12F.96 The Mahatma came to realise that the Congress was paying lip sympathy to non-violence and he was considered as a burden. Pyarelal whose power of observation and exactness is shown by the clarity of the narrative in his book, felt that in the Delhi Police there was infiltration of anti-Gandhi feelings and of pro-RSS elements.
12G.3 After the bomb incident, the number of policemen was increased and a larger force was stationed at Birla House. Ex.10 also shows that after the bomb incident, the number of policemen was immediately increased to one assistant sub-inspector, two head constables and sixteen foot constables. In addition to this, there were plain-clothes men, one sub-inspector, four head constables and two foot constables who were all armed with revolvers. Three plain-clothes men were stationed on the path leading from Birla House to the place where the prayer meetings were held, and a small detachment of troops for moving patrol all round the compound was also stationed.
12G.7 D.W. Mehra, D.I.G. Delhi, was personally present with Gandhiji when the later started his fast and Gandhiji talked to him about the steps to be taken to improve Hindu-Muslim relations. Because of the mental anxiety on account of Gandhiji's fast and four months of constant arduous labour Mehra fell ill with an attack of influenza on 16 January 1946 and was in bed for four days. In spite of that he went to Mahatmaji on 21 January and he resolved to attend all his prayer meetings. He again fell ill on the 24th and went to Birla House on the 30th after the great tragedy had taken place.
12G.8 It had also been decided that Superintendent of Police A.N. Bhatia should personally attend Mahatma Gandhi's meetings and he continued to do so but on the fateful day, 30 January, he was also absent due to the threatened strike of the CPWD.
12G.17 M.S. Randhawa, witness No. 18, has also stated that 'On account of the departure of Muslim police to Pakistan in very large numbers, the police organisation in Delhi was seriously depleted and policemen had to be hastily recruited from the rural areas to fill the gap. They were not trained properly'.
12G.23 M.K. Sinha, when asked about the action which should have been taken after the statement of Madanlal, said: 'I still think that if adequate and prompt action had been taken to locate the persons described in Madanlal's statement, then the assassination should have been prevented. I had heard rumours when I was here that whispers about the conspiracy were current in Bombay and were even known to officials.'
12G. 31 Examined before the Commission, Bannerjee deposed to certain important matters which might be enumerated thus:
6.Neither Sanjevi nor Mehra had ever complained to him regarding inaction of the Bombay Police. It was at that meeting (on 31 January 1948) that Sanjevi had stated that he had sent to Bombay the confessional statement of Madanlal the substance of which was that Apte and Godse must have gone back to one or the other of their two or three haunts in Bombay.
8. Bannerjee said that even under the prevailing practice, Sanjevi should have discussed with him the bomb case but unfortunately the first time a copy of the statement of Madanlal was placed before him was at the meeting after Mahatma's funeral. Bannerjee himself had no detailed information regarding the grave offence of Madanlal before the meeting and it was for that reason that the Home Secretariat remained inactive.
12G.32 When recalled R.N. Bannerjee stated that the news of the bomb explosion reached him in Delhi the same evening when the bomb exploded and it was in the newspapers the next morning. His own reaction was, that it was an act of an individual fanatic and it never occurred to him that there was anybody behind it, although he did see in the newspapers that Madanlal's companions had escaped. Although they thought that the bomb was a serious matter, he did not interfere in the investigation, because it had been left in the hands of a very senior and high police officer who had come from Madras with a high professional reputation.
12G.34 Bannerjee said: 'It may be said that it was really the procedure, the working of the Home ministry which made it difficult for me to question Sanjevi in regard to the progress of the investigation'. This passage from his evidence shows that there was something wrong in the working of the Home ministry which had made the king-pin of the ministry, that is, Home secretary, rather ineffective. If the Home secretary could not question Sanjevi in regard to the progress of the investigation it is difficult to imagine anybody else doing so.
12H. 4 G.K. Handoo, witness No. 48, stated that as the Hindu Mahasabha was influential all over the country and the Partition had produced communal feelings, he would, if he had been in charge of security, have got C.I.D. policemen from all the provinces where Hindu Mahasabha was strong and he would have stationed them on a special look-out in the prayer meetings.
