Representatives Porter Goss (R-FL) and Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) denounced the threats. “The long list of political assassinations in Haiti is proof enough to believe these are not idle threats,” they said in respective statements. “Instead of keeping his promises to President Clinton, Mr. Aristide is condoning by his silence thuggish acts of violence in his name.”111 Most dramatic were the efforts of purported Lavalas followers to kill opposition leader Evans Paul, the leader of the Espace de Concertation (Space for Dialogue) party. Haiti’s police remained passive during these attacks, but arrested, beat, and jailed Aristide’s opponents after the elections. These patterns of violence continued despite repeated appeals by France, Canada, the United States, the OAS, and the UN Secretariat for Aristide to denounce the violence.
The political opposition continued to protest the outcome of the November election, and Aristide’s followers protested the protests. Nonetheless, on the basis of the May and November elections, Aristide and a new parliament were inaugurated on February 7, 2001, with few international observers.112 Aristide and his followers claimed that the elections were free and fair, but virtually all opponents and observers declared them neither free nor fair. While Aristide was being sworn in as president, the Democratic Convergence Party denounced Aristide’s election and named its own alternative president, Gérard Gourgue. This government became the principal target of pro-Aristide factions, which have kept up violence in the streets ever since.
It is not easy to describe the process by which the “new” Aristide government came into being. Aristide was declared president after a so-called election, and a new parliament (consisting entirely of his followers) was “elected.” He and his followers ran virtually without opposition after violence and threats of violence had driven out or silenced potential opponents. Haiti’s elections were mired in force and fraud. Violence was endemic; corruption universal, and turnout extremely low.
Aristide and his Lavalas Family constructed a one-movement state that ruled on the basis of intimidation, fraud, and fear. Nonetheless, they sought to reap international support for having been “chosen” in democratic elections and tried to collect the $600 million from international agencies and other governments that would have been available to a fairly elected government.
The many violations of normal democratic rules discredited the new government before the governments of the world and the leading international organizations, including the UN and the OAS. In a report to the General Assembly in November 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan charged that Haitian authorities had disregarded all calls for rectification of the May 2000 elections, and he recommended that the UN close its mission (MICAH—the International Civilian Mission in Haiti) because it could not function in a “climate of political turmoil.”113 (MICAH closed on February 6, 2001, the day Gérard Gourgue was named provisional president by the opposition and the day before Aristide’s inauguration. Since the May 2000 elections, Annan noted, “Haiti’s political and electoral crisis has deepened, polarizing its political class and civil society.”114 The first report of the OAS mission on the elections reported: “[T]he aftermath of the May 21 elections…exacerbate[d] an existing political and democratic-institutional crisis in the country rather than beginning to resolve it, as it had been hoped. The sense of the urgent need for political dialogue now coexists with extremely serious doubts about whether such a dialogue is possible.”115
OAS assistant secretary-general Luigi Einaudi traveled to Haiti twenty times over the next two years to mediate a dialogue between the government and the opposition. A number of proposals were advanced, but the OAS generally found a mutual lack of trust and an atmosphere that was not conducive to negotiations. Meanwhile, the political polarization and security climate worsened. In March 2001, the State Department issued a statement that said, in part, “The United States is deeply concerned by escalating political violence in Haiti. Opposition demonstrators began peacefully on March 14. However, anti-opposition protests by ‘popular organizations’ have turned increasingly violent in recent days, with incidents of tire burning, rock throwing, roadblocks, and shootings that have resulted in several reported casualties.”116 Gourgue went into hiding after the Senate passed a unanimous resolution calling for his arrest.
In May 2001, Aristide advanced a proposal that included the resignation of the seven senators whose seats had been contested and a commitment to appoint a new CEP, which would set dates for elections for those seven seats and organize early elections for the rest of the parliament. The Democratic Convergence argued that this proposal would allow the Aristide government to secure the release of the blocked foreign aid and still avoid holding immediate elections for all offices. The OAS worked to build on the initiative and continue dialogue.117 On July 18, the two parties agreed to hold new legislative and local elections, although they could not agree on election dates.118
But violence flared once again. On July 28, armed men in military uniforms attacked two police stations, killing five police officers and injuring fourteen. A Los Angeles Times article reported that the attacks had lasted sixteen hours before police commando units were dispatched to restore order. The Aristide administration denounced the attacks as an attempted coup and claimed that the armed men were former members of the Haitian armed forces. Government officials took to the airwaves and urged Haitians to mobilize against any plots. The opposition denied involvement and suggested that the administration had arranged the attacks to derail progress on resolving the political impasse. OAS secretary-general César Gaviria urged the parties to continue negotiations, 119 and the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince called on the Haitian government to put a stop to arbitrary arrests and killings in the wake of the attacks. (By August 8, more than forty people, most of them members of the opposition, had been arrested in connection with the attacks. All were released by mid-September.) Not surprisingly, these events largely undid the progress toward a political compromise that had been made in July.
