310. Samuelson, Soviet Defense Industry Planning, 41.
311. Merridale, Moscow Politics, 260. Kamenev was making proposals for a 20 percent increase in worker pay, even though, as head of the Council of Labor and Defense (the executive body parallel to the government), he knew no such funds were available. He also proposed that workers share in factory profits (almost all factories were unprofitable). Moskovskie bol’sheviki, 128–9 (citing MPA, f. 3, op. 6, d. 28, l. 45; XIV Moskovskaia gubpartkonferentsiia: biulleten’ no. 1, 133).
312. Carr, Socialism in One Country, II: 66. The intrigues escalated into several “private sessions” of the members: Dmitrenko, Bor’ba KPSS za edinstvo svoikh riadov, 211.
313. Politicheskii dnevnik, 238–41; Kvashonkin, Bol’shevistskoe rukovodstvo, 309–12 (RGASPI, f. 76, op. 2, d. 28, l. 1–8); Kun, Bukharin, 159–61.
314. Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski, 231. On Dzierzynski’s defense of the OGPU, especially against Bukharin, see Koenker, Revelations, 18–9 (RGASPI, f. 76, op. 3, d. 345, l. 1–1ob, 2–2ob); and Kvashonkin, Bol’shevistskoe rukovodstvo, 297–98, 302–6. Economic functionaries viewed Dzierzynski as a “rightist” Bolshevik. Valentinov, Novaia ekonomicheskaia partiia, 23, 102–6; Izmozik, Glaza1, 131.
315. Khelemskii, “Soveshchanie v Sovnarkome o gosapparate [1923 g.],” 113–4, 118: RGAE, f. 3429, op. 6, d. 86, l. 12–31: 1923.
316. There were at least 1.85 million white-collar functionaries as of 1925. Gimpel’son, NEP, 386 (citing GARF, f. 374, op. 171, delo omitted, l. 14–15). If before the revolution there had been 600 specific titles for positions in the state, there were now more than 2,000. Tekhnika upravleniia, 1925, no. 1: 23–4.
317. “Even on Sundays, at the dacha outside the city,” recalled his wife Zofia Muszkat, “instead of relaxing he would sit with his papers, verify what was presented to him by the departments of the Supreme Council of the Economy, all the tables of data, go through whole mountains of figures.” Mozokhin and Gladkov, Menzhinskii, 174.
318. On January 9, 1924, Dzierzynski wrote to Stalin: “Personally. To comrade Stalin. The party discussion established that the situation, in terms of the party-political aspect, in the agencies entrusted to me by the Central Committee is unhealthy to the highest degree—in the GPU and in the commissariat of railways. That worries me, especially because I am so busy with Soviet work, that personally cannot devote sufficient time to party work to overcome the evil and even to expose it in timely manner.” Dzierzynski requested two secretaries (a line Stalin underscored in his text), one for the GPU and one for the railways, who would look after party affairs there, as well as other helpmates. Stalin agreed to these requests: he could implant his own people. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 726, l. 28–9.
319. RGASPI, f. 3, op. 1, d. 527, l. 1.
320. Khromov, Po stranitsam, 92 (no citation); Plekhanov, VChK-OGPU, 277.
321. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 35, l. 43, in Liubianka, Stalin i VChK, 108.
322. Pravda, December 10, 1925 (Bukharin’s speech); Rabochaia Moskva, December 13, 1925 (Kamenev’s speech); Pravda, December 20, 1925 (Moscow party committee answer to the Leningraders); Novaia oppozitsiia (Leningrad, 1926) (Leningraders’ pamphlet refuting the charges point by point). The Moscow party committee published an answer to the Leningraders, defending the NEP and socialism in one country, in Pravda on December 20, 1925. Carr, Socialism in One Country, II: 133–43; Merridale, Moscow Politics. Carr was wrongly dismissive of the New opposition as being merely personal and careerist.
323. Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, 1926, no. 17–18: 5.
324. Brovkin, Russia After Lenin, 156 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 16, d. 533, l. 199).
325. Kommunist, 1989, no. 8: 82–4. He had written an earlier note for Stalin, dated December 6, 1925, about the initiative-crushing state apparatus, which he did not send. Plekhanov, VChK-OGPU, 278.
326. Plekhanov, VChK-OGPU, 278. In the immediate aftermath of Lenin’s death there had been rumors that Dzierzynski would take over the government (rumors generated, it seems, by fear: he was thought to be a heartless type). Velikanova, “Lenina v massovom soznanii,” 182.
327. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 99–130.
328. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 130–53. Like Bukharin, Stalin employed the now cliched dismissal of Zinoviev: “Hysteria, not a policy.” Sochineniia, VII: 378. “When there is a majority for Zinoviev, he is for iron discipline, for subordination,” Mikoyan observed. “When he has no majority . . . he is against [iron discipline].” XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 186.
329. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 158–66. Stalin rejected Krupskaya’s characterization of NEP as capitalism, adding, politely, “and may she pardon me.” At a later moment, however, he became more barbed: “and what precisely distinguishes comrade Krupskaya from any other responsible comrade?” Sochineniia, VII: 364–5, 383–4. Krupskaya did not officially quit the opposition until the 15th Congress in December 1927. She was never forced to recant publicly, and was not arrested. In 1927 she just delivered a speech to the effect that in 1925 it had been necessary to “verify there was enough socialism in our structure,” which she now said had proved to be the case, so she was no longer in the opposition. In fact she had ceased to identify with the opposition a year earlier. Pravda, November 5, 1927.
330. Molotov, at the congress, remarked upon Kamenev’s penchant for addressing issues always “by way of discussion,” as if he were getting ready to back away even as he was just beginning. XIV s”zed VKP (b), 484–5. On impressions of Kamenev’s “soft” character, see also Sukhanov, Zapiski, II: 243–5.
331. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 96, 246. Leninskii sbornik, V: 8–11.
332. XIV s”zed VKP (b), 18-31 dekabria 1925 g., 273–5; Daniels, Documentary History of Communism [1984], I: 183–6.
333. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 289–92.
334. Genis, “G. Ia. Sokolnikov,” 80 (citing the then-unpublished autobiography of G. I. Serebriakova); Galina Serebriakova, “Iz vospominanii,” in Anfert’ev, Smerch, 230–49 (at 241).
335. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 327–35.
336. Chigir, “Grigorii Iakovlevich Sokol’nikov,” 119–32 (citing RGASPI, f. 54, op. 1, d. 13, l. 76–117, esp. 111–2, 114–5). The official stenogram removed all sentences perceived to undermine Stalin’s authority and edited Sokolnikov’s text to enlarge the distance between him and Stalin; words and sometimes whole phrases were inserted in Sokolnikov’s mouth. Rykov taunted the opposition over its divisions: Krupskaya supported Zinoviev from the vantage point of the poor, while Sokolnikov supported them “from the Right” (advocacy for deeper market relations). Carr, Socialism in One Country, II: 156.
337. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 397.
338. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 455–6.
339. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 508.
340. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 601.
341. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 570, 600–1.
342. Sochineniia, VII: 262; Carr, Socialism in One Country, III: 491; Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, III/i: 3–5.
343. David Woodruff, “The Politburo on Gold, Industrialization, and the International Economy, 1925–1926,” in Gregory and Naimark, Lost Politburo Transcripts, 214–5.
344. Kuz’min, Istoricheskii opyt sovestkoi industrializatsii, 28–9. Stalin dismissed Sokolnikov’s designation of “state capitalism,” pointing to the state-owned railroads, foreign trade, and banking system. “Perhaps our Soviet apparatus also represents capitalism and not a proletarian type of state as Lenin constituted?” Stalin said mockingly. RGASPI, f. 54, op. 1, d. 13, l. 82; f. 558, op. 3, d. 33; XIV s”ezd, 14.
345. Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party, II: 258–60.
346. Pravda, December 29, 1925; XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 504–5. Much of Stalin’s speech was rendered far sharper in the published stenogram: RGASPI, f. 54, op. 1, d. 13, l. 60; f. 558, op. 3, d. 33; XIV s�
�ezd, 8. The passage on Bukharin’s blood was excised when the speech was reprinted. Sochineniia, VII: 363–91 (at 379–80).
347. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 710–1.
348. Harris, “Stalin as General Secretary: The Appointment Process and the Nature of Stalin’s Power.”
349. Mawdsley and White, Soviet Elite, 36–9.
350. Trotsky, My Life, 521–2. Serebryakov told the 14th Congress that “Zinoviev proposed an alliance with comrade Trotsky,” who “categorically rejected a bloc, however.” Trotsky—who was present—made no effort to repudiate this statement. XIV s”ezd VKP (b), 455–6.
351. Stalin is said to have personally approached Leonid Serebryakov. When Serebryakov replied that they had no faction—factions being illegal—Stalin is said to have remarked, “Leonid, I summoned you for a serious conversation. Pass on my proposal to your ‘old man’ [starik]” (meaning Trotsky). Tsakunov, V labirinte, 169 (citing a conversation with I. Vrachev, who lived in the same building as Leonid Serebryakov).
