Gallatin hoped to avoid war if at all possible.8 Instead of appropriating money for the navy or adopting the declaration of no war, Gallatin supported a resolution demanding that President Adams turn over all the correspondence sent by the envoys to the secretary of state. The House overwhelmingly adopted the resolution on April 2. It was an unprecedented demand on the executive’s privilege that threatened to expose secret diplomatic communications. Federalists joined in demanding the president release the letters.9
Gallatin must have felt conflicted about his role. As a young immigrant from Geneva arriving in Richmond in 1783, he was befriended by Marshall. It was, in fact, Marshall who first recognized Gallatin’s potential and trained him in the practice of law.10 Now Gallatin was repaying Marshall’s generosity by demanding his secret correspondence with the secretary of state and putting Marshall’s life in jeopardy by possibly offending the French Directory.
Of course, Gallatin did not know what the correspondence contained or that President Adams was delighted to comply with the Republicans’ demand. The president lost no time responding to the House the following day. Before releasing the envoys’ dispatches, Secretary Pickering replaced the names of Talleyrand’s agents—Jean Conrad Hottinguer, Pierre Bellamy, and Lucien Hauteval—with the letters “X,” “Y,” and “Z,” respectively, to protect their identities. Henceforth, the whole diplomatic fiasco would be known as the XYZ Affair.11
The House met in an extraordinary closed session with doors bolted and guarded while it read the dispatches. Federalists and Republicans alike were stunned at the insulting and grotesque behavior of the French foreign minister. Republicans could no longer pretend that the Federalists were culpable for the collapse of the talks. Moderate Republicans, fearing that they would be tarred with being “French partisans,” expressed support for the Federalists and opposition to France. Vice President Jefferson blamed President Adams’s speech critical of the French the previous May as the “only obstacle to accommodation, and the real cause of war, if war takes place.” Despite all the evidence to the contrary, the papers, in Jefferson’s view, did not “offer one motive more for our going to war.” However, even Jefferson admitted that the XYZ papers “produced such a shock on the republican mind as has never been seen since our independence.”12
James Madison later confessed that setting aside Talleyrand’s “depravity,” he could not believe the foreign minister’s “unparalleled stupidity.”13 Gallatin, having argued that the dispatches were of vital national interest, now had nothing to say about their contents. Instead, he spoke passionately of the need to avoid war at all costs, even at the cost of the nation’s honor, as he believed that the “present situation” was still “better than war.”14 Privately, he acknowledged that he was appalled by the way France had treated the American envoys: “They behave still worse than I was afraid from their haughtiness they would.” And he now feared the worst. “God Save us from War!”15
Republicans worried that if the correspondence was made public the tide for war would be irresistible. Jefferson insisted that the revelations in the dispatches had changed nothing, but he was swimming against an irresistible tide.16 It was impossible to keep the documents secret, especially since the Senate, controlled by Federalists, now demanded copies of the reports as well. The press and the public were hungry to learn what Congress knew, and both houses agreed to publish the complete contents of the XYZ dispatches.17
Marshall’s journal recorded every detail of their contacts with Talleyrand and his agents. It exploded any myth of France’s benign attitude or of the American commissioners’ culpability. As Washington had confidently predicted months earlier in a letter to Marshall, now “the eyes of all in this country, who are not willfully blind, and resolved to remain so (some from one motive, and some from another) will be fully opened.” Washington assured Marshall that the Directory “greatly deceive themselves” if they imagined the United States would be polarized by partisanship. But Washington could not help but express his disappointment with Jefferson’s party for attacking Adams “in the severest terms, and sounding the Tocsin upon every occasion that a wild imagination could torture into a stretch of power, or unconstitutionality, in the Executive,” and yet the same Republican leaders were “the warm advocates of those high handed measures of the French Directory.”18
Vice President Jefferson plotted in any way possible to undermine President Adams’s policies and the momentum toward going to war. Just as Pickering was distributing the XYZ papers, Jefferson and his lieutenants were scrambling to counter the Federalists’ arguments. Jefferson went so far as to send copies of Marshall’s secret diplomatic instructions to his agents, hoping that this would demonstrate that the Federalists had sabotaged negotiations from the outset. This was an extraordinary breach of government secrecy that substantially undermined U.S. diplomacy with France.19
In a matter of days, Republicans sheepishly retired the red, white, and blue cockades they had pinned to their hats as a symbol of Gallic solidarity. After the publication of the XYZ papers, a person wearing a tricolor cockade in the streets of Philadelphia would have been assaulted. Anti-Republican riots broke out in the capital in May. Opponents of France, both men and women, now wore black ribbons in their hats without feeling self-conscious about the fact that black was also the color of the English cockade. Republicans in Congress distanced themselves from France, fearing retribution by the American electorate, and many Republican newspapers lost circulation and advertising. Benjamin Franklin’s grandson and the country’s most virulent Republican editor, Benjamin Franklin Bache, was physically attacked for his pro-French writings in the Philadelphia Aurora. Hard-line Federalists talked about the need to root out their internal enemies even at the risk of civil war, and vigilante groups ominously trailed Republican leaders, who were afraid to speak out against the surging popularity of the president’s party. President Adams could now move forward with almost the entire country galvanized behind his efforts to protect commerce from French aggression.20
Throughout April, the president easily pushed through Congress nearly two dozen measures to fight the French. Congress agreed to establish an enlarged army and the first U.S. Department of the Navy under the leadership of Benjamin Stoddert, a wealthy Georgetown merchant. The new navy would be separate from the War Department because Adams had so little faith in his secretary of war, James McHenry. Congress appropriated funds for purchasing a dozen ships with up to twenty-two guns each and provided money for substantial increases in arms and ammunition.