This became a familiar pattern. Under OAS auspices, talks between the government and the opposition coalition were resumed in October, only to collapse a day after they started. The opposition said, “We cannot accept the unacceptable…. Last year’s so-called elections were an electoral coup d’état.”120 Meanwhile, in a letter to President George W. Bush, the CBC pleaded for a change in U.S. policy, in particular its refusal to allow the IADB to release loans to Haiti.
Einaudi returned to Haiti in December to restart the dialogue, but was defeated in the attempt by another resurgence of violence. Two days before his scheduled arrival, radio journalist Brignol Lindor was hacked to death with machetes—he had received death threats the week before for inviting opposition supporters onto his talk show. Violence flared at his funeral. On December 17, armed commandos stormed the National Palace. Seven were killed before the attack was thwarted. Once again government officials condemned the attack as an attempted coup, and their supporters took to the streets and burned down opposition headquarters and the homes of several opposition leaders. Gérard Gourgue again went into hiding, saying “I don’t know what happened at the National Palace, but it has become a pretext to massacre the opposition.”121
In the spring of 2002, the OAS appointed a Commission of Inquiry to examine the acts of violence that occurred on December 17 and created a Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti, which would work in four core areas: security, justice, human rights, and governance. In July, the OAS issued a report stating that the December 17 attack was not a coup attempt “but rather an outbreak of violence connected to the general breakdown of law and order.”122 Einaudi was sent to Haiti to recommence negotiations, but again little progress was made. The OAS negotiator commented that the “government was not assuming its responsibilities” vis-à-vis the negotiations.123 An Aristide spokesman claimed that the opposition would not budge until Aristide resigned and general elections were held.124 In August, anti-Aristide protests broke out in Gonaïves and surrounding areas.
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In September 2002, after more than two years of failed attempts to broker an agreement between the government and the opposition to resolve the political crisis stemming from the May 2000 elections, and citing “the continuing deterioration of the socioeconomic situation in Haiti, the ongoing suffering of the people, and its potential for humanitarian disaster,” the OAS passed a resolution calling for the “normalization of economic cooperation between the Government of Haiti and the international financial institutions,” which would mean allowing the release of the $500 million in blocked international aid and loans.125 The Bush administration signed on to the resolution, which laid out goals for the Haitian government that would allow the aid to be unblocked. However, the government failed to meet a November 4 deadline to appoint a new CEP, improve security, punish gangs, and disarm the population.126 Einaudi commented, “The long and short of it is that the key actors have been unwilling to rise above entrenched personal positions in terms of allowing for an end to the fragmentation and paralysis that are leading the country as a whole toward disaster.”127
Meanwhile, Haitian boat people continued to head for Miami, causing disputes in the United States over what to do about the refugees.128 In late October 2002, more than two hundred Haitians arrived in a rickety freighter, many jumping overboard to reach land. In Haiti, protests against Aristide broke out in mid-November. The more than $500 million in aid money that Haiti sorely needs to get its economy moving is still frozen.
New Democracies, New Problems
Military intervention in another country to promote democracy is a relatively new idea; in fact, many nations still consider it an illegitimate interference in the internal affairs of another state.
The world has learned a great deal about how democracies fail. In his book The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, political scientist Juan Linz provides a brilliant analysis of how new democracies establish the legitimacy, authority, and effectiveness necessary to survive, and how they can lose it. Much of what Linz says is directly relevant to problems that exist today in countries in Eastern Europe, Central America, the Philippines, and elsewhere. So far, the United States is the only country that has attempted to systematically design policies that promote democratic practices, and its efforts have been extremely controversial.
The United States has embraced the idea that human rights and democracy should be important concerns of American foreign policy, but we have been inconsistent in the pursuit of these goals. Concern about human rights and democracy have been factors in U.S. policy toward the former Soviet Union and in Latin America, where Congress has demanded democratic and human rights reforms in return for U.S. aid. There has been broad public approval of making aid to the Philippines, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and other countries conditional on the development of democratic governments.129
The occupation of Haiti, in contrast showed that our government had become too casual about using military force, deploying U.S. troops, and assuming open-ended obligations. Large majorities of Americans feel very cautious about direct military interventions abroad, and a majority opposed sending U.S. forces to Haiti. The primary concern of the largest number of Americans was discouraging immigration from Haiti.
The Clinton administration was committed to success in Operation Restore Democracy, although opposition existed in both the UN Security Council and the Organization of American States. In his effort to “restore democracy” in Haiti by restoring Aristide to power, President Clinton exercised his new approach to foreign policy, 130 involving the United States deeply in Haiti’s political development—at great expense. The American presence in Haiti to put Aristide back in power and subsequent involvement with and assistance to Haiti cost U.S. taxpayers about $3 billion.
