BY THE FALL of 1916, Great Britain and its allies were reaching strategic collapse. The Germans had embarked on a strategy of exhaustion, hoping to bleed its enemies white through a bombing assault meant to terrorize civilians, a relentless U-boat campaign, and a grinding war on land. Zeppelins began bombing London in January that year; the attacks would continue throughout the war. The U-boat campaign was initially successful, but poor world opinion forced the Germans to end the sinkings by the middle of the year. British and French ground losses in France were horrific: the battle of the Somme and the meat grinder at Verdun had destroyed the best troops the Allies had. Britain was forced to conscription, and the French army was on the verge of mutiny. In Russia, General Alexei A. Brusilov’s offensive would run out of steam by September 20. Meanwhile, unrest in Ireland was moving toward open insurrection. Hordes of Senussi guerrillas were making incursions from Libya into western Egypt. In the Middle East, the British were still recovering from the twin debacles at Gallipoli and Kut. Now the Arabs were requesting a brigade of infantry at the worst possible moment: the strategic cupboard was bare.
At the same time, there was a larger division of geostrategic views toward the entire war in the Middle East. The “Westerners” included General Murray himself, along with Major-General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell, Murray’s chief of staff and his chief intelligence officer, Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. V. Holdich. Their views reflected the views of the War Office, which believed that the world war could be decided only on the western front in the meat grinder of France. Their position was supported by the India Office, which saw meddling in Muslim affairs in the Middle East as likely to have a serious backlash among the millions of Muslims who lived in India, the “crown jewel” of the British Empire. Their world outlook was conservative, narrow, and opportunistic. The “Easterners” included Lawrence, Sir Henry McMahon, Storrs, Clayton, Wingate, Wilson, in time Admiral Wemyss, the Foreign Office, and a resurgent David Lloyd George, the new prime minister: all believed that since Turkey was the weakest of the enemy powers, its collapse would create a dominolike effect and produce the eventual overthrow of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Their larger collective worldview could be best described as “messianic imperialism,” which saw as Great Britain’s holy mission the assumption of the “white man’s burden,” civilizing and Christianizing the pagan world.
The larger strategic considerations had little effect on Lawrence as he sought to find the mainspring of the Arab Revolt. He continued to reside in Feisal’s camp, gauging the measure of the man who now seemed to be emerging as the leader he had been seeking. Lawrence engaged Feisal in innumerable conversations, watching him chain-smoke through lengthy discussions, with the logic of his arguments stacking up at the same regularity as the piles of his cigarette ends. He was a master of the oral tradition, and this seemed to be the source of his thrall over the people. His mastery over his followers was natural and unaffected, and he seemed little concerned whether or not they followed him. He was a born leader and led out of love rather than through the power of physical strength or force of personality.
Lawrence also studied Feisal’s method of leadership in defeat. He was most accessible to his troops in defeat when their spirits were darkest. He gave of himself in ways that encouraged his men. In this he displayed the utmost patience and understanding that seemed to make no battlefield sense. But Lawrence soon realized that Feisal was not only leading an army, he was leading an entire community, and his leadership therefore required the most inclusive and embracing form. As a community leader, he was able to demonstrate extreme self-control, personal abnegation, and humility. Lawrence recalled that “Feisal, in speaking, had a rich musical voice, and used it carefully upon his men. To them he talked in tribal dialect, but with a curious, hesitant manner, as though faltering painfully among the phrases, looking inward for the just word. His thought, perhaps, moved only by a little in front of his speech, for the phrases at last chosen were usually the simplest, which gave an effect emotional and sincere. It seemed possible, so thin was the screen of words, to see the pure and the very brave spirit shining out. At other times he was full of humor—that invariable magnet of Arab goodwill.”7
Feisal’s camp reflected his simple yet effective style of leadership. Near daybreak the army chaplain, the imam, would rise to a nearby hill and offer his call to prayer as a kind of reveille. Feisal’s five slaves would attend their master with sweetened coffee. However, these were slaves in name only. He had freed them long ago, but out of respect for Feisal they had remained in his service. An hour or so after he had risen, his tent flap was thrown open as an invitation to his household staff to begin the morning routine, which opened with breakfast and news of the day. After breakfast, sweetened tea was offered between rounds of unsweetened coffee. Feisal usually spent the morning dictating letters to his personal secretaries. Occasionally the routine was interrupted by a private audience. By nine in the morning, Feisal would strap on his ceremonial dagger and repair to the reception tent, where he would greet the waiting supplicants who bore this or that grievance for judgment. At noon, Feisal took a light lunch. His heavy cigarette smoking no doubt contributed to his slim appetite. Many of his heavier acquaintances often ate before having lunch with him, knowing his meals would be quick and sparse. After lunch, his visitors would spend some time in idle conversation, sipping glasses full of a syrupy green tea. Feisal would then go into seclusion for an hour or so to sleep, read, pray, or attend to personal matters. By midafternoon, he would return to the reception tent and finish his audience.
