by Dick Camp
Just prior to midnight, the convoy hove to at a point about two thousand yards off the southwest coast of Choiseul. “We got to the place where we were supposed to go, a place called Voza,” Krulak said. “The plan was to send a small reconnaissance detachment ashore to scout out the landing area and guide the battalion ashore by light signal if the beach was clear.” Lieutenant Rea E. Duncan, 3rd Platoon, George Company was assigned to lead the patrol. He told his platoon to “[m]ove quickly up the beach to the edge of the jungle. Spread out and set up a beachhead perimeter … Somewhere on the beach is the Australian Coastwatcher Nick Waddell and the native guides …” On signal, the platoon climbed down the cargo net rigged against the ship’s side and into a ramped landing craft (LCP(R)) for the run to the beach. The men tensed as they approached the darkened, jungle lined shore, wondering if the Japanese were waiting in ambush. The noise from the boat’s engine was enough to wake the dead!
Suddenly the craft lurched to a stop as the bow slid up on the sandy beach. The ramp dropped and the Parachutists scrambled out and across the narrow beach to the edge of the jungle. Nothing stirred, except the rustle of jungle creatures disturbed by the sudden invasion. Averill wrote that if the beach was secure Duncan “would signal the old Churchillian ‘V’ for victory signal, dit-dit-dit-da, by shaded light.” After listening intently for several minutes, Duncan decided the beach was safe and used his flashlight to signal the battalion. Shortly after midnight the first wave of Parachutists landed, and within an hour the entire battalion was ashore with the bulk of its equipment. In the middle of the unloading, a Japanese twin-float plane, code named “Jake,” swept in and dropped two bombs that exploded off the port quarter of the Conway. Fortunately they did not do any damage, but the bombing certainly lent a sense of urgency to the unloading. The two bombings indicated that the Japanese were alert to the possibility of an American landing and were maintaining aircraft surveillance around the island.
KRULAK PRELIMINARY REPORT, OPERATION BLISSFUL
The Second Parachute Battalion (Reinforced) landed at Voza, Choiseul, British Solomon Islands at 2300, October 27th unopposed, and established a beachhead. Enemy Reconnaissance aircraft discovered the landing and ineffectively bombed the area. At daybreak the battalion moved into the mountain area one mile inland from Voza and established a defensive base position. Patrols were immediately sent out both by foot and boat to determine the location of the nearest enemy installations. These were found to be at Sangigai to the southward, a barge staging and replenishing base, and at Warrior River to the northward the Choiseul Bay outposts.
As Krulak’s men assembled on the beach, Seton, who had accompanied the battalion, tried to locate the native carriers he and Nick Waddell had recruited to assist the Parachutists. They were supposed to meet him at the abandoned village of Voza but for some reason they were not there. After tromping through the jungle for several minutes, Seton found eighty of the wayward natives and led them back to the beach without incident. Peatross stated, “Before dawn, the battalion, reinforced with native bearers of Seton’s coast-watcher group, carrying heavy-duty radio equipment, ammunition, and rations, struggled up the narrow, single-track trail towards the base camp location. It was high ground covered with forest growth, well-concealed from the ground and air, a stream of clear, rushing water sliding around one side of the bluff.”
At daylight the beachhead was attacked by several enemy planes, which blindly strafed the area. Fortunately everything had been either moved or camouflaged, so the air raid did not cause any damage. At this point, Krulak knew that the first phase of the operation was successful. The Japanese knew Americans were ashore—but did not know how many there were or their intentions. The first part of the diversion was working. To reinforce the idea of a landing, IMAC headquarters broadcast the news of the landing on Allied radio and told the press that an invasion was underway. In Silk Chutes and Hard Fighting: U.S. Marine Corps Parachute Units in World War II, Lt. Col. Jon T. Hoffman wrote, “At least one newspaper illustrated the story with fanciful drawings of parachutists floating down from the sky.”
