When the new viceroy took over, Caroe tried to influence him to dismiss the provincial government. He cited the law and order situation in the province and the inability of the provincial government to normalise the situation as reason enough for dismissal. In April, when the viceroy visited the NWFP, Caroe made a strong pitch for new elections. This was strange since an election—which the Congress had won—had been held just a year back. The election had been fought on the issue of Pakistan; the League had campaigned hard on the basis of their demand for an independent Muslim homeland, and yet of the thirty-eight Muslim seats the Congress won twenty-one, it won all the nine Hindu seats and two out of three Sikh seats. The result reflected that the Congress had secured acceptance among all three communities, whereas the Muslim League had managed to win only a marginal number of seats overall and that exclusively amongst the Muslims.
On his arrival at Peshawar, the viceroy held a meeting with the governor, Dr. Khan Saheb, and his Cabinet of four ministers. During this meeting harsh words were exchanged between Dr. Khan Saheb and Sir Olaf Caroe. Privately Mountbatten told Dr. Khan Saheb that, in his opinion, a fresh election in the province was necessary. Jinnah had promised him that, in the event of a fresh election being held, he would call off the League-sponsored 'Direct Action', and there would be no violence. The viceroy assured Khan Saheb that he had made no definite commitment to the League. He added that he had told Jinnah firmly that nothing would be yielded to violence. The same day, as per the promise he had made to Jinnah in Delhi, Mountbatten ordered the release of all the Muslim League leaders arrested for their role in instigating violence during the 'Direct Action' agitation.
The next day, on his return journey, the viceroy and his wife got to see the results of the League's 'Direct Action' at Rawalpindi in the Punjab. The devastation in the Hindu and Sikh quarters of the city, in the words of the press attache, was 'as thorough as any produced by fire-bomb raids during the war'. The Muslims of the area seemed to be 'quite pleased with themselves'. While Mountbatten, HMG and the colonial administration kept reiterating that nothing would be yielded to force, the Muslim League increased the intensity of its violence and instead of it jeopardising their political demands, it led to one extraordinary concession after the other. The 'Direct Action' campaign in the Frontier was never called off and on 7 May, Jinnah issued a statement that he approved of the decision of the Frontier Muslim League to carry on with the movement.
Why was Caroe so adamant about dismissing the Congress government and holding fresh elections in the province? He argued that the 'violent demonstrations throughout the province' indicated a lack of confidence in the ministry. Badshah Khan gave a spirited rejoinder. During the six years of the Second World War there was no trouble in the Frontier Province. The British needed peace then and there was peace. And now, while the British power in the NWFP looked on, hundreds of people were being killed and thousands rendered homeless. Instead of taking the firm measures that their ministers had asked for, lawlessness was being used as an excuse for their removal, though they had been returned to power by an overwhelming majority and still commanded a majority in the legislature! In a statement issued on 4 May 1947 from Delhi, Acharya Jugal Kishor, the general secretary of the Congress, and Dewan Chamanlal, whom Nehru had sent to the Frontier Province, reported: 'We have recently returned from a tour of the Frontier Province and what we have seen has shocked us beyond measure. There is no doubt that the adherents of the Muslim League have utilised these atrocious methods with the primary object of making it impossible for the Ministry to function, nor have we any doubt that what we may call the Governor's party has given direct or indirect encouragement to the law breakers. It is an open secret that the present Governor does not favour the Ministry. A man in his position, who is also the head of the Political Department, can seriously hamper the work of the Ministry since large numbers of administrative officers play a dual role, being civilian administrators as well as political agents.
