1. IRAQ INVADES KUWAIT
1. David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 776–7.
2. In Secretary of State James Baker’s words, “It took some arm-twisting to convince the Latins to denounce Noriega by name for stealing the election. The old doctrine of non-interventionism and fear of U.S. power still paralyzed the organization.” James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992, with Thomas M. DeFrank (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 183.
3. National Security Directive 26, “U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,” October 2, 1989, http://www.bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsd/NSD/NSD%2026.0001.pdf.
4. Ibid. NSD-26 reaffirmed our strategic interests in the region and, with caveats conveying our concerns, generally confirmed the previous policy of engaging Iraq: “Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq.”
5. Don Oberdorfer, “Missed Signals in the Middle East,” Washington Post Magazine, March 17, 1991, W19.
6. The transcript of the July 25, 1990 meeting between April Glaspie originally appeared in an Arabic-language version leaked from Iraqi sources to ABC News, who translated it and then passed it on to the New York Times. The translated version appeared as “Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy,” New York Times, September 23, 1990, page 19. In 1998 the U.S. government declassifed the document, which appears on the Margaret Thatcher Foundation website, as “Gulf War: US Embassy Baghdad to Washington, 25 July 1990,” margaretthatcher.org.
7. Charter of the United Nations, Article 51.
8. George Bush, “Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 26, August 5, 1990, 1207.
9. Entire text of UN Security Council Resolution 661:
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its Resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990,
Deeply concerned that that resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues with further loss of human life and material destruction,
Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,
Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed its readiness to comply with resolution 660 (1990),
Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of Resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
Decides, as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
Decides that all States shall prevent: (a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported there from after the date of the present resolution;
(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or transshipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported there from after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products;
Decides that all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial, or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, food stuffs;
Calls upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or license granted before the date of the present resolution;
Decides to establish, in accordance with Rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations: (a) To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary-General;
(b) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the present resolution;
Calls upon all States to co-operate fully with the Committee in the fulfillment of its task, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present resolution;
Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for the purpose;
Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above, nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all States; (a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies;
(b) Not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power;
Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days;
Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq.
10. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 277. Baker’s interpretation is curious, as the last five presidents were Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, and Lyndon Baines Johnson. Only Carter’s presidency really fits Baker’s description.
11. Ibid., 277.
12. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s War (Boston: Little Brown, 1995), 49.
13. George Bush, “Annual State of the Union Address,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27, January 29, 1991, 90. In his State of the Union Address in 1991, President Bush said,
We will succeed in the Gulf. And when we do, the world community will have sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, present and future, who contemplates outlaw aggression. The world can therefore seize this opportunity to fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order—where brutality will go unrewarded, and aggression will meet collective resistance.
14. William Schneider, “Consensus Holds, But for How Long?” National Journal 22, no. 35 (September 1, 1990
): 2102. Schneider points out that the American public generally believed that protecting our oil supply was the most important reason for our actions in the Gulf. He writes:
[in mid-August 1990] the Gallup Organization Inc. asked Americans “Why do you think we are involved in the Iraqi situation and why are our troops in Saudi Arabia?” The leading answer (49%) was that we were there to protect our oil supplies. By comparison, 35% gave internationalist reasons that we were there to defend other countries or stop Iraqi aggression. When the CBS News-New York Times poll asked people to choose between two objectives, 46% said America was sending troops mainly because the price of oil would increase too much if Iraq controlled the oil fields, and 30% said America was there mainly to help its friends.
15. Robert Thompson, “Japanese Companies in Saudi Oil Link Study,” Financial Times, May 29, 1991; Steven Weisman, “Japan, Courting Israel, Joins Move to Scrap UN’s Stand on Zionism,” New York Times, December 13, 1991.
16. George Bush, “On Deployment of U.S. Troops to Persian Gulf,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 26, August 8, 1990, 1216. See also William Schneider, “Consensus Holds, But for How Long?” 2101. In an address to the nation concerning the Gulf crisis, President Bush stated,
We succeeded in the struggle for freedom in Europe because we and our allies remained stalwart. Keeping the peace in the Middle East will require no less. We’re beginning a new era. This new era can be full of promise, an age of freedom, a time of peace for all peoples. But if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As the case in the 1930s we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors…. This is not an American problem or a European problem or a Middle East problem, it is the world’s problem. [Emphasis added.]
17. These six points are paraphrased from remarks by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club. See Caspar W. Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power,” Speech before the National Press Club, November 28, 1984. See John T. Correll, “The Use of Force,” Air Force Magazine, December 1999, Vol. 82, No. 12. http://www.afa.org/magazine/Dec1999/1299force.asp.
18. Edward Lucas, “Storm Clouds Gather Over White House,” Independent, May 3, 1991, 10.
19. Robert M. Kimmitt, undersecretary of state for political affairs, citing President Bush in “Economic and National Security,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, June 3, 1991.
20. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 304.
21. Ibid., 278.
22. Ibid., 279.
23. Ibid., 307.
24. Ibid., 304.
25. See Steven Hurst, “The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration,” in Search of a New World Order (New York: Cassell, 1999), 4.
This ability to use the UN as a vehicle for U.S. policy was vital to Bush both domestically and internationally. In the latter context it gave legitimacy to the U.S. goal of expelling Iraq from Kuwait. It also ensured that Iraq would be isolated diplomatically and, thanks to UN resolutions imposing sanctions, economically…. Domestically, the securing of UN backing was a vital step towards securing congressional and public support for the major U.S. role in the Gulf being contemplated.
26. George Bush, “Remarks of President George Bush upon Presenting the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Margaret Thatcher,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27, March 7, 1991, 264.
27. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 279.
28. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 1993), 821.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 167.
