Results
Results can explain a great deal about a policy, even a policy with silences. The success of Bandenbekämpfung as an experiment was accepted by all parties, and Himmler promoted Bach-Zelewski to “Plenipotentiary for Bandenbekämpfung in the East” (Bevollmächtigter für die Bandenbekämpfung im Osten) on October 23. The decision was finalized six days after Hitler concluded the amendments “a” and “b” of Directive 46. Bach-Zelewski also received a large number of Jeckeln’s security assets and forces.99 Himmler authorized Bach-Zelewski to represent the Reichsführer-SS in all matters concerning Bandenbekämpfung. To bolster the inspectorate further it was assigned troops: 13th and 14th SS-Police Regiments, all the Schuma formations from HSSPF Russia-Centre, the 1st SS-Infantry Brigade, and the Danish and Scandinavian collaborators (Freikorps Danmark).100 Bach-Zelewski suggested in his diary that his new status was a demotion to the level of a brigade commander. This was patently untrue. The new position placed him in the key liaison role between the SS and Wehrmacht. His responsibilities also called for the centralization of intelligence and coordination of all security assets applied to security warfare. In terms of actual capability, Bach-Zelewski was on par with an infantry division commander. His functions, however, went far beyond tactical operations with a roving strategic role ranging across the rear areas of the Eastern Front, crossing over both SS and Wehrmacht spheres of authority. His release from administrative and bureaucratic duties was regarded as temporary, and the HSSPF Russia-Centre received another substitute.101 These were subtle moves because Bach-Zelewski, as Himmler’s Trojan horse, was working the scheme toward taking control of security as a whole.
The relationship between the army commanders and the SS in the field remained positive. On October 25, Schenckendorff wrote to Bach-Zelewski regarding the 1st SS Infantry Brigade and the 286th Infantry Division, congratulating them on their efforts during Operation “Karlsbad.” One of Bach-Zelewski’s first political tasks was to meet with Schenckendorff on October 27 and draw up a broad agreement over joint SS and army operations. The next day, Bach-Zelewski visited the chief of staff, Army Group Centre, Generalmajor Wöhler. They arranged a security agreement over respective spheres of operations. Bach-Zelewski generously agreed to assign the 13th SS-Police Regiment to security protection for the construction of the army group’s secondary defense line, an indication of Bach-Zelewski’s power of decision.102 By this time, he was receiving a constant flow of intelligence reports from SD-Oberführer Naumann, in Smolensk, and operational reports from SS-Brigadeführer Kutschera. In the last quarter of 1942, Bandenbekämpfung operations turned toward the Pripyat marshes with the objective of eradicating “bandits,” “bandit suspects,” and Jews.
On October 28, Himmler sent a message to Wolff, the SS liaison officer in Hitler’s headquarters, requesting him to plead with the Führer and Keitel not to transfer his police battalions to the front. He asked Wolff to explain to Hitler that achieving success in Bandenbekämpfung was impossible without the main body of his troops. It was a deliberate “flyer.” He knew well enough that the deteriorating situation around Stalingrad forced their transfer. Himmler could hardly lose face with this sentiment but would gain considerable leverage in the acquisition of resources and authority for the coming year, avoiding the problems that occurred in spring 1942.103 On November 16, Himmler released a communiqué. “In this critical period,” he decreed, “all men must be armed to combat the ‘bandit.’ The harder the fighting now, the sooner the civilian government can begin to work effectively.”104 A month later, he warned Bach-Zelewski that the 1st SS Infantry Brigade was being transferred to the front.105 In the short time available for their use, Bach-Zelewski led the brigade and Schuma formations in short but harrowing actions to prevent the “bandits” from consolidating their camps before winter. Although Bach-Zelewski had lost his strongest body of troops, he maintained aggressive operations against the partisans with a mix of ad hoc units. He soon came to depend on the SS-Kommando Dirlewanger, assisted by two police armored companies and a collection of Schuma battalions.
