(a) whether any persons, in particular Shri Gajanan Viswanath Ketkar, of Poona, had prior information of the conspiracy of Nathuram Vinayak Godse and others to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi;
(b) whether any of such persons had communicated the said information to any authorities of the Government of Bombay or of the Government of India; in particular whether the aforesaid Shri Ketkar had conveyed the said information to the late Bal Gangadhar Kher, the then Premier of Bombay, through the late Balukaka Kanitkar;
(c) If so, what action was taken by the Government of Bombay, in Particular by the late Bal Gangadhar Kher, and the Government of India on the basis of the said information.
This notification was amended by notification No. 31/28/68- Pll.I(A) dated 28 October 1968, making clause (c) to read as follows:
(c) if so, what action was taken by the Government of Bombay, in particular by the late Bal Gangadhar Kher, and the Government of India and by the officers of the said Governments on the basis of the said information.
To assist the commission G.N. Vaidya was engaged by the government of Maharashtra and K.S. Chawla, barrister-at-law was appointed for the Government of India. The latter replaced their counsel and engaged B.B. Lai, advocate, who appeared before the commission from 10 February 1968. As G.N. Vaidya was raised to the bench, R.B. Kotwal took his place. The commission examined 101 witnesses and 407 documents were produced by the two governments and witnesses who appeared before the commission. The examination of the witnesses took 162 days at various places where the commission had to sit for the convenience of the witnesses—Bombay, New Delhi, Dharwar, Nagpur, Poona, Baroda and Chandigarh.
The report is in six volumes. The evidence recorded by the commission is contained in five volumes and the documents produced before it are contained in another five volumes. Besides this, the record of the proceedings before Judge Atmacharan had also to be perused as some of the statements were made part of the evidence before the commission. The case diaries of the Delhi Police's investigation into the bomb case and the murder case and the crime report of the Bombay police as also some of the files produced by the Government of India, director, Intelligence Bureau and by the inspector-general of police, Delhi, have been made part of the records.
In Chapter II of the commission's report headed Inquiries—Delhi. Para 3.3, states: After the funeral, a meeting was called at a very short notice at the house of the Home Minister in the evening of 31 January, 1948. According to R.N. Bannerjee's statement before Pathak as witness No. 17, the following were present: Prime Minister Nehru, Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel, B.G. Kher, Premier of Bombay, Rajagopalachari, Governor of West Bengal and Bannerjee and Sanjevi. D.W. Mehra's note Ex. 10-A dated 1 February 1948, besides these names gave the names of Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Morarji Desai, the Chief Commissioner and himself.
Sanjevi read out the confessional statement of Madanlal Pahwa and said that he had sent a copy to Bombay with two police officials who were flown from Delhi to Bombay on 21 January 1948. Sanjevi complained that the two police officers returned after two or three days and complained that the Bombay Police had asked them to return to Delhi.
This was what the director of Intelligence, told the prime minister and Home minister of the Union of India in the presence of the then premier and the Home minister of the province of Bombay. This was a serious allegation by a senior policeman against a subordinate police officer. The police officer at the receiving end was Jamsheyd 'Jimmy' Nagarvala, assistant commissioner of police and head of CID, Bombay. Nagarvala in his testimony before the commission denied that Madanlal's confession was given to him. At the time when the commission began proceedings Sanjevi had died and Nagarvala and U.H. Rana, another senior police officer from Poona, appeared before the commission to defend their actions.
At the meeting it was revealed that Sanjevi gave no information regarding the investigation post 20 January to either the deputy commissioner of Delhi or to Bannerjee. Bannerjee commented: 'I will put it to gross incompetency and lethargy on part of Sanjevi that he did not care to inform either me or to remind the Bombay Police as to what action they had been taking.'
Deposing before the commission Bannerjee stated that, besides the gentlemen he had named before, Shankarrao Deo was also present at the meeting. He said, 'This was the first intimation that we, from Pandit Nehru downwards got that there was a confessional statement and certain information was contained in it which if properly utilised would have resulted in the arrest of those persons who were participants in the murder of Mahatma Gandhi. In the Statement, the particulars and haunts of some of the persons who were subsequently accused and convicted of murder were given. If the police had been vigilant, it should have been possible for them to have arrested those persons.'
