OGPU reports portrayed former tsarist officers as a tightknit caste with shared values, capable of acting as a collective body, lying in wait for an opportunity, while Soviet foreign intelligence was organized almost entirely to penetrate emigre circles, especially those with a military aspect.290 The OGPU special departments in the army set up false anti-Soviet conspiracies, using former White officers in Cheka employ as provocateurs to expose anti-Soviet moods, while abroad an elaborate OGPU operation known as the Trust (or the Syndicate) was created around a false underground monarchist “center” that supposedly united former tsarist officers, high tsarist officials, and expropriated industrialists serving the Bolshevik regime while secretly plotting against it.291 Agents of the Trust smuggled abroad some genuine documents, thereby entering into confidences, enabling them to feed disinformation about the status and plans of the Red Army.292 Even skeptical emigres clued in to OGPU methods wanted to believe their homeland could somehow be seized back from the godless, barbaric Bolsheviks, and speculated endlessly about a Napoleon figure to lead a patriotic movement, mentioning most often Mikhail Tukhachevsky: noble by birth, megalomaniacally ambitious, and rumored to “imitate Napoleon in everything and constantly to read his biography and history.”293 One emigre publication, which derided Tukhachevsky as “a typical adventurist, in love with himself, self-reliant, striving for one thing only: career and power,” allowed that he “might be determined” to follow in the footsteps of the French general who had massacred the Paris Communards. After all, Tukhachevsky had done it at Kronstadt to the sailors and at Tambov to the peasants, what were the Communists to him?294 Soviet intelligence fostered these fantasies about Tukhachevsky’s concealed disloyalty, feeding it through multiple channels, such as the OGPU-sponsored Russian-language journal War and Peace in Berlin, which held him up as an anti-Bolshevik nationalist savior linked to foreign intelligence circles.295 At home, Tukhachevsky was under close police surveillance.296
An additional source of anxiety was Frunze’s fragile health. Despite an operation in 1916 for a perforated ulcer, he continued to endure chronic inflammation, and doctors had warned him his internal organs were utterly frayed, counseling a surgical excision, the only known treatment at the time, but he would only agree to less invasive treatments. Thus it went for years until summer 1925, when his internal bleeding worsened considerably; in early September, the politburo mandated a seven-week holiday. Frunze left for Yalta with his wife, Sofia, but on September 29 he returned to enter the Kremlin hospital. No fewer than twelve leading internists and surgeons examined him in two rounds, concurring on the need for surgery.297 “I now feel completely healthy and it’s laughable even to contemplate, let alone undergo an operation,” Frunze wrote to Sofia, still in Crimea, on October 26. “Nevertheless, both sets of consultations decided to do it. I’m personally satisfied with this decision. Let them once and for all make out what’s there and try to establish a genuine treatment.”298 Two days later, he was transferred to the country’s best facility, Soldatyonkov Hospital, where Lenin had been operated on, and the next afternoon a team led by Dr. V. N. Rozanov, who had treated Lenin, performed an operation. A day and a half later, in the wee hours of October 31, 1925, Frunze died of what the newspaper reported to be heart failure provoked by anesthesia.299 It seems he had been administered a heavy dose of chloroform, which might have provoked dystrophy in the muscles of his vital organs.300 Frunze was buried near the Kremlin Wall on November 3.301 Pishpek, Kyrgyzia, where he had grown up, was renamed for him.
