by Mark Zuehlke
Lieutenant General Harry Crerar was already in the midst of preparing for a critical conference of staff officers representing First Canadian Army, Twenty-First Army Group, the First Allied Airborne Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air force to agree on how to clear the Scheldt estuary when Simonds’s report hit his desk. Although Crerar quibbled with some points, there was much in Simonds’s proposal that meshed with his own thoughts on clearing the north bank of the Scheldt. On the day Simonds drafted his commentary, Crerar had been explaining his script for what had been codenamed Operation Infatuate to Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay and Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, Major General Sir Francis “Freddie” de Guingand.
In contrast to Simonds, Crerar accepted that the south bank of the Scheldt estuary had to be taken before a final plan for clearing the north bank could be decided. He also wanted the area extending from Bergen op Zoom on the East Scheldt coastline about seven miles east to Roosendaal brought firmly into Allied hands in order to protect the forces crossing the isthmus onto South Beveland from German counterattack. Once these two conditions were met, Crerar thought the isthmus could be attacked in coordination with an amphibious assault on South Beveland at Hoedekenskerke. He also envisioned “a minor combined operation designed to land infantry only on the south-west coast of Walcheren.” To support this, “from a purely military point of view… sustained and heavy bomber attacks” should target the German defences “on the basis of complete destruction” and this might include deliberate breaching of the dykes.
Agreeing that an assault landing might be required, Ramsay promised sufficient landing craft and fire support from two 15-inch-gun monitors and the battleship HMS Warspite. Royal Navy Captain A.F. Pugsley, an experienced destroyer commander who had commanded a naval assault group on D-Day and had his headquarters ship sunk under him during the invasion, was assigned to work with II Canadian Corps planners on the naval contribution. As for flooding the island, de Guingand would solicit “the views of higher authority,” and connect II Canadian Corps with No. 84 Group so that a plan for bombing Walcheren could be developed.2
On September 22, while preparing for the forthcoming day’s major conference on Operation Infatuate, Crerar more closely analyzed Simonds’s report, using a pencil to tick off each point that accorded with his own thinking. The proposed movements of II Canadian Corps divisions were checked off, but in his marginal notes he substituted 4th British Special Services Brigade—currently masking Dunkirk—for the 3 CID brigade that Simonds had intended to assault Walcheren. The demand that Walcheren be flooded was not commented upon, but he checked off the use of bombing to destroy defences and break the German garrison’s morale.3
Once the south bank of the West Scheldt was cleared and the isthmus sealed off, “then the difficult assault and capture of Zuid [South] Beveland and Walcheren will be successively carried out.” Rejecting Simonds’s notion that an operational plan could be detailed at this point, Crerar offered only a tentative one that would most likely entail an assault across the isthmus and a waterborne landing from near Terneuzen onto South Beveland at Hoedekenskerke. These two operations might occur “concurrently or successively. Finally, once South Beveland was taken, a “seaborne combined operation, involving, from this Army, 4 SS B[rigade] launched against the SW coast of Walcheren Island or possibly the ne coast if North Beveland in [Canadian] possession.” This attack would be “in conjunction with an attack launched from Zuid Beveland.”
While in the midst of drafting his notes, Crerar received the discouraging news that Eisenhower had personally scotched deployment of airborne troops for clearing either South Beveland or Walcheren. In doing so, Eisenhower confirmed an earlier refusal by Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton, the Allied Airborne Army commander. Brereton defended his decision “because of intense flak on Walcheren, difficult terrain which would prevent glider landings, excessive losses likely because of drowning… and the fact that the operation is an improper employment of airborne forces.”4 The reasoning behind the last point was not explained and was certainly open for debate, as others believed this kind of drop onto a concentrated objective or to break a strong defensive line by assaulting its rear fit precisely with the correct use of airborne forces.
Eisenhower tried to soften the obvious blow to First Canadian Army’s plans by arguing that the allocation of aircraft to mount such an airborne operation would “divert aircraft from the direct support of the Canadian assaulting forces. My decision is therefore not to launch an airborne operation but to make a priority demand on Bomber Command, and Eighth Air Force for the complete saturation of the targets you select. All medium bombers will also be made available to assist.”5
Crerar was little impressed. “Until yesterday,” he wrote, “I was promised the additional assistance of two [parachute brigades] of an Airborne Division. While dropping conditions are undoubtedly poor in the Dutch Islands, so are other conditions which concern these particular offensive operations. I consider, therefore, that the decision to withhold Airborne forces from Operation ‘Infatuate’ may well have made its accomplishment still more difficult.”
