced in March of 1947. Thanks to this draconian effort, it’s said, whatever Communists or security risks had got on official payrolls were ousted. Thus, when McCarthy showed up in 1950 he was banging on a door already closed and locked by Truman.
Sad to say, this portrayal of Truman’s policy on the home front is almost entirely fiction. That he was a visceral anti-Communist is not in doubt. However, he seemed to know little about the way the Soviets and their U.S. agents functioned, or their presence in the government he headed, and didn’t show much interest in learning. This ennui persisted despite the myriad FBI reports supplied to the White House and Truman cabinet about the vast extent and serious nature of the penetration. Accordingly, not only was the security problem not cleaned up by 1950, some of the most flagrant suspects imaginable were flourishing in the federal workforce.
J. Robert Oppenheimer
Foremost among such cases was J. Robert Oppenheimer, the famous nuclear scientist who played a leading role in the atom project of World War II. This was by all odds the most significant security problem in Cold War records, having its genesis in the days of FDR, blossoming into a full-fledged scandal under Truman, then finally coming to public view in the Eisenhower era.
The earliest known mention of Oppenheimer in the FBI reports is a memo from March 28, 1941, which says he had the previous year attended a meeting in the home of Haakon Chevalier, an identified (later self-admitted) Red, along with Communist leaders Isaac Folkoff and William Schneiderman. It was apparently this information, obtained at the era of the Hitler-Stalin pact, that prompted the FBI to put Oppenheimer on its “custodial detention” list of people to be picked up by the Bureau if a national emergency developed. A memo to this effect was issued May 21, 1941, describing his “national tendency” as “Communist.”
Further intel on the case did nothing to dissuade the Bureau from this verdict. As part of the COMRAP/CINRAD inquiry, the FBI at this time was keeping a close watch on itinerant Soviet commissar Steve Nelson, then based in California. From surveillance of Nelson and other Communist bigwigs, the FBI recorded numerous references to Oppenheimer, explicitly and repeatedly saying he was a secret member of the party. One such entry in the Bureau archive reads as follows:
In December, 1942, Julius Robert Oppenheimer was the subject of a discussion between Steve Nelson and Bernadette Doyle, organizational secretary of the Communist Party for Alameda County, California. At this time, Steve Nelson stated that Dr. Hannah Peters had been to visit him and she had stated that Dr. Oppenheimer, because of his employment in a special project, could not be active in the party…. Bernadette Doyle answered Nelson by saying that she believes the matter should be taken up with the State Committee regarding the “two Oppys” inasmuch as they were regularly registered and every one knew they were Communist Party members.1
A similar entry dating from May 1943 recounts a conversation between Bernadette Doyle and one John Murra, “suspected intelligence agent of the USSR.” This says “Bernadette Doyle…informed John Murra that Mrs. Oppenheimer and her husband were ‘comrades’ and that the husband was working on a special project in the [Berkeley] Radiation Laboratory…AlsoBernadette Doyle stated that Oppenheimer was a Party member but that his name should be removed from any mailing lists in John Murra’s possession and he should not be mentioned in any way.”*194 2
“A PARTY MEMBER”
In this excerpt from an FBI report on nuclear scientist J. Robert Oppenheimer, Communist leaders in California are quoted as calling him a secret member of the party as of December 1942.
Source: FBI Oppenheimer file
Despite these and other similar data from the FBI, Oppenheimer was taken on as scientific/administrative head of the nuclear project in the crisis of the war years. This was a huge calculated gamble on the part of Gen. Leslie Groves, military capo of the project, who thought Oppenheimer (under tight surveillance) was a plausible security risk in the conflict with the Nazis. And given the circumstances of the war, with Moscow as our ally, it might be viewed as a risk worth taking that in the end succeeded.
