J.D. NAGARVALA'S STATEMENT
18.103 As the conduct of J.D. Nagarvala, the then Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay, has come in for serious criticism at the hands of counsel, the Commission thinks it necessary to set out the salient points of his statement which are relevant to the course of the investigation or inquiry which he conducted after the information given by Prof. Jain had been relayed to him by Morarji Desai. The evidence of Nagarvala comes to this.
18.104 There was communal tension due to influx of refugees into Bombay. Arms and ammunition were left by the British with certain communities and transmitters left by the Royal Air Force were being used for transmission of news to Pakistan.
18.105 The Hindu Mahasabha believed in political assassination as a means of achieving political ends.
18.107 The Bombay City Police had not heard of Madanlal or of Godse or Apte before the bomb was thrown, and the Bombay City Police could not have started any investigation from mere press reports unless it was therein give that Madanlal had migrated to some locality in the city of Bombay. On 21 January there was no communication from Delhi about the bomb incident. Normally, the practice was that if any information had to be sent by the police of one province to that of another, it would communicate with the Inspector General of Police or the D.I.G. or the D.S.P. direct, and in the case of Bombay city with the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of Police.
WHAT DESAI TOLD NAGARVALA
18.108 Officially Nagarvala got information about the bomb on January 21 when the Home minister called him and told him of the information which Professor Jain had given him without disclosing to him the name of Professor Jain. He was asked what information was given to him by Morarji Desai.
Q. 'Did he tell you anything?'
Ans. 'Yes, he did. He told me that the man, Madanlal, who had exploded the bomb in Delhi prayer meeting of Mahatma Gandhi was companion of one Karkare from Ahmednagar and I should try and arrest Karkare.'
Desai also suggested to him that he might keep a watch on Barrister Savarkar's house. Whatever Morarji Desai told him was correctly recorded by him in his Crime Report No.1 as follows:—
'I was told by H.M. that he had received definite information that the attempt on the life of Mahatmaji on 20-1-48 at the prayer meeting at Birla House, Delhi, was made by one Madanlal along with his associates, Karkare and others. He also told me that Karkare and Madanlal had met Savarkar immediately before their departure to Delhi to attempt on the life of Mahatmaji. He also ordered me to apprehend and arrest this man named Karkare who hailed from Ahmednagar and whose arrest he had already ordered in connection with other incidents of anti-Muslim nature at Ahmednagar. He also ordered me to inquire and apprehend the associates of Madanlal and Karkare.'
18.109 Nagarvala also stated that he had kept a note about the information by Desai but he did not take down a First Information Report as he was not making an investigation. He said:
'I was not an Investigating Officer. They were orders given to me by the Government on the basis of which I started my inquiries.'
18.116 Nagarvala was not told who had sent those police officers to Bombay. All he knew was that they had come to arrest Karkare and belonged to Delhi Police.
Even if one were to believe Nagarvala, that the Delhi Police had kept him in the dark. When he found out that they were looking for Karkare, why did he not inform them that the Home Minister had issued orders for his arrest? One must remember that while most of the other Police Officers involved in the bungling of the investigations between the 20th and 30th January 1948 got an opportunity to save their skins by appearing before the Kapur Commission. Sanjevi had passed away before the Kapur Commission was constituted so he could not put forth his side of the story and so all his colleagues got a convenient posthumous scapegoat to pin the blame on. I hold no brief for Sanjevi but he was the only incompetent bungler who did not get a chance to make excuses.
18.117 Nagarvala was questioned whether he asked them about any statement made by Madanlal, his reply was:
'No I did not ask them but during the course of conversation I gathered that they had no knowledge of what Madanlal had said or done.'
He did not ask them about the antecedents of Madanlal because the Home Minister had told him that he and Karkare were together and Bombay Police was already looking for Karkare. Nagarvala repeated 'that the officers could not have told me anything because they knew nothing more'.
18.118 When asked if he had got the Delhi Police diaries translated into English, he said that he did get them translated, he went through the English translation of the case diaries of the bomb case. When his attention was drawn to paragraph 15 of case diary No.l and that Deputy Superintendent Jaswant Singh and Inspector Balkrishna were present when the statement of Madanlal was made and therefore they must have known what statement he made, his reply was that that may or may not be so. All the information they gave him about Karkare was that they had come to arrest him. He did not ring up Delhi to find out what the officers had been sent for, as it was not for him to do so. The investigation was by Delhi Police. It was for them to ask for help. Assuming that in a strictly legal sense this position is correct, yet because the matter concerned the safety of a person like Mahatma Gandhi, one should have expected more inquisitiveness to get out all what those Delhi Officers knew. A bland legalistic approach at that stage was no credit to the Bombay 'Inquiry'. And if the Delhi Police officers could give him no information, a long distance call to Rana or to the New Delhi Superintendent of Police could have been helpful.
18.120 Knowledge of Madanlal's statement—He came to know about Madanlal's statement after the murder. Rana did not tell him what statement Madanlal had made but he told Rana what he had done up to then in the way of investigation.
18.121 He came to know that the conspirators were from Poona only during the investigation, post murder, and not before. The Home Minister had told him that Karkare and his associates wanted to murder Mahatma Gandhi.
Q. 'Were these associates according to your information Maharashtrians or refugees from Pakistan?'
Ans. 'The information that we had in this connection was as recorded in my case diary and my reply to Government which would show that predominant suspicion of the Bombay City Police was on people who had migrated to Bombay and who might be classed as refugees.'
He did not learn from Ahmednagar about the associates of Karkare. His information was that Karkare was not in Ahmednagar during the last few days. He did not know that Madanlal had migrated to Ahmednagar or had been living there. All he knew was that Karkare belonged to Ahmednagar. But this is not in absolute accord with the first Crime Report. He further said that he did not think necessary to find out from Ahmedmagar Police about the associates of Karkare. That in the opinion of the Commission was an erroneous approach.
18.122 It was only after the murder that he came to know that amongst the associates of Karkare were Poona people like Godse, Apte and Badge. About Badge he knew that he was a trafficker in arms but he did not connect him as an associate of Karkare and Madanlal. He said that he must have ordered a watch to be kept at railway stations which would also include the airport.
Here Nagarvala has resorted to a blatant lie. When he d id not know whom to look for why would he have ordered a watch and for whom. He has confessed that he did not investigate about Karkare's whereabouts after the Home Minister had told him that he had ordered his arrest. So his own statements condemn Nagarvala.
18.123 It is difficult for the Commission to find on the evidence as to what watch was kept at Air or railway terminals but if any watch was kept it must have been most ineffective because Karkare, Apte and Godse used both rail and air without any detection during the period 23 January to 27 January 1948. The watch could not but be futile, as no one seemed to know these people as the statement of Rana shows.
18.124 On his return from Delhi on 27 January, Rana stayed with Nagarvala and the later explained to him what all he had already done, and they d
ecided to let the D.I.B. know about it. In the presence of Rana, Nagarvala told the D.I.B. on the telephone as to what he had done.
18.125 Nagarvala did not ask Rana as to the contents of the statement of Madanlal because Rana appeared to be satisfied with what he (Nagarvala) had already done. This is a rather peculiar statement because Nagarvala was working out the information given by Professor Jain which had been conveyed to him by Morarji Desai and Madanlal's statement at Delhi would have been helpful in working out the information. Rana had brought valuable information from one of the co-conspirators and the Commission has been unable to find any reason why the content of Madanlal's statement were not given by Rana to Nagarvala and why the later did not ask Rana as to what the statement contained. Particularly when Nagarvala later stated that he would have liked Madanlal to be brought to Bombay.
18.126 According to the statement of Nagarvala, Badge could not be considered a member of the Savarkar group because he was trafficking in arms and Nagarvala was looking for him not as a conspirator but as a trafficker in arms.
18.128 He was asked why he persisted with his theory of conspiracy of kidnapping and not of murder. His reply was that that was not his theory but that is what he learnt during the course of investigation. He added 'what I mean to say is that I was working on the information given to me by the Home minister and at the same time telling the Home minister the result of my enquiries.'
18.129A. He emphasised that he had not seen Ex. 5A before. He was asked whether the reading of Ex. 5A would not have disclosed to him the class of persons who were in the conspiracy though not their identity. His reply was that it was possible to get a clue as to who those persons were. More so, from the reference to Karkare as proprietor of Deccan Guest House and member of the RSS Nagarvala tried to clarify the matter in regard to conspiracy to murder or the conspiracy to kidnapping Mahatma Gandhi. He said:
'On 21 January 1948, the information that was given to me by the Home minister, Bombay, is recorded in Crime Report No.l dated 30-1-1948 contained in document called file of crime reports which is marked as Ex.185 by which number the whole book will hereinafter be referred to. The first crime report Dt. 30-1-1948 contained in Ex, 185 reads: 'Before the Home minister talked to me all I had was the report of the newspaper which I had read.' I started no activity or enquiry till I received instructions from the Home minister. In other words, the information to me was attempt on the life of Mahatma Gandhi. What I recorded on that occasion was this: 'I was told by the Home minister that he had received definite information that the attempt on the life of Mahatmaji on 20-1-1948 on the prayer meeting at Birla House, Delhi, was made by Madanlal and his associate Karkare and others.'
All that was conveyed to me by the Home Minister was that an attempt had been made on the life of Mahatma Gandhi oil 20-1-1948 by Madanlal, Karkare and others. During the course of my enquiries what I learnt was that at no stage it was contemplated that we should go on with the theory of kidnapping and forget the original information. The information of kidnapping transpired during the course of enquiries in connection with the information furnished by the Home minister. I did not ask the Home minister as to who his informant was. I would not do so because if the Home Minister wanted to tell me the name of his source he would have done so. The stage at which the Home minister gave me the information, the question of conspiracy did not arise in the legal sense. If I were to register this case in the Tughlaq Road Police Station as F.I.R., I would have put it under section 307, I.P.C. At this stage I would not have added section 120-B. The investigations or the enquiries which the police would be conducting would have been on the same lines whether or not section 120-B were added or invoked.'
This statement of Nagarvala is a masterful act of obfuscation and evasion. He has completely clouded the issue and evaded answering the simple question put to him by the Commission.
18.134 The evidence before the Commission, however, shows that the Ahmednagar Police had a full record of Karkare's doings or misdoings in Ahmednagar, and had Nagarvala asked for this information, the District Police would have given him something valuable, e.g., connection of Karkare with Apte which Sub-Inspector Balkundi furnished to the Deputy Superintendent Chaubal soon after the murder when this information was called for from him by the Poona C.I.D. Sub-Inspector Deshmukh, witness No. 32, has stated that all this information was with him.
18.135 Nagarvala got the full statement of Madanlal on 5 February 1948.
18.139 Bombay Police not investigating the Bomb Case—The Bombay Police, said Nagarvala, was not investigating the bomb case but it was making enquiries on information received from the Home Minister. The offence was committed in Delhi and the investigation was in the hands of the Delhi Police. The Bombay Police had neither been asked by the Delhi Police to make any investigation nor did the Delhi Police come to do it. An investigating officer had to ask for help, and if that had been done in the bomb case, the Bombay Police would have given it willingly. It was not for the Bombay Police to interfere suo motu with the investigation of the Delhi Police and Sanjevi's note that Bombay Police had to do any investigation was not correct (Once again Nagarvala was calling a dead man a liar to save his own skin). He further stated that he was not under any duty to inform D.I.G. Kamte of the information given to him by the Home Minister but he did disclose to the Commissioner of Police the information given by the Home Minister on 22nd in the Tea Room at tea which was usual practice where matters of this kind were discussed. When the attention of Nagarvala was drawn to Ex. 8 where it was stated that the investigation was entrusted to Nagarvala, he replied that the word was loosely used.