Bannerjee continued, 'None of us knew about the particulars of this conspiracy. Sanjevi never gave us any information about it. When he was asked why he had not done so he just said, "he was sorry he just did not do it". I put this due to the incompetency and lethargy of Sanjevi not to have informed or to have ordered the Bombay police to send their men here or to have reminded the Bombay police in regard to the information which was sent to them.'
This is a very surprising statement by a senior official. The dispute between Sardar Patel, the Union Home minister and Jawaharlal Nehru the prime minister had arisen because Nehru used to constantly interfere in the affairs of the Home ministry. Patel complained about this to Gandhi too. Surprisingly after the bomb attack on 20 January, till 30 January, the Prime Minister's Office did not inquire about the progress in the investigation or try to find out what had been learnt from the arrested man even once. It seems that all of a sudden the PMO had decided to keep its hands off the Home ministry. This too in a matter concerning an attempt on the life of Gandhi.
Writing about the inquiry carried out by Nagarvala in Bombay the commission states, in Para 2.34: 'The scene now shifts to Bombay where on an information given by Prof. Jain investigation was carried on between 21st January and 30 January 1948. This is an unfortunate chapter of opportunities missed, errors committed and of assuming exaggerated notions about one's self. After the explosion of the bomb Prof. Jain of the Ruia College got a little unnerved because Madanlal had disclosed to him before going to Delhi that he and his companions were going to murder Mahatma Gandhi which he had considered to be a mere boast though infact he did not take the matter so lightly. But he was hesitant, dithering and failed to give this information to any authority'.
Para 2.36 states what Nagarvala did on being given the information Prof. Jain had given to Morarji Desai: 'Nagarvala promptly got into touch with his contacts and his informers, instructing them to locate Karkare and his associates. He learnt from Ahmednagar that Karkare was not there'.
Para 2.37 states: 'It is not necessary at this stage to give a resume of what Nagarvala did or what steps he took. But briefly stated, he learnt that one Balraj Mehta and Avtar Singh of the Sher-e-Punjab Hotel were in the conspiracy. Information from Ahmednagar was that Badge of Poona, a dealer in illicit arms, was a close associate of Karkare; and his contacts informed him that Savarkar was the real instigator of the conspiracy and his illness was feigned. Savarkar's house was kept under watch. Nagarvala's informants told him that there were many other conspirators, about 20 Punjabis and Maharashtrians, with a large following. Efforts were made to find out the haunts of those persons. From 22nd onwards the Police tried to find out the whereabouts of Karkare and Badge, particularly in Hindu Mahasabha Bhavan at Parel. Watch was kept on the Arya Pathik Ashram where two suspicious looking Punjabis were staying. They were suspected to be associates of Balraj Mehta'.
Para 2.38 states: 'Rana the D.I.G. (CID) arrived in Bombay on the 27th and stayed with Nagarvala who told him of the steps he had taken up to then and both of them had a long distance talk with Sanjevi, the D.I.B. and then gave him full details of what had been done uptill then. Rana had taken with him the statement of Madanlal, which he showed to Nagarvala who read one or two p
ages, but Rana took it back from him saying it was too long and promised to send him a copy from Poona, which he never did'.
Para 2.39 states: 'After the murder when Nagarvala learnt the name of Nathuram Godse, he arrested the various suspects and interrogated Savarkar's Secretary Damle and his Bodyguard Kasar. Limaye who had been detained earlier told the police that if Nathuram Godse was the murderer, Apte must have been with him and that they must have consulted Savarkar'.
Bannerjee was cross-examined by Vaidya, counsel for government of Mahrashtra, Bannerjee said that when they came back from the cremation a meeting was called at a very short notice where everybody was in a mournful mood, and 'the Sardar asked Sanjevi what had happened and he came out with the allegation that the names had been sent to Bombay police and nothing was done there. It was that part which was emphasised by Sanjevi there'. Bannrjee added that Sardar Patel was in great anguish and so were 'we all but I told Sardar Patel that he could not have done anything more than to ask the police to be vigilant'.