The Canadian commander fully intended to hold Eisenhower to his promise. He would seek “large scale heavy bomber attacks by Bomber Command, and if possible Eighth USAAF be carried out against known enemy defences” on Walcheren and South Beveland or the southern bank of the West Scheldt. Crerar now entirely embraced the concept of flooding Walcheren. “If technically feasible, and no restrictions imposed on grounds of higher policy, air effort should also be designed to destroy locks and flood Walcheren Island—thus isolating the enemy to high ground,” he entered as his concluding remark.6
Thirty-six staff officers were crowded into a stuffy room at First Canadian Headquarters the next day when Crerar walked them through his operational plan, ending with the proposal that, if SHAEF sanctioned it and Bomber Command deemed it possible, Walcheren be flooded. Simonds then took the floor and “stressed the favourable situation that would develop if Walcheren could be flooded by breaching the dykes in the vicinity of Westkapelle. The enemy would be forced to the unfloodable parts of the island, principally the sand dunes and an assault landing could be made on these positions from the rear. LCTS [Landing Craft, Tanks] might disgorge LVTS [Landing Vehicles, Tanks] near the breached dyke and the LVTS could then proceed through the gaps and be used to assault the rear of the positions.” Simonds wanted heavy bombing of Walcheren to begin as soon as possible. But he also noted that no matter how quickly the south bank of the Scheldt was cleared or the Bergen op Zoom to Roosendaal line attained, the attack on the peninsula and Walcheren Island would not be possible for about twenty-one days due to a shortage of heavy ammunition for the Canadian artillery regiments. These were now dependent on receiving munitions through Dieppe, and until a rate of 1,500 tons daily was attained, the gunners would quickly exhaust their ammunition.7
When Simonds returned to his seat, a general discussion ensued. To the surprise of both Crerar and Simonds, their desire to have Walcheren flooded met unexpected opposition from Brigadier Geoffrey Walsh, II Canadian Corps’s chief engineer. Walsh declared the plan to breach the Walcheren dykes “impracticable.”8 Air Vice-Marshal R.D. Oxland demurred that he could not say it was possible or not. He stressed that his role was simply that of an air adviser to the Canadians, “and that the decision to engage targets in Walcheren rests with C-in-C Bomber Command and the Supreme Allied Commander.”9
Despite Walsh’s and Oxland’s reticence, the general mood of the room slowly drifted towards adopting the flooding idea. “The advantages seemed to outweigh all doubts about the efficacy of the plan,” noted one RAF commentator. “Flooding would completely disorganize the enemy’s communications, immobilize his reinforcements and at the same time put out of action a number of defence works. Furthermore the assault forces would be able to take advantage of the floods by swimming through the breach in armoured vehicles and operating behind the enemy’s forward p
ositions.” It was decided that Bomber Command and Walsh’s engineers should seriously scrutinize the idea.10
When Captain Pugsley’s turn to address the naval issues surrounding an operation against Walcheren came, he said the most immediate problem was that the North Sea approaches to the Scheldt as well as the estuary itself were heavily mined. The good news, though, was that minesweepers were already working to clear the sea to the west of the island. Within a few days, it should be possible for the monitors and perhaps even Warspite—were it committed to the operation—to come within an offshore bombardment range of ten miles. Pugsley’s pronouncement garnered the navy a round of applause for its energy because “clearing a way through the German mine fields—the first major hazard in the seaward approaches—was a source of encouragement to all.” The navy captain, however, followed the good news with bad. As “the combined operation would probably take place in October,” he cautioned, “about four days out of six could be counted as being unsuitable [to amphibious landings] owing to heavy swells.”11
The conference ended with most questions unresolved and many points still to be studied and referred to higher command for approval or rejection. But Crerar was able to immediately direct 4th Canadian Armoured Division and 2nd Canadian Infantry Division to carry out the first two phases of the campaign that he considered prerequisites to the launch of Operation Infatuate—clearing the Scheldt’s south bank and advancing northwards from Antwerp towards Bergen op Zoom and Roosendaal. Both were sure to be difficult tasks, facing strong defensive lines dug in behind a major canal.
ON SEPTEMBER 18, 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade had deployed to the east of Antwerp along the south bank of the Albert Canal. As the 53rd Welsh Division, which had been manning this line, had pulled out before the Canadians arrived, neither Brigadier W.J. “Bill” Megill nor his battalion commanders were able to glean any useful intelligence from their British counterparts.12 Glaring across the canal’s ninety-foot span from the opposing bank were remnants of the 719th Infantry Division cobbled into company-sized fighting units. These Germans acknowledged the brigade’s arrival with desultory sniper, mortar, and artillery fire that did little to dampen the spirit of optimism that pervaded throughout 2nd Canadian Infantry Division’s ranks as news travelled that Market Garden had been launched.
When the sound of hundreds of aircraft overhead on September 19 caused everyone at divisional headquarters to spill outside to see great formations of gliders, rumours that this operation was underway were confirmed. A few hours later, BBC Radio announced that airborne troops had landed at Nijmegen and Arnhem.13 The war might be over sooner than expected.
Megill told his battalion commanders that their immediate task was to “prevent the enemy from blowing [the canal’s] locks, as this would result in the inundation of a large tract of land.”14 To prevent German sabotage, 5 CIB would carry out aggressive patrolling along the banks of the canal while absorbing badly needed reinforcements. Even though the brigade was stationed outside Antwerp, it was exposed to many of the surreal aspects of the Streetcar War. The Calgary Highlanders set about cleaning themselves up and carrying out basic training exercises. They had “many ‘green’ men and if they can be taught the fundamental principles of battle drill it will be a much easier task for us in our next battle. Every available moment will be utilized in this manner,” noted the battalion’s war diarist. Across the street from battalion headquarters, however, a bar was open that was drawing a lot of uniformed troops. The war diarist soon commented that its proprietor had “given some of the lads a ‘ribbing’” on the night of September 18. “The price of beer had been raised three times during the evening and worst of all there appeared to be no particular closing hours.” It was promptly blacklisted with nobody allowed to “frequent the spot during the day.”15
Despite this initially festive attitude, Megill quickly impressed on his battalion commanders that they were not there to relax. The brigade’s purpose extended beyond merely keeping the Germans at bay, it was to win a bridgehead over the Albert Canal.