'The happenings at Dera Ismail Khan were an eye opener to us. The League agitation had practically fizzled out until it became difficult to find more than four persons to offer themselves for arrest. It was obvious that the back of the agitation had been broken and all was peaceful. In this situation, secret meetings were held, people imported from the Punjab and other areas. Definite information was conveyed to the authorities of the impending disaster. Repeated orders were issued by the head of civilian administration for the arrest of ringleaders and repeatedly these orders were disobeyed by police officials. Indeed, even the orders of the Inspector-General of Police under the instructions of the Ministry were flouted. The flouting of these orders resulted in the agitators resorting to violence with impunity. The police had ample force at their disposal. Not a single platoon was brought into action, not a tear gas shell exploded, not a lathicharge made, not a shot was fired even in the air, with the inevitable result that whole bazaars were gutted and looted. A Governor should be appointed in the place of Sir Olaf Caroe, who is prepared to guarantee protection to the minorities and who is in full sympathy and harmony with the present ministry. It is not the Ministry that should be dismissed, but the Governor and the officials who look to him for support, and who have failed in preserving law and order'.
The Congress high command took a hard stance against the dismissal of the Dr. Khan Saheb ministry holding and of the fresh elections in the province. They threatened to boycott the colonial administration and walk out of any further negotiations with the viceroy and the British government. Mountbatten immediately made it clear to the League that he could neither agree to the dismissal of the ministry nor to fresh elections, in the face of Congress defiance. The proposal was therefore being dropped. Frustrated, the League intensified its programme of murder and arson.
Badshah Khan scented in these developments 'a big plot' engineered by the Leaguers and their 'departing masters the British'. He warned: 'We have set fire to our country, a fire from which we ourselves cannot escape. These things can neither help Islam nor the Muslim League nor Pakistan. It is dishonest to give a political status to the communal movement of the Muslim League, whose followers have been indulging in crime.' He appealed to the Muslim League 'to sit down with the Khudai Khidmatgars in a joint jirga [tribal council],' to tackle various important issues which might crop after the British departed from India. 'We can iron out our differences today if they meet us as brothers and renounce their violent methods. I shall agree to any honourable settlement among ourselves, if an earnest effort is made. Leaguers fear Hindu domination while we fear British domination. Let us meet together and convince each other. We are prepared to allay their fears. But will they in turn allay ours?' The appeal fell on deaf ears. The League had no desire to sit down with the Congress or the Khudai Khidmatgars, and come to an honourable compromise when it could get more through the British, who, on the one hand, continued to woo them, while continuing to frown over their wanton acts of butchery, on the other.
After the Cabinet Mission Plan fell through and partition was accepted by the Congress and the League, the new plan included a clause which acceded the League's demand of a referendum in the Frontier province to decide which dominion it would accede to in the altered situation, to India or to the new dominion of Pakistan, in case West Punjab opted for Pakistan. The Khan brothers, along with other Frontier leaders, felt this was rather premature. They believed that the issue could not properly be decided before the two parts of India had framed their respective constitutions and their decision on the very vital question of their future relationship with the British was known. Their past experience of British-West Asia imperialist diplomacy had taught them to be extremely wary of the British. In a statement issued soon after the publication of the partition plan of 3 June 1947, Badshah Khan observed: 'It may be a triumph for the Muslim League it is none for Islam. There are to be two Indias with Dominion status for each pending the decision of the respective Constituent Assemblies. Pathans do not want Dominion s
tatus for one day. They would prefer to frame their own constitution and ally themselves to that portion of India which makes for complete independence. Pathans would be friends with the whole world and foes with none.
'The question of referendum in my opinion does not arise. But I would welcome it any day if it was to be conducted without intimidation and outside influence. All India knows what travail the Frontier Province has recently passed through and yet may have to. My advice would, therefore, be that the Frontier Province should be left alone till the political weather has cleared. It may be asked to pronounce opinion as to the choice when the two parts have decided on the issue of final independence or membership of the British Commonwealth'.
The Frontier leaders also felt that the issue on which the verdict of the people was being sought was wrong. It would confuse the Pathan mind and was sure to be exploited by the Muslim League to raise communal passions and set up divisions among the Pathans with its inevitable result—civil war and everlasting blood feuds. They felt that if the referendum were to be held on the issue of Pathan autonomy, it would find all Pathans united, asking for 'freedom'. They demanded that the people of the Frontier should be free to choose between Pakistan and Pathanistan, an autonomous self-contained unit of Pushtu-speaking people under one constitution framed by them. Pathanistan would then decide which part it would accede to, when the full picture of the respective constitutions of India and Pakistan was before it.
