'My assessment of that is that they did not take the case so seriously then and they trusted the high police officials who were in charge of the investigations and they were under the impression that such high police officials would do their duty.'
Nagarvala was asked by the commission:
'Q. What power has the minister to order the arrest of any one?
Ans. If a minister gave an order for arresting any particular person and I on considering the matter thought that it was a reasonable order under the circumstances, I would unhesitatingly carry it out.'
Chapter IX of the Kapur Commission's Report deals with the previous attempts on Gandhi's life. Since I have dealt with these ina previous chapter I will not repeat these here except for a few select extracts. While dealing with the attack at Panchgani the commission has cited an extract from the Agranee: 9.29 Ex.52 is an extract from the Agranee of 23 July 1944. There also the incident given is that of demonstration organised by Hindus against Rajaji's 'unpious formula of Pakistan in this land of Shivaji'.
Apte says: 'Gandhiji you have committed an offence of stabbing the nation, by giving your consent to Pakistan formula. You have already confessed that you have no right to speak on behalf of Hindus. Today we are demonstrating peacefully our protest on behalf of Hindu Youths. You bear in mind that if you do not change your behaviour more difficult situation and ill fame await you. We will treat the mas traitors who will try to vivisect our motherland. We, by this statement call on national minded people to treat Gandhi-Rajaji formula in this manner'.
Although the Kapur Commission concluded that the attack in Panchgani was not life threatening but a mere demonstration a similarin stance throws light on the attitude of Godse and Apte towards those who held diverse opinions. This was narrated during Badge's cross-examination during the Red Fort Trial. Bhopatkar the chief defence counsel, was present in court. Neither Nathuram nor Bhopatkar challenged Badge's story. This would lead one to believe that what Badge had narrated was true.
The Kapur Commission has relied on police testimonies to arrive at the conclusion that both the attack at Panchgani and at Sevagram were mere protests and not murder attempts. It must be remembered that at that time the police were under the British and not likely to be too concerned about what Indians did to each other, It would have been very convenient for the British if an Indian did away with Gandhi; they would then be rid of the irritant and they would face no blame.
Chapter X deals with the attack at Wardha and Chapter XI deals with the derailment of the Gandhi Special Train. I have dealt with this in another chapter and the Kapur Commission's Report states nothing different so I will not delve on these chapters again.
Vol. II Chapter XII deals with conditions in Delhi; 'Partition of India; the events leading up to it and the aftermath of the partition'. I have dealt with this in detail previously so I will only reproduce some pertinent excerpts.
Dr. Sushila Nayyar was called by the Kapur Commission; she was witness No. 53. Her testimony is as follows:
12A.29 Dr. Sushila Nayyar, Mahatma's Personal Physician (witness No. 53) has described the conditions before and during the fast thus: Mahatma Gandhi blamed persons who were guilty of violence andadvised the majority community to behave properly towards the minority which caused a certain amount of discontent among there fugees who shouted slogans outside the Birla House. Mahatma Gandhi undertook a fast because the atmosphere became too oppressive on account of both sides exaggerating matters and the Mahatma was anxious that proper protection should be accorded to minorities here so that in Pakistan also the minorities could feel safe.He said that he could not ask Pakistan to behave until India herself behaved in a proper manner. 'Evil is not weighed in golden scales. 'Continuing she said: 'When Mahatmaji undertook the fast, for the first two or three days the refugees were not affected thereby. On theother hand they began shouting "Gandhiji ko marne do, ham ko ghar do.""Let Gandhiji die, give us homes". But after four or five days when Gandhiji's health deteriorated there was a complete change in the mentality of both the Hindus and the Muslims of Delhi. Long lines of persons used to come to ask Gandhiji to give up his fast; they had tears running down their cheeks. There were men, women, Hindus, Muslims, Muslim women in Burqas, refugees and non-refugees. It made a tremendous impression on the whole of the Delhi populace.'