Four Navy LCP(R)s were left behind to provide support. They were taken to a small cove on Zinoa Island, a tiny islet directly off Voza, where they were camouflaged under overhanging mangrove trees. Lieutenant John Richard’s 1st Platoon, Easy Company, went along to guard them. Sometime just before dawn, a Japanese plane circled overhead but did not drop any bombs. The men believed they had been spotted and couldn’t understand why they weren’t bombed. Back at the base camp, Krulak sent out patrols with native guides to gather information. One of the patrols reported that approximately two hundred Japanese were guarding a barge station at Sangigai, about eight miles southeast of the camp and another force was defending an outpost about ten miles northwest at the mouth of the Warrior River. Krulak decided that Sangigai would be the first target and decided to personally scout the objective before launching an attack.
The next day Krulak sent Lieutenant Averill on a reconnaissance patrol to check out the possibility of using Moli Point as a base for PT boats, while he led another to Sangigai. “Yours is a reconnaissance patrol, not a combat patrol,” he stressed to Averill. “Don’t get into a wrestling match.” Lieutenant Junior Grade Richard Keresey (a former PT boat skipper), an Army radar specialist, and a native guide accompanied the patrol. Averill started out in good spirits. His map showed a good trail from Voza to the point, a distance of about six miles. However, he soon learned that he could not rely on its accuracy.
“The maps issued for BLISSFUL were unbelievable, next to useless,” Averill complained. “A gridded overprint of aerial photographs of our area of operations, which supplemented these maps, left much to be desired. The jungle growth was so dense that the camera’s eye had no more success in penetrating it than did the eye of a human. Trails were inked in and overprinted, pure guesswork, for beneath the umbrella of the rainforest no trails actually could be observed. Native villages and known Japanese installations were overprinted, their locations the most accurate of any on the map. The larger streams and rivers were portrayed with some accuracy also. What were not shown, perhaps not known about at all by the planners of BLISSFUL, were the rocky spurs that extended from the central mountain mass, east and west, projecting into the sea in places. In following the northwest trail along the beach, there was no way to circumvent these spurs except to seaward, so it was up and over—the slow tedious, exhausting method of making headway.”
It took Averill’s patrol eight physically exhausting hours to cut and claw their way to the Moli Point destination. In Isolation of Rabaul, Henry Shaw and Douglas Kane described the island as being, “[f]ully overgrown and choked with rank, impenetrable jungle and rain forest. The mountain ranges in the center of the island extend in long spurs and ridges toward the coasts, thus effectively dividing the island into a series of large compartments.” By that time they explored the area and determined that it was impracticable for a PT base it was so late in the day they decided to spend the night—which was anything but uneventful. Just after dark the first of several Japanese barges loaded with troops pulled into the cove near their perimeter. This happened several times but inexplicably the barges all turned back and steamed farther up the coast. At dawn, Averill was about to call the guide when he saw the man beckon. “Jap! Jap! Many! Many!” the guide whispered urgently. Averill was shocked to discover that a large number of enemy soldiers had bivouacked less than a hundred yards from his position and were now between the patrol and the main base camp. Fortunately the native guide was able to show them a way around the large Japanese force and they were able to successfully make it back to the camp by mid-morning. When he returned, he found that Krulak had not yet returned from the patrol to Sangigai.
KRULAK PRELIMINARY REPORT, OPERATION BLISSFUL
On October 30th a combat patrol was dispatched to the southward with the intention of apprising the Japanese of our presence on Choiseul. A Japanese detachment of about ten men
was encountered at the Vagara River. In the encounter seven (7) Japs were killed and a landing barge which these men were using was destroyed. There were no Marine casualties. On October 30 a combat patrol accompanied by a PT base reconnaissance party proceeded up the beach as far as Moli Island and returned without event. On the night of October 30th plans were prepared and orders issued for a coordinated attack with the two-fold mission of destroying the Sangigai base and impressing the enemy with the strength of our forces.