However, with the advent of the Cold War, as Moscow turned from ally to increasingly hostile foe, the global outlook was obviously quite different. By the latter months of 1945, signs of tension with the Soviets were mounting and the FBI was following up Elizabeth Bentley’s revelations on the home front. At this time also, Oppenheimer would leave the jurisdiction of the Army and become a subject of direct concern to Hoover and the Bureau. Accordingly, in mid-November 1945, Hoover provided a précis of the case to the White House and to Secretary of State James Byrnes, then overseeing atomic matters for Truman. This three-page memo wrapped up the pertinent data on Oppenheimer, including his involvement with pro-Red causes and individuals. Specifically noted was the information that Communist leaders in California considered him a secret member of the party.3
None of this, however, seemed to be of much concern to Truman officials dealing with the famous suspect, who rather than being phased out of America’s nuclear setup would now be given still other significant duties involving our atomic secrets. Among the most important of these new jobs was his appointment to the General Advisory Committee on atomic energy (and subsequent election as its chairman), which carried with it a “Q clearance” providing access to confidential data. This was no honorific post, but one of utmost sensitivity, as the GAC would be the source of expertise and guidance for the Atomic Energy Commission in making key decisions.4
As this appointment was going forward, Hoover again hustled over to Truman higher-ups the security data on Oppenheimer and the problem he presented—again, however, to no avail. This further report would be dismissed in utterly casual fashion by Truman’s staffers, including White House aide Clark Clifford and Truman’s choice to head the AEC, David E. Lilienthal. In these precincts, the fact that Oppenheimer rendered good service in the war, and was otherwise well regarded, trumped the intel from the Bureau. As Lilienthal would testify in later hearings on the case, favorable statements from nuclear satraps Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant, who had worked with Oppenheimer in the atom program, meant “Dr. Oppenheimer’s loyalty was prima facie clear despite material contained in the FBI summary.”5 (Emphasis added)
And that, believe it or not, was that. There was, Lilienthal added, some discussion with Clark Clifford about a possible “special board” to look into the matter, but “Mr. Clifford did not seem to take this seriously.” Nor did Lilienthal himself. He testified that he had forgotten about this proposal entirely and didn’t do anything about it. So the question of Oppenheimer’s security status apparently just drifted along in bureaucratic limbo until his authorization for a “Q clearance” was formalized in Aug
ust of 1947.6
Further suggestive of then-prevailing security measures is an AEC memo saying that, in fact, Oppenheimer had already received such clearance, dating back to February 1947, but for some reason this significant item hadn’t been recorded. This memo also states that “Dr. Oppenheimer was previously cleared by the Manhattan District” (the name given the atom project in World War II)—the point being that such prior clearance meant he was now entitled to another.7 Once more, the fact that a risk taken when the enemy was in Berlin might be a risk of a different nature when the enemy was in Moscow apparently didn’t cross the minds of Truman and his people. There are many possible terms for this, but toughness on Cold War security issues obviously isn’t among them.
Harry Dexter White
Had Oppenheimer stood alone as an instance of security coma in the Truman years, the case might be put down as a bizarre exception. It was, however, closer to the norm than to unusual conduct for the era. Among other similar episodes was the strange saga of Harry Dexter White and the even stranger handling of the case by Truman.
Though no Oppenheimer in terms of clout or status, White was a significant figure. He wielded enormous influence with Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, had a hand in countless global dealings, and was instrumental in placing his friends and allies in Treasury and other billets. He was also one of the most important Soviet agents named by Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley and would later show up in Venona. He was accordingly featured in numerous FBI reports about the penetration problem, beginning in late 1945 and continuing for months thereafter.
Notwithstanding all of this, White would in early 1946 be named by Truman as the top U.S. official at the International Monetary Fund, to a large extent White’s own creation, stemming from a 1944 global confab held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. White was confirmed for this position by the Senate, had his commission signed by Truman, and went on to the IMF when it began operations in the spring of 1946.
All this would become a matter of public knowledge when the appointment blew up into a political scandal in the early 1950s. How, it was asked, could Truman have permitted the advancement of an identified Moscow agent to such a high-ranking post? In trying to provide an answer, Truman came up with three different explanations: that the FBI failed to inform him of the security problem with White; that when he found out about it, he took prompt and effective action; and that he allowed the appointment to go through to cooperate with the FBI in its investigation.
All these responses, besides being mutually inconsistent, were mistaken, as shown by the documented record. Extensive information on the case would be disclosed in 1953 Senate hearings by Eisenhower Attorney General Herbert Brownell and, in a rare appearance of this nature, FBI Director Hoover. Most provably wrong was the contention that the FBI had failed to tell Truman about White, as the Bureau had copious evidence in writing—some already noted—that it supplied a steady stream of reports about the case not only to the Treasury and Truman Justice but directly to the White House.8
Thus, taking the matter from the top, White was featured in the Hoover letter of November 8, 1945, delivered by special messenger to Truman aide Harry Vaughan for the President’s attention. White was second on the list of suspects named in this letter. He would be named again in the comprehensive Bureau memo of November 27, 1945, delivered to the White House December 4. White would then be the subject of a special memo from the FBI, devoted mainly to his case, dated February 1, 1946, delivered to the White House February 4. There would be other Bureau reports in which White was mentioned, but these are noted because they were all supplied to Truman and his agents before the IMF appointment became official.*195 9
Likewise, the notion that the appointment went forward in cooperation with the Bureau (an argument earlier floated in the case of Victor Perlo) was categorically denied by Hoover. “At no time,” said the Director, “was the FBI party to any arrangement to promote Harry Dexter White, and at no time did the FBI give its approval to such an agreement.”10 In fact, as Hoover further noted, White’s move to the IMF impeded the FBI inquiry as the Bureau’s investigative powers didn’t extend to global bodies.*196
A last revealing sidelight to the above: When White had been confirmed and was ready to take up his IMF position, Truman sent a flowery letter to the appointee congratulating him on his fine service to the nation and the new job he was assuming. This Truman missive said he regretted White’s departure from the Treasury, but “my regret is lessened…in the knowledge that you leave the Treasury only to assume new duties for the government [at IMF]…In that position you will be able to carry forward the work you so ably began at Bretton Woods…I am confident that in your new position you will add to the distinction of your already distinguished career with the Treasury.”11
This effusive Truman letter was dated April 30, 1946—almost six full months after he was first warned by the FBI that White was an identified Moscow agent. It was also at a time, according to Truman’s later claims, that he was cooperating with the Bureau to crack down on White and others like him.