Megill’s army career differed sharply from that of most Permanent Force officers. He had enlisted in the signal corps in 1923 as a private when just sixteen years old. After six years’ service, Megill left to study engineering at Queen’s University. Two years later, he returned to army life with a commission. The year before the war started, he attended imperial staff college at Quetta, India, and garnered praise from its instructors for both tactical and administrative skill. This was followed by a series of staff postings on return to Canada that culminated in appointment to senior staff officer of I Canadian Corps under Crerar. The two men failed to hit it off, Crerar thinking Megill professional enough but lacking in imagination and handicapped by not having any field command experience. Perhaps recognizing this weakness, Megill asked for and received a reversion from acting Brigadier to Lieutenant Colonel so that he could take command of the Algonquin Regiment in October 1943. This posting lasted only until February 1944, however, when Megill was promoted to command of 5 CIB as part of a major housecleaning by 2nd Canadian Infantry Division’s new commander, Major General Charles Foulkes, who got rid of all three of his brigadiers in favour of younger officers.16
Now that his other brigades had reached the Antwerp front, Foulkes was determined to win a crossing over the Albert Canal and then quickly establish a bridgehead across the Antwerp–Turnhout Canal— known by the Flemish as Kanaal Schoten–Turnhout–Dessel—to the north. Breaching both these defensive lines would well position the division to drive through to the South Beveland isthmus. Accordingly, he ordered Megill on September 20 to gain a bridgehead across the canal in the area of Wijnegem, about three miles east of Merksem and the Antwerp dockyards.17
Megill held an O Group at his headquarters at 2130 hours to explain his plan to the battalion commanders. In the early morning hours, he said, the Black Watch would send two scouts across the water to check the German strength. This would be followed by a fighting patrol “to find out if the Hun had withdrawn.” If “the fighting patrol could successfully cross, then the Calgary Highlanders would also cross. It was specifically laid down that it was not to be an assault crossing. Bridging would commence as soon as a bridge-head was established. Three Coys were to be pushed over the canal and make the bridge-head fairly wide. While Coys were pushing and consolidating, patrols would be out front to maintain contact with the enemy.” As no vehicles could be used, everything would have to be manhandled across and wounded evacuated “by hand initially across the locks” to points where the first aid men would “nest” them until they could be loaded safely onto Jeep ambulances.18
Shortly after midnight, two Black Watch scouts—Privates Wilkinson and Sharpe—slipped across the canal in a small boat. Crouched on the shore behind them, scout platoon leader Lieutenant Joe Nixon “was paying out… line, letting the boat across.” But he soon “found that the line would not reach to the other bank so he took off his belt and tied it to the rope. This was still not long enough so he quickly and silently took off his boots and used the laces to extend the line. The boat was now near enough to the far bank for the Scouts to jump out, but in so doing the lace was pulled out of Lt. Nixon’s hand and he was unable to pull the boat back. As a result, when the patrol returned to the bank, after penetrating the enemy’s lines for about 2,000 yards, they found the boat still on their side and were able to effect the return trip in the swirling mists before dawn, unobserved. They report that the enemy are holding this area in strength.”19
Despite the patrol’s findings, Megill ordered the Black Watch’s Lieutenant Colonel Frank Mitchell to send a fighting patrol across one of the locks per the original plan. It was still dark when the fourteen men crawled out onto the lock only to be pinned down immediately by machine-gun fire. Unable to make any forward progress, Mitchell eventually called the men back.
Megill turned up shortly afterwards, and began to criticize the Black Watch’s performance to Mitchell’s face. The rela
tionship between these two officers had been increasingly combative since the Black Watch had been badly mauled in Normandy during attacks that Mitchell believed Megill should never have ordered. Facing more criticism that he believed warranted, the lieutenant colonel’s temper snapped and a bitter argument ensued. Mitchell was unceremoniously relieved of command and sent into purgatory as commander of the 10th Canadian Base Reinforcement Group. His replacement, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce R. Ritchie, had served as the Black Watch second-in-command before being promoted to command of the South Saskatchewan Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Vern Stott, second-in-command of the Calgary Highlanders, took over command of the South Saskatchewans. Although Megill instigated Mitchell’s firing, the decision to give the battalion to Ritchie was made by Foulkes over the brigadier’s opposition. Megill felt that the Black Watch needed a strong controlling hand and that either Stott or young Denis Whitaker, who commanded the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, would be the better choice.20 But Ritchie had deep roots in the regiment, having served with it before the war and during active service until his promotion to battalion command, and Foulkes felt he would be the best man for the job.21