'These were the agents through whom the administration had to be carried on. Sardar Patel was a much harassed man, very ill too. The machine of which he was in charge could be run only in a particular way. He had to rely on his officers.... He could not afford to lose their loyalty by putting too heavy a strain on it, or allow their moral to be affected in the difficult times through which they were passing. Gandhiji found himself in a very anomalous position. He was not in the Government. The tempo of things very often left hardly any time to act through the normal channels. To tackle urgent and immediate problems that brooked no delay he had often to avail himself of the medium of his prayer address broadcasts. These became for the public and all concerned unofficial orders of the day. At the same time he did not want to do anything which might have even the appearance of intrusion or interference. On one occasion we found him writing to the Sardar: "After meeting Randhawa (deputy commissioner of Delhi) I felt it would save your time if I wrote to him directly. Would it be in order?"
'Mirabehn had been able to make some very fruitful contacts with the British military officers in 1942, when the Government became panicky under the stress of war. She asked Gandhiji whether she could not do something like that to get things set right in Delhi. The reply he gave her was significant: "These are not old days. Now there are wheels within wheels. You cannot do any useful service by seeing these military men except as friendly faces, who will give warm welcome but nothing else."
' "People expect much from me," he observed at one of his prayer meetings, "but they must realise that I am not running the Government." Those at the helm of affairs were his friends, but he did not, he went on to say, want anyone to accept his advice merely out of friendship or regard for him. They should do so only if it went home.... The Ministers had inherited the old machinery from the British rulers and they were making the best of it.
There were stresses and strains within the Cabinet too. The temperamental differences between Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel had always been there. And then there was the difference in regards to their respective approach to various questions. The Sardar had the highest regard personally for Pandit Nehru, and his matchless qualities of head and heart. But he complained that his chief had surrounded himself with bad counsellors, did not show sufficient confidence in him and got himself lost in abstractions and generalities which defeated his good intentions. Pandit Nehru on his part was dissatisfied with the Sardar's way of handling various questions, though he yielded to none in his appreciation of his shrewd common sense, administrative genius, drive and unsurpassed fighting qualities.... Both the Sardar and Pandit Nehru had by turns been allergic to Gandhiji's approach to sundry issues. But neither could do without Gandhiji, and Gandhiji had come to the conclusion that the country needed the services of them both in the Government. In spite of their differences the two had cooperated as disciplined soldiers and loyal friends and comrades for nearly thirty years during the struggle for freedom.... But since independence, these differences had begun, more and more, to assume a practical shape and even to affect their personal relations.
The delimitation of powers and functions of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis his Cabinet colleagues had never been clearly effected. Had the Prime Minister a special function as a "coordinator and supervisor" covering all the other Ministries? If so, how was that function discharged without interference with the functioning of other Ministries? This particularly affected the relations between Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel.... Acute differences of policy between two powerful colleagues in the Cabinet is generally resolved by a showdown between them—one of the two eliminating the other—if the differences cannot be otherwise reconciled. But Gandhiji's nonviolence had introduced a new dimension in Indian politics. It was possible, he had shown, to guide power without oneself being in power. Both Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel were big enough in their own right not to depend upon office for their position in the country. Instead of one trying to eliminate the other, each was prepared to eliminate himself in favour of the other in the interest of smooth running of the Government and both had written to Gandhiji to that effect.
'Gandhiji was afraid that the growing rift between the Congress leaders would be exploited by Pakistan. It almost seemed that Pakistan was banking upon a split and was only biding for its opportunity. Even more painful to Gandhiji personally was the fact that the Governor- General was being drawn into these bickering. "Why should we allow Mountbatten to take such interest in our family quarrels—his best intentions not withstanding?" he exclaimed to a Congress colleague. It was no reflection on Mountbatten the man. Gandhiji had the fullest confidence in him. But it was humiliating for India. Gandhiji had been trying in his own way to bridge these differences and from what he knew of the parties, he had not a shadow of a doubt as to the ultimate result. They were both patriots to the core.... Soon after I had rejoined him at Delhi, Gandhiji remarked to me one day: "Each of them—the Sardar, Pandit Nehru and Mountbatten—is playing his game with consummate skill—with the purest of motives and with the sole purpose of serving India according to his lights. As I am playing mine," he added, "and it alone is going to prevail in the end. There is no salvation for India except through my way. Mountbatten at least has seen this".'
The situation in Kashmir was deteriorating by the day. Gandhi likened the situation in Kashmir to a glowing matchstick in a stack of hay. 'You never can tell when it may light up and the whole thing go(es) up in a blaze'. The question of special powers given to the Maharaja post his accession was becoming a contentious and complicated issue. Gandhi wanted that the Union government have no special agreements with any of the princes or provinces. He hoped that the Indian Union would stand by the principles it was founded on, where there was 'full justice and equal treatment to the minorities and punishment for the wrong doers without fear or favour.'