352. Dewey, The Case of Leon Trotsky, 322–3; Trotskii, Moia zhizn’, II: 273; Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, 248–9.
353. V. L. Genis, “Upriamyi narkom s Il’inki,” in Sokol’nikov, Novaia finansovaia politika, 5–38 (at 23); Genis, “G. Ia. Sokolnikov,” 80 (citing the then-unpublished autobiography of G. I. Serebriakova); Galina Serebriakova, “Iz vospominanii,” in Anfert’ev, Smerch, 230–49 (at 241).
354. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 680. See also XIV s”ezd, 323–36 (esp. 335–6).
355. Stalin may have also contemplated naming Kamenev agriculture commissar. During the politburo meeting, Zinoviev passed Kamenev a note: “You need to state (among everything else) that if Sokolnikov cannot be the finance commissar, that I [Kamenev] cannot be the agriculture commissar.” Zinoviev’s note also contained a hint about their need to bring Trotsky onto their side. But Zinoviev remained pessimistic based on the fact that Trotsky had remained silent over Moscow’s forced replacement of the editor of Leningrad pravda. Nazarov, Stalin i bor’ba za liderstvo, 138 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 210, l. 101–229; f. 323, op. 2, d. 29, l. 59–60, 73).
356. Kvashonkin, Bol’shevistkoe rukovodstvo, 318 (RGASPI, f. 85, op. 25, d. 118, l. 2–3).
357. Nazarov, Stalin i bor’ba za liderstvo, 143–4 (citing RGASPI, f. 324, op. 1, d. 540, l. 37–38ob). On Molotov at these meetings, see also Grigorov, Povoroty sud’by i proizvol, 413–9; and Leningradskaia pravda, January 22, 1926.
358. Kvashonkin, Bol’shevistkoe rukovodstvo, 319 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 2756, l. 1), 323–4. (RGASPI, f. 85, op. 25, d. 120, l. 1–2).
359. Grigorov, Povoroty sud’by i proizvol, 420. Kirov was officially confirmed as the new party boss at a Leningrad province conference, also attended by Dzierzynski, in February 1926. Leningradskaia pravda, February 12, 1926. The Leningrad second secretary, Nikolai Shvernik (b. 1888), a former telephone-factory worker, lacked comparable abilities. Stalin soon returned Shvernik to the central party apparatus.
360. Nazarov, Stalin i bor’ba za liderstvo, 150 (no citation).
361. Leonid Serebryakov wrote to Stalin on March 27, 1926, indicating a desire to cooperate with his proposal to afford more normal working conditions in the Central Committee, but wondering why the smearing of the 1923 opposition continued unabated in the press. “No one can believe that this is done without the authorization of the secretariat,” Serebryakov wrote. “I spoke with Trotsky, Pyatakov, and Radek. They expressed complete readiness to continue the conversations that Trotsky had both with Bukharin and with you and that you and I had.” Kvashonkin, Bol’shevistkoe rukovodstvo, 324–5 (RGASPI, f. 85, op. 1/s, d. 171, l. 1). Trotsky wrote to Serebryakov (April 2, 1926 ) that he found it odd that Stalin would use “a circuitous path” (through Serebryakov) to further discussions after having spoken directly to Trotsky already. Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, I: 188.
362. Trotsky, Stalin, 417; Trotskii, Moia zhizn’, II: 265–6. See also Fischer, Stalin and German Communism, 547–8 (citing a conversation with Zinoviev).
363. Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 212; Deutscher, Prophet Armed, 267.
364. Trotsky’s ailments remain unclear, but on the advice of one doctor, his tonsils were extracted. Trotskii, Moia zhizn’, II: 266–8. Trotsky stayed at a private clinic, until the German police passed word of a possible assassination attempt by White emigres, and Trotsky relocated to the Soviet embassy (his supporter Krestinsky was in exile as ambassador). Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, 265–6.
365. Biulleten’ oppozitsii, March 1937, no. 54–5: 11 (quoting Sergei Mrachkovsky).
366. Although Chagin is our only source for this anecdote, it has plausibility. Chagin added: “The unexpectedness of this declaration surprised me so that I have preserved it almost literally in my memory.” APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 493, l. 1–2 (Chagin letter to Khrushchev, March 14, 1956), Hoover Institution Archives, Volkogonov papers, container 23. Also there in Kirov’s apartment: N. P. Komarov, N. K. Antipov, and I. P. Zhukov. Chagin (1898–1967) had served as second secretary to Kirov in Azerbaijan.
367. Zakharov, Voennye aspekty (RGVA, f. 33988, op. 3, d. 78, l. 67–76); Akhtamzian, “Soviet-German Military Cooperation,” 100.
