Cochrane gave orders for his son to be carried below but after wails of protest and violent struggles the attempt was abandoned. The O'Higgins came through the ordeal undamaged except for the rigging. Cochrane put to sea, landed on the offshore island of San Lorenzo, took the Spanish occupants prisoner and freed thirty-seven Chilean soldiers who had been kept there in chains for eight years. "The joy of the poor fellows at their deliverance, after all hope had fled, can scarcely be conceived," he reported.6
He now began a blockade of Callao, though offering to return the Spanish prisoners to their commander if the liberated Chileans were permitted to rejoin their families. While these negotiations continued, under flag of truce, the Spanish viceroy of Peru, Don Joaquim de la Pezuela, reproached him, as a British nobleman, with having joined a rebel navy. "A British nobleman is a free man," replied Cochrane sternly, "and therefore has a right to adopt any country which is endeavouring to re-establish the rights of aggrieved humanity." He added that the Duke de San Carlos, Spanish ambassador in London, had approached him on behalf of Ferdinand VII and had offered him an admiral's command in the Spanish navy. He had refused it, and had joined the Chileans instead. As the news spread among the crews at Callao and they learnt who their adversary was, memories of the Speedy and the Mediterranean war of 1801-1808 were revived. Cochrane learnt that he had a new nickname among them, not intended as flattery but which pleased him well: El Diablo. More than two hundred years before, Sir Francis Drake had raided Callao and earned the title of El Dracone. After Cochrane's death, his son Thomas wrote, "Drake the Dragon and Cochrane the Devil were kinsmen in noble hatred, and noble punishment, of Spanish wrongdoing."7
It was June 1819 before he returned to Valparaiso, the six months' cruise having been spent in raiding Spanish supply depots ashore, seizing currency intended to pay the Spanish troops, and intercepting ships at sea. At Huacho, the Spanish garrison hardly fired a shot before retreating and leaving supplies behind them. Cochrane's reputation had spread down the coast and he found, increasingly, that his enemies rarely bothered to contest the issue. His marines landed at Patavilca and seized 70,000 dollars belonging to the Spanish treasury. Five days later they boarded the brig Gazelle and took 60,000 more. On 16 June, the O'Higgins dropped anchor off Valparaiso and Cochrane went ashore to a hero's welcome.
The ships were refitted after their long cruise. It was not until September that Cochrane paid a return visit to Callao. Since his first attack, the Spanish had built a substantial boom across the harbour, sturdy enough to require an explosion ship to dislodge it. Cochrane contented himself with attacking the port by using rockets and a fire-ship, then he turned his attention to a more formidable enterprise.
Just as Callao was the great Spanish base to the north of Valparaiso, so Valdivia was the military stronghold to the south. Englishmen who saw it were apt to regard it as the equivalent of the rock of Gibraltar in terms of the Pacific coast of South America. It was also much closer to Valparaiso than Callao happened to be. If the infant republic of O'Higgins was to be crushed, the blow was more likely to be aimed at Santiago by a Spanish army using Valdivia as its base.
There was an equally urgent reason for attempting a spectacular coup against Spain. Though the Chilean republic had bought an American-built corvette, the 28-gun Independencia, following Cochrane's arrival, little or nothing was being spent on the armament of the navy. Cochrane had offered to surrender all his prize money to pay for the cost of rockets for attacking Spanish-held ports. The offer was refused and money was saved on their manufacture by making the Spanish prisoners undertake it. The consequence, as Cochrane found before Callao, was that many rockets were utterly ineffective. In almost every respect, the navy of the new republic was ill-equipped. A dramatic victory over the Spanish at sea might persuade O'Higgins and San Martin of the unrealised power which the little fleet put at their disposal.
The chances of a successful attack on Valdivia were diminished when the Chilean government declined to supply Cochrane with troops for an assault. It might have been possible, of course, to have attacked the base using only the crew of the O'Higgins, since Cochrane intended to make the attempt with the flagship alone, but it was hard to find trained men.
