In his post-prayer speech on the 16th, Gandhi pleaded for patience. He said, 'You should bear with the Mission, too. They have inherited the tradition of imperialism which they cannot outgrow all at once.... We must not blame them for not throwing it overboard overnight. Let us trust their bona fides. Let us not act upon mere suspicion.' That night he woke up at half past one and dictated a draft of a letter from the CWC to the viceroy in response to the unilateral announcement about the interim government. He emphasised four points: (i) the League being avowedly a Muslim organisation could not include any non-Muslim representative in its list; (ii) the Congress as a nationalist organisation must have the right to include a Congress Muslim in its list; (iii) the League could have no say in the selection of any name outside those belonging to its quota of five Muslims. This meant, in the event of a vacancy occurring among the seats allotted to the minorities, the Congress alone would have the right to select names to fill up the vacancies as it claimed to represent all sections by right of service; and (iv) in action, the interim government should be regarded as being responsible to the elected representatives in the Assembly. The CWC ignored Gandhi's draft and in the afternoon session on 17 June decided on their reply: the CWC was not 'enamoured' of the viceroy's proposal but they did not want to say 'no' to it. Mahtab, being a loyal Congressman, would abide by the decision of the CWC and the omission of Sarat Chandra Bose would be rectified. The non-inclusion of a nationalist Muslim from the Congress would be dealt with by nominating a nationalist Muslim in place of a Hindu from the Congress quota, even though this would effectively give the majority Indian community a minority representation in the interim government.
After having denied that he had ever assured the Congress that the interim government would enjoy the same powers as a dominion Cabinet, in a letter addressed to the Congress president on 30 May, the viceroy went on to assure that: 'His Majesty's Government would treat the new Interim Government with the same close consideration as a Dominion Government; most liberal intentions may be almost unrecognisable when they have to be expressed in a formal document. I have no doubt that if you are prepared to trust me, we shall be able to cooperate in a manner which will give India a sense of freedom from external control and will prepare [it] for complete freedom as soon as the new constitution is made'. The Congress surprisingly cowed down to the bullying tactics of the Muslim League and the partisan behaviour of the viceroy and decided to accept the viceroy's plan for the interim government. It was decided that, since the inclusion of Abdur Rab Nishtar's name directly affected the Khan brothers of the NWFP, the CWC would wait for the arrival of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan from Uttmanzai the next day.
Just then a new crisis occurred. The Statesman published an extract of a letter written by Jinnah to Lord Wavell, in which he had laid down new conditions which would have to be fulfilled before the Muslim League agreed to the proposal put forth by the viceroy. Some of his demands were totally new, to which the Congress could never agree. Referring to the newspaper report the Congress president wrote to the viceroy asking for the text of Jinnah's letter as well as the viceroy's reply. In a letter dated 20 June 1946, the viceroy had given several assurances to Jinnah. One was that no change would be made in the list of nominees without the consent of both the major parties. This meant that the Congress could not nominate a nationalist Muslim even within its own quota without the consent of the League and neither would its objection to the nominees of the League be of any consequence. Another assurance given by the viceroy to Jinnah was that if a vacancy occurred among the minority seats, including the schedule castes, both the major parties would be consulted before filling the vacancy. This gave the Muslim League the power of veto in the selection of representatives of the scheduled castes who were an integral part of the Hindu society, even according to the classifications prepared by the administration and confirmed by the viceroy, and further linked by him to the Congress. In his letter of 15 June to the Congress president, the viceroy had denied that there was any League-Congress or Hindu-Muslim parity in the interim government, since to the five League-Muslim members there were six Congress-Hindu members which included a schedule caste member. But with the new Wavell-Jinnah understanding, 'parity' was being brought in through the backdoor. Now the schedule castes were not only being separated from the Congress, but also from the Hindu quota. This was the only conclusion that could be drawn from the viceroy giving the Muslim League the power to accept or reject a nominee of the schedule castes; there would now be parity not only between the Congress and the Muslim League, but between the caste Hindus and the Muslims too. The Congress would henceforth not only be reclassified as a Hindu organisation, but as a caste Hindu one.
The CWC now began to feel that the viceroy was not only behaving in a partisan manner towards the Muslim League and Jinnah, but actually in alliance with them. This feeling was further strengthened when, on 22 June, the viceroy, in a letter to the Congress president, asked the Congress not to press their demand for the inclusion of a nationalist Muslim from their party in the interim government: Tor reasons of which you are well aware it is not possible for the Cabinet Mission or myself to accept this request'. This was at variance to his reply rejecting the objections raised by the Congress to the Muslim League's nominee Abdur Rab Nishtar. The viceroy had, on 15 June, reasoned that, 'I cannot accept the right of the Congress to object to names put forward by the Muslim League, any more than I would accept similar objections from the other side'.