Krulak’s reconnaissance patrol, consisting of two officers, seventeen enlisted men, and five native guides, left at first light. They followed a fairly well-defined trail southeast toward the objective. Within a short distance, the patrol discovered evidence that the Japanese had been in the area—lean-tos, discarded equipment, log bunkers—fairly recently. The patrol continued to the Vagara River where Krulak had Platoon Sgt. Frank J. Mullins, a detail of three Marines, and four native guides, split off from the main body and move inland to the high ground behind Sangigai. He told Mullins to make panoramic sketches of the Japanese positions and to calculate the time it took him to reach the high ground. Krulak intended to use the information to brief the battalion for the attack.
The main body of the patrol continued toward the mouth of the river, paralleling the beach, just inside the jungle. About a mile and a half farther on, the point man signaled “enemy in sight” after spotting ten unsuspecting Japanese soldiers unloading a landing barge no more than seventy yards away. Krulak immediately decided to take them on and moved the men into firing positions. “Pick out individual targets,” he whispered. “When I give the word, kill them all!” In the ensuing burst of gunfire, seven of the Japanese were killed but the others managed to escape into the jungle. The barge was destroyed with demolitions and, having announced its presence to the Japanese, the patrol returned to camp without incident. Krulak was pleased. The first round of his “hit and run” strategy was paying off. Later that same afternoon, the Miller patrol returned after an exhausting trek through the jungle. They received a well done for the “complete and accurate” sketches they had made.
Late in the afternoon, Sgt. Norman F. Law and a squad of Marines from Fox Company were sent to set up an overnight ambush position near the Vagara River. They had hardly left the perimeter before they ran head-on into a platoon-sized Japanese unit. Both sides immediately opened fire and in the brief fire fight that resulted, the enemy patrol was driven off. The Parachutists claimed seven enemy killed in action. Sergeant Law and two men returned to the camp to brief Krulak while the others hunkered down for the night.
Sangigai
The village of Sangigai had been in Marine sights since mid-October when the plan for the diversion was first considered. It was an important replenishing point for the Japanese coastal barge traffic and its loss might cause the enemy to react to the threat posed by the raiding force, which is just what Krulak wanted. He hoped that a successful attack would make the Japanese believe the Americans were on the island in force and might transfer troops from Bougainville. As a secondary objective, Krulak intended to destroy the Japanese headquarters and the supplies they had stored there.
Upon his return from the patrol, Krulak gathered his key personnel to issue the attack order. He planned for a two-company attack. The companies, reinforced with a section of machine guns, two rocket teams, and twenty native carriers, were to be transported by LCP(R) to the mouth of the Vagara River, where they would disembark and move to their assigned positions. Easy Company was to proceed along the coast to an attack position north of the village, while Fox Company circled around through the jungle to the high ground behind the village. At H-hour (1400), Easy Company would assault the village behind a barrage of mortar and rocket fire and drive the surviving enemy into Fox Company’s killing zone. The attack was to be proceeded by an early morning air strike. George Company was designated camp security and to be a reaction force, if needed.
KRULAK SANGIGAI ATTACK ORDER
• There are between 100 and 200 Japs at Sangigai, guarding a barge station and attempting to locate and destroy coastwatchers in that area.
• This battalion attacks Sangigai about 1400 tomorrow. Destroys garrison and installations, captures material and withdraws to base.
• Company “E,” attached; one machine gun section regimental weapons, two rocket teams, twenty bearers, take departure from Vagara River down beach 30 minutes after “F” Company passes its left flank. Hit Sangigai on northwest flank, destroy all installations, assist “F” Company. Withdraw on order.
• Company “F,” attached; one machine gun section regimental weapons, two rocket teams, one TBA transmitter, twenty bearers; move to Vagara by boat, pass left of Company “G,” move wide around north and east of Sangigai. Attack in westerly direction on hearing “E” Company firing. Prevent enemy withdrawal into mountains. Withdraw on order.
• Remainder of battalion set up perimeter defense of base, prepared to move to Sangigai area if required or so directed.
• Re-embark at Vagara in withdrawal.
• Prisoners and captured material to Bn-2.
• Take one K meal.
• One unit of fire for all weapons, 10 rounds per rocket gun.
• TBX make contact at halts with base.
• Open voice net at 1200.
• I will be with Company “F.”