12H.11 On 30 January 1948 Police Superintendent A.N. Bhatia was absent. Assistant Sub-Inspector Amar Nath came on duty at 4-30 pm The statement of Raghunath Naik P.W.76 in Court, who was a gardener, shows that the assailant was caught hold by him, by an army man and 2 police constables showing that the Police was present at that time.
12H.18 B.B.S. Jetley was questioned by the Commission as to how the viceroys used to be guarded when they went to a district or into a police range. He replied that the local police was not able to cope with the arrangements and plain-clothes and uniformed policemen had to be imported and deployed at all strategic points and the place where he was staying had to be heavily guarded. He also said that he went to Mahatma Gandhi and showed him the weapons which he had seized from the RSS and told the Home minister that something serious might happen from the RSS. What he meant was not particularly something happening to Mahatma Gandhi but even to the Central ministers like Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel.
12H.20A The statement of G.K. Handoo that Godse admitted to him that their next target would have been Prime Minister Nehru and the statement of J.N. Sahni that Nehru's life was also in danger find corroboration from an anonymous letter in Hindi to Godse while he was in police custody in Delhi. It bore the postmark of Bara Bazar, Calcutta, no doubt, of a date after the murder it is in the Intelligence Bureau File Ex. 224A at pp 77-78. It praises Godse for having murdered Mahatma Gandhi and is strongly anti-Nehru who was therein dubbed as a 'crusher of the Hindu community'. It ended 'May God, Jawaharlal Nehru finishes'.
12H.23 He was asked what arrangements should have been made after the bomb was thrown at Birla House. His reply was that protections of the nature given in the blueprint should have been given i.e. an inner ring and an outer ring should have been formed along with the spotters, searchers from Bombay province for identifying any likely assailants. When asked what he would do in the case of Mahatma Gandhi who would have gone on a fast, he said why should he (Mahatma) have known anything about it. The police would have come from Bombay. The inner and outer rings would have been dressed exactly like Congress volunteers who would be around Mahatma and spotters could have been dressed as Malis and other domestic servants and nobody would have known about it. He also said that he would have made arrangements for a watch to be kept at railway stations, the air terminals. Terminal routes, dharamshalas and other places where people are likely to come and stay.
12H.25 With regards to the Mahatma he said as follows:
'In case of Mahatma Gandhi and his security—it appears that no well-defined or carefully planned security measures whether physical or internal had been made by the Delhi Police or Intelligence Bureau. Admittedly the main responsibility for asking and for detailed and careful security measures to be instituted was by the Congress Party— but if they failed to judge the seriousness and danger of the situation— it was undoubtedly the business of the Delhi Police or the Intelligence Bureau to do so—particularly after the exploding of the gun cotton slab by Madanlal on 20th January 1948, at Gandhiji's prayer meeting. Further—in view of Madanlal's statement made soon after the incident—it became imperative for the Delhi Police to immediately wireless Bombay and Poona (the I.G. Police Bombay and the D.I.G., C.I.D. Poona) to send over immediately a plain-clothes squad of intelligent and knowledgeable police officers who woul
d help in identifying the Maharashtra youths who had conspired to kill Gandhiji.
'What again is most unfortunate—is the fact that the Bombay Police in spite of the knowledge they had of the danger to Gandhij's life and even after Madanlal's arrest—failed to offer sending their knowledgeable plain-clothes staff to help in identifying any of the Maharatta youth who had been described by Madanlal. If the Bombay or Poona policemen had arrived—and if they had been utilised by the Delhi Police properly and carefully in batches at the railway stations, hotels, dharmashalas, and political party head quarters as also at the entrance and exits of Birla House and the actual prayer meeting, it would possibly have made it much more difficult for the assassin to succeed and after all security is never fool-proof but is always an intelligence and a strenuous attempt to make it more and more difficult for the assassin.'
121.5 Rajagopalachari had added that whether the assassination was due to the payment of Rs. 550 million or it may be the result of a more ancient grudge but Gandhiji insisted that India should carry out its agreement and not start its career of independence by breaking promises. India would have lost moral power, Gandhiji would have died of a broken heart instead of by a Hindu's revolver, Rs. 550 million given away saved India's moral status and added to it.