Rumors were instigated that Trotsky’s people had killed the proletarian commander in revenge for taking his place, while Trotsky’s acolytes turned the tables, accusing Stalin.302 Beyond these false accusations, Bolshevik susceptibility to illnesses became the talk of the day as a psychoneurologist presented a grim report about pervasive “revolutionary exhaustion and attrition.”303 Nearly half of all visits by top party figures to medical clinics were for nervous disorders (with tuberculosis well behind, at around one quarter).304 Two German specialists were imported to examine a list of fifty regime figures, beginning with Dzierzynski and Mezynski and working through to Rykov and Stalin, with what results remains unknown, but the internal discussions indicate acceptance, including by Trotsky, of the fact that Frunze had died of natural causes, even if better medical care might have saved him.305 For Stalin, Frunze’s demise presented yet another opportunity. Tukhachevsky, during a moment of the usual gossip, voiced support for Sergo Orjonikidze—which was duly reported—but the handwriting was on the wall: Stalin appointed his close associate Voroshilov.306
Voroshilov, after his checkered civil war role, had written to Stalin begging to be let out of the army (“you should pity me”), but Stalin had ignored his pleas.307 In May 1924, he had promoted him to Moscow military district commander, in place of Trotsky’s associate Nikolai Muralov. Absent Frunze, Voroshilov was the next highest “proletarian” commander. Zinoviev’s man, Mikhail Lashevich, became first deputy war commissar.308 Tukhachevsky became the chief of the general staff, the so-called brains of the army, and a vivid rival to Voroshilov, who began to circumscribe the general staff chief’s powers, removing military intelligence from his purview. Tukhachevsky complained bitterly in writing, but Voroshilov remained unmoved.309 Probably no one despised Trotsky more than Voroshilov, not even Stalin himself, but the Voroshilov-Tukhachevsky animosity would reach operatic dimensions. This afforded Stalin tight control, but did nothing to elevate fighting capacity. “The situation with the Red Army is very difficult,” Tukhachevsky reported. “If enemies learn about the situation, they may want to attempt something.”310
DZIERZYNSKI’S MUDDLE
Kamenev, though close to Stalin, had joined Zinoviev’s Leningrad opposition and, from September 1925, his speeches began to disappear from the press and even from the “stenographic” records of party meetings.311 Kamenev had no political machine and publishing house, unlike Zinoviev in Leningrad, but he had skill at intrigue and he managed to recruit Finance Commissar Sokolnikov to protest the Stalin-Bukharin duumvirate’s leadership. Together with Krupskaya, they produced a “platform of the four” that, though unpublished, circulated to members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, where it was discussed at a plenum October 3–10.312 Sokolnikov, unlike the other signatories, stood by the NEP’s conciliatory peasant policy but he objected to the throttling of internal party debate and bullying tactics. The wily Kamenev had even courted the head of the OGPU, Dzierzynski, and not without success: On the night of October 5–6, Dzierzynski sent an abject letter to Stalin, which he also addressed to Orjonikidze (but in the end not to Krupskaya, indicating she, too, may have played a role in recruiting him). “I ask that you acquaint a meeting of the faction of Leninists with the following letter from me,” Dzierzynski began, divulging the existence of “a plot” by Zinoviev and Kamenev, a “new Kronstadt within our party,” which, he noted, was especially alarming because “the peasantry in the majority is not with us, though they are not against us—we have not yet organized the peasantry to our side.” After explaining that a schism in the party would open the doors to enemies and make Thermidor unavoidable, Dzierzynski confessed that he had joined the conspiracy before coming to his senses. “I am not a politician, I am unable to find a solution or to propose one, perhaps in judging me you will find the fragment of a solution. But I am leaving the [opposition] faction, remaining a Leninist, for I do not wish to be a participant in a schism, which brings death to the party.” Expecting to be relieved of his post, Dzierzynski offered to take up any work he might be given.313
Stalin had to wonder who else in the OGPU might have been recruited to the side of the opposition. Dzierzynski, as head of the political police and someone whose stout reputation made him invulnerable to removal, occupied a potentially decisive position. Stalin, of course, made no move to remove him; public revelation of a rift between them would have been damning.
Dzierzynski had bee
n a staunch Left Communist who hung a portrait of the Polish-German leftist martyr Rosa Luxemburg in his Lubyanka office, but his experience of practical work as concurrent head of the Supreme Council of the Economy, where he employed an army of “bourgeois” economists, had made him a staunch defender of the NEP.314 Already in 1923, he denounced “the rise of ever newer apparatuses, monstrous bureaucratism of all kinds, mountains of paper and hundreds of thousands of scribblers, the seizure of huge buildings and facilities, the automobile epidemic,” and what he dubbed “legal kormlenie”—that is, functionaries living parasitically off those they were supposed to serve, as in ancient Muscovy.315 He predicted the overweening bureaucracy and pilferage would bankrupt the system, but offered no practical solutions.316 Stalin, who called him “Felix” in his confidential letters to Molotov (when he called everyone else by their last names), knew Dzierzynski was overworked and had a heart condition. Dzierzynski had suffered his first heart attack back in late 1924, but ignored doctors’ warnings that he limit his work hours.317 In summer 1925, Dzierzynski had submitted his resignation.318 Stalin had already left for Sochi and wrote to him (July 25, 1925), “I implore you not to do that,” asking for patience.319 That same day, Stalin wrote to Bukharin: “Dzierzynski is just jittery, he’s drowning. It’ll pass.”320 In August 1925, when Tovstukha wired Stalin to ask if Dzierzynski, who was going south on vacation, could visit him in Sochi, Stalin wrote back, “With pleasure I’ll receive Dzierzynski and his friends from work. Stalin.”321 Not long thereafter Dzierzynski was approached by Kamenev, who was aware of the OGPU’s frustrations with economic policy.