After a second audience, if time permitted, Feisal would stroll with his friends to discuss the events of the day and other mundane matters. Sunset prayer was generally a public affair, and although he wasn’t particularly religious, Feisal was a deeply spiritual man who saw the divine reflected in all things. It was only after the evening prayer that he would turn to military matters, since most reconnaissance took place after dark. While in the field, of course, his schedule was much different, with time spent on community issues in inverse proportion to the routine when he was in camp. The evening meal was more of a lunch, again reflecting his spartan existence and fondness for cigarettes. The meal, around eight or nine o’clock, completed the day, with time spent in relaxation and perhaps idle diversions like storytelling or chess. Feisal was an excellent chess player and seldom beaten. His tactical acumen at the game board was well reflected in the field of operations.
It was during one of these early visits with Feisal that Lawrence decided to don Arab dress. It was at the request of Feisal himself, who felt that Lawrence would be less obtrusive in camp if he dressed as a native. Only the Turks wore khaki, and Feisal was getting tired of explaining Lawrence’s presence to all and sundry day after day. Lawrence was happy to comply and found the garb much more comfortable and practical in the hot desert atop a galloping camel. He was given a brilliant white-and-gold embroidered silk wedding gown, a bequest from Feisal’s great-aunt. Feisal also gave him a splendid bay camel for his travels around the battlefields. From a distance, Lawrence was now taking on the guise of a real Arab fighter.
WHILE LAWRENCE WAS thus engaged with Feisal, pressure was also being placed upon British strategic interests by the French. France had large numbers of Muslims in its empire and saw Hussein’s success as a way to reopen the pilgrimage to Mecca for French Muslim subjects, not to mention the opportunity it offered to meddle in British affairs to serve France’s own aims. To that end, Lieutenant-Colonel Eduard Brémond, an accomplished Arab scholar, was put in charge of a military mission. The mission reached Alexandria on September 1 and soon arrived at Jidda. With the French came pilgrims and money, over 1.25 million gold francs, as well as offers for military support. The pilgrims headed for Mecca, where they were warmly received by their Arab co-religionists. However, Hussein was wary of their political influence, especially the French presence in Syria, where he had aspirations of his own. It was clear to Brémond and others that these diff
erences could never be easily reconciled. In the short term, the British were willing to turn the French presence in the region to their advantage by requesting immediate French assistance. The French, however, were completely unprepared to send any significant troops to the Hejaz, at least until November, but to compensate for their own unpreparedness they too clamored for a British brigade at Rabegh.
When Lawrence landed at Jidda in October, the Turks had still not moved against Mecca, but as each day wore on, they were growing stronger. The Turks under Fakhri Pasha had more than made up for their early losses. At Medina they still had ten thousand troops, with a further twelve hundred guarding the northern railway and twelve hundred occupying the port at Wejh. Arab forces were still deployed in three main groupings: a force of five thousand raiders under Ali near Rabegh, four thousand men with Abdullah hard by Mecca, and the largest segment under Feisal raiding the railway out of Yenbo. Three days after Lawrence and Storrs landed, Feisal was driven back from Bir Abbas to Hamra, where Lawrence eventually joined him and conducted his assessment.
