by Mark Zuehlke
Corps command’s greatest concern was the crumbling state of morale that had led many of its troops to surrender to the rapidly advancing Canadians or to hurriedly retreat after the briefest of fights. There had even been cases where officers abandoned their commands. To stiffen the backbone of officers and troops alike, it ordered that any “commander of a strongpoint [be] shot summarily for cowardice in the presence of the enemy, if he is the first to retire without the order to do so, with the poor excuse that he wants to report the situation.”41 Yet, despite poor morale, the majority of the Germans continued to fight with a dogged determination. One conscript scrawled in his diary, “Am very ill. They left me in a fox-hole some 100 metres from my room. I have a high temperature but I do not want to go to hospital, not for all the world. Now every man counts. That’s why I, a conscript, shall join the battle again.”42
This overall tenacity surprised the Canadians, who were repeatedly assured by intelligence reports that the enemy was finished and one more push would see him off. An October 7 ii Canadian Corps intelligence summary declared, “The enemy has been conducting an orderly withdrawal, his rearguards offering stubborn resistance all the way. The causeway to South Beveland and the only road communication with the island is now well within the range of our artillery. It is now clear that he has given up any plan… to stand on the mainland approaches to Walcheren.”43
Closer to the ground, Brigadier Holly Keefler was less optimistic and increasingly concerned about 2 CID’S long, unprotected right flank that became more vulnerable with each advance. On October 6, he consequently diverted 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade and the bulk of the Fort Garry Horse to secure it. At 1100 hours, Keefler outlined his plan to 6 CIB’S Brigadier Guy Gauvreau. Until now, the brigade had been conducting limited offensive operations across a line running from Brecht to Kapellen, intended merely to keep the Antwerp–Turnhout Canal’s northern bank and the rear of the division safe from counterattack. As all three of the brigade’s battalions were badly understrength, Keefler and Gauvreau had been proceeding gingerly to avoid unnecessary casualties, and save 6 CIB for the pivotal role it was to play in the forthcoming drive across South Beve-land and over the causeway onto Walcheren Island.44
Now, Keefler announced, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, concentrated near Kapellen, would be replaced by a “mixed force” consisting of an antitank battery, a troop of anti-aircraft gunners turned into infantry, and some resistance fighters. The Fusiliers would become part of a motorized force–codenamed Saint Force–that would advance from Putte to Kalmthout and Achterbroek, about five miles distant. In addition to the Fusiliers, the force would include the Fort Garry Horse’s ‘A’ and ‘B’ squadrons, a squadron of 14th Canadian Hussars’ armoured cars, a platoon each of Toronto Scottish Regiment’s heavy machine-gunners and mortarmen, and a troop of 23rd Canadian Anti-Tank Battery armed with 17-pounders.
As some of the armoured units were supporting the South Saskatchewan Regiment near Brecht, both commanders were anxious that their extraction not be disclosed to the Germans because the South Saskatchewans were “too thin on the ground and any sign of withdrawal might [encourage] the enemy to infiltrate.”45 Keefler had intended to launch the operation on October 7 at 1000 hours, but the Essex Scottish in Putte only received instructions to secure a designated start line one mile north of the town at 0130 hours and met stiff resistance from the 1018th Grenadier Regiment troops, who had to be rooted out from behind several well-positioned roadblocks.