Although Dzierzynski quickly went back on Kamenev and Zinoviev, the opposition did not relent, taking the offensive in rival regional party conferences, including one of the Moscow organization, which opened on December 5, 1925 (and ran until the thirteenth), and one of the Leningrad organization, which started and ended earlier. In Leningrad the delegates attacked Bukharin and his slogan “Enrich yourselves”; in Moscow, Bukharin hysterically mocked Zinoviev and his supporters as “hysterical young ladies,” and forced through a resolution condemning the Leningrad party organization’s behavior as “antiparty.”322 Besides the policy dispute over the NEP’s seeming prokulak bias, the Leningrad party fought to uphold its autonomy. But the New opposition amalgamated contradictory tendencies, as the Menshevik emigre newspaper pointed out.323 Sokolnikov, in his speech, extolled market relations, which he called different from capitalism, and cultured farmers, whom he called different from kulaks. Such a formulation had the potential to render markets compatible with socialism, at least in the countryside. Sokolnikov, however, also put his finger on the fundamental problem at the heart of the NEP: “We are encouraging the middle peasant up to a certain limit and then we begin strangling him.” Politics, in other words, limited economic growth. Another speaker, Yakov Yakovlev, founder and editor of Peasant Newspaper, flat out proposed that the regime allow peasants to register the land they farmed as private property, to be bought, sold or inherited, arguing that legal ownership, instead of mere user rights, would boost output because peasants would be able to pass on the fruits of their hard work to their children.324
As for Dzierzynski, on December 12 he sent Stalin a long letter enumerating the intractable problems in the economy, citing his inability to manage them, pointing to his health, his nerves, and asking to be allowed to resign from the Supreme Council of the Economy: “I am sure that if Vladimir Ilich were alive he would honor my request.”325 Stalin again refused the request. But Stalin also found out that sometime in late 1925, with the 14th Party Congress looming, a number of leading figures gathered in the apartment of Petrovsky, the Ukrainian Communist, and without Dzierzynski’s participation, discussed having him replace Stalin as general secretary.326 But unlike secret police chiefs in most dictatorships, he did not aspire to supreme power. In fact, Dzierzynski would not speak at the 14th Congress.
BIRTHDAY DENUNCIATIONS
Stalin had twice postponed the 14th Party Congress, and by the time it met (December 18–31, 1925), eighteen months had elapsed since the previous one, the longest interval yet. The Leningrad delegation arrived early, on December 14, fanning out to factories and urban ward party organizations to argue their case. Back at the previous congress, when Stalin was still in alliance with Zinoviev, the two had agreed to hold the next one in Leningrad, but in October 1925, Stalin’s new politburo majority voted to annul this as “out of date.” The congress assembled 1,306 delegates (665 voting), representing 1,088,000 party members and candidates. Stalin for the first time since before the revolution delivered the main political report. But on the opening day, Zinoviev had fired an advance salvo in Leningrad Pravda. “They fight against the kulak, but they offer the slogan ‘Enrich yourselves!’” he charged. “They proclaim the Russia of NEP as a socialist country.” Stalin, in his speech, cunningly made no mention of disagreements with Zinoviev and Kamenev, ensuring that the opposition would be viewed as causing the dissension. Sure enough, the Leningrad delegates petitioned that Zinoviev be allowed to deliver a coreport, which took place on the evening of the second day, ran for four hours, and targeted Bukharin with a vengeance.327 After a break, Bukharin was given the floor, and droned on even longer.328 The atmosphere was belligerent. Krupskaya, on behalf of the opposition, omitted mention of Stalin but assailed Bukharin’s “Enrich yourselves” slogan as unsocialist, while scolding the delegates for their “shameful” heckling of Zinoviev. She cited the Stockholm Party Congress of 1906, when the Mensheviks had a majority, to imply that the current Zinoviev, Kamenev, Krupskaya group, though a minority, were the real Bolshevik-Leninists.329 But the congress sensation turned out to be, of all people, Kamenev, who was known for equivocating, but delivered a sharply worded oration on December 21.330 This happened to be Stalin’s birthday (officially he was forty-six).