Chapter XIII of the Kapur Commission's Report deals with the investigations in Alwar.
13.1 There was a very strong rumour across the country that Savarkar and his Kesari group amongst the Hindu fanatics had reached an agreement with many of the erstwhile princes of India to forge an alliance which would stage a coup d'etat and overthrow the democratic government and declare India a Hindu Rashtra. The princes would then form a council which would rule as the protectors of the 'Hindu Rashtra,' Gandhiji's murder was to be the trigger. The Princes of Alwar, Bharatpur, Bhopal, Baroda, Gwalior were said to be a part of this conspiracy. The intelligence reports talked about a six hundred thousand strong cadre prepared to rise in revolt. Nagarvala's theory about core group of twenty each supported by twenty plus volunteers spread across the nation also ties in with this scenario. Many of the Raja's were smarting over the strong arm tactics used against them to accede to the Indian dominion, would have backed any scheme which would have ensured that they clung on to their feudal powers and control over their fiefs.
13.2 Ex. 96 dated February 10, 1948, contains a case diary of U.C. Malhotra who was appointed Chief Police Officer of Alwar State. The Case Diary No. 2 dated February 8, 1948, contains the following information:
(1) A printed poster in Hindi a handwritten copy of which is Ex. 105, incited the public to murder Mahatma Gandhi; to cut him into pieces and throw his flesh to dogs and crows. This was an anonymous poster and it was not discernible as to where it was printed.
(2) One Nathuram Shukla from Nagpur had visited Alwar towards the end of December 1947 and he delivered speeches from the Hindu Mahasabha platform. His description is given as being 5'-6" in height, wheat complexioned, small moustache, a good speaker in Hindi. This evidently does not fit in with Nathuram Godse's description. (It must be noted that there was strong suspicion that this person was indeed Nathuram Godse, he could have used a disguise, or a sympathetic policeman could have written down a misleading description. What gives credence to the belief is that the police were never able to trace Nathuram Shukla, it was as if he had dissolved into thin air after delivering speeches in Alwar.)
(3) A foreigner disguised as a sadhu came to Alwar and stayed with Girdhar Siddha, the secretary of the local Hindu Ma hasabha. He had brought a letter containing a printed letter giving the news of assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. This news was out at 3 p.m. at Alwar whereas the assassination actually took place at 5.17 p.m. at Delhi.
(4) Sweets were distributed; Prime Minister Khare had addressed meetings pouring upon Gandhiji curses of a Brahmin. The Hindu Mahasabha and RSS were encouraged by Dr. Khare.
13.4 One Rikhi Jaimuni Kaushik, an editor of a newspaper, produced a printed article which contained the following information:
(a) Anti-Gandhi Front party in Alwar distributed a pamphlet in which Hindus were requested to fast and pray for the death of Mahatma Gandhi.
(b) The RSS at Alwar had distributed sweets and held picnics on Mahatma's assassination day.
(c) A few days before Mahatma Gandhi's assassination, Dr. Khare had said that he was Anti-Gandhi Front man.
13.16 Dr Khare was examined by the Commission he said that he was anti-Gandhi i.e., against his philosophy but not anti-Gandhi qua his person. He did not know if one of the Ministers extended full facilities to the RSS. The head of the RSS, Golwalkar, did visit the State when he was the Prime Minister and he attended his meetings because he was a Nagpur man. He might have addressed the meeting also. He condemned Gandhism at the meetings and 'Guruji' (Golwalkar) also did the same. When asked whether he had allowed the RSS volunteers to be trained in 'the Samant Infantry', he said he had no recollection.
13.24 Pannalal Choube, witness No.47, is now living in Mathura He was an informer of the C.I.D. right up to 1952. He stated that three months before the assassination Hakim Rai, the Home Minister of Alwar, called Parchure and Godse to Alwar. There was a private meeting at which he (Panna Lal) was present. Dr. Khare was also present and he said that he had been unfairly treated by Mahatma Gandhi and in his opinion Mahatma Gandhi was a danger for India and something should be done in regard to him. Dr. Khare was President of All India Hindu National Front Alwar, which was vituperative and against Mahatma Gandhi.