Consequently, it was 1330 hours when the 14th Hussars sent an initial reconnaissance party along the single road connecting Putte to Kalmthout. They quickly encountered a roadblock and started taking antitank fire. Hastily withdrawing, the Hussars attempted to find an alternate route to bypass the position. But each track wending off through the dense woods and marshes either petered out or wandered in the wrong direction. At 1700 hours, an exasperated Keefler called off the operation, planning a fresh attempt on October 8.46
This time, the Fusiliers and tankers would lead the drive, despite the fact that the infantry was short 226 men and so less than three-quarters of its normal strength. The Fort Garry Horse officers were briefed on the new plan “dreamed up on the previous night” at 0645 hours, and came away understanding that Saint Force’s “hastily improvised” purpose was “to worry the enemy on the right” to take pressure off the thrust on Woensdrecht.47
Tankers and infantrymen crossed the start line at 0805 hours. A mist that cut visibility to about 150 feet clung to the ground. After advancing a few hundred yards, the tanks came under fire from hidden 88-millimetre guns, and the road was heavily mined. Several hours were spent bypassing the German strongpoint. The mist having dissipated, the tanks were able to locate and break up pockets of resistance, and the advance began to quicken. By late afternoon, Saint Force had reached Dorp, a mile north of Kalmthout. This armoured thrust greatly alarmed lxvii Corps, which feared the Canadians were making for Essen, about seven and a half miles farther north.48A complete breakout was only prevented “in hard, fluctuating fighting” by throwing in “the last reserves [other than those of Kampfgruppe Chill], put together from division trains and alert units.”49
At Dorp, these reinforcements stiffened the resistance and Saint Force was heavily shelled and mortared. At 1730 hours, Keefler met Gauvreau and told him that the Germans were concentrating in strength north of Hoogerheide to undertake a major counterattack against that village. Therefore, Saint Force’s operation was cancelled. While the Fusiliers concentrated at Kalmthout, the tanks were withdrawn and sent west to meet this threat.50
[ 11 ]
With Devastating Effect
ON THE EARLY MORNING of October 8, Brigadier Holly Keefler had ordered 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade to send a probe from Ossendrecht onto the South Beveland isthmus to sever the communication link between the island and Bergen op Zoom. Assured that resistance would be light, Major D.S. “Tim” Beatty led the Royal Regiment of Canada’s ‘D’ Company directly west along a dyke road bordered by fields covered in eight feet of water as a result of deliberate German flooding. A troop of the 14th Canadian Hussars armoured cars, two antitank gun sections, two Toronto Scottish three-inch mortar sections, and two of this battalion’s Vickers machine-gun sections were in support–as were fifty Belgian resistance fighters. About a mile out from Ossendrecht, the fields ceased being flooded. But the force remained in true polder country, wide fields of reclaimed land protected by a grid of dykes with scarcely a tree or bush in sight. Beatty and his men hoped the heavy mist hid them from German eyes.1
Beatty kept the advance moving smartly, for the mist might lift at any time. When the lead platoons surprised and drove off about thirty German infantry supported by a 20-millimetre gun, the short bursts of gunfire gave the game away. From the seaside village of Bath on the southern edge of the isthmus, fusiliers from 70th Infantry Division rushed to block the Canadian advance, and were soon joined by a self-propelled gun sent from Bergen op Zoom. This ad hoc force tried to slow ‘D’ Company’s pace with scattered machine-gun fire. But the hastily improvised positions dug into the dykes were easily located and Beatty was able to eliminate them with artillery or mortar fire. By evening, ‘D’ Company had advanced six thousand yards and, halfway between Ossendrecht and Bath, was dug in along the east side of a north-south–running polder dyke. Under cover of darkness, ‘A’ Company came forward to provide reinforcement.2
In Hoogerheide, meanwhile, the Calgary Highlanders had cleaned out the remaining resistance by mid-morning. To their right, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve had also emerged from its hiding spot in the woods in a renewed advance. Encountering a strong German position, Lieutenant Charles Forbes led his platoon to outflank it, only to have his men driven to ground by heavy fire. Alone, Forbes charged on, firing his Sten gun and shouting for his men to follow. Forbes “rushed two posts, killed two crew members and captured five more.”3 That cleared the way to its objective on the east side of Hoogerheide. With Hoogerheide de
clared secure, the path was open for the Black Watch to begin its move up the road to Korteven.
