Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare From Ancient Times to the Present
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INVISIBLE ARMIES
* * *
An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present
MAX BOOT
DEDICATION
To the Council on Foreign Relations,
for making this book possible;
And to Victoria, Abigail, and William Boot,
for the good fortune of being their father.
EPIGRAPH
“An invisible army spread itself out over nearly the whole of Spain like a net from whose meshes there was no escape for the French soldier who for a moment left his column or his garrison. Without uniforms and without weapons, apparently the guerilleros escaped easily from the columns that pursued them, and it frequently happened that the troops sent out to do battle with them, passed through their midst without perceiving them.”
—COUNT MIOT DE MELITO (1858)1
“We . . . attack an enemy who is invisible, fluid, uncatchable.”
—COLONEL ROGER TRINQUIER (1961)2
CONTENTS
Cover
Title Page
DEDICATION
EPIGRAPH
PROLOGUE: BAGHDAD PATROL, APRIL 9, 2007
BOOK I
BARBARIANS AT THE GATE
The Origins of Guerrilla Warfare
1. AMBUSH AT BETH-HORON
Romans vs. Jews, AD 66
2. CLASSICAL CONFLICTS
The Peloponnesian War, Alexander the Great in Central Asia, the Maccabees, and the Bar Kokhba Revolt, 426 BC–AD 132
3. UNCIVILIZED WARFARE
Tribal Wars of Mass Destruction
4. AKKAD AND THE ORIGINS OF INSURGENCY
Mesopotamia, 2334–2005 BC
5. CATCH ME IF YOU CAN
Persians vs. Scythians, 512 BC
6. “CREATE A DESERT”
The Origins of Counterinsurgency in Assyria and Rome, 1100 BC–AD 212
7. ROME’S DOWNFALL
The Barbarian Invasions, AD 370–476
8. AN EASTERN WAY OF WAR?
Ancient Chinese Warfare beyond Sun Tzu
9. NOMADS AND MANDARINS
Xiongnu vs. Han, 200 BC–AD 48
10. THE GUERRILLA PARADOX
Why the Weak Beat the Strong
11. THE TARTAN REBELLIONS
Scotland vs. England, 1296–1746
12. WAR BY THE BOOK
The Counterinsurgents’ Advantage
BOOK II
LIBERTY OR DEATH
The Rise of the Liberal Revolutionaries
13. IRREGULARS IN THE AGE OF REASON
Hussars, Pandours, and Rangers, 1648–1775
14. THE AMERICAN HORNETS
The Revolution against Britain, 1775–1783
15. WAR TO THE KNIFE
The Peninsular War, 1808–1814
16. BLACK SPARTACUS
The Haitian War of Independence, 1791–1804
17. GREEKS AND THEIR LOVERS
The Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832
18. HERO OF TWO WORLDS
Giuseppe Garibaldi and the Struggle for Italian Unification, 1833–1872
19. REVOLUTIONARY CONSEQUENCES
The Liberal Achievement
BOOK III
THE SPREADING OIL SPOT
The Wars of Empire
20. THE WARS THAT WEREN’T
Why Did So Few Guerrillas Resist the European Advance?
21. THE SKULKING WAY OF WAR
The “Forest Wars” in Eastern North America, 1622–1842
22. THE WINNING OF THE WEST
Braves vs. Bluecoats, 1848–1890
23. THE WINNING OF THE EAST
The Holy War against Russia in Chechnya and Dagestan, 1829–1859
24. DARK DEFILES
The First Anglo–Afghan War, 1838–1842
25. NORTHWEST FRONTIER
Britain and the Pashtuns, 1897–1947
26. MISSION CIVILISATRICE
Lyautey in Morocco, 1912–1925
27. COMMANDOS
Britain’s Near-Defeat in South Africa, 1899–1902
28. HIGH NOON FOR EMPIRE
Why Imperialism Carried the Seeds of Its Own Destruction
BOOK IV
THE BOMB THROWERS
The First Age of International Terrorism
29. SUICIDE KNIFERS
The Assassins, AD 1090–1256
30. JOHN BROWN’S BODY
The Terrorist Who Helped Start the Civil War, 1856–1859
31. THE DESTRUCTION OF RECONSTRUCTION
Ku Kluxers and the War against Civil Rights, 1866–1876
32. PROPAGANDA BY THE DEED
Anarchists, ca. 1880–ca. 1939
33. HUNTING THE TSAR
The Nihilists on the Trail of Alexander II, 1879–1881
34. “AN UNCONTROLLABLE EXPLOSION”
Socialist Revolutionaries in Russia, 1902–1917
35. SHINNERS AND PEELERS
The Irish War of Independence, 1919–1921
36. THE TERRORIST MIND
Sinners or Saints?