The effectiveness of the winter operations has received some analysis, but the various sources present mixed opinions. One report intercepted by the British was poignant. The conclusion of Operation “Hamburg” led SS-Brigadeführer Bassewitz-Behr to release a signal to the RSHA on December 20. The signal was addressed to the chief of Order Police and stated that SS-Brigadeführer von Gottberg had led an exemplary operation. The communiqué announced that “in spite of swamplands like primeval forests, the territory was reopened for the German administration after it had been ruled by ‘bandits’ for months.” The results of the operation itemized the total enemy dead of 6,172: 1,674 were “bandits” killed in action, 1,510 were executed suspects, and 2,988 were “bandit sympathizers,” also executed. Ten well-constructed camps were also destroyed, one with the capacity of one thousand men, with modern installations. Large amounts of booty were collected, including four tanks, artillery pieces, and guns. “A great quantity of automatic and no-automatic weapons,” Bassewitz-Behr added, “as well as large quantities of artillery and infantry ammunition, which were destroyed there and then, as it is not possible at the moment to get them out of the swamps.” He concluded the communiqué with the news that seven German sergeants had been killed and seventeen were wounded (seven police officers) and that Gottberg and Bach-Zelewski received the clasp of the Iron Cross (Second Class). 106
Meanwhile the Wehrmacht was not complacent during this period. On August 26, OKW ordered all military formations involved in combating the bands to return reports biased toward reconnaissance, intelligence, tactics, and propaganda. The reports also included the treatment of captives, the control of large areas, and the use of local defense and collaboration units for Bandenbekämpfung. The sum of these reports indicated to OKW the soundness of Directive 46 and the comprehensive treatment of civilians. The outcome led to the “directive for combating banditry in the east” (Kampfanweisung für die Bandenbekämpfung im Osten), issued in November.107 These instructions continued to preach the execution of partisans as “bandits” and “bandit suspects,” during fighting or in-flight. “Bandit deserters” were treated honorably as prisoners of war, while captured bandits who could prove they were press-ganged into joining the band were sent to hard labor camps. Villages found guilty of aiding the bands were subject to collective reprisals, ranging from increased quotas to total destruction through burning.108
On December 1, a conference between Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl confirmed the general approval for Bandenbekämpfung. Keitel initiated discussion on the security issue because OKW was on the point of issuing yet more instructions. Hitler immediately rose to the theme claiming to encourage those who succeeded through brutal means in eradicating the “bandits.” He recalled the Zabern Incident (1913) to explain the ineffectual methods adopted in the past to deal with insurrection and insurgency. Hitler explained that in the interwar years, he had observed how the “red bastards” had placed children at the head of their march through Chemnitz in order to dissuade their opponents from attacking. Faced with similar circumstances, an officer, he explained, must be prepared to kill women and children to eradicate the greater menace. Hitler accepted that burning down a house with innocents inside was a military necessity, while Jodl appeared to consider hanging, drawing, and quartering as permissible punishments. Indeed, his only limitation, largely in agreement with Himmler, was to prevent unnecessary after-action measures frightening the populace into supporting the “bandits” en masse. Referring to SS methods, Hitler believed they had more experience in Bandenbekämpfung and were wrongly accused of being brutal. Jodl replied that they only applied the stick-and-carrot, like all forces. Keitel interjected to add that there had been good cooperation between the SS and troops under Bach-Zelewski.109
On December 16, Keitel issued the last security order for the year to all commands on behalf of Hitler. It warned that “bandits” fought as “communist-trained
fanatics who do not hesitate to commit any atrocity.” He added that Hitler had received reports that following Bandenbekämpfung operations some officers had been charged with misconduct for extreme measures. It was time “to be or not to be” (sein oder nicht sein) and for measures beyond gentlemanly conduct or the Geneva Convention. Consequently, Keitel believed the conflict in the east and the Balkans was a disease (Pest) that demanded brutal measures because of the shortage of forces. The troops were granted the right to use all measures, even against women and children, if it led to success. Any attempt to apply consideration for people in these operations was regarded as a crime against the German people and soldiery. The applications of the Kampfanweisung für die Bandenbekämpfung im Osten was to be carried out without retribution or restitution against the troops. In section 2 of the order, Keitel stated that “no German[s] employed in Bandenbekämpfung can be made responsible for their actions before the courts.” All officers and commanders of troops had to be made aware of the order and military judge advocates informed that no sentences against soldiers would be confirmed.110 This was another blow against Schenckendorff’s shrinking authority after he had ordered the arrest of soldiers following an incident in March 1942: “A crowd of soldiers burst into the guards’ quarters and lynched four Russian civilians…. After prolonged beating with whips the Russians were soaked in petrol and set alight. An officer, a captain, who was present at the lynching calmly looked on at the activities of the soldiers.”111
