'Our anxiety only was to get those persons arrested whose description had been given by Madanlal.'
When reminded that the descriptions were inadequate, his reply was that whatever description they could get from Madanlal were sent to Bombay and his opinion was that with the cooperation of the Bombay Police it would be possible to arrest those persons.
24.50 A.N. Bhatia admitted that whatever was said or was given to Jaswant Singh should have been mentioned in the case diary. His attention was drawn to diary No. 2B of Jaswant Singh dated January 21, 1948, which does not contain any reference to the statement of Madanlal or to a synopsis thereof. His reply was that he could remember about Nagarvala but could not say anything about Gurtu, which was hardly a reply relevant to the question asked.
24.51 His attention was next drawn to the case diary No. 3-A of Jaswant Singh of 22 January and he was asked if he had any recollection about the matter. He said that some kind of endorsement might have been made on one of those documents by him but he could not recollect what exactly it was.
24.52 He was recalled on 17 October 1967 and was questioned about Ex. 5A. He was asked as to when the document was prepared. He said he could not remember. He said —
'I personally did not have a precis of the statement of Madanlal prepared. I do remember that such a precis of the statement was prepared. Whatever was happening was known to me because I was being constantly told of what investigation was going on. I was asked my advice which I gave and I also gave directions where I thought necessary and in this way the subordinate police officers had the advantage of my advice'.
24.53 The witness was shown the document Ex. 5A and asked —
'Q. Have you seen this document?
A. I must have seen it at about the time it was prepared and may have seen it later also during investigation but I have not seen it since'.
24.54 His attention was drawn to the portion, 'Met Karkare who appeared to be active worker or President of the Sabha' and to the portion relating to 'S. Deshpande, Om Baba and with Karkare left at 6.00 on 20 January, 1948' they are not in the police diaries and the answer of the witness was, 'I cannot say anything about it'.
24.56 In Cross-examination by Mr. Vaidya, he said—
' .... And after looking at the case diary No. 1,1 can now say that I asked the Inspector to prepare in English a precis of the statement of Madanlal. Because it was incomplete I added a few words and those words I have already indicated'.
24.61 A.N. Bhatia proved endorsement of Rai Sahib Rikhikesh, Ex. 1-A, on the copy of the full statement of Madanlal, Ex. 1 which was attached to Sanjevi's note, Ex. 7. It may be mentioned that the copy of Ex. 5 which was attached to Sanjevi's note, Ex. 7, and is marked Annexure V therein has the following endorsement—'True copy. Inspr. CID, N.D.'— But the Inspector's signature is not there; and underneath it is signed 'T.G. Sanjevi' dated 20-2-49. Which Inspector certified the original to be a true copy, the Commission has not been able to discover.
24.62 Cross-examined by B.B. Lai, A.N. Bhatia said that the document must have been prepared by Ram Chand (R.C. Bhatia) under his orders he must have prepared it from the case diaries. The witness himself got the information contained in portion A-Al of Ex. 5A from the officers who were interrogating the accused. He added, 'Really speaking what is given in the portion A-Al is a gist of what Ram Chand had written in the two pages and something from my own knowledge'.
'I prepared this small note A-Al so that I could at once tell any officer who made enquiries from me.'
He put the document on his table. He could not say when his reader or stenographer handed it over to Jaswant Singh but it must have been before 25 January. He did not miss the document because he had no occasion to use it. He was emphatic that this document could not have been taken by Jaswant Singh when he went to Bombay nor could Sanjevi have sent it.
24.63 Examined by the Commission, A.N. Bhatia said if he had anything to do with the sending of the papers he would not have sent that document. No officer would have done it. He could give no explanation why Jaswant Singh falsely introduced this document into the file before 25 January 1948.
24.64 As far as A.N. Bhatia could recollect whatever had been got from the statement of Madanlal had been sent to Bombay. He never showed the document Ex. 5A to Sanjevi.
The Commission examined many witnesses, Inspector Balakishan, .Dy.S.P. Jaswant Singh's Court testimony, Sardar Patel's Secretary V. Shankar, the Union Home Secretary R.N. Bannerjee, Sardar Patel's daughter Maniben Patel, the infamous U.H. Rana and many more to ascertain whether Ex. 5A and a few other document's which the Delhi Police claimed were sent to Bombay were true or fabricated.
Chapter XXV of the Kapur Commission's Report deals with Investigations in Bombay.
25.3 In between the period from 22nd to the 30th two things happened. Two Delhi police officers came to arrest Karkare and to seek the aid of Nagarvala. The second fact is that U.H. Rana reached Bombay on the 27th evening. He had with him the fuller statement of Madanlal, Ex. 1, which amongst other things made mention of the proprietor of the 'Hindu Rashtra' as one of the conspirators. Both Rana and Nagarvala did not read this statement. To say the least, this was rather surprising conduct because if Nagarvala was even making an inquiry, the information which was contained in Ex. 1 should have been of the greatest importance to him.
25.11 To Nagarvala Morarji Desai gave the whole story but did not ask him to arrest Savarkar because there was no evidence against him. 'I had a very strong feeling', he said, 'That Savarkar was behind the conspiracy and that is the reason why I asked his house to be particularly watched'. Morarji Desai considered the story of Jain to be genuine.
25.13 It was argued by Kotwal that if these were the facts, i.e. Madanlal and Karkare were from Ahmednagar, dump of arms was also at Ahmednagar, the proper person to be informed of these facts and proper person who should have been asked to take action would be Kamte, Inspector General of Police and not Nagarvala, because Kamte's jurisdiction extended over the whole of the Province of Bombay and Nagarvala's was confined to only within the City of Bombay and because Nagarvala could not have taken any action in regard to the conspiracy which was formed outside the city of Bombay i.e. at Ahmednagar. There may be some justification for not disclosing the name of Jain who had requested Morarji Desai not to do so because he lived in a dangerous locality and if his name was given out he was likely to be murdered. (Prof. Jain lived in the Shivaji Park area a stone's throw away from the Savarkar Residence. Dadar and Shivaji Park were considered to be Hindu Mahasabha bastions). But it would in the opinion of the Commission be difficult to blame Desai for choosing Nagarvala rather than Kamte to take over the investigation or inquiry. At this distance of time after knowing all the facts and identity of the conspirators it may be said that Kamte would perhaps have been better, but could the same thing have been said on 21 January 1948 when the two names were of the 'Seth' Karkare of Ahmednagar, and V.D. Savarkar; and which of them was more important? That is where the choice lay. (Here I defer from the Commission's view, Desai could have also brought in Kamte, who could have dealt with the Provincial Police while Nagarvala dealt with the investigation in Bombay city. History shows Nagarvala didn't do much justice to the faith reposed in him by the Home minister.)
25.15 When asked whether Morarji Desai was right in passing on the information to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, KM. Munshi, Wit. No. 82 replied 'that is the only way that a Minister can act. He is not expected to do the investigation himself' Munshi gave an instance of a similar case when he was the Governor of U.P, information was received about a conspiracy at Jhansi to murder Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. He passed on the information to the Home Minister, who asked the Inspector General of Police to make inquiries, which showed that the information was without substance.
25.16 Kotwal referred to the provisions of the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902 (No. IV of 1902), henceforth referred to as the 'Bombay City Act', to buttress his argument that entrusting the investi
gation to Nagarvala was a mistake. According to the aforementioned Act Nagarvala could not have taken any action either to get intelligence regarding the crime or to prevent the commission of the crime because of the limited nature of the powers given by the Bombay City Act. Kotwal cited many Sections and codes of procedures in support of his contention.
The Kapur Commission did not accept Kotwal's arguments.
25.26 The Commission is unable to accept the contention of Kotwal so broadly stated. If his contention is correct, then it would lead to some extraordinary results. If information was received by an officer of the City of Bombay police that certain persons within his jurisdiction had armed themselves to go and murder the members of the Government of another Province or of the Centre, then the Bombay City police officer need and even can take no notice of the information given and may twiddle his thumbs and remain totally indifferent and inactive and allow persons in his jurisdiction to make preparations, collect arms and to allow them to proceed from Bombay to wherever they were going to commit the offence. Taken to its logical conclusion, if there was an espionage ring having its base in Bombay but operating outside the city of Bombay, it would be free to operate outside Bombay, it could steal any secret and confidential information that it wanted, it could commit acts of sabotage, it could do the most dangerous, the most treacherous acts but as long as its operative filed was outside the City of Bombay, the Bombay City Police would be helpless even when after doing all these acts the spies returned to Bombay and were hiding there to the knowledge of the Bombay Police and even when attempting to cross the seas or the skies.