The crews for the most part consisted of cholos, or native peasants, whom it was difficult to shape into good seamen, though they fought gallantly when well led. The officers were nearly all English or North American, this being a redeeming feature, but very few of them possessed the tact to bring up the men to anything like a seaman-like standard.8
Despite this, Cochrane sailed in the O'Higgins, taking with him Major William Miller, the fellow mercenary who was commander of the Chilean marines. With his habitual coolness, Cochrane hoisted Spanish colours at the mast of the O'Higgins, dropped anchor off Valdivia on 18 January 1820, and signalled for a pilot. The trick succeeded because, as Cochrane knew, by reports from the Atlantic coast, where the ships had touched, Valdivia awaited two battleships and a new frigate from Spain. He also heard that one of the battleships had proved unseaworthy and was still on the Atlantic coast. The other battleship had foundered off Cape Horn, and the new frigate was sheltering in the Guayaquil river to escape his own squadron. It was that frigate, the Prueba, which the O'Higgins successfully impersonated. The Spanish commander sent out a boat with a pilot, an officer, and four soldiers, all of whom were made prisoner as soon as they stepped on deck. They were then persuaded, as Cochrane put it, that it was "conducive to their interests to supply all the information demanded". The pilot took the O'Higgins into the navigation channels of Valdivia, enabling Cochrane to map the approaches to the harbour and the position of all the forts.
The Spaniards on shore were puzzled to see what they took to be the Prueba turn and head for the horizon once more. Cochrane had now discovered from his prisoners that another ship was expected soon, the 18-gun sloop Potrillo with 20,000 dollars on board, that being the pay of the Valdivia garrison. Three days later, the sloop was hailed by a friendly warship under Spanish colours. When the captain at last realised that he had been boarded by the O'Higgins, it was too late to offer any resistance. Without firing a shot, Cochrane captured the sloop, 20,000 dollars, and a set of extremely valuable despatches detailing Spanish plans and troop movements.9
It was now clear that in southern Chile the Spaniards had enlisted the most savage of the Indian tribes on their side to attack and destroy settlements within the area loyal to the new republic. Accordingly, Cochrane sailed farther south still, to Concepcion, where he repeated his request for troops to attack Valdivia. Governor Freire listened and then agreed to lend him 250 men. If Valdivia could be taken and its province subdued, the Indian threat might largely be removed.
The attacking force sailed again on 25 January, the O'Higgins now accompanied by the schooner Montezuma with troops on board and the brig Intrepido. But the entire expedition almost ended in disaster on the night of 29 January, when the O'Higgins was some forty miles out to sea and not within sight of either the brig or the schooner. Cochrane had retired to his cabin and was sleeping, having left the lieutenant of the watch in charge of the flagship. Presently the lieutenant also decided to turn in, taking advantage of Cochrane's absence to hand over his duties to a midshipman.
Though the ship was far out to sea, there were numerous reefs and half-submerged shoals, which had made Cochrane leave orders with the lieutenant to call him at once if a breeze sprang up. But either the orders were not passed on to the midshipman or else he neglected them. The wind gathered strength and a sudden squall blew the ship's prow round. As the midshipman gave his commands, in an effort to bring her back on course, there was a jarring thud deep below the keel and the O'Higgins bucked and grated on a sharp ledge of rock.
The story of the Pallas off Ushant seemed likely to be repeated, though this time there was no hope of the sea lifting the ship clear. Instead, the surges were hammering her against the rock on which she was lodged. It was now in the small hours of a hazy morn
ing and, unlike the men of the Pallas, the first thought of the crew of the O'Higgins was to take to the boats.
Cochrane arrived on deck, "half-dressed" according to his secretary W. B. Stevenson, and found that the ship was aground on a reef, which boasted a few trees, and that "the jib-boom was entangled among the branches". More ominous, the surface of the ocean was littered with fragments of the false keel and of the ship's "sheathing". First, Cochrane warned the ship's company that the boats would hold only a quarter of them, and that they were too far from land to attempt such a voyage in any case. If they reached the nearest shore, they would find nothing but "torture and inevitable death at the hands of the Indians". There had been stories enough of this at Concepcion and his warning had a sobering effect.