In July, Congress approved a trade embargo against France that prohibited any French ships from entering U.S. waters, rescinded all treaties with France, and authorized the navy to seize any French vessels near the coastline and any U.S. vessels going to French ports. This was the beginning of what eventually became known as the Quasi-War against France. Though Adams did not ask for a formal declaration of war, there was no doubt that the United States was engaged in a full-scale naval war with France. The president named Washington as commander in chief of the new army and Hamilton as second-in-command. The Quasi-War, the first undeclared war in American history, lasted for the next two years.
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AMID ALL THIS WAR PREPARATION Marshall quietly slipped into New York Harbor on Sunday, June 17, 1798, on the Alexander Hamilton. Nearly two months had passed since he had left Bordeaux, and he had no idea of the impact of his dispatches on national politics. His arrival was announced a few days later in a special edition of the New York Commercial Advertiser. In the frenzy of the moment, Marshall was hailed as a national hero for standing up to French demands. Just by virtue of being the first of the three envoys to return, Marshall became a symbol of resistance to French aggression. Had Pinckney not been delayed in France by his daughter’s illness, Marshall might never have received national attention. Not since Citizen Genet’s arrival at Charleston had the nation experienced anyt
hing quite so electric. Federalist and Republican leaders alike in New York sought an audience with Marshall. New Yorkers planned a gala celebrating Marshall, but he preferred to leave as soon as possible for Philadelphia.21
As Marshall’s carriage approached Philadelphia on the evening of Tuesday, June 19, he was greeted by Secretary of State Pickering and the capital city’s cavalry. Marshall could not have anticipated this fuss, and as the parade marched down Philadelphia’s Market Street, church bells rang for hours, cannons roared, and crowds lined the streets and rooftops waving handkerchiefs and cheering him as they had once cheered Citizen Genet. Marshall was amazed and overcome by the reception. Members of Congress hosted a grand banquet in his honor at Oeller’s Hotel for more than one hundred distinguished guests that included foreign diplomats, members of the Supreme Court, and the cabinet. There were sixteen toasts to Marshall, Pinckney, and the United States, but one toast by a South Carolina representative was particularly memorable: “Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute.” That slogan, later mistakenly attributed to Pinckney, became a rallying cry against French aggression. The one person notably omitted from the toasts was Elbridge Gerry, who was still in Paris negotiating.22
Marshall had serious business in Philadelphia. President Adams had been traveling around the country making bellicose speeches that sounded more and more like he was preparing the country for war. On June 20, Marshall met with the president and Secretary of State Pickering to lay out his view that France did not intend to go to war. Adams appreciated Marshall’s service, and he was impressed and grateful for Marshall’s insights.23 Secretary Pickering asked Marshall to leave his Paris journal with him to be copied. Though much of the journal had already appeared in the published dispatches, some of it had not. Pickering was particularly interested in learning more about Gerry’s role and his relationship to Talleyrand. “The President ought to be acquainted with Mr. Gerry’s whole conduct,” Pickering explained. Pickering detested Gerry and went so far as to express his hope that the French would guillotine Gerry.24
As the capital buzzed with excitement over Marshall’s presence, Jefferson was obsessed with Marshall’s celebrity. Having previously insisted on the disclosure of the XYZ papers, Jefferson now accused Marshall of writing the XYZ papers “with a view to their being made public” to aid the Federalists. Marshall’s journal, Jefferson wrote to Gerry, “was truly a God-send to them, & they made the most of it, many thousands of copies were printed & dispersed gratis at the public expence,” which “excited a general & high indignation among the people unexperienced in such maneuvers.” The vice president maintained that in gratitude “[t]he Federalists (self-called)” had “beamed on your colleagues [Marshall and Pinckney] meridian splendor.”25
Jefferson had already concluded that war with France was inevitable.26 He blamed Marshall for the sharp turn in public opinion against France and worried that the Republican Party would be forever tainted by its Gallic association. He was relieved to hear that Marshall preferred to give negotiations more time before lobbying Congress to declare war. Jefferson decided to set aside their bitter rivalry for the moment and pay Marshall a visit.
Marshall was no doubt surprised to see Jefferson’s calling card when he returned to his hotel. Jefferson wrote on the card that he was “so lucky” to find Marshall out. Then realizing his error, he changed the word to “UN-lucky.” Marshall later joked that it was the only time Jefferson had come close to telling the truth. The two cousins had missed an opportunity to meet and possibly reconcile.27
Marshall left Philadelphia hurriedly the next day for Winchester, Virginia, where Polly was recuperating from depression after the birth of their son John.