The attack force left the perimeter at 0400 and made its way to the beach to meet the LCP(R)s. The early morning air strike arrived on schedule and proceeded to bomb and strafe Sangigai. Much to Krulak’s chagrin four of the planes mistook the boats on Zinoa as enemy and strafed them. As the aircraft came around for a second pass, one of the Marines waved an American flag and they pulled off without firing. Fortunately there were no casualties but three of the boats were damaged and could not be used for the attack, forcing the battalion to set out on foot. After a tiring five-hour forced march the battalion’s lead element approached the Vagara River where it ran into an enemy outpost. After a brief fire fight the enemy withdrew. At this point, Krulak split the force per his plan—Easy Company continued along the coast, while Fox Company circled inland.
Fox Company
Fox Company had the most difficult route through heavy rain forest. Christ wrote, “They waded through countless streams, climbed huge roots, and crawled under fallen trees. Everything seemed to snag on their shirts, belts, and straps, slowing them down. The terrain was an unforgiving wallow. … Men tripped and slid in the mud, their arms flailing to grab branches or something to stop their fall.” H-hour was fast approaching and they were still a considerable distance from their assault position. Krulak was worried. Shortly after 1400 he heard Easy Company open fire with its mortars and rockets. Moments later, the native scouts at the front of the column signaled “enemy ahead.”
Almost immediately the column came under fire from Japanese snipers in trees, rifle pits, and bunkers constructed in the roots of banyan trees, which were almost impossible to spot. There was momentary confusion as the men adjusted to the sudden ambush. For many of the young Parachutists it was their first time under fire and they hesitated to shoot for lack of a target. It wasn’t long before that misconception was cleared up by the old timers, some of whom were veterans of previous fire fights. By fire teams and squads the men rushed forward, building up a firing line that quickly gained superiority. Two of the attached machine gun teams worked their way forward and began laying down suppressive fire, while Lt. W. E. King’s 2nd Platoon enveloped the enemy’s left flank. The maneuver worked and the Japanese were forced to pull back and regroup. In the initial burst of fire, Capt. Spencer H. Pratt, the company commander was wounded in the shoulder, and Krulak was hit with shrapnel in the cheek, but remained in action.
As the Japanese fire momentarily died down, the Marines could hear them working themselves into frenzy, preparatory to launching a full scale assault. “The Japanese on the ridge above had kept up a constant barrage of screams and curses that
began to grow still louder,” Christ wrote, describing the moments before the onslaught. “The noise was bloodcurdling and eerily high pitched. Suddenly, with a final, ‘Totsugeki! Totsugeki!’ (attack, attack) the Japanese poured out of the jungle with bayonets fixed, aching for the opportunity to close with the Americans. The Parachutists opened with a deafening blast of automatic weapons fire that staggered the Japanese assault. … [M]en were hit multiple times and collapsed; others ran a few steps before falling … but some kept advancing despite the rain of steel, throwing grenades and firing on the run. But flesh can only stand so much … and the survivors fled back to the relative safety of the jungle. The Parachutists heaved a sigh of relief. … [A] Japanese banzai attack is a terrifying experience.”
Now and again, a single shot rang out as a Japanese sniper singled out a Marine for special attention but for the most part the battlefield was quiet. Cordite hung in the air, mixed with the cloying smell of blood from the bodies that littered the jungle floor. Blackened circles and shredded undergrowth marked the explosive power of the hand grenades that were traded back and forth. Here and there along the Parachutist line, the battalion surgeon and his corpsmen ministered to the wounded. Several forms lay in that impossibly limp pose that only the dead can assume. Suddenly the silence was broken by the “pre-assault warm up.” The surviving Japanese burst out of the jungle, although not nearly as many as before. It was a half-hearted effort that was almost over before it really began. Lieutenant W. F. Naylor’s 3rd Platoon picked up and moved on the enemy’s right flank in an effort to box them in. Their effort was only partially successful, as some forty Japanese survivors were observed fleeing into the jungle “in a most non-Samurai fashion.” Krulak later wrote, “The outcome appeared to be in question until the Japs destroyed their chances by an uncoordinated banzai charge which was badly cut up by our machine guns. …”