Kamenev began by referring to his responsibilities as nominal director of the Lenin Institute, which was intended to assert Leninist credentials, then took aim at “rosy” portrayals of Lenin’s New Economic Policy.331 “I have reproached comrade Stalin at a number of conferences, and I repeat it at the congress: ‘You do not really agree with this [pro-NEP] line, but you protect it, and this is where you are at fault as a leader of the party,’” Kamenev said. “‘You are a strong man, but you do not allow the party strongly to reject this line, which a majority of the party thinks incorrect.’” He called Stalin “a prisoner of this incorrect line, the author and genuine representative of which is comrade Bukharin.” But Kamenev went far beyond separating Stalin from Bukharin.
We are against creating a “leader” theory, we’re against building up a “leader.” We are against the idea that the secretariat, by combining both policy and organization in practice, should stand above the main political organ, that is, the politburo. . . . Personally, I suggest that our general secretary is not someone who is capable of unifying the old Bolshevik headquarters around himself. . . . Precisely because I have spoken on numerous occasions with Comrade Stalin, precisely because I have spoken on numerous occasions with a group of Lenin’s comrades, I say here at the Congress: I have come to the conclusion that Comrade Stalin cannot perform the function of unifying the Bolshevik headquarters.
Kamenev, as he uttered these remarkable words, was interrupted repeatedly, and the jeering became nearly deafening:
“Untrue!” “Nonsense.” “So that’s what they’re up to.” “Stalin! Stalin!” The delegates rise and salute Comrade Stalin. Stormy applause. . . . “Long live Comrade Stalin.” Prolonged stormy applause. Shouts of “Hurrah.” General commotion.
The published stenogram continued: “Yevdokimov, from his seat: ‘Long live the Russian Communist Party! Hurrah! Hurrah!’ (The delegates stand and shout ‘Hurrah!’ Noise. Stormy, long-sustained applause) (Yevdokimov, from his seat) ‘Long live the central committee of our party! Hurrah!’ (The delegates shout ‘Hurrah!’) ‘The party above all! Right!’ (Applause and shouts, �
��Hurrah!’)”332
Stalin never had a birthday like this (nor would he again).
Tomsky was given the floor for repudiation: “It is ridiculous to speak as some comrades have spoken here, attempting to represent someone as having concentrated power in his hands. . . . How could this happen?”333 The answer to Tomsky’s question was, in part, Kamenev himself, who had abetted Stalin nearly every step of the way.
Stalin’s birthday celebration was not over: That same evening, Sokolnikov got the floor. Stalin relied on him utterly for the NEP. “Garya’s relations with Stalin . . . were friendly,” his wife, Galina Serebryakova would recall, referring to her husband by a diminutive of his real first name (Gersh). “I heard their conversations often on the vertushka. There was never any tension or inequality in tone or interaction. . . . Before the congress, according to what Garya told me, Stalin met with him and implored him not to support Krupskaya and Klavdiya Nikolaeva, not to speak of Lenin’s Testament and the need to elect a different general secretary. But Garya would not agree. ‘You’ll be sorry, Grigory,’ Stalin warned him and later that same night called him on the vertushka, asking for his support and not to mention the Testament in his speech.” Sokolnikov refused to back down.334 At the congress, speaking for nearly an hour, he cited Lenin against Bukharin, stated that the USSR was “state capitalist,” and called not for dispossessing the kulaks but raising the level of agriculture in order to have more grain for export to pay for imports of machinery, which in turn would develop agriculture in a virtuous circle, the only realistic path to industrialization. But though Sokolnikov backed the Stalin-Bukharin Central Committee majority against the opposition in economic policy, he backed the latter against the Central Committee in their critique of the absence of party democracy and the concentration of Stalin’s power.335
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