No wonder Nagarvala was Morarji Desai's blue eyed boy, he had the knack to twist and turn everything to suit his purpose and possessed the quality of self righteousness in excess which was a quality Morarji Desai also had in abundance.
18.140 The position taken by Nagarvala is not correct. On the facts of this case, Nagarvala was making an investigation, which has been dealt in a chapter headed 'Bombay Investigation'. But assuming he was making an inquiry to work out the information, he was acting as a police detective whose duty it was to obtain intelligence concerning the commission or design to commit a cognisable offence. A part of the conspiracy was entered into in Bombay city and even if it was the commission of an offence outside, Nagarvala as the head of the detective agency was performing a statutory duty otherwise it would be officiousness on his part and his order of arresting Badge on 24th would be wholly without jurisdiction.
18.142 Trunkcall to Sanjevi must have been made by Nagarvala and Rana after 7 O'clock and both Rana and Nagarvala talked to Sanjevi. The most important part of the talk was that Nagarvala told Sanjevi that the situation was serious and effective steps should be taken to protect the life of Mahatma Gandhi and he told Sanjevi that there was a gang whose objective was to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi. He gave this information to Rana also. Ex.8 dated 30 January, 1948, is a letter confirmatory of what he had talked on telephone with Sanjevi. (It is very strange that Sanjevi, who outranked both Nagarvala and Rana, did not tick them off for propagating nonsensical theories. Sanjevi knew more than both these officers because by then Madanlal had made an extensive confession to his officers. What prevented him from ordering Nagarvala and Rana to stop wasting time and get on with the investigation will never be known.)
18.152 Nagarvala claimed that Morarji Desai did not give him any information about the editor of the Hindu Rashtra or Agranee. For the first time, he heard the name Godse, was when the B.B.C. gave the news at 7.30 p.m. IST on 30 January 1948.
18.153 In regard to Badge, Nagarvala said that he was hiding in Poona jungles because that is the information the contacts had given him. When his attention was drawn to the statement of Badge that he was attending to his normal work in Poona and that he was staying in his house from 23rd to 31 st January, Nagarvala replied that it would not be in the 'case diary' that his contacts in Bombay had informed him that Badge was hiding in the jungles of Poona.
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18.156 After Morarji Desai's orders, when he started making inquiries, a lot of information was coming from numerous sources. In that context, Badge was being looked for. The names of Karkare and Badge appeared prominently in the first Crime Report. Karkare's connections were seen and they were looking for Badge. After 20th January, Badge had completely disappeared from the conspiracy. In view of all that, information about Badge had to be verified. Nagarvala said that he was treating Karkare as (an) associate of Madanlal but there was nothing to show that Badge was also an associate.
18.161 When asked if Rana had discussed the statement of Madanlal with him, he replied that Madanlal's statement was given to him and hardly had he read one or two pages when Rana took it back from him. He also told Rana that he was in touch with Ahmednagar and every effort was being made to locate Karkare. But the statement of Madanlal was not discussed after the telephone call nor before.
18.162 Nagarvala said that reading of the statement of Madanlal, Ex.1, would have made no difference as whatever had to be done in regard to it was to be done at Poona which was outside his jurisdiction. As far as he remembered, the statement which Rana brought was a typed copy on a slightly coloured paper, it was pinkish.
18.164 The culprits, he said, were not residing in Bombay; they came to Thana and escaped from Santa Cruz by air but they were not identified by the Police there. Karkare, he said, had left by train from Kalyan in Thana district and he (Nagarvala) himself was operating only within his jurisdiction.
Note—It may be mentioned that Karkare did not leave from Kalyan but took the train for Delhi from the Central Station (Bombay Central) and the other two, Apte and Godse were staying in Bombay Hotels up to the morning of the 27th, both well within Nagarvala's jurisdiction.
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