368. Akhtamzian, “Voennoe sotrudnichestvo,” 12.
369. Quoted in Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 76.
370. Korbel, Poland Between East and West; Dyck, “German-Soviet Relations,” 81 (citing Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, K281/K097454–60: memorandum by Dirksen, Sept. 19, 1927).
371. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 13, 68–72; Kennan, Russia and the West, 208–23; Carr, Socialism in One Country, III: 438–9.
372. “I have continually striven since taking up my post here to create, through a close relationship with Soviet Russia, a counterweight against the West, in order not to be at the mercy—the very expression is repugnant to me—of the favor or disfavor of the Entente Powers,” German ambassador von Brockdorff-Rantzau wrote to President von Hindenburg after the April treaty. “Our relation to Soviet Russia . . . will always rest to a certain extent on bluff, i.e. it will be useful to create vis-à-vis our so-called former enemies the impression of greater intimacy with Russia than in fact exists.” Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, III/i: 36 (citing Brockdorff-Rantzau Nachlass, 9101/24038-224046).
373. Moggridge, The Return to Gold, 45–6.
374. McIlroy, Industrial Politics; Robertson, “A Narrative of the General Strike of 1926.”
375. That same day, Stalin passed word of the British coal miners’ strike to Rykov and Bukharin, requesting their views. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 34, l. 68.
376. Adibekov, Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Evropa, 117–20, 123–7.
377. G. Zinov’ev, “Velikie sobytiia v Anglii,” Pravda, May 5, 1926; Carr, Socialism in One Country, III: 494. Zinoviev had already publicly elevated Britain in place of Germany as top candidate for proletarian revolution in advanced Europe.
378. Rothschild, Piłsudski’s Coup d’Etat, 20–1; Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the World Wars, 46, 54–5.
379. Kvashonkin, Bol’shevistkoe rukovodstvo, 329–30 (RGASPI, f. 76, op. 3, d. 390, l. 3–4). Dzierzynski had written to Yagoda that Poland was likely to launch a war to seize Ukraine and Belorussia. RGASPI, f. 76, op. 3, d. 364, l. 55.
380. Rothschild, Piłsudski’s Coup d’Etat, 47–64, 360–1 (citing Kurjer Poranny, May 27, 1926).
381. Wandycz, Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 48. At the same time, British officials encouraged Germany to recover Danzig and the Polish Corridor, proposing that Poland be compensated with part, or even all, of independent Lithuania. Von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 248–55.
382. Karl Radek published close analyses in Pravda of the divisions in Poland’s army and society, mocking Piłsudski
(“the last Mohican of Polish nationalism”), but proved unable to deny his triumph. Pravda, May 15, May 18, May 22, and June 2, 1926.
383. Pravda, May 16, 1926; Korbel, Poland Between East and West, 205.
384. Wandycz, August Zaleski, 35.
385. Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania.
386. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki, VIII: 72–6; Lensen, Japanese Recognition of the USSR.
387. Anosov, Koreitsy v ussuriiskom krae, 7–8; Brianskii, Vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleniia 1926 goda, VII: 8.
388. Gelb, “The Far-Eastern Koreans”; Martin, “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing,” 835 (citing GARF, f. 1235, op. 140, d. 141, l. 144).
389. Iazhborovskaia and Papsadanova, Rossiia i Pol’sha, 83.
390. “The most potent source of the dominant ethnic suspicion of the mobilized diaspora is the existence of its ‘homeland’ outside the dominant elite’s territorial control,” one scholar has noted, adding that “the dominant ethnic elite’s suspicions tend to be self-fulfilling.” Armstrong, “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas,” 400–2.
391. Medvedev, Let History Judge, 111–2.
392. Trotsky, Stalin, 215; Trotskii, Predannaia revoliutsiia [1937], 25–7.
393. Medvedev, Let History Judge, 90–1 (Igor Sats, Lunacharsky’s top aide).
394. One scholar put it, “one of the factors in Stalin’s eventual success was his ability to evoke an image of his relationship with Lenin that was more appealing to the rank-and-file members than were those of his opponents.” Gill, “Political Myth and Stalin’s Quest for Authority in the Party,” 99.
395. “Dve besedy s L. M. Kaganovichem,” 114. See also Bazhanov, Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin, 114–7, 122.
CHAPTER 13: TRIUMPHANT DEBACLE
1. Cherniavskii, “Samootvod,” 68–69 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 335, l. 4–8: Rykov’s copy of the stenogram for correction). See also Murin, “Eshche raz ob otstavkakh I. Stalina,” 72–3.
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