In Para 3.9 Bannerjee said that after 30 January, the government felt rather guilty about not having taken preventive or punitive action against the RSS; an informal decision at the post funeral meeting was that the RSS should be banned immediately and secret instructions were passed to provincial governments the same night, but somehow or the other the news of the ban leaked out and the leaders of the movement went underground.
This was an indication how far up in the government and administration Hindu extremists had infiltrated, that a decision taken in a closed doors meeting attended by some very senior ministers and senior Home department and police officials also leaked out.
Questions were raised in the Bombay provincial council. Members grilled the Home minister Morarji Desai. A member asked the Home minister whether the police had lost track of Nathuram Godse. The minister replied saying that after the arrest of Madanlal a copy of his statement was taken to the Bombay CID. The arrest was not made because it was considered inexpedient as by so doing the other conspirators would have gone underground. Therefore after consultations between the Bombay and the Delhi police, it was decided that for the moment no arrest should be made. The Bombay police was on the track of the conspirators but they were not all in Bombay.
Asked if photographs could have been procured of those persons, the reply was that all of them were not at one place. However, photographs of Narayan Apte, Nathuram Godse and Vishnu Karkare were on police records then.
These were questions and answers given in a provincial assembly. They clearly show that Desai was lying to the House. The police had claimed that they were in the dark about the identities of the conspirators till after the murder, so when the Home minister said that the police were on track of the conspirators, to whom was he referring?
Nagarvala vehemently denied that the two police officers showed him Madanlal's statement. He claimed that they only showed him a chit bearing some words scribbled in Urdu. He also denied that Rana had given him the report. Nagarvala learnt Nathuram Godse's identity for the first time after the murder. But the Home minister was claiming that the police was on the track of the conspirators. What did he base his inference on?
When Judge Atamacharan passed adverse remarks against the police in his judgement the Government of India called for an explanation from the condemned police officials. The replies show the course of investigation of the bomb case both in Delhi and in Bombay and what the police had to say in reply to the learned judge's adverse comments. The commission first dealt with Sanjevi's explanation and then with what Nagarvala had to say as to the investigation process in Bombay.
The Kapur Commission examined many confidential records to investigate and find out which police department had slipped up in exposing the conspirators in time to prevent the murder. Looking at its findings a shocking scenario emerges. All the departments involved in the investigation after the bomb attack on 20th committed blunders and showed a distinct lack of efficiency and intelligence in investigations: their approach was lackadaisical. All the four concerned departments were guilty of criminal negligence and unbelievable blunders; the three senior officials handling the investigation were the most guilty: the actions of Sanjevi, who had come to Delhi after building a very formidable reputation in Madras, Nagarvala who was the blue-eyed boy of the Home minister of Bombay, and U.H. Rana a senior officer of the Poona CID. The findings of the Kapur Commission paint a very sorry picture of the police and especially these three officers.
In his note to the Union Home ministry, Sanjevi claimed that the Delhi Police had done all that they could have and blamed the Bombay Police for all that had gone wrong. Para 3.34 states: 'Sanjevi himself visited the scene of occurrence and made inquiries from the Police Superintendent of New Delhi. The next day he ordered 2 Police officers to fly to Bombay "to contact Nagarvala, Deputy Commissioner of Police Bombay, and Rao Saheb Gurtu, A.D.I.G. (C.I.D.) Poona". They took with them Ex. 5-A which officers of the Law Commission, after some effort, found with the original case diary of the bomb case lying somewhere in the Delhi District Record Room. (Exhibit 5-A is the translation of the first confession made by Madanlal Pahwa on the night between the 20th and 21st January, 1948)'.
The commission's report in Para 3.35 says: 'The Delhi Police continued with its investigation and ordered its C.I.D. to be on the look out for the conspirators whose descriptions were given in a document Ex. 244 which is a bundle of corrections, contradictory descriptions and a mere look at it will show its worthlessness'.