To compound the chaos, every day brought with it a new complication. One of these was Pakistan's share of the cash balance of undivided India, which evolved into a long drawn out and acrimonious issue. Eventually, out of the Rs. 375 crores cash balance, Pakistan was paid Rs. 20 crores on the day of the transfer of power. Pakistan's share was to be decided after negotiations between the two governments. This agreement was signed between the representatives of the Pakistan government and senior leaders of the Union government including Patel and Nehru, after Pakistan had become an independent nation. After prolonged negotiations, an amount of Rs. 75 crores was agreed upon. A bilateral treaty was signed between two independent nations, by which India agreed to pay Rs. 55 crores to Pakistan.
To force India's hand and to score brownie points with their people, the Pakistan leaders made a triumphal announcement to the media that they had 'forced' India to pay Pakistan its share. This did not go down well with the people of India in the backdrop of the developments in Kashmir and the rehabilitation of refugees from Pakistan territories. To save face, the Indian leaders issued statements that they had insisted that the final settlement of the accounts and the payment of the balance amount would be done only after all issues were resolved between the two dominions. Pakistan leaders denied that any such conditions were imposed or accepted by them. The text of the treaty did not mention this either. Facing growing criticism, the Indian government decided unilaterally to defer the payment of the balance amount 'till all issues were resolved'. Pakistan immediately went on the offensive. The finance minister of Pakistan termed the move 'an act of aggression'. The Indian government justified their decision as their unwillingness to fund Pakistan's aggression against India in Kashmir. But when the agreement was signed, the aggression in Kashmir had already begun, but no such rider had been included. Nehru issued a statement justifying the Indian government's actions: 'A State freezes the credit of the other party in such circumstances. We have not frozen anything in that sense. All that we said was that we accept this agreement but there must be an overall settlement and we shall honour it completely'. This was logical but should have been included in the
treaty. Also, going by this agreement, when an act of aggression had already been committed why was the treaty, agreement, whatever one must call it, signed?
On 6 January, while meeting Gandhi to discuss the overall situation in Delhi, Mountbatten voiced his concern about the government's stand. Gandhi asked Mountbatten for his frank and candid opinion. Mountbatten replied that it would be the 'first dishonourable act' by the Indian Union government if the payment of the cash balance claimed by Pakistan was withheld. After this conversation Gandhi did refer to it and also said that, by agreeing to partition, a sin had been committed. By dishonouring an agreement, which was a moral commitment, India would compound the sin and after that its word would be worthless. He did not question the legality of the Union government's decision. He agreed that he would not insist that the Union government go beyond what the strict letter of the law required and permitted them. But he expected that India would live up to its tradition of death before dishonouring a promise.
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BOOK 3
12
* * *
RED FORT TRIAL
'I shall be content to be written down an impostor if my lips utter a word of anger or abuse against my assailant at the last moment.'
– MAHATMA GANDHI
Immediately after Gandhi was murdered at 5.17 pm on the lawns of Birla House on 30 January 1948, his murderer, Nathuram Vinayak Godse, was arrested. A member of Gandhi's entourage and an eyewitness to the murder, Nandlal Mehta, filed a First Information Report, FIR,of the murder at the Tughlaq Road Police Station. The original FIR was written in Hindustani, in the Urdu script. The following is its translation.
F.I.R. (First Information Report) & A.T.R. (Action Taken Report) of the Assassination of Mahatma Gandhi Police Station: Tughlaq Road, District New Delhi
F.I.R. No. 68 (In the original in Urdu script, the numerals 14 precede the handwritten number 68)*
Date and Place (should be time) of Occurrence: 30-1-1948; at 5.10 pm (5.17 pm)
Date and Hour when reported: 30-1-1948, 9.45 in the evening.
Name and Address of Informant & Complainant: Nandlal Mehta S/o. Nathalal Mehta, Community: Hindustani. Address: Connaught Circus, Lala Sarju Prasad Building, M Block, New Delhi.
Brief Description of the Offence and Property Carried off if any: 302 IPC.
Name & Address of the Criminal: —
Steps Taken regarding Investigation Explanation for Delay in Recording Information: There have been no delays. Complaint Number 50, Note Book No. 1.
Date and Time of Despatch from Police Station: Refer to Special Report.