13.26 Godse and Parchure visited the arms museum in the palace and they wanted to take away pistols from there. The curator helped them in getting them an old Mouser Pistol. It was taken but as it was useless it was returned by Godse and Parchure.
13.29 The conspiracy to assassinate was hatched at Alwar in which Dr. N.B. Khare took a prominent part. Dr. Parchure said that it was not in the interest of the country that the Mahatma should live and that Godse alone could assassinate Gandhi, Godse replied, 'Don't bother, I shall do the whole thing.'
13.32 Hakim Rai told him that Godse and Parchure were big leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha.
13.33 He did not think that Godse and Parchure would actually assassinate Mahatma Gandhi.
13.34 He did not inform anyone about Godse and Parchure except the police.
13.36 He met Godse twice—once at the meeting which was forthree hours and another time he met him in Delhi at the house ofProf. Ram Singh about one and half months before the assassination.
13.42 The Inspector General of Police of Rajasthan has in reply to the questionnaire stated that there was nothing to show in the record that Pannalal Choube was working as a police informer in Alwar State but sometimes used to get money from Inspector General and later on actually from some other police officers. Pannalal Choube was associating with Hindu Mahasabha but the police does not know that he was also associating with Raizada Hakim Rai.
The Kapur Commission disbelieved the testimony of Pannalal Choube. Its contention was that he was a police informer so the Commission thought that he could not have been trusted by the Hindu Mahasabha leaders to be able to sit in when such important topics as the murder of Mahatma Gandhi was being discussed. The fact remains that the testimony of a witness in Alwar states that Parchure and Godse were in Alwar in December 1947 looking for a handgun. When in the last week of January, Nathuram failed to procure a reliable handgun, he immediately thought of Parchure and rushed to Gwalior, where he succeeded in procuring one of the most efficient hand guns for close range murder. The Berretta was bought with the help of Parchure. The incidents in Alwar and Gwalior cannot be brushed away as unconnected coincidences.
The commission next examined M.L. Hooja, Wit. 59, he was the assistant director of Intelligence Bureau in 1948. He had submitted a report on the activities of the RSS in the Alwar principality.
13.50 Hooja concentrated his investigation on two points (1) Possible connection of the local people in the conspiracy to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi and (2) pa
tronage and assistance by the state to the RSS organisation.
13.51 There was considerable evidence of patronage and aid by the state to the RSS. Full facilities were provided for the training camp and rally in May-June 1947 of RSS officers. This was given under the direct orders of the Prime Minister Dr. Khare and the Home Minister Raizada Hakim Rai, apparently with the knowledge of the ruler. Both Prime Minister and Home Minister took prominent part in RSS activities and the Prime Minister was in constant touch with all its local activities and extended fullest patronage.
13.55 The investigation into the conspiracy leading to Mahatma Gandhi's assassination revealed that one Nathu Ram Shukla of Jabbalpur (elsewhere in the report he is stated to be from Nagpur) had come and stayed under state patronage and toured variou s parts of the State. It was suspected by people that he really was Nathuram Godse.
13.56 Investigation was unfortunately hampered by the fact that the local police was unreliable and even the I.G.P. was a 'staunch Rajput'.
13.58 Another report of M.L. Hooja dated February 23, 1948 restates that Nathu Ram Shukla was suspected to be the same manas Nathuram Godse.
13.68 The Commission appreciates the misgivings of the Government of India in regard to Alwar where all these activities were carried on which had a communal colour and an anti-Congress and anti-Praja Mandal leanings. Besides these, Dr. N.B. Khare himself had been rather intemperate in condemning Mahatma Gandhi, so much so that he resorted to the ancient cult of cursing and he did so against Mahatma Gandhi by issuing A Brahmin's Curse' Ex. 88 dated October 12. 1947. He has stated that he was opposed to Gandhiji's politics not his person. (While issuing a 'Brahmin's Curse' on Gandhiji it was not on his politics but aimed at the person.) He denied any association of Godse or Parchure with Alwar. But police reports containing information no doubt collected after the murder have a different story to give.
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