Alger Hiss
If White and Oppenheimer were proof of indifference to security standards, the case of Alger Hiss was even more so. This was of course the most famous spy scandal of them all. It was also the case that showed the willingness of the Truman administration, not merely to ignore security intel, but to harass the witness who supplied it.
Histories of the Cold War often highlight Truman’s statement that the Hiss-Chambers hearings in the summer of 1948 before the House Committee on Un-American Activities were a “red herring.” However, things being said and done in private far exceeded in shock value mere criticism of the House proceedings or the term “red herring.” (As it happened, the phrase wasn’t initially used by Truman but propounded to him in a question by the press, to which he assented.)
As seen, the FBI had provided top officials plentiful information on Hiss, based on the Chambers-Bentley data, beginning in the fall of 1945. It was information of this type that caused Secretary of State James Byrnes to conclude in early 1946 that Hiss should be removed from the department, and that led to Hiss’s slow-motion resignation ten months later. Also, the department security squad under Joe Panuch had been all over Hiss for a considerable time before he was ousted. Multiple FBI reports about the case were meanwhile sent, not only to the State Department, but to the White House and Truman Justice.
Despite this extensive background, when the Hiss-Chambers duel went public in the summer of 1948, the White House and Truman Justice bent their efforts to nailing and discrediting, not Hiss, but Chambers. Elements of the game plan were set forth in an August 16 memo to Clark Clifford from Truman aide George Elsey. Capsuling steps agreed to at a meeting with Attorney General Clark, this included the notation: “Justice should make every effort to ascertain if Whittaker Chambers is guilty of perjury.” To this was added the handwritten comment “investigation of Chambers’ confinement in mental institution.”12 There were no similar notes suggesting Hiss be measured for a perjury count or that his mental health might be in question. (See Chapter 25.)
Unfortunately for the Chambers-is-crazy thesis (an oft-repeated line of Hiss himself), the FBI found no records of this nature. On August 20, Hoover reported to Clark: “With respect to Whittaker Chambers, there is nothing indicated in the files of the Bureau, or the files of the New York office that Chambers has been institutionalized.”13 Undaunted by this failure, Truman Justice persisted in its efforts to discredit Chambers and, if possible, indict him. Somewhat improbably, this campaign intensified when Chambers came up with documentary proof that Hiss was lying—long-concealed official papers and summaries of secret data Hiss (and White) provided to then–Soviet courier Chambers in the 1930s.
Some of these papers would be produced by Chambers in a deposition taken by Hiss’s lawyers in November of 1948, others in microfilm format to the House Committee on Un-American Activities a few weeks later. This sequence would become the
stuff of folklore and start Hiss on the road to prison. The Truman forces, however, didn’t see it that way. Their unwavering focus was on the crimes of Chambers—the fact that he hadn’t previously produced these papers, which indeed meant he hadn’t hitherto been completely truthful. This was the angle that appealed to Truman Justice.
Thus a memo to the FBI from Assistant Attorney General Alexander Campbell, reacting to the November deposition, says: “It is desired that an immediate investigation be conducted so that it can be ascertained whether Chambers has committed perjury. In this connection, photostatic copies of these documents should be obtained together with a copy of the deposition given by Chambers.”14
Other such memos soon made their way to Hoover. One, dated December 2, 1948, reemphasized that Justice wanted “an immediate investigation by the Bureau to determine whether Chambers committed perjury.” While telling his agents to proceed as ordered, Hoover noted in the margin: “I can’t understand why such effort is being made to indict Chambers to the exclusion of Hiss.” He would likewise later comment, “I wonder why they don’t move against Hiss also.”15 It was—it is—an excellent question.
NAILING CHAMBERS
This memo from Truman aide George Elsey summarizes plans to discredit Whittaker Chambers and, if possible, indict Chambers—not Hiss—for perjury.
Source: NSA-CIA Venona report
Luckily for Chambers, he by this time had a vigorous champion in the House committee, spearheaded by chief investigator Robert Stripling and freshman GOP representative Richard Nixon. When these worthies learned of administration plans to railroad Chambers, they raised a vociferous protest, warning of the further uproar that would be caused by any such proceeding. Relative sanity then prevailed and Truman Justice at last switched sides, deciding to drop the Chambers perjury angle and go after Hiss. We can only speculate as to what might have happened had the House committee not been on the job and in possession of probative data Truman Justice couldn’t deny or keep sequestered.
Blacklisted By History Page 40