By November 1, Lawrence was ready to return to Cairo to report to Clayton. He traveled by camel as far as Yenbo and then received passage to Jidda, where he linked up with Admiral Wemyss. The two of them took a detour across the Red Sea to Port Sudan and then to Khartoum, where they both offered Wingate their appreciation of the situation. In Lawrence’s view, British troops were unnecessary because he believed the Arabs under Feisal’s leadership could hold off the Turks with British naval support. Whereas Murray and Robertson had little faith in the success of the revolt and therefore viewed the expenditure of British troops a waste of good men, Lawrence saw great opportunity. He also saw bringing British units into the region as an unnecessary complication on religious and political grounds, given increasing French interest.
Upon his return to Cairo, Lawrence made the same recommendation opposing the deployment of British troops to Rabegh that he had at Khartoum in conversations with Wingate. What the Arabs needed was strong artillery reinforcements, for their effect on Arab morale was as great as their tactical contribution. For months, Feisal had been asking for guns, but to no avail. Lawrence believed that Feisal’s army could defend itself in the hilly terrain between Medina and Mecca as long as they had sufficient artillery and machine guns. British troops, on the other hand, would have been greeted with deep suspicion and bias, undermining any solidarity that might exist between the two allies. Tactically, the British troops were too cumbersome for mobile operations in desert terrain. Lawrence was all the more adamant when he discovered Brémond—who saw Hussein’s reliance on Allied troops as a way to leverage the Arabs into greater subservience—urging the dispatch of troops. The essential consideration as far as Lawrence was concerned was that the Arabs had to be seen in their struggle for liberty as succeeding through their own independent efforts, cohesion, and strength of will. Nothing less could guarantee the achievement or its recognition before the whole world.
MEANTIME, THE TURKS began to intensify their information campaign. Back in August, they had stripped Hussein of his title as emir of Mecca and bestowed it on Ali Haidar. The intention was to bring Haidar with the Turkish advance from Medina and install him once Mecca was seized. The move was also meant to delegitimize Hussein and the entire Arab cause. By December, Turkish propaganda leaflets spoke of the impending arrival of whole Turkish divisions from Europe sent to recapture the holy city, and with Ali Haidar, the Arabs would be brought back to the path of righteousness.
In early December, Lawrence returned from Cairo to the Hejaz with official sanction to cooperate with the Arabs. He appeared unexpectedly at Yenbo, where new operational developments began to unfold. For the past six weeks, the Turks had been unable to break through the Arab hill defenses to the southwest of Medina. Hussein began to consider a strategy that would break the deadlock and allow the Arabs to seize the initiative through offensive action. A plan was developed that would extend military operations 180 miles north to the small port of Wejh in the Turkish rear. The port was also within raiding range of the Hejaz rail line. Severing the line would cut off Medina from Syria and force the Turks to dispatch more troops from the Medina front to secure the now vulnerable railway.
The plan started off well but soon collapsed after the initial moves out of Yenbo were outflanked by advancing Turkish troops. Lawrence joined Feisal at Nakhl Mubarak and remained there for a few nights until he began to realize the potential threat to Yenbo. The Turks resumed their attack shortly after Lawrence left and routed Feisal’s entire force, which fled to Yenbo, arriving there on December 9. The collapse of the Arab advance now had the makings of a complete disaster. On his own initiative, Lawrence began to organize defenses at Yenbo for a Turkish attack he was certain would come. In his efforts to organize the defenses, he received considerable aid from naval captain W. H. D. “Ginger” Boyle aboard the HMS Suva, which, along with four other warships, had just landed a convoy of supplies to help support the new offensive and to enlarge the port into a more effective base of operations. By December 10, Boyle and Lawrence had managed to deploy the ships in such dominating positions that the Turks called off the impending attack.