12A.30 She added that the refugees were in an angry mood when the Mahatma undertook the fast. About the precautions taken she said that after the bomb there were more plain-clothes policemen round about the Birla House but she did not know if they also attended the prayer meetings. There was one policeman who said 'What difference does it make if an old man dies. Why make a fuss.' She said that she was not consulted about the security arrangements.
12A.56 At pages 685-686 of the same book, Pyarelal has said that the Mahatma had become irritable and that he was trying to keep it down. Suddenly he used to say, 'Don't you see. I am mounted on my funeral pyre?' Sometimes he would say, 'You should know it is a corpsethat is telling you this'.
12A.77 J.N. Sahani, a well known journalist, further stated that people like Dr. N.B. Khare, prime minister of Alwar, made provocative speeches likely to incite violence and other people from Poona alsowere making similar kind of speeches. Most of them were Marathi newspapers. He learnt this as a member of the editor's conference. There were, he said, some Punjab papers also which were writing inthe same strain and those matters were also reported to the conference. It was being openly discussed in those days that there were about six lakhs volunteers forming a part of a secret organisation plotting tostage a coup d'etat. This organisation had secret cells in different parts of India—Punjab, Southern India, Maharashtra, etc.
12A.85 Sahni's attention was then drawn to page 223 of the book as follows:
'Q. Now I draw your attention to Maulana Azad's book, India Wins Freedom, page 223, wherein he has said that Jayaprakash Narayan had accused Sardar Patel that the Home Minister of the Government ofIndia could not escape the responsibility of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi.
A. I do not remember exactly these words. But I do remember that there was quite a feeling in responsible circles that Government could not escape the responsibility for not having taken proper precautions to avert this tragedy especially after the bomb incident.'
2A.92 There was a meeting of All India States Hindu Mahasa bhaat Bombay on 29th, 30th November and 1st December 1947 (Ex. 275-A).One of the speakers was Master Tara Singh, the Akali leader. He made a spirited speech saying that hundreds and thousands of Sikhs were killed in Punjab by Muslims and still the government was protecting the interests of Muslims while Hindu and Sikh refugees were dying of cold in Delhi. Gandhi had no feeling for them. He cared more for the Muslims and he was requesting them not to leave India. He said that the English had left the eternal enmity between Hindus and Muslims....Jinnah had said that as long as Islam remained they would not allow a single Sikh to live in Pakistan. He (Master Tara Singh) retorted that as long as Hindu Dharma lived, they 'shall not allow a single Muslim to live (loud cheers)'. Nowadays, he said, many Muslims were calling themselves nationalists but no Musalman could ever be a Hindu- lovingman. He would always be a Muslim at heart although he might pretendto be a nationalist. He added that they would allow all religions to continue to live in India but they could not allow 'their necks to be cut by Musalmans'. He wanted all Musalmans to be sent to Pakistan.
12A.93 Savarkar (also at that meeting) drew the attention of the public to the danger from Muslims who were joining the Congress. 'How could a Muslim Leaguer become a nationalist overnight?' TheMusalmans wanted to create another Pakistan in India. He said that Rajaji was their next enemy and that Congress' repressive policy towards the Hindus would rouse 'Hindutva' in the hearts of the masses.
12B.10 Under the heading 'Hindu Affairs', it was stated that the orthodox Hindus were criticising the Congress for their policy of appeasement. V.G. Deshpande, Mahant Digvijay Nath and Professor Ram Singh at a meeting held on 27th a
t Connaught Place under the auspices of the Delhi Provincial Hindu Sabha said that Gandhi's attitude had strengthened the hands of Pakistanis. They criticised the communal policy of the Government of India and the measures taken by Gandhi to coerce the Indian Cabinet to pay Rs. 55 crores to Pakistan. Mahant Digvijay Nath exhorted the gathering to turn out Mahatma Gandhi and other anti-Hindu elements. Professor Ram Singh also opposed Gandhi's policy.