To Gandhi, the intricacies of maintaining a balance of power were meaningless. He refused to accept a change of role for the Congress for the mere success of a power-sharing formula. To him, the Congress was rightfully and duty-bound to portray its role as a nationalist organisation representing all communities and classes. The Congress would be committing political suicide if it accepted any other role. Similarly, it must not discard, for any political gains, its friends. Such opportunism would be the cause of its downfall and would eventually prove fatal. 'To gain the world at the cost of one's soul' was a bad bargain for Gandhi. The CWC, however, thought differently. The daily entries in Pyarelal's diaries throw light on the events of these days, Gandhi's state of mind and the growing chasm between him and the CWC:
New Delhi, 19th June, 1946
'In order to include a Nationalist Muslim in the Cabinet it would be necessary for the Congress to drop a Hindu name. If an outstanding figure like Maulana Saheb for instance is put there, nobody would object even though it would reduce the Hindu quota. But the Maulana feels a delicacy about it and has absolutely refused in spite of Bapu's personal pleading.
'Bapu gave a final notice to the Working Committee today that if they agreed to the non-inclusion of a Nationalist Muslim and the inclusion of the name of N.P. Engineer, which the Viceroy had foisted upon them, he would have nothing to do with the whole business and leave Delhi'.
New Delhi, 20th June, 1946
'Bapu again reiterated his stand in the Working Committee in regard to the inclusion of a Nationalist Muslim. The Sardar strongly supported him and told the members that they dared not make terms with the Cabinet Mission by repudiating Bapu. In the end it was decided to send Bapu's draft letter to the Cabinet Mission. In the meantime news came that the Kashmir Government had arrested Pandit Nehru. Wires were sent to the absent members, Shankarrao Deo, Govind Vallabh Pant and Narendra Dev—to call them back.
'Between 1.30 and 2.45 pm, Cripps came and saw Bapu. Bapu again urged upon him that the Cabinet Mission must choose between the one or the other party, not attempt an amalgam; the Cabinet Mission were pursuing a wrong course. Cripps was apologetic. It would be difficult to begin anew after having come so far; Jinnah would not listen, and so on. In the end Bapu told him that in that case the Cabinet Mission could go the way they liked; he would have nothing to do with it.'
New Delhi, 21st June, 1946
'Bapu's draft was again discussed in the Working Committee. Bapu warned the members that they would not gain anything b
y entering on their new venture on bended knees. He reiterated his opinion that if the Cabinet Mission did not accept their conditions, it would be better to let the Muslim League form a National Government at the Centre during the interim period.
'The Maulana Saheb sent a wire to the Kashmir Government that Jawaharlal's presence was badly needed in the deliberations on the Working Committee. He also sent a message to the Viceroy requesting him to make arrangements for a suitable transport to enable him to return to Delhi. The Viceroy has accordingly sent necessary instructions to the Resident. Later, news came that Kashmir Darbar had provided plane and motor transport for Jawaharlal's return.
'In the evening Bapu told the Sardar that negotiations for the inclusion of a Nationalist Muslim in the Cabinet should be conducted not by the Maulana Saheb but someone else as the Maulana Saheb being himself a Nationalist Muslim might feel it embarrassing to carry the insistence to its logical end.'
New Delhi, 22nd. June, 1946
'Sudhir Ghosh saw Cripps. He reported that Cripps had told him that the Congress stand in regard to the inclusion of a Nationalist Muslim was absolutely logical and legitimate but could not the Working Committee waive it? They had proceeded on a written assurance which they had received from the Maulana Saheb that the Working Committee would not stick out on that point. And now they found themselves placed in an awkward position. On Sudhir asking why they could not entrust the power to the League if the Congress declined to accept it on the Cabinet Mission's terms, Cripps replied that they did not feel that the League by itself could be entrusted with it.
"Then why not entrust it to the Congress?"
"For that we shall need the authority of HMG."
"Could not that be done from here?"
"No, that would require personal discussion."
'At noon, a letter was received from the Viceroy asking the Congress President not to press the demand about the inclusion of a Muslim of their choice among the representatives of the Congress in the Interim Government. It achieved what Bapu's persuasion had failed to do so far. On the question being put to the vote in the Working Committee all except one were opposed to the acceptance of power on those terms'.
New Delhi, 23rd June, 1946
'In the Working Committee meeting in the afternoon Bapu put forth his emphatic view that the Congress should keep out of the Interim Government but go into the Constituent Assembly as it was purely an electiye body whose representative character was admitted even by the British Government. The Viceroy could not interfere with its working—he could not even sit in it as a matter of right. If the worst came to the worst, it could be turned into a rebel body... In the alternative, he saw no possibility of giving a fight, as the requisite atmosphere of non-violence was not forthcoming. Personally, he could not even think of launching civil disobedience, etc.
'While he was proceeding in this strain, Rajendra Babu read out a telegram he had received from Assam, drawing attention to the form which the Viceroy's Reforms Office had issued to the Speakers of the various Provincial Assemblies for the election of members to the Constituent Assembly. Among other things it required the candidates to declare that they would be "willing to serve as representatives of the Province for purposes of paragraph 19 of the statement" of 16th May of the Cabinet Mission. Para 19 contained the disputed clauses relating to the formation of groups. Sardar Patel had also received a similar message from B.G. Kher, the Chief Minister of Bombay: If the Congress candidates signed the declaration would it not commit them to the principle of grouping and voting in the Section, as laid down in Para 19? On reading the text Bapu exclaimed: "Even the Constituent Assembly plan now stinks. I am afraid, we cannot touch it".