BOOK V
THE SIDESHOWS
Guerrillas and Commandos in the World Wars
37. THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR
Blood Brothers and Brownshirts, 1914–1945
38. THE EVOLUTION OF AN ARCHAEOLOGIST
“Lawrence of Arabia,” 1916–1935
39. THE REGULAR IRREGULARS
The Birth of the Special Forces in World War II
40. WINGATE’S WARS
A “Wayward Genius” in Palestine, Abyssinia, and Burma, 1936–1944
41. RESISTANCE AND COLLABORATION
Yugoslavia, 1941–1945, and the Limits of Scorched-Earth Counterinsurgency
42. ASSESSING THE “SUPERSOLDIERS”
Did Commandos Make a Difference?
BOOK VI
THE END OF EMPIRE
The Wars of “National Liberation”
43. THE WORLD AFTER THE WAR
The Slipping European Grip
44. THE RISE OF THE RED EMPEROR
Mao Zedong’s Long March to Power, 1921–1949
45. ADIEU AT DIEN BIEN PHU
The Indochina War, 1945–1954
46. “CONVINCE OR COERCE”
The Algerian War of Independence, 1954–1962
47. A MAN AND A PLAN
Briggs, Templer, and the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960
48. “A DISTINCTLY BRITISH APPROACH”?
Why the British Succeeded—at Least Sometimes
BOOK VII
RADICAL CHIC
The Romance of the Leftist Revolutionaries
49. TWO SIDES OF THE COIN
The Guerrilla Mystique in the 1960s–1970s
50. THE QUIET AMERICAN
Edward Lansdale and the Huk Rebellion, 1945–1954
51. CREATING SOUTH VIETNAM
Lansdale and Diem, 1954–1956
52. THE OTHER WAR
The Limitations of Firepower in Vietnam, 1960–1973
53. M-26-7
Castro’s Improbable Comeback, 1952–1959
54. FOCO OR LOCO?
Che’s Quixotic Quest, 1965–1967
55. THE CHILDREN OF ’68—AND ’48
The Raid on Entebbe and the Terrorism of the 1970s
56. ARAFAT’S ODYSSEY
What Terrorism Did and Did Not Achieve for the Palestinians
57. LEFT OUT, OR REBELS WITHOUT A CAUSE
The End of the (Marxist) Affair in the 1980s
BOOK VIII
GOD
’S KILLERS
The Rise of Radical Islam
58. FIFTY DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD
Tehran, Mecca, Islamabad, and Kabul, November 4–December 24, 1979
59. RUSSIA’S VIETNAM
The Red Army vs. the Mujahideen, 1980–1989
60. THE A TEAM
The “Party of God” in Lebanon, 1982–2006
61. THE TERRORIST INTERNATIONALE
Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, 1988–2011
62. CARNAGE IN MESOPOTAMIA
Al Qaeda in Iraq since 2003
63. COUNTERINSURGENCY REDISCOVERED
David Petraeus and the Surge, 2007–2008
64. DOWN AND OUT?
The Failures and Successes of the Global Islamist Insurgency
EPILOGUE: MEETING IN MARJAH, OCTOBER 23, 2011
IMPLICATIONS: TWELVE ARTICLES, OR THE LESSONS OF FIVE THOUSAND YEARS
APPENDIX: THE INVISIBLE ARMIES DATABASE
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
PICTURE SECTION
COPYRIGHT
ALSO BY MAX BOOT
PROLOGUE
BAGHDAD PATROL, APRIL 9, 2007
LIKE PREDATORS READY for the hunt, the paratroopers came out of their “hootches,” their quarters, as twilight began to fall, their tan desert boots crunching softly on the silvery gravel spread over the barren soil of their compound. On went their gear: Kevlar helmets, M-4 assault rifles, 9-millimeter pistols, fire-retardant gloves, night-vision goggles, first-aid kits, ammunition pouches, walkie-talkies, and much else besides. The most unwieldy implement was their body armor, complete with shoulder and crotch coverings and SAPI plates (small arms protective inserts) in front, back, and around the sides. At least sixty pounds of added weight in all—about the same weight that a Roman legionnaire would have carried.