Para 3.37 states: 'The note then proceeds to state the steps taken at Bombay. It mentions that the two officers with all the information furnished to the Delhi Police by Madanlal flew to Bombay and stayed at the Universal National Restaurant and met Nagarvala the next day and gave him all the information that they possessed. Nagarvala told them that he also had received information about the case and had deputed special men to locate the wanted persons. He warned them that nobody should know about their presence in Bombay and so they should not stay in the city because if the suspected persons came to know of their arrival the whole plan of their arrest would be "ruined". He ordered the police officers to go about in Mufti. When the two officers met Nagarvala at his office, they claim that they gave him the facts of the case and also showed him the note on Madanlal's statement from which Nagarvala took extracts, Nagarvala wehemently denies this. "The Delhi Police Officers told him that one of the accused was the editor of the 'Agranee' or the 'Hindu Rashtra' newspaper. The description of all the accused persons as disclosed by Madanlal, was communicated to him". The Police Officers again met Nagarvala and he told them, "his information was that there were more persons in this conspiracy. He said that there were about 20 persons. He added that he had made special arrangements for Karkare in Bombay, Poona and Ahmednagar. About the other persons connected with this case, he said that he had located three or four". He also disclosed to them the scheme to locate all the offenders and to carry out their simultaneous arrests, his reason being that if only a few were arrested, the others would go underground. He also told them that he would accompany them to Ahmednagar as soon as he got the necessary information and asked one of his inspectors to arrange their lodging so that- nobody should know about their presence. He also told them not to give their Delhi address at the hotel, and that he would consult his Home Minister and will take further action against the accused. The same day again they went to the Bombay C.I.D. Office where they were told by an Inspector that their presence was no longer required. The Inspector also told them that Bombay Officers had been deputed to arrest the other suspects who had not been located till then. In regard to Karkare and the editor of "Agranee" or "Hindu Rashtra", he told them that an Inspector from Ahmednagar was arriving the next day at Bombay, and they would then arrange for their arrest'.
Para 3.39 states: 'The next day, i.e. 23 January, 1948. so the note says, the Delhi Police officers went to the Deputy Commissioner's office but could not meet him. A C.I.D. Inspector told t
hem that the inspector from Ahmednagar had arrived and he had been told to search for the editor of "Agranee" or the "Hindu Rashtra", which again appears to be a wrong statement or misunderstanding by the Delhi Officers. Deputy Superintendent Jaswant Singh then asked for information regarding Karkare and his associates and the Bombay C.I.D. Inspector gave him the following name as being Karkare's associates:
i) Badge of Poona.
ii) Avtar Singh, Punjabi Sikh of Amritsar.
iii) Talwar of Karachi, then in Bombay.
iv) Balraj Mehta of Lahore, then in Shivaji Park in Bombay.'
Para 3.40: 'Nagarvala who arrived at about 12.30 p.m. told the Police Officers that he was doing his best to arrest the wan ted persons and that the presence of the Delhi Police was not required at Bombay and he ordered them to return. On this Jaswant Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Delhi, drew Nagarvala's attention to Madanlal's statement regarding Karkare and the editor of "Agranee" or the "Hindu Rashtra" and asked that as soon as they were arrested. They should be sent to Delhi. The Delhi Officers handed over to the C.I.D. Inspector a brief note on the case, with the names and the description of the accused wanted, as far as knewn then'. Of the handing over of this note there is no evidence except this cryptic No questions were put to Nagarvala although he was questioned at length and was examined for a good few days. In a subsequent affidavit in reply to the commission's questionnaire, Nagarvala denied any such document having been given to his officers.
The Delhi officers returned to Delhi and complained to Sanjevi about the treatment they received in Bombay. V. Shankar, secretary to the Union Home minister in a note expressed surprise that the Delhi officers did not stay back in Bombay to assist in the investigation there. In his statement before the commission Rai Sahib Rikhikesh, superintendent of police, CID, stated that these officers stayed in Bombay too long and should have returned earlier.
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