Mist wrapped Hoogerheide and the ground north of it as the Black Watch officers gathered next to a windmill outside the village to be briefed by Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Ritchie. Standing on a damp patch of grass, the officers listened glumly as Ritchie told them the rifle companies would have to win their own start line north of the village because 5 CIB’S other two battalions were only just finishing clearing the immediate area of Hoogerheide. Given the fog and lack of intelligence regarding possible opposition, Ritchie said “a more cautious advance was called for” than the original mile-long dash straight to Korteven that brigade had planned. With a troop of tanks from the Fort Garry Horse’s ‘C’ Squadron, two companies would push in line up either side of the main highway to its crossing with Dool Straat, about midway between Hoogerheide and Korteven. Here the regiment would concentrate while Ritchie assessed whether it was possible to go farther.4
As Ritchie was giving his orders, Oberstleutnant Friederich von der Heydte was setting up his headquarters in the magnificent Mattemburg estate country house to the north of Korteven. In the surrounding woods and small open fields, the paratroops were readying for battle. Considering that the best intelligence was gathered personally, von der Heydte soon jumped into his Kubelwagen and headed for Hoogerheide.5
As he raced south, the Black Watch’s ‘C’ Company on the left and ‘D’ Company on the right started marching up the road at 1030 hours. ‘A’ Company followed the former, ‘B’ the latter. Back at a large school-house in Hoogerheide, Ritchie anxiously monitored the wireless. No sooner had the rifle companies and trailing tanks disappeared from view than Ritchie heard the sharp sounds of gunfire and the thud of explosions. Yet it was almost an hour before ‘D’ Company reported having gained the start line for the attack, and Ritchie realized his men had been “forced to fight every inch of the way up to it.”6
Pausing by a bakery just north of where the highway intersected a major crossroad named the Raadhuisstraat, von der Heydte peered south and saw through the windows of a house a line of soldiers approaching his position along another street. Suddenly, he recognized the distinctive piss-pot profile of British helmets and lunged back into the Kubelwagen. Reversing at full speed, von der Heydte backed out of range before the startled Black Watch troops could open fire. He arrived back at Mattemburg, “considerably scared but unharmed,” and began preparing to counterattack the Canadians as quickly as possible.7 His aim was simple. The paratroops, supported by 225th Assault Gun Brigade and 70th Artillery Regiment, would advance “without delay” to retake Hoogerheide and then Ossen-drecht. This would restore a strong defensive line capable of protecting the isthmus.8 The paratroop commander was completely confident this could be done, as was Oberst Elmar Warning, who considered the “leadership and troops” of these units “excellent; the cadre personnel consisted of long-experienced, battle-tried, active parachutists, the main body of the troops of very good replacements.” The 225th Assault Gun Brigade was likewise “well tested.”9
Having gained their start line, the Black Watch advanced to Dool Straat. Opposition kept hardening, as paratroops stiffened the defences with heavy machine guns and skillful sniping. Artillery and mortar fire pummelled the Canadians. ‘D’ Company’s No. 17 Platoon, under Lieutenant Lewis, crossed the side road and set up a fighting position inside three houses, only to receive orders from company commander Major Popham to fall back because of heavy casualties and reorganize at the start line. Near Dool Straat, ‘C’ Company dug in at 1335 hours and the Black Watch went over to the defensive.10
WITH EACH PASSING hour, German artillery and mortar fire directed against Hoogerheide increased. When exploding rounds severed the telephone lines linking the Calgary Highlanders headquarters to the forward companies, Captain Mark Tennant drove forward in a Bren carrier. Stopping behind the cover of the village church, Tennant dismounted and jogged around to the cemetery to assess the situation ahead before driving into it. Badly savaged by incoming shells, the cemetery was macabre. Tombs had been shattered and graves broken open so that the bones of corpses were tossed all over. As he trotted up the stairs leading to a church entrance, a shell struck nearby. Badly wounded, the officer fell to the ground. Several soldiers rushed to drag Tennant into a ditch, and when the shelling slackened, had him taken back to headquarters in the carrier.11 The medical officer applied emergency dressings and sent the officer by ambulance to a field hospital. Hovering close by as Tennant was bandaged, a tearful Lieutenant Colonel Donald MacLauchlan declared in a choked voice as the ambulance drove off, “There goes a stout fellow! Worth three men to us!”12
In the mid-afternoon, a group of Dutch civilians slipped through the lines and advised Calgary Highlanders Company Sergeant Major Harold Larson that a large force of German infantry supported by tanks, guns, and various types of fighting vehicles was gathering to the north of Hoogerheide. Larson quickly passed the information to Lieutenant Colonel MacLauchlan, who sent it on to brigade. “There are reports of a strong enemy force forming up between Bergen op Zoom and Korteven composed of 1,000 troops with tanks, guns, and AFVS,” the brigade war diarist recorded. “This may possibly be a strong counter-attack force.”