Signed D/o. ASI Dalu Ram
The statement of Nandlal Mehta S/o. Nathalal Mehta, Community Hindustani, resident of Connaught Circus, Building Lala Sarju Prasad, New Delhi:
'I was present at the Birla House today. At about 10 minutes past 5 o'clock Gandhiji got up and left to go to the Prarthana Sthal from his room in the Birla House. He was accompanied by his "Sticks" Mrs. Abhabehn Gandhi and Miss Manubehn Gandhi. Mahatma Gandhi was walking between the two sisters with his arms on their shoulders. Shri Brijkishan Chandiwala resident of No. 1, Narendra Palace, Parliament Street and Sardar Gurbachan Singh resident of Minarpur, Delhi, were walking a few paces behind them. Some women from the Birla Family and 2 or 3 members of his staff were also in the entourage. After passing through the garden, Gandhiji climbed up the stone paved steps to go to the Prarthana Sthal. As Gandhiji ascended the steps, the gathering at the Prarthana Sthal stood up and parted forming a passage three feet wide through which Gandhiji could pass. Gandhiji folded his hands in greetings and started walking down the passage towards the dais. He had barely taken six or seven steps towards the Prarthana Sthal when a youth stepped out of the crowd and blocked his path, it was later learnt that the name of the young man was Narayan (should be Nathuram) Vinayak Godse, resident of Poona. The young man walked up to Gandhiji, when he was barely 2 to 3 feet away, he whipped out a pistol and fired thrice in rapid succession at Gandhiji. The bullets hit Gandhiji in his stomach and chest, blood began to flow from the wounds. Gandhiji collapsed to the ground saying "Ram ....R..a..m ..... R...a.....m". The attacker was immediately caught along with the pistol. Mahatma Gandhi was picked up and carried, unconscious, to his room in Birla House. There it was discovered that Gandhiji was no more. The Police took the murderer to the Police Station'. Signed N. L. Mehta, 30-1-48
Action Taken: On hearing the report of Gandhiji's murder, I immediately rushed to Birla House. Mahatma Gandhi's body was kept in a room in Birla House. I met Nandlal Mehta Sahib, who had given his eyewitness statement. The text of his statement was read out to him, after confirming that it was correct he signed it. A copy was given; on inquiring about the accused, I was told that ASI Dalu Ram had taken him to the Police Station. Since the offence was of IPC 302, the crime scene was investigated, evidence gathered, statements of eyewitnesses recorded and all this was filed at the Tughlaq Road Police Station, under due procedure. A special report must be forwarded to the concerned Senior Officials from the Police Station Post Haste. Signed.
Thus a file containing all the statements, investigation reports and copies of the relevant entries in the registers have been despatched to the office of DSP New Delhi, Jaswant Singh. The special report was despatched to the concerned officers on 30-1-1948 ASI Dalu Ram.
Written by SI Kuldeep Singh
The political fallout of Gandhi's murder was that the Union Home minister, Sardar Patel, came under intense attack, for the failure of the police department, which was directly under him, to protect Gandhi. The Nehru loyalists in the Congress saw this as an opportunity to attack and weaken the Iron Man of India. The attacks were strongly corrosive. It took a terrible toll, both on Patel's political as well as physical health. On 6 February 1948, in a special session to discuss Gandhi's murder, questions were raised in Parliament and the Home minister faced severe criticism.
(The following is a translation from Hindi by the author of the actual parliamentary proceedings)
Balakrishna Sharma, MP: Is it true that a superintendent of police was assigned to remain present during the prayer meetings, but on that unfortunate day he was absent?
Hon. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel: There were armed policemen in large numbers. But I have no information whether a superintendent was not present. I cannot confirm whether the officer was present or not. But I will inquire.
BS: On the day of the bomb explosion a search was carried out at Marina Hotel and some clothes were found with the laundry mark 'N.V.G.', Nathuram Vinayak Godse. Armed with this information the police went to Bombay and asked the Bombay Police to find that person. The Bombay Police sent back the policemen from here saying that they would make inquiries. Is it true that Bombay Police failed to track down and arrest Nathuram Vinayak Godse?
SVP: It is difficult and also improper to speak about or reveal issues which are under investigation. I can only say that after the arrest and interrogation of the first person who exploded the bomb, an officer from Delhi was immediately sent to Bombay to interact with the CID there. After consultations it was decided that some people should be arrested; but it was felt that immediate arrest would be improper, this would alert others involved in the conspiracy, they would then abscond or worse go underground and continue their nefarious activities. That is why after consultations the Bombay Police and the Delhi CID decided that the matter should be discreetly investigated and the entire conspiracy should be exposed along with all who were a part of it before (the) arrests. It is true that the police were on the look out for these people, but all of them were not in Bombay.
BS: If the information does not compromise the ongoing investigation, can I ask if it is true that Nathuram Godse came back to Delhi by plane?
SVP: I feel that it is improper to reveal details about a matter that is currently being investigated.
Deshbandhu Gupta, MP: If it is true that the person arrested first had confessed the name of the murderer was it not possible for the Delhi C
ID to secure his photograph from Bombay? Then copies of the photograph could have been distributed amongst the people looking after arrangements at the prayer meeting and they could have detained the murderer in time to prevent the murder?
SVP: After getting the information the Delhi Police did try to locate these people. But all the accused were not in one place and it was not possible to photograph them.
L. Krishnaswamy Bharati, MP: Is it true that this government had been informed by the Bombay police that a 'criminal' involved in the conspiracy was on his way from Bombay?
SVP: This is not true.
H.B. Kamath, MP: Is the government aware that after the calamity that has befallen us, certain vested interests and people are putting the entire blame on the Hon. home minister and are thus trying to create a rift in the Cabinet and are sowing doubts in the minds of the people?
Speaker: Keep quiet. Second question.
Rohini Kumar Chaudhury, MP: Can I ask if the police seek the convenience of the person they are assigned to protect? The truth is that in the matter of security the convenience of neither the governor nor the governor general is asked.
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