A short mission brief, then onto an unarmored truck that would spare them the half-mile walk to the front gate of Forward Operating Base Justice. After a brief drive, they hopped off. Four feet down from the rear of the truck. Out the gate. Into the warm spring air. Into the toxic smells drifting across the nearby Tigris River.
Monday, April 9, 2007. The Kadhimiya neighborhood of northwestern Baghdad.
This was the anniversary of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Although American troops had no trouble toppling the Iraqi army and Republican Guard, which fought exactly the kind of positional warfare that all conventional militaries prefer, they had found themselves stymied by armed groups ranging from Sunni jihadists to Shiite militias. Using simple weapons—AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, and, above all, the bombs that the American military dubbed IEDs (improvised explosive devices)—a variety of militants had already killed over 3,300 Americans and wounded 25,000 more. Another 1,184 would die over the next four years and eight months. The death toll among Iraqis was far more horrific, eventually reaching more than 80,000 dead.1 Just a few months earlier, the terrible bloodletting in Baghdad had brought the country to the brink of all-out civil war.
American troops found their tactics and technology, still designed to defeat an opponent like the now defunct Red Army, woefully inadequate to deal with these new threats. In this sort of war, there were no flanks to turn, few bastions to storm, no capitals to seize. Only the grim daily challenge of battling an unseen foe that was everywhere and nowhere. A foe that struck with ruthless abandon and then melted into the population. A foe that hoped to goad the Americans into savage reprisals that would turn the population against them. This was the kind of enemy that Americans have battled before, from the jungles of the Philippines in the early 1900s to the rice paddies of Vietnam in the 1960s, but it is not an enemy that most soldiers feel comfortable in confronting.
Not until the end of 2006—almost four years after the beginning of the Iraq War—did the Army and Marine Corps finally release their first new field manual in decades (FM 3-24) dealing specifically with counterinsurgency operations. When General David H. Petraeus, who oversaw the writing of FM 3-24, was appointed the American commander in Iraq in early 2007, he began to implement its prescriptions. More troops were dispatched to Iraq and more of them began to move out of their remote Forward Operating Bases, where miles of concertina wire and concrete cut them off from contact with the society they were supposed to be pacifying. Troops began to take up residence in Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts, where they could live and work alongside Iraqis. The emphasis began to shift from drive-bys in heavily armored Humvees to foot patrols that allow the soldiers to get out among the people and to gather the intelligence they need to hunt down insurgents.
Captain David Brunais, newly promoted from the rank of first lieutenant but still in command of a platoon, was a small part of this shift in strategy as he led eleven enlisted men and a sergeant from the Eighty-Second Airborne Division onto the darkened streets of Kadhimiya. This was their third patrol of the day in a heavily Shiite area where the few Sunni residents had been chased out months before. It was home to many sympathizers of Moqtada al Sadr’s Jaish al Mahdi (Mahdist Army), an extremist Shiite group, as well as to a revered Shiite shrine heavily protected by local security forces. Much like the Mafia in John Gotti’s neighborhood, the Mahdists preferred to keep their own area quiet while exporting violence elsewhere. So this neighborhood was relatively secure by Iraqi terms. But that did not mean much. Shocking violence could erupt with no notice practically anywhere in this lawless land. Not even the Green Zone at the center of the city was secure. In a few days’ time, a suicide bomber would penetrate the Iraqi parliament in the Green Zone and kill a lawmaker in a heavily publicized attack.
The paratroopers fanned out on either side of the street, keeping a vigilant eye for trouble with night-vision goggles that turn the darkness into a glowing, green-tinted version of daylight, communicating in low tones over microphones strapped to their helmets. The only problem they encountered was a bad traffic accident: a taxi flipped upside down. Brunais stopped to chat with an Iraqi Army major to ask whether he needed any help, but the Iraqis seemed to have the situation well in hand. The paratroopers kept on walking until they got to an outdoor café where half a dozen middle-aged men were smoking hookah pipes. Brunais had gotten to know them in the month that he had been patrolling this neighborhood. He stopped to chat, sitting down in a cheap plastic lawn chair.
The men displayed the invariable Arab hospitality, offering Brunais a water pipe, which he declined, and a Pepsi, which he accepted. Sometimes an English-speaking Iraqi was among the hookah smokers, but not today, so Brunais called his interpreter over—an Iraqi man wearing a ski mask to hide his identity in order to avoid insurgent retaliation. Through his “terp,” Brunais conducted a stilted if friendly conversation that began with jokes about playing dominoes and soccer and proceeded to an explanation from the captain of why the government of Iraq had decided to close the capital to vehicular traffic on this symbolic day. The men complained good-naturedly about this interruption in their daily routines which they said was bad for business. Brunais pointed out that car bombs were even worse for business.
The conversation lasted but a few minutes. Then, with protestations of friendship on both sides, Brunais and his men were on their way, walking slowly back to where they started from. An hour and a half after having left their base, they were back, spent, tired, and sweaty, ready to sack out and do it all over again in the morning.2
THERE WAS NOTHING exceptional about what these soldiers from the Eighty-Second Airborne Division did on this balmy Baghdad night. And that is precisely the point. They were undertaking the sort of modest, tedious, mundane intelligence gathering and security operations that have been a cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations since the days of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. They were part of a long continuum of soldiers who have struggled to master the rigors of unconventional warfare, just as their enemies were part of an even longer continuum of irregular warriors who have always given conventiona
l armies fits.
Time and again, guerrilla warfare seemed to be superseded by the “new new thing”—industrial warfare in the 1910s, aerial warfare in the 1930s, nuclear warfare in the 1950s, network-centric warfare in the 1990s. And yet each time it reasserted itself with a vengeance.
Since World War II, insurgency and terrorism have become the dominant forms of conflict—a trend likely to continue into the foreseeable future. Even as conventional interstate clashes dwindle, the number of guerrilla and terrorist groups continues to grow, the latter even faster than the former.3 One study found that in the 1990s over 90 percent of all wartime deaths occurred in civil wars fought primarily by irregulars; the figure was undoubtedly just as high in the first decade of the twenty-first century.4
It is not hard to see why this mode of warfare has become so prevalent. For one thing, it is cheap and easy: waging guerrilla warfare does not require procuring expensive weapons systems or building an elaborate bureaucracy. And it works. At least sometimes. From Algeria and Vietnam to Afghanistan, Chechnya, Lebanon, Somalia, and Iraq, insurgents have shown a consistent ability to humble great powers. Americans got an unwelcome reminder of how potent irregular tactics could be on September 11, 2001, and in the wars that ensued. Suddenly understanding the nature of guerrilla warfare, and its close cousin, terrorism, was no longer the stuff of musty academic studies from the era of flower power. It had become a matter of life and death.
Yet there was no accessible and up-to-date account to trace the evolution of guerrilla warfare and terrorism over the ages.5 The aim of Invisible Armies is to deliver precisely such a narrative, telling the story of irregular warfare from its origins in the prehistoric world to the contemporary conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond. The aim is to show low-intensity conflict in its most important variations and manifestations over the centuries. The primary focus is on the last two centuries, but the first part of the book examines guerrilla warfare in the ancient and medieval worlds in order to place more recent developments in perspective.
This book is intended to serve as a one-stop destination, as it were, for a general reading public interested in this subject. But I had no intention of producing an encyclopedia. My goal has been to pen an account that is as engrossing as it is instructive. Instead of trying to chronicle every occurrence of guerrilla warfare and terrorism—something that is impossible, in any case—I aim to draw out the main trends and to illustrate them with well-chosen and well-told stories. In the interests of concision, I have had to omit or abbreviate discussion of many wars. Those in search of greater detail on a particular topic should turn to the endnotes for suggested reading.