32. Other policymakers also speculated openly about the price of the coalition. For example, during a November 28, 1990, hearing of the Armed Services Committee, Senator William Cohen (R-ME) noted: “According to this morning’s news, China apparently is using the threat of a veto or an abstention from voting to purchase goodwill, mainly an adjustment of their trade status. This is extortion by another name, in my opinion.” Senator William Cohen, Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Persian Gulf Crisis,” November 28, 1990.
33. See Weinberger Doctrine, principles 2 and 5.
34. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Though Our Allies May Waiver…,” Washington Post, January 7, 1991.
35. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 314.
36. Note: There are no democratic governments in the Gulf; but there is a great deal of oil.
37. Dan Goodgame and Michael Duffy, “Read My Hips,” Time, October 22, 1990, 26–27.
38. On December 31, 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved into fifteen separate countries, Russia, the largest one of these, was the Soviet Union’s successor in the UN Security Council and other international organizations.
39. President George Bush, “Address to the 46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27, September 23, 1991, 1324.
40. Gerald Butt, “Iraq Showing No Signs of Relaxing Grip on Kuwait,” Daily Telegraph, August 11, 1990.
41. Aleksandr Yakovlev, August 20, 1990, on Moscow television.
42. Senator Sam Nunn, 102nd Congress (January 11, 1991), Congressional Record 137, pts.6-8:S190.
43. Senator George Mitchell, 102nd Congress (January 10, 1991), Congressional Record 137, pts. 6-8:S102.
44. Senator Claiborne Pell, Ibid., S125.
45. Vice President Dan Quayle, “America’s Objectives in the Persian Gulf,” Address at Seton Hall University, South Orange, New Jersey, November 29, 1990; U.S. Department of State Dispatch, December 10, 1990, 310.
46. Richard M. Nixon, “Why,” New York Times, January 6, 1991. Also, Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Turn Saddam Back,” Washington Post, December 17, 1990.
47. Nixon, “Why.”
48. “Speech by Saddam Hussein on the 70th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Iraqi Army,” Baghdad Domestic Service, in Arabic, 0805 GMT, January 6, 1991. Also, Ofra Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1992), 156, 159.
49. Al Qadisiya, January 5, 1991.
50. “Text of Appeal by the General Secretariat of the Popular Islamic Conference Organization,” Baghdad, Republic of Iraq Radio, 1734 GMT, January 18, 1991.
51. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Fantasies That Doomed Saddam,” Washington Post, January 20, 1991.
52. Ibid. The Koran passage is from The Book of the Pilgrimage, verse 39.
53. Ibid.
54. Judith Miller, citing Iraqi information minister Latif Jassem, “Iraq’s Seesaw Diplomacy: Threats and Entreaties,” New York Times, October 17, 1990. Also, Judith Miller, “Mideast Tensions: King Hussein on Kuwait and Dashed Hope,” New York Times, October 16, 1990; Jeane Kirkpatrick, “The Threat Must Be Real,” Washington Post, October 22, 1990.
55. Jim Wolf, “U.S. Rejects Any Deal Letting Iraq Hang on to Part of Kuwait,” Reuters, PM Cycle, October 17, 1990.
56. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1968), 111. Also, Kirkpatrick, “The Threat Must Be Real.”
57. von Clausewitz, On War, 104. Also, Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Will We Liberate Kuwait?” Washington Post, November 12, 1990.
58. Eliot Cohen, “Iraq: Why and How the U.S. Should Strike,” Commentary 90, no. 5 (November 1990): 27.
59. George H. W. Bush, “Why We Are in the Gulf,” Newsweek, November 26, 1990, 28.
60. George Bush, “State of the Union Address,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27, January 29, 1991, 90.
61. Hoffman, David, “Baker Wants UN to Approve Force; More Tank Divisions to Be Deployed,” Washington Post, November 8, 1990.
62. George Bush, “Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27, January 16, 1991, 50.
63. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 278–281, 305.
64. Daniel O. Graham, “Q: Should the U.S. Build a Space-Based Missile Defense? Yes: Onl
y a Space-Borne System Can Counter Missile Threats,” Insight on the News, September 11, 1995, p. 18. Also, “Patriot Missiles Ineffective During Gulf War, Analysis Claims,” United Press International, January 28, 1993.
65. Alan Riding, “Confrontation in the Gulf,” New York Times, January 1, 1991.
66. Senator Sam Nunn, Hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Persian Gulf Crisis,” 27–28 November 1990.
67. George Bush, “Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf,” 50.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Donald Kagan, “The General’s War: Book Review,” Commentary 99, no. 6 (June 1995): 41, citing Laurence Freedman and Efram Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and the New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
71. Charles Lane, “The Legend of Colin Powell,” New Republic, April 17, 1995, 70.
72. George Bush, “Kuwait Is Liberated,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27, February 27, 1991, 224c.
73. Elie Kedourie, “Iraq: The Mystery of American Policy,” Commentary 91, no. 6 (June 1991): 15–19, 17.
74. John Kelly, assistant secretary of state, Near East and South Asian affairs, Hearing of the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 26, 1991. Kelly also stated,
The United Nations, in all of the resolutions it passed with regard to Iraq and the debate and vote in the American Congress on authorizing the use of force against Iraq, set as their goals the liberation of Kuwait, the restoration of the legal government of Kuwait, and a return to peace and stability in the area. Neither in the UN debates nor in other enunciations of military objectives was the conquest of Baghdad or of the removal of Saddam Hussein enunciated as an objective.
75. McNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (March 27, 1991). Schwarzkopf continued: “And the President, you know, made the decision that we should stop at a given time, at a given place. That did leave some escape routes open for them to get back out and I think that it was a very humane decision and a very courageous decision on his part also.”
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