He ordered a kedge anchor to be carried out astern and securely lodged. By using the hawser it was then possible to heave the O'Higgins clear. However, she was leaking badly with three feet of water in the hold already, though the depth was not increasing as rapidly as might have been feared. For another thirty-six hours the flagship continued on course, the men at the pumps working to keep the flood in check. But the ship's carpenter was an unskilled member of the crew who had no idea of how to maintain the pumps. While the seamen seized buckets to bail out the ship, the depth increased to five feet and then seven, flooding the powder magazine. The carpenter and most of the Chilean crew had been peasants or agricultural labourers, to whom the mechanics of a ship's pumps remained a complete mystery. The European and American officers were more familiar with the pumps as such, but the technicalities of such devices had always been considered below the dignity of a gentleman to investigate.
It was left to Cochrane, as admiral, to prove the worth of the apprenticeship he had served to Jack Larmour on the Thetis, almost thirty years before. While his men formed a chain to use the buckets for baling he now stripped off his coat and went below to use such "skill in carpentry" as he possessed. It was uncomfortably evident that unless the pumps could be put back into working order, the O'Higgins and her crew were doomed. At its present rate, the sea would overwhelm the ship in a few hours. He worked until midnight and succeeded in repairing the pumps sufficiently for use. The men who had been bailing turned their energies to pumping. The level of water in the hold steadied, and then began to fall.
It was not surprising that the drama of the pumps decided many of those on the O'Higgins against making an attack on Valdivia. In the first place, the assault was one which no one but Cochrane would have contemplated. But the flow of water into the O'Higgins was likely to increase and the likelihood was that the ship would founder before the battle was over. Cochrane himself was undeterred, as he explained to Major Miller: "Well, Major, Valdivia we must take. Sooner than put back, it would be better that we all went to the bottom."
The dramatic simplicity of his decision was greeted by misgivings. Yet he knew that in terms both of strategy and of Chilean morale a spectacular victory was badly needed. The apparent impossibility of what he was about to do was the guarantee of success. It was the familiar argument which he employed throughout his career.
Cool calculation would make it appear that the attempt to take Valdivia is madness. This is one reason why the Spaniards will hardly believe us in earnest, even when we commence. And you will see that a bold onset, and a little perseverance afterwards, will give a complete triumph.
With the schooner and the brig in attendance, he set sail for the Spanish base.10
The stronghold of Valdivia consisted of a well-defended and almost landlocked anchorage, guarded by forts on high ground to either side. As Major Miller and his marines discovered, these forts not only covered the entrance to the great natural basin but were able to enfilade every part of the harbour. Within that harbour basin there was also the fortified island of Manzanera, the centrepiece of an anchorage some four miles long and two miles broad. Deep within the shelter of the anchorage was a smaller bay and two estuaries, that of the Valdivia river leading to the town of Valdivia itself which was fourteen miles upstream.
The only entrance to the great natural harbour was about 1200 yards across, overlooked by Fort Niebla on the eastern height and Fort Amargos on the west. Any ship which attempted to force an entrance would be at the mercy of their artillery and, even beyond that, the harbour was an ideal trap in which the intruder would be helpless before the surrounding guns and troops. To make matters worse, from the attacker's viewpoint, the strong sea and the surf on the coast outside the harbour would make a landing at any other point difficult.
However, Cochrane studied the possibility of a landing outside the harbour itself. The one feasible place was the Aguada del Ingles, a small bay about a mile to the west of the harbour entrance. It was not an easy landing but an attack might be made at slack water. The compensating disadvantage was that it was guarded by the first of the forts on the western side, Fort Ingles. Since it was out of the question to attack through the harbour mouth, Cochrane decided to land at the Aguada del Ingles, storm Fort Ingles, and then advance by taking every fort on the western side of the harbour in succession, except possibly for the strongpoint of Corral Castle which might withstand a siege.