THE CRISIS AT Yenbo raised yet again the question concerning the need for British reinforcements, perhaps a brigade. For a brief time, even Lawrence and Feisal believed the day had finally arrived for the employment of British troops. As the crisis swiftly passed, they changed their minds for good. In a final definitive argument, Lawrence asserted that in the first place, even if troops were available—which was not likely under the circumstances then prevailing in Egypt—they would not reach Rabegh in time to matter. Second, even if a brigade was at hand, it was unclear the force could hold out against a determined corps-sized Turkish assault. Third, there was always the possibility that the enemy could simply bypass the entire position and make a dash directly for Mecca. Finally, and for Lawrence the most decisive argument, there was the potential presence of British troops in the theater. To the Arab rebels, the intervention of British forces—or any foreign units, for that matter—would mean a sellout of the whole revolt and the possible abandonment of the Arab cause. But against this volatile strategic backdrop, Wingate, largely on behalf of the Foreign Office, finally agreed to issue Hussein an ultimatum requesting that he decide definitively on use of the troops. While Hussein was thus considering his alternatives, the situation changed dramatically again.
On December 16, the Turks began a general evacuation from Yenbo; two days later, they withdrew from Nakhl Mubarak. These movements were swiftly followed up by Feisal’s reorganized forces. Apparently, the Turks believed that Ali, who had left Rabegh some days earlier, was attempting an envelopment near Bir Abbas and threatening their lines of communications with Medina. The operation collapsed, however, when Ali for unknown reasons decided to return to Rabegh. By December 22, it was clear that Fakhri Pasha was reorganizing his forces. The signal question was whether he was reorganizing for a withdrawal or redeploying for another attempt at Rabegh.
While the Arab camps seethed with rumor and as they waited for the operational situation to clarify, the maneuver to Wejh was reconsidered, now as a way to spread the revolt to the northern Hejaz. Under the original formulation, Feisal had not intended to move north with his main body until the defenses southwest of Medina had been completely solidified. But time was slipping away: the Arabs had to act before the Turks. At this moment of decision, Lawrence reconsidered his options. He found it curious that the Turks had hesitated to rush the Arab positions at Rabegh after the enemy had made such successful gains against the port in late October. Why did the Turks waver? It occurred to Lawrence “that perhaps the virtue of irregulars lay in depth, not in face, and that it had been the threat of the attack by them upon the Turkish northern flank which had made the enemy hesitate so long. The actual Turkish flank ran from their front line [at Rabegh, their ‘face’ in Lawrence’s words] to Medina, a distance of some fifty miles: but, if we moved
towards the Hejaz railway behind Medina, we might stretch our threat (and, accordingly, their flank) as far, potentially, as Damascus, eight hundred miles away to the north. Such a move would force the Turks to the defensive, and we might regain the initiative.”
Under the revised plan for the attack on Wejh, Lawrence also found a new way to disrupt the Hejaz railway closer to Medina. Up until that time, Abdullah had been located northeast of Medina, a position poorly chosen because the Turks found the line readily defensible from that direction. Lawrence expressed his dissatisfaction to Feisal, who recalled the existence of an old wadi north of Yenbo that directly bisected the railway like a dagger from the sea. This was Wadi Ais, where Abdullah was now charged to move and set up a new base. The wadi easily covered all movement against the track. Under the plan, the two Arab armies would now be able to dominate two hundred miles of the Hejaz railway.
On January 2, 1917, Lawrence conducted his first combat mission riding out with a patrol, scouting the location of the withdrawing Turkish forces. The raid was generally uneventful but auspicious, as the party captured two Turkish prisoners. On his return to camp, Lawrence reflected on the transformation of Feisal’s men since he’d first met them three months earlier. “They were quiet but confident. Some who had been serving with Feisal for six months or more, had lost that pristine heat of eagerness which had so much thrilled me at Hamra; but they had gained experience in compensation; and staying-power in the ideal was fatter and more important for us than an early fierceness.” At the same time, Lawrence noticed another change: “Their patriotism was now conscious; and their attendance grew more regular as the distance from their homes increased.… When the Sherif came near they fell into a ragged line, and together made the bow and sweep of the arm to the lips, which was the official salute. They did not oil their guns: they said lest the sand clog them; also they had no oil … but the guns were decently kept, and some of the owners could shoot at long range.”
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