25.34 Two salient features of the information given by Morarji Desai were: the complicity of VR. Karkare of Ahmednagar and the suspicion of V.D. Savarkar of Bombay being also a participant in the conspiracy which had resulted up to then in the explosion of the bomb and an attempt to murder Mahatma Gandhi. The Police may not have known much about V.R. Karkare but they were fully aware of the political philosophy of Savarkar, whose followers though not active in the City of Bombay were quite active in Poona. Karkare's activities could have been obtained from Ahmednagar if an effort had been made.
25.36 The combination of Karkare, of Savarkar, and some association of Badge and the evidence of throwing of a bomb were not proof of attempting to kidnap and thereby immunise Mahatma Gandhi from his activities which were considered as pro-Muslim and anti- Hindu by the Savarkar school of thought. But the group had given enough proof of their intention to murder. In the opinion of the Commission, efforts should have been made by the Special Branch to get whatever information it could from Ahmednagar and also to make full use of the Provincial C.I.D. which could be a source of useful information both in regard to Karkare as well as in regard to Badge. If Dy. Supdt. Chaubal of Poona and Gurtu, the A.D.I.G., C.I.D. Bombay Province could supply useful information after the murder, they could have done so before the murder also. Evidence shows that the Provincial C.I.D. sent, on February 1, 1948, to the D.I.B., Delhi, Photographs of Karkare and Apte, and also evidence of association of Karkare and Apte. Nagarvala was then investigating as a Delhi Officer. The same information would have been available to him as a mere C.I.D. fact-collecting officer under S. 32(l)(b) of the Bombay City Act as also if he was acting under Chapter V of that Act.
25.38 But the main error of Nagarvala was to pursue the theory of kidnapping which led him to suspect a different group of persons and thus led him into a cul-de-sac.
25.46 After receiving directions from the Home Minister to inquire into the matter and apprehend the associates of Madanlal and Karkare. Nagarvala got in touch with his informants and contacts and instructed Police Officers to locate Karkare and his associates.
25.47 By the 22nd January, 1948, the information was that one Balraj Mehta of Shivaji Park was an active member of the conspiracy. Orders were given to watch him and contacts at Ahmednagar were also asked to try and locate Karkare if he was there.
25.52 On 23rd January reports received were that Karkare and Badge were not in Bombay, and that they were both staunch Hindu Mahasabhaites and if they came to Bombay they would be at Parel Hindu Mahasabha office and that that place was already being watched. Balraj Mehta, it was learnt, used to meet his associates at the India Coffee House at Mahatma Gandhi Road. A watch was organised at that Coffee House also but without any tangible results. The same was in case of Savarkar's house. It was also learnt from Ahmednagar that Karkare was not there and his whereabouts were not known.
25.54 On 25 January 1948 it was learnt from sources that two Punjabis living in Arya Pathik Ashram, Room No. 27, were close associates of Balraj Mehta and were dealing in arms; the description of these two Punjabis is given. In view of this it was decided to keep a watcher in room No. 26. The watchers reported that a suspicious looking person came in car No. BYF 2744 to the Ashram but the watcher did not know whom he visited. The watcher also said that the driver of the car also looked suspicious. (Apte and Godse had only the previous evening shifted from the Arya Pathik Ashram to the Elphinstone Annexe Hotel; the police informers who gave information about the suspicious Punjabis failed to recognise them.) It was also learnt that Karkare's brother was working as a jobber in one of the Bombay mills and was living in Naigaum. A watch was organised on his house also. It was discovered that Balraj Mehta was holding long conversations with two persons in Parekh Chambers, Shivaji Park, one of whom was a Sikh and the other a Punjabi. But the attempt to overhear the talks because they were talking in Punjabi and the watcher could not understand it. The behaviour of these persons appeared to be suspicious.