VALDIVIA, FEBRUARY 1820
Before Valdivia appeared on the horizon, Cochrane abandoned the O'Higgins as an attacking vessel. She was in no state to lead the assault, though she might be useful as a floating battery later on. Moreover, the element of surprise was essential in the attack and there was too big a risk of the Spaniards recognising the O'Higgins from her recent masquerading as the frigate Prueba. Still out of sight of the base, Cochrane transferred Major Miller's marines and the troops from Concepcion under Major Beauchef, a French volunteer officer, to the brig Intrepido and the schooner Montezuma. He accompanied them, in order to lead the attack himself. On 3 Februaiy, flying Spanish colours, the two little ships anchored off the Aguada del Ingles. There was no alternative to putting themselves within range of Fort Ingles itself.
Cochrane ordered all his troops and marines out of sight below decks. The ships' boats in which they would land had been made fast at the seaward side of the brig and schooner, concealed from the Spaniards ashore. A detachment of Spanish troops from Fort Ingles appeared on the shore at the double, their commander ordering the Montezuma and her consort to identify themselves. Cochrane had chosen a Spanish-born officer to reply. His story was that the two vessels were part of the squadron which had left Cadiz with the Prueba. They had been separated from the others while rounding Cape Horn and their boats had been washed away in the storms.
Cochrane's aim was to play for time, until darkness and a slacker tide would assist the landing and the subsequent attack on Fort Ingles. But the Spaniards were unconvinced by the Cape Horn story. Cochrane's officer then added a request for a pilot. It was the usual thing to do under such circumstances but only a couple of weeks earlier the O'Higgins had made a similar request with consequences which were well-known at Valdivia. Those on the ships now heard with some apprehension the firing of alarm guns from the nearer forts and saw Spanish troops moving at the double from the other bastions to reinforce Fort Ingles. At 4 p.m., without further argument, the guns of Fort Ingles opened fire on the two little ships.
The action seemed precipitate, until Cochrane saw what had gone wrong. By an extremely bad stroke of fortune, one of the ship's boats, concealed on the seaward side, had broken loose and drifted into the view of those ashore. The falsity of the Cape Horn story had been embarrassingly revealed. Almost at once, two of the first shots from Fort Ingles smashed into the planking of the Intrepido's hull, killing two of the soldiers on the lower deck. There was no chance of retreat and, therefore, no alternative to attacking at once.
Cochrane clambered down into the little gig, in which he was to bob about offshore, directing the landing. Major Miller and his forty-four marines were packed into one of the two remaining launches, and the seamen began to row them ashore as the vanguard of the assault. A further complication for Coch
rane's men was that when the O'Higgins was holed on the rock, the water had reached the powder magazine, soaking much of the contents. As a result, it was the bayonet rather than the bullet which would decide the assault on Valdivia.
As the first of the launches pulled towards the beach, the Spanish troops of the advance party opened fire. Miller counted seventy-five of them defending the landing place. A heavy swell was still running and, to make matters worse, the sailors found their oars encumbered with masses of floating seaweed. In the opening volleys of musket fire, four or five of the marines were hit. More important still, the Spanish fire was directed at the boat itself. Miller was alarmed to see that his launch was being "perforated with musket balls, and the water rushed in through the holes". Two of the sailors refused to row any closer but when one of them was felled by a marine with a musket butt, the rest took up their oars again. The storm of bullets swept over the lowered heads of Cochrane's men, one musket ball passing through Miller's hat and another hitting the quartermaster of the O'Higgins who was acting as coxswain of the launch.
As the craft approached the shore, Miller ordered his men to use some of their precious ammunition against the Spanish defenders, who now found themselves in exposed positions at close range. Once the marines had landed, Miller led them in an immediate bayonet charge up the beach, routing the defenders and giving Cochrane's main force a precarious hold. The 250 Chilean troops were ferried ashore and, as soon as it was dark, Cochrane directed the attack on the first strongpoint, Fort Ingles.
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