Throughout Marshall’s travels from Pennsylvania to Virginia, he was welcomed as a national hero by uniformed militia, cheering crowds, and artillery salutes. His appearance gave people hope that America would stand strong and united.
When he reached Winchester several days later, he was in for another shock: Polly was far worse than he could have imagined. She was confined to bed and chronically depressed. She had barely written to her husband for most of the twelve months he had been away. He had left her with three children to raise on her own, still grieving the loss of four other children who had died in infancy, and pregnant with one more. It was more than she could manage, and her mind had snapped. The humid weather seemed to aggravate her mental condition. For Marshall, the contrast between the tributes and applause he received from strangers and the sullen reception from his own spouse after a year’s absence must have been profoundly disappointing.
Polly never recovered. For most of the rest of her life, she preferred to remain a recluse largely confined to her bedroom. She was so sensitive to noise that Marshall avoided socializing in their home, and the few guests who did visit were encouraged to remove their shoes and speak in a whisper lest they upset her fragile nerves.28
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AS THE QUASI-WAR with France unfolded, Marshall was generally pleased with the defensive measures approved by Congress, but he drew the line at the Alien and Sedition Acts. These were four separate measures breathlessly rushed through a war-crazed Congress in June and July by the hard-line Federalists and supported by President Adams. Though they were justified as internal security measures, they were, in fact, aimed at critics of the president’s policies. Congress, it soon became clear, had sacrificed liberty in defense of freedom.
The Naturalization Act made it more difficult for resident aliens to become naturalized citizens, required aliens to register with the federal government, and subjected aliens to government surveillance. The Federalists worried that the recent surge of Irish immigrants, who naturally opposed the English, were inclined therefore to be sympathetic to France and join the Republican Party. The Naturalization Act intended to discourage these immigrants from becoming naturalized citizens—or, to be more specific, naturalized Republicans.
To prove they were sufficiently patriotic, Republicans responded by proposing the Alien Enemies Act. This act provided that in the event of a declaration of war, the president could deport enemy aliens. Since Congress was not about to declare war, the act had no practical effect other than to counter any suspicion that the Republicans were French puppets. However, it may have had the unintended effect of discouraging immigrants from engaging in politics.
The Alien Friends Act gave the president the authority to deport any alien he judged “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.” It was an extraordinary delegation of power to one man, which President Adams wisely never invoked.
Most important, Congress passed the infamous Sedition Act, which prohibited any statement or writing critical of the U.S. government, Congress, or the president. The maximum penalties included a fine of five thousand dollars and five years in prison for those caught merely conspiring to speak out against the government and two thousand dollars and two years in prison for actually making “seditious” statements. It was plainly intended to silence the Republican press and the president’s critics. It is ironic that President Adams signed the law on Bastille Day 1798. The Federalists wrote the statute to lapse the same day that President Adams left office so that it could never be used by a Republican president against Federalists. Though the definition of sedition was purposefully vague, one Federalist paper put it bluntly: “It is patriotism to write in favor of our government—it is sedition to write against it.”29
The Federalists lost no time in invoking the act to prosecute Republicans. The first person indicted was Vermont Congressman Matthew Lyon, who accused President Adams of a “continual grasp for power, in an unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish avarice.”30 For his statement, Lyon was convicted and sentenced to four months in prison and fined one thousand dollars. The imprisonment of Representative Lyon sent a chilling message to all opponents of the Federalist administration. Vice President Jefferson
, among others, became increasingly paranoid. He suspected that he was being followed by Federalist agents and that his mail was being read.31 Jefferson worried that the president had trumped up the threat of foreign agents as a pretext to spy on American citizens.
Marshall did not approve of these acts. He thought that the First Amendment had abolished the ancient British crime of “seditious libel,” which punished anyone who criticized the king. If the government could punish Americans for dissenting, it was no better than the French Directory. Marshall also foresaw that it was likely that the Federalists’ heavy-handed tactics used against Republican newspapers was likely to backfire in the next election. He privately voiced his concerns to Secretary Pickering, but only later did he object publicly.32 Marshall published a letter in the Virginia Herald stating that if he had been in Congress when the Alien and Sedition Acts were adopted, he “certainly [would] have opposed them.” Rather than suggest that such laws threaten civil liberties, Marshall toned down his public rhetoric to avoid offending his own party—and risking a possible jail sentence. He merely thought that such laws were “useless” and were likely “to create, unnecessarily, discontents and jealousies at a time when our very existence as a nation, may depend on our union.”33 It was a faint-sounding defense of the First Amendment, but it was no ordinary time, and not one of his fellow Federalists went any further to oppose these laws.
Years later, after the Quasi-War had ended, Jefferson asked Gerry whether peace with France might not have been preserved if either Marshall or Pinckney had agreed to buy off France. Gerry replied, “I have no hesitation to answer in the affirmative.”34 Jefferson felt vindicated that it was, after all, his meddlesome cousin Marshall who was to blame for triggering the Quasi-War with France.
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