Gandhi supported the proposal of the Khan brothers. He agreed that, if the proposed referendum was to be 'Pakistan versus Hindustan', in the context of events taking place, fanatics would misrepresent it. The Pathans would be asked, 'will you be with the Hindus or with your Muslim brethren?' The Congress was not a Hindu organisation, but in the circumstances, the Pathans would be confused. 'Let both parties honour the Pathan sentiment, and let the Pathans have their own constitution for internal affairs and administration. It would promote Pathan solidarity and avoid internal conflict, so that they would be better able to federate with Pakistan or with the Union of India. This should be irrespective of whether there was or was not a referendum. Any premature referendum would be a leap in the dark.'
The Pathans were a proud highlander race, and as is the case all over the world, averse to the domination of men from the plains. In the Pakistan that was taking shape, it was evident that the Punjabi Muslim landlords and traders were crafting out a dominant role for themselves. The Pathans feared that, after losing half of Punjab, the Punjabi Nawabs would grab the lands of the NWFP to establish new fiefdoms. This domination of the Punjabi Muslims in Pakistan was resented not only by the Pathans but also by the Bengalis of East Pakistan and the citizens of Sind. In 1971 it was this hegemony of the Punjabi Muslim that forced the Bengalis to wage a war of independence and break away from Pakistan. Kashmir was also in a similar position; the Kashmiri Muslim could not visualise being subservient to the Punjabi Muslim in Pakistan; that distrust remains even today.
Reams of correspondence ensued between the Khan brothers and Gandhi and various Congress leaders. Gandhi counselled the Congress leaders as well as conferred with the viceroy and Jinnah. His suggestion that, if the demand for an autonomous Pathan homeland was not granted, the Pathans should resort to satyagraha, found no takers. The Khan brothers feared that a confrontation with the Punjabi Muslim-dominated Muslim League, would lead to innumerable blood feuds and the Pukhtoon tribes would be embroiled in civil war. After months of negotiations and attempts to make Jinnah see reason, the Pukhtoon politicians decided to stay away from the referendum. The Muslim League had again managed to get what it wanted with considerable help from the colonial administration and the mechanisations of the British Political Department. Finally, a referendum based on communal lines was carried out and the result desired by the Muslim League and its British patrons was arrived at— the NWFP would be a part of Pakistan. After making innumerable visits to British prisons during the independence movement, Badshah Khan spent most of his remaining life under house arrest in Pakistan.
Pyarelal has summed up the situation in Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Vol. 10, Part II: 'The development in the Frontier Province had left Gandhiji extremely unhappy. The way partition was being effected, like the way the decision about partition itself had come, did not spell peace. "Lord Mountbatten means well, but I am afraid, the way he is going he may end by unwittingly doing incalculable harm", he observed in one of his post prayer addresses. In the desperation to obtain immediate relief, there was an unwillingness to grapple with realities and recourse was being had to make-believe and false compromises. Gandhiji's prediction concerning the departing British power was coming true. It was showing deep fissures. In the past that power had not hesitated to take strong measures when its own interests were at stake; but now it was not prepared to face up to the full logic of its solemn declaration and put down violence by a firm hand.
'Gandhiji saw no good coming out of this. By accepting partition at British hands, the Congress had averted an open civil war but only at the cost of a smouldering undeclared war. Gandhiji would have preferred the naked reality. An open fight, however ugly, ends in the natural course in a spell of peace and confers immunity of sort, at least for a time. But an undeclared war, which only the armed might of a third party prevents from breaking out into an open fight, only intensifies the dangerous passions. And as mental violence tends always to run to an excess that physical violence seldom does, such violence, when it ultimately breaks loose, does so with the cataclysmic fury of a lightning stroke, which leaves nothing but the trail of death and destruction behind.