25.61 On 31 January, 1948 it was learnt that if Nathuram Godse was the assailant of Mahatmaji, then the plot would be known to Savarkar and also to Damle his secretary and Kasar his Body Guard, who both lived at Savarkar's house. This information was as a result of the interrogation of Chavan and Limaye who were already under detention.
25.62 Some very useful information was gathered from N.V. Limaye a detenue who said that Savarkar must be fully aware of the facts and Nathuram Godse must have consulted him before undertaking his mission. W.B. Chavan told the police that Savarkar must have got the offence committed and that Godse must have been accompanied by his associate N.D. Apte because Godse never did anything without taking Apte with him. Thereafter Damle and Kasar were interrogated and Savarkar's house was placed under strict surveillance. Others interrogated were Balraj Mehta, Rameshwar Singh Thakur, Trilok Nath Mehra, Fakir Chand Chopra, L.G. Thatte and Prahlad Dutt. As a matter of fact Dutt had been injured during the police raids and had been sent to the hospital. From Damle and Kasar it was learnt that Godse and Apte had seen Savarkar twice or thrice before the bomb was exploded and it appeared from their story that on these occasions the plan to murder Mahatma Gandhi was finalised. They also disclosed that Karkare was an active Hindu Mahasabhaite and had also come to see Savarkar. He was accompanied by a young Punjabi whose name later was learnt to be Madanlal. They had a hour long talk with Savarkar. But neither of them was prepared to depose to anything which took place at the meeting at Savarkar's house. They also disclosed that Badge also used to come to see Savarkar. As a matter of fact Apte and Godse had free access to Savarkar and could come without any appointment or having to wait downstairs.
25.63 No information could be obtained from Balraj Mehta, Avtar Singh and others, but Thatte disclosed that Apte and Godse were the two main organisers of Savarkar's Hindu Rashtra Dal whose members believed in Savarkar and his ideology. On the basis of this the police decided to search Savarkar's house. When the police arrived Savarkar significantly asked Nagarvala whether he had come to arrest him in connection with Gandhiji's murder. But when he was told that it was only a search in connection with Gandhiji's case, Savarkar pretended to be ill and went inside the room and lay down. A mob started attacking his house, it was only the timely arrival of a large police squad which saved him and his property. He mentioned to the Police that the mob fury was likely to be repeated and wanted police protection. Poona and
Ahmednagar Police were contacted because of Karkare, Badge and others being accused with instructions to carry out searches at their places of residence and to arrest them.
Several Hindu Mahasabhaites who were anti-Gandhi were rounded up and their homes searched but nothing important was recovered. Several other persons were arrested. They were all RSS or Hindu Mahasabha workers.
Nagarvala's investigations between 21st and 30th January in the Bomb Case came under sever criticism from Lai.
25.83 Lal argued that when Morarji Desai had mentioned the name of Savarkar in conjunction with Karkare and had also told Nagarvala that there was a conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi, he should have directed his attention to Maharashtrian Brahmins, to Savarkar and his followers who were mostly in Poona and Ahmednagar and not followed his will-o'-the-wisp of Punjabis and the theory to kidnap. He had also criticised Nagarvala for not mentioning the kidnap theory in his Crime Report at all and he wanted the Commission to infer there from that what had been stated in the Crime Report was not a correct representation of facts and that it was a false document. From the fact that the kidnapping theory is not mentioned in the Crime Report, no inference can be drawn that the Crime Report is a false document. By the time the Crime Report came to be written, Mahatma Gandhi had been murdered so that the theory which Nagarvala was working on had been proved to be wrong if not ignis fatuus. He had by then been appointed a Special Officer of the Delhi Police to investigate in to the murder. It was unnecessary at that stage to mention the tangential investigational line which for some reason or another perhaps wrongly Nagarvala had hitherto pursued.
For all his bungling in investigating the Bomb Attack case and exposing the conspiracy to murder before the actual murder it must be said that Nagarvala carried out a very efficient investigation of the Gandhi Murder Case and managed to build a case which withstood very severe attacks from the Defence Counsels in the Special Court.
Lets Kill Gandhi Page 101