12C.7 Some Socialist leaders like Jayprakash Narayan, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya and Mrs. Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay issued a statement at a press conference in which they said that 'the assassin was not one person but there was a wide conspiracy and organisation behind it. They laid blame on the Hindu Mahasabha, RSS and the Muslim League and such like bodies for the assassination Mahatma Gandhi. They accused the Government for not protecting the Mahatma against a 'prowling assassin'. They then asked for reconstitution of the Government and demanded that the Home Ministry must be entrusted to a person who will have no other portfolio and who will be able to curb the cult and organisations of communal hate and there should be no place in the reconstituted Government and, in particular, the Home Minister must push through at top-speed the programme of purifying Government services of all communal elements and of educating them into a national citizenship.
12C.19 Further, the evidence of police witnesses that Bombay Provincial Police from Poona should have been called, is based on good commonsense and the Commission is of the view that that should also have been done although according to D.W. Mehra, witness No 23 and U. H. Rana, witness No. 3, both D.I.Gs., it wouldhave been inefficacious.
12C.22 It would be fair to add that the conditions in Delhi from after the Partition right up to the time the fast was under taken weremost disturbed and disturbing. There were Hindu-Muslim riots in theold city and there were disturbances even in the area around about the city. According to V. Shankar, witness No. 10, the time of the District Magistrate was mostly taken up with the law and order problems, and M.S. Randhawa who was then the District Magistrate, has also emphasised this aspect of the state of affairs in the capital.
Next the Commission examined principal witnesses who at the time of the bomb explosion and Gandhi's murder were connected with the Home ministry. These witnesses were V. Shankar, ICS, Patel's private secretary, R.N. Bannerjee, ICS, secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Miss Manibehn Patel, M.P., daughter of Patel.
12D.2 V. Shankar, witness No. 10 stated that from the intelligence reports as well as from the discussions between the Bombay premier and the Home minister, the Sardar knew 'that there was a move to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi and also that perhaps the centre of that movement was at Poona', but the witness did not know about any particular individual who had given that information. At that time there were vague rumours and suspicions but the bomb incident was the first concrete piece of evidence on which action could be taken.
12D.5 The general instructions were that the suspects 'should be particularly kept under watch' and the first concrete evidence on the basis of which any effective action could be taken was the confessional statement of Madanlal. Before that there were only rumours. The Sardar, Kher and Morarji Desai knew that there was a conspiracy but not as to who was in it. Even a man like N.C. Kelkar was being mentioned.
12D.12 Shankar was examined by this commission on April 10, 1967. He did not know anything about Ketkar's giving information through Balukaka Kanitkar but there was information of the existence of a hostile camp at Poona known as the 'Kesari School' which was against Gandhi and Savarkar was its inspiration. But their activities were watched by the Bombay Special Branch which since British days used to deal with political matters and it was not the ordinary C.I.D.The witness said that the Sardar must have seen the statement of Madanlal made on 25 January. Even earlier, a gist of the statements of Madanlal made from time to time were conveyed to him by the D.I.B. and the witness distinctly remembered that the Sardar had ordered to keep persons mentioned by Madanlal under surveillance.
12D.17 R.N. Bannerjee, ICS (retired) was the Home Secretary of the Central Government at that time was examined by Pathak on 22 January 1966.
12D.18 ... Further at the meeting (On the evening of 31 January,1948) everybody was disgusted with the police inaction and Bannerjee described his own version in an article in a book called The CivilServants in India by K.L. Punjabi where he said the following:
'All the same a great deal of temporary disintegration occurred in Secretariat administration. In Delhi Province (which never had a proper full-time Inspector General of Police ever since its creation in 1912) the police force got ill-organised and weak; and minimum liaison between the Chief Commissioner and the Home Department on the one hand and the district administration on the other could hardly be maintained. Mahatma Gandhi's assassination on 30 January 1948 was partly a by-product of this confused state of affairs. After the cremation there was a meeting at Sardar Patel's residence in the evening of the 31st and it was disclosed for the first time that by the early morning of 21 January the Delhi Police had in their possession statement made by Madanlal (who detonated a hand-grenade at Mahatma Gandhi's prayer meeting at Birla House on the 20th evening and made a confession to the police overnight) in which the full history of the conspiracy was set out. The Delhi Police did function in one respect, namely that they sent Madanlal's statement to the Bombay Police on 21 January evening but the papers lay with the Bombay Police. Both Godse and Apte could have been found and nabbed in one of their two Bombay haunts on the 23rd. Unfortunately nobody took any action on this statement of Madanlal and the Delhi police did not even remind the Bombay police. The Delhi Magistracy and the Home Secretariat remained ignorant of the statement (as the head of the Delhi Police never kept them informed).