An aerial reconnaissance soon confirmed that a major German force was massing north of Korteven.13 In an attempt to disrupt this buildup, eight Typhoons of 257th Squadron, Royal Air Force strafed the area with rockets. The planes were met by intense anti-aircraft fire from guns von der Heydte had deployed to protect his headquarters and rallying ground. One badly damaged Typhoon crashed in the woods near Mattemburg, killing its twenty-two-year-old pilot, New Zealander J.R. Powell.
In the early evening, Germans began infiltrating the outskirts of Hoogerheide to warn the civilians to clear out, less for humanitarian reasons than because the paratroops feared they might try to disrupt the counterattack or carry intelligence to the Canadians. While some civilians headed north to Bergen op Zoom, more passed through the Canadian lines to find safety in the Belgian border area.
All three 5 CIB battalions braced that evening for certain attack. The Brabant Wall presented a natural barrier that protected the brigade’s western flank, so the Calgary Highlanders were able to concentrate to meet a head-on attack from the north. Their defensive area covered the left side of the village, anchored on the Raadhuisstraat, while the Black Watch held the right side. On the village’s eastern edge, this battalion’s carrier platoon established a blocking position where a road called the Woowbaan came in on a forty-five-degree angle from the northeast. Out on the right flank from the Black Watch position, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve had its outer flank anchored on the edge of an airstrip that until recently had been intermittently used by the Luftwaffe.14
Once darkness fell, paratroopers began infiltrating Hoogerheide, probing for weaknesses. With each passing hour, the intensity of shelling and mortaring increased. The exploding shells made sleep impossible, so the soldiers huddled in their fighting positions were alert. Consequently, when two paratroopers crept up, intent on killing or capturing the Black Watch troops in one slit trench, they were immediately shot dead by a Bren gun burst.15 Several small counterattacks tested the line. First, the Calgarians ‘C’ Company drove off an attack. Then it was ‘D’ Company’s turn. From all along the perimeter, the grinding sound of tanks, self-propelled guns, and other vehicles could be heard.16
A counterattack struck the Black Watch’s ‘D’ Company, and as it was being fought off, a large number of German infantry marched down the Wouwbaan towards the blocking carrier platoon.17 Attached to headquarters, carrier platoons served as an inherent mobile fighting unit that could pinch-hit as armour when necessary by moving rapidly from one hotspot to another. Normally, a carrier platoon numbered about sixty-five men, twice as strong as a regular rifle platoon. Because the carriers mounted Bren guns, these platoons had far more firepower. They travelled aboard a dozen carriers, the same number of motorcy
cles, and several jeeps.18
Perfectly positioned, the carrier platoon “made no move, and held their fire until the enemy was from 50 to 60 yards away, and then they opened up with everything they had, killing over fifty… Very heavy fighting ensued and it was over two hours before the enemy decided that he had had enough. We lost no ground, and accounted for many Germans in the engagement.”19
Although the counterattacks on the Calgary line were smaller than those against the Black Watch, Lieutenant Colonel Donald MacLauchlan was growing increasingly alarmed. He urgently requested tank support, but was told by brigade at 2115 to provide his own support with the battalion carrier platoon.20 At 2205, he asked Brigadier Bill Megill for reinforcement by 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, a request immediately rejected. When reports from the front indicated that German patrols were probing his far left flank, MacLauchlan feared he was going to be outflanked and pleaded with Megill for two companies of reinforcements to extend his line. Megill had nothing to offer him.21
While MacLauchlan fretted, some officers in his headquarters staff were delighted when the farm’s owner broke out “several cases of wine, milk and jam” and “presumed upon the farmer’s generosity” by sampling the wine. Hearing this, MacLauchlan “announced his displeasure in a scathing blast. These are trying days for our c.o.,” noted the battalion war diarist. “He worries about everyone and everything.”22 It was increasingly obvious MacLauchlan was verging on a breakdown, likely a victim of battle exhaustion. Just as apparent–from the increasing racket across the length of the perimeter of German rifle, machine-gun, and mortar fire, the rumbling back and forth of tracked vehicles, the shouts in German as men yelled back and forth to each other in the darkness, the sound of shovels and picks cutting into the earth to carve advanced fighting positions, and the endless infiltration attempts–Hoogerheide was about to be the focus of a terrific attack by a superior force.