'That was why Gandhiji had been so opposed to partition under the British aegis. He saw in the consequences of partition, as they were unfolding themselves, a confirmation of his worst fears. The Congress High Command had agreed to the vivisection of India to obtain a respite for themselves and the country from the League's subversive activities. In Pandit Nehru's grim phrase, they had cut off their head to get rid of their headache. They got relief no more than an amputee, who is left with his "phantom limb" aching worse than ever after the affected member had been removed'.
The Congress leaders had hoped that, immediately after the acceptance of the partition plan, the Muslim League members in the interim government would be removed, enabling them to administer the newly emerging independent nation without their harassment. They started clamouring for this but Mountbatten dithered over forcing the issue. Jinnah immediately sensed the danger; if the League members were removed from the interim government now, they would have no powers till Pakistan came into being and the Congress would have exclusive rule of the land. He immediately threatened to walk out of the partition plan and take recourse to 'Direct Action'. Mountbatten demurred as he did not wish to jeopardise the transfer of power. The issue of Mountbatten being appointed governor general of India and Pakistan was still pending confirmation. The Congress was in agreement, but Jinnah was yet to confirm. This was his trump card. The viceroy's advisors felt that he must not, in the circumstances, take any action that would jeopardise his 'objective and almost judicial status'. As a compromise, Mountbatten recommended that all contentious issues in the interim government should, so far as possible, be put on the backburner while contentious issues arising in the course of day-to-day administration should be referred to him for decision instead of being settled by a majority vote in the Cabinet. This provided him with temporary relief but the tension continued.
Conditions across the country were deteriorating rapidly. There were daily reports of violence, murder and arson pouring in from Punjab, Bengal and the NWFP. The Sikhs, in danger of losing the most as a result of partition, were becoming restive. The minorities in Sind and NWFP were becoming increasingly insecure about their future in Pakistan. The trickle of refugees from West Punjab was becoming a steady flow. The situation around the capital was also grim. There were reports of pitched battles being fought between the Muslim Meos of Gurgaon district and Hindu Ahirs and Jats.
Patel, who had agreed to partition to get rid of the danger posed by the League to the unity and stability of India, to his chagrin found that, with the Muslim League's bastion still firmly established in the interim government and in the administration he could do nothing to cope with the deteriorating situation. They had cut off the head, but the headache refused to go.
On the day after the council of the All India Muslim League adopted its resolution accepting the partition plan, Gandhi once again wrote to Mountbatten to bring home to him the danger of allowing matters to drift: 'The sooner you have a homogeneous Ministry the better. In no case can the League nominees work independently of the whole Cabinet. It is a vicious thing that there is a joint responsibility for every act of individual members.... The problem of civil and military services demands the same firm handling. Gurgaon strife is an instance in point, so far as I know, one single officer is responsible for the continuation of the mischief.
'Lastly, may I suggest that the attempt to please all parties is a fruitless and thankless task. In the course of our conversation, I suggested that equal praise bestowed on both the parties was not meant. No praise would have been the right thing. "Duty will be merit when debt becomes a donation". It is not too late to mend. Your undoubted skill as a warrior was never more in demand than today.'
But Mountbatten the political administrator, dominated Mountbatten the warrior, and so the former continued with his own agenda, ignoring the dire warnings of one, who at that time, was endowed with clairvoyance. Gandhi feared that, for all his good intentions, Mountbatten would be bound by his own compulsions and the fetters of the colonial administration, and thus would be unable to avert the looming tragedy unless there was a radical change in the policy pursued since the Cabinet Mission's visit to India. Gandhi still felt that the Cabinet Mission's plan for India would be better than Mountbatten's partition plan. He decided on one last effort to convince the viceroy to see issues from his perspective. On the midnight of 27 June, Gandhi wrote to the viceroy. Since he finished writing when it was past midnight, the letter was dated 27/28 June, 1947: 'I sent you a note in the afternoon. The time after the evening prayer and walk I wish to devote to talking to you on certain matters I was able to touch but could not develop when we met.
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