Once the intervention had occurred, I believed we should follow through on our investment for three reasons: (1) in the interest of human solidarity; (2) because imposing the embargo, which further weakened Haiti’s fragile economy, gave us some responsibility and created an increased flow of refugees; and (3) because we had imposed a military occupation on the island. Having intervened so far into the internal affairs of Haiti, the United States had a responsibility to foster the implementation of democratic practices, and the provision of nonpolitical police and judiciary systems.
But the U.S. government could not solve Haiti’s terrible problems. No one knows exactly how foreign forces can help civil societies or modern states emerge in very different cultures, and the influence of an external power on the process of democratization is limited. I suggested that the United States concentrate on what we could do well—improving literacy rates and providing police and job training—rather than aiming for the total renovation of Haiti, which would be an inappropriate lapse into neocolonialism. As we now know, even the assistance for judicial reform and police training we provided in the mid-to late 1990s produced scant improvement, as corruption and government indifference created obstacles to reform.
Literacy can be taught from outside a society. Vocational training can also be effectively taught by foreigners. Obviously, efforts to help with literacy and vocational training should respect the traditions of Haiti—its language, culture, and educational system. By playing an active role in programs to promote literacy and technical education, the United States could guard against efforts to politicize these programs and ensure their effectiveness.
There were a good many highly educated Haitians, although many fled the country in these years. Haiti’s small commercial and business sectors, along with tourism, constituted the primary sources of foreign exchange, which is why the embargo was so devastating. The development of larger, more skilled working and middle classes could help create the foundation for economic and political development.
But the key to assisting Haiti on the road to democracy is to establish reliable law and order—and since the United States restored Aristide to the presidency in 1994, neither he nor René Préval, who ruled between Aristide’s first and second terms, brought about the rule of law that has been missing throughout Haiti’s history. Aristide holds a dubious distinction. He was ousted from power twice, again in February 2004 and forced back into exile. A rule of law might have prevented Aristide’s second coup and would encourage Haitian exiles to return from the United States, France, and South America, and would contribute greatly to political and economic development.
I was pessimistic in the 1990s about the prospects for democracy in Haiti. Today, I am not much more sanguine—not when the cultural, social, and economic foundations of genuine democracy are still missing there. As sociologist Anthony Maingot concluded a grim article on poverty and corruption in Haiti by saying: “All that has changed are some of the actors. The play is a tragedy and in Haiti, as in theater, the outcome of a tragedy is predictable; it invariably ends without solutions and with many deaths.”131
4.
THE BALKAN WARS: MAKING WAR TO KEEP THE PEACE
[Bosnia was] the historic boundary between East and West, Islam and Christianity. Most of all, it represented the limits of Euro pean integration, of humanitarian concern, and of political interests.1
—JAMES GOW, Triumph of the Lack of Will:
International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War
Many Western observers were impressed with the skill of Josip Broz Tito in preserving Yugoslavia’s independence from Joseph Stalin’s boundless appetites, from the end of World War II to his death in 1980. Only after Tito died and wars of secession broke out did it occur to Americans that his greatest achievement had been holding together the diverse peoples of Yugoslavia. It was ironic that the Communist autocrat who ruled this one-party state understood the importance of ethnic identity and decentralization to the preservation of Yugoslavia. Tito (who was half Croat, half Slovene) respected ethnic diversity but rigorously suppressed separatism; he was especially sensitive to manifestations of Serb nationalism. After his death, Serb nationalism asserted itself in the person of Slobodan Milošević.
The story of U.S. involvement in Bosnia is an interesting counterpoint to the experience in Iraq/Kuwait, Somalia, and Haiti. Here the problem was not overreaching but hesitation in the face of tyranny and mass murder on European turf. It shows the danger of allowing political sensitivities, both domestic and international, to stand in the way of strong action. The first President Bush was reluctant to act because he was in an election. Clinton wanted to act, but the Europeans would not agree, the UN peacekeepers were subject to too many limitations, and the UN secretary-general insisted on having the final say. The failure to organize a timely and effective response to Slobodan Milošević demonstrated a global lack of seriousness about a new world order, the Clinton administration was forced to retreat in the face of the lack of support, and NATO stepped in to make the difference where the UN had been merely obstructive.
SETTING THE SCENE
Under Tito’s governance, Yugoslavia adopted new constitutions in 1946, 1963, 1968, and 1974. The 1974 constitution provided for an eight-member collective presidency, with one representative from each of the six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and the two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). Each region had its own parliament, as well as representatives in the federal parliament. The presidency of the collective executive rotated annually among the eight states, with the commander in chief of the armed forces presiding and the Communist Party reinforcing unity.
Making War to Keep Peace Page 18