12D.22 Asked as to what should have been done if information was given to the Bombay government as early as July 1947 that Gandhi's life had been threatened, Bannerjee said the government should have ordered to keep those persons under surveillance and should have also informed the Delhi Police.
12D.32 Regarding the RSS the witness complained that when decisions were taken in regard to the banning of RSS, the news leaked out and appeared in the press the next morning and thus the tallpoppies of RSS went underground in the early forenoon of 1st February.... In Mahatma Gandhi's case the minister and the Secretariat started issuing directives to the police and the magistracy because it realised that the police had not functioned properly.
12D.37 The next witness whose testimony is relevant in regard to the Government of India is Miss Manibehn Patel, daughter of Sardar Patel, witness No. 79.
12D.44 .... 'We did know that Mahatma's life was in danger and whatever precautions could humanly be taken were taken. But this much I can say that I had no idea that there was a conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi. At that time at least I thought that the danger to Mahatma Gandhi's life was more likely to come from Muslims....'
12D.45 .... She did not know anything about things happening and speeches being made in Poona or Ahmednagar indicative of violence against Mahatma Gandhi. She did remember that a fortnight before the murder a newspaper editor from Poona, from whose paper security had been demanded, came to see her father at 5.00 A.M. but she would not be able to recognise him because it used to be dark at that time. But she could remember that he talked about the demand of security payment from his paper. He complained that Morarji Desai had been unfair to him. (This has to be Nathuram Godse since his was the only paper from which security had been demanded and in court too when Morarji Desai appeared as witness Nathuram had shouted angrily at him alleging that Desai had vindictively harassed him. This means just a few days before the bomb attack Nathuram Godse had met the Union Home minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.)
12D.46 Before Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated her father went to see him. She accompanied him. They talked on various matters but he did not broach the subject of searching of persons coming to the prayer meetings. The news of the murder was conveyed to them by Brij Kisha
n Chandiwalal soon after they returned home.
12D.48 She added that her father was publicly accused for being responsible for the murder at a meeting by Jayaprakash Narayan. Maulana Azad was present at the meeting but he did not protest this was a great shock to her father.
12D.49 ... She could not remember if there was any talk between her father and Balasaheb Kher after the murder about earlier information about danger to Mahatma Gandhi's life.
'Q. Do you remember if at any time Balasaheb Kher mentioned it to your father that it was weighing on his mind that some information conveyed to him earlier was not taken much note of?
A. I can definitely say that nothing of that kind happened. Balasaheb did not either blame himself for being negligent nor was any blame against my father. Balasaheb I knew very well and at no stage did he ever blame himself for being negligent in the matter of handling of the information of danger to Mahatmaji's life.'
12D.53 ... She characterised the allegation absolutely false that her father was not protecting Mahatma Gandhi because of his attempts to remove him from office. On the other hand, she said that her father did not want to stay on in the Cabinet and had sent his resignation to Mahatma Gandhi. As a matter of fact Gandhiji opposed the presence of policemen in Birla House in order to maintain the reputation of the State.
12D.54. Gandhiji made a speech (post prayer) which was published in the Harijan of 25 January 1948 where he said: 'I wonder if with a knowledge of this background to my statement anybody would dare call my fast a condemnation of the police or of the Home Ministry. If there is any such person, I can only tell him that he would degrade and hurt himself, never the Sardar or me....'
12D.56 .... The Sardar said that Brajkishan and Aruna were also in league in his removal and that Jayaprakash had started attacking him in Bombay and at Surat.
12D.57. On the following day i.e. 5 March, Sardar Patel had a heart attack. At 4 p.m. that day he told Sushila Nayar that he had to go with Gandhiji who had gone ahead alone.
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