'Referring to the new hitch in the course of the prayer discourse in the evening Gandhi remarked: 'A single drop of poison can convert a pot of nectar into a fatal draught. It grieves me to see that the Constituent Assembly is being killed by the underlings of the very people who had given it birth,' he said about the authors of the state paper unless it was found later that they had known that such instructions were issued. He still clung to the hope that it was only an error and would soon be rectified.
'In the evening Rajkumari Amrit Kaur went to see Abell, private secretary to the viceroy. Abell said that Jinnah was very obstinate. But what could they do? They had to take him along. He showed her the letter received from the Congress which apparently seemed to have been written without the knowledge of the CWC. It was only on receiving that letter that they had conceded Jinnah's demands for the sake of a settlement. How could they be blamed for it? He hoped that the Congress would not carry its insistence to the breaking point'.
New Delhi, 24th June, 1946
'Fates seem to have been furiously at work yesterday. In the morning while returning to Birla House from the silent prayer meeting, after dropping Bapu at Harijan Colony, the Sardar's car crossed that of Lord Pethick-Lawrence coming from the opposite direction. Lord Pethick-Lawrence had gone from the silent prayer straight to Birla House to meet the Sardar but did not find him there. He recognised the Sardar's car, took the Sardar into his own and whisked him away to his residence, where they had half an hour's talk.
'At noon Lord Pethick-Lawrence and Mr. A.V Alexander joined the Sardar at lunch at Birla House. Rajaji also was present. In the afternoon the Sardar, the Maulana, Pandit Nehru and Rajendra Babu had a meeting with the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy.
'In the morning today, when Sudhir came to see Bapu, he said that last night he had seen Cripps. The latter had told him that they had decided that if the Congress accepted the long term plan and rejected the short term proposal, all that the Cabinet Mission had done under the 16th June declaration for the formation of an Interim Government would be scrapped and a de novo attempt made for the same. They invited Bapu and Sardar to meet them. They seem to have made up their mind to clear up the mess created by the assurances given to Jinnah by Lord Wavell.
'At seven a.m. Bapu accompanied by Sardar and Sudhir went to meet the Cabinet Mission. Today being his day of silence, conversation on his part was carried on by scribbling short slips, which read as follows:
"I understood that you proposed to scrap the whole plan of Interim Government as it has gone up to now and consider the situation de novo.
"Then if you say that you will form a Government out of the acceptances it won't work as far as I can see. If you are not in a desperate hurry and if you would discuss the thing with me, I would gladly do so after I have opened my lips, i.e. after 8 p.m. Meanwhile you should have if you do not mind the Working Committee letter of rejection of the proposal contained in the Viceroy's letter of 22nd instant. In my opinion that letter put a new appearance on the Interim Government. The object of the Working Committee so far as I know is to help the Mission, not to hinder it except when its project results in the Working Committee committing suicide. Sudhir's talk led me to see light through the prevailing darkness. But is there really light?
"As to the Constituent Assembly, I was quite clear up to yesterday afternoon that the Congress should work the Constituent Assembly to the best of its ability. But the rules I read yesterday have revolutionised my mentality. There is a serious flaw. I accuse nobody. But a flaw is a flaw. The three parties must not work with three minds and hope for success.
"Then you should not isolate a particular section from the whole. Why not say 'under the state Paper as a whole'?
"However I would gladly discuss this question also with you in the evening. I am sorry to cause you all this trouble. I only hope that you perceive my object in all this effort."
'After the meeting, the Sardar asked to be dropped at the residence of the Maulana. On the way he asked Bapu: "There is a meeting of the Working Committee; what am I to tell them?" Bapu answered that he was not satisfied with the talk with the Cabinet Mission. The Sardar was irritated. "You raised doubts as regards para 19. They have given a clear assurance on that. What more do you want?" Bapu scribbled in reply: "During our meeting when Cr
ipps said to me that if we were apprehensive about the wording of the instruction issued by the Reforms Office they could delete the reference to para 19 and substitute in its place the words 'for the purpose of the declaration of the 16th May', Lord Pethick-Lawrence immediately intervened and said: 'No, that presents difficulty'. " The Sardar dissented, Bapu asked Sudhir, Sudhir confirmed Bapu's version but added that his own impression was that they were prepared to concede what Bapu had asked for.
'The Maulana Saheb after hearing the report of the meeting with the Cabinet Mission took both Bapu and Sardar to the Working Committee where there was a prolonged discussion. The Sardar said that they were under a promise to give their decision to the Cabinet Mission that afternoon. Bapu dissented. In a series of scribbled slips he suggested that they should postpone their decision till he met the Cabinet Delegation in the evening and obtained further clarification from them. Finally he scribbled: "There is no question of my feelings being hurt. I am against deciding this issue today but you are free to decide as you like".
Lets Kill Gandhi Page 27