In December 1941, Himmler’s diary confirmed the combination of a policy for the extermination of Jews and partisans. This was not fully realized until the Wannsee protocol was enacted in January 1942 and the subsequent change in wartime conditions following the rise of Tito and the death of Heydrich. The results from the first phase of Bandenbekämpfung highlighted the continuing mass extermination of Jews alongside the rapidly increasing killing of “bandits” and their supporters. In Himmler’s report 51a, passed to Hitler on December 29, the figures present the stark reality behind Prützmann’s activities (Table 3.1).112 It is immediately apparent from the figures that the number of Jews executed outweighed the number of all other groups executed. The number of “bandits” executed after action was far greater than the number of those killed in action. The German and collaborator casualty figures prove the stark imbalance. In January 1943, Daluege itemized the total police casualties for the Order Police in 1942 from all causes as 5,012 dead, a further 9,389 wounded, and 251 believed to be held as prisoners of war.113
Table 3.1: Report 51a, December 1942
Bach-Zelewski’s personal record, as Bevollmächtigter für Bandenbekämpfung, calculated from his diary, confirmed the stark imbalance of casualty figures between Germans and “bandits” (Table 3.2). The accuracy of Bach-Zelewski’s figures are also questionable. We know from other sources that Gottberg recorded 1,826 Jews killed during “Nuernberg” but did not include the number burnt alive in buildings. For “Hornung,” Gottberg recorded 3,300 Jews killed, and while Bach-Zelewski was again serving at the front, he accounted for 2,958 Jews killed during “Hamburg” (December 1942).114 As Hitler’s war and Bandenbekämpfung entered the final stages, the results from operations aided continuous criminal warfare begun in 1939 by becoming a measure of loyalty to Hitler and proof of conformity to Nazi policy.
Table 3.2: Bach-Zelewski’s record as Bevollmächtigter für Bandenbekämpfung
PART TWO
BANDENBEKÄMPFUNG
4
BANDENBEKÄMPFUNG
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
On September 3, 1947, a two-page document titled “Bandit Fight and the Security Situation” (Bandenkampf- und Sicherheitslage) was retrieved by U.S. war crimes investigators from among the captured collection of Himmler’s personal papers. A retrieval page, taking the document’s place, recorded “Bandenbekämpfung N331.” The two pages were returned on November 13, 1947, the marker remained in place, and there were no further proceedings.1 The document was a two-page office memorandum drafted and filed by Himmler at the KSRFSS on June 28, 1943. 2 It recorded the outcome of a meeting held on June 19, 1943, between Heinrich Himmler and Adolf Hitler. The venue was Hitler’s idyllic retreat of the Obersalzberg, deep in the Bavarian mountains. The document was cited by Professors Kershaw and Fleming, although they overlooked the wider implications of the memo and as a consequence it has retained its secrets for more than sixty years.3 This document represented the formulation of a Nazi security policy, prosecuted through the Bandenbekämpfung operational concept, which integrated exterminating Jews with eradicating insurgency.
The memo was broken into two sections. In the first, Himmler set the scene confirming he had presented Hitler with a batch of radio signals received from General Governor Hans Frank (General Government of Poland) on June 18, Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart (Holland) on June 18, and Dr. Friedrich Rainer, Gauleiter Carinthia (Kärnten), on June 17. All referred to the “bandit situation” (Bandenverhältnisse) in Poland, Russia, and an area covering Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia (known as the Oberkrain). Himmler also showed Hitler a copy of his June 11 order that was issued for liquidating Jewish ghettos in the east. Finally, he handed Hitler a “bandit map” (Bandenkarte) illustrating the “bandit” situation in the General Government as of May 31, 1943. Himmler offered Hitler full and personal responsibility for failing to eradicate the “bandits” over the previous winter, adding that it was a difficult situation worsened by the withdrawal of his forces to plug the gaps at the front. He made a promise to Hitler: if he was allowed to keep the forces presently under his command (including the SS-Cavalry Division, the 1st SS Infantry Brigade, and numerous police formations), as well as return police formations serving in the army’s security divisions, he would resolve the “bandit” situation within the year and completely pacify the areas presently experiencing “banditry.”
The second section of the memorandum listed seven decisions made by Hitler that Himmler recorded as personal commands:
1. The bandit-fight [Bandenkämpf] remained the business of the Reichsführer-SS, the SS and police.
2. He [Hitler] clearly confirmed that no reproach is held against the SS and police because of the growing bandit danger after the transfer of forces to the front.
3. He [Hitler] promised to check if the two police regiments, Griese [based in Marseilles] and Franz [based in Finland], could be returned to us.
4. My order of June 11, 1943, was completely correct and gave the order to inform the General-Governor it will remain in force.
5. The Führer declared, after my report, that the evacuation of the Jews, despite the unrest that would thereby still arise in the next 3 to 4 months, was to be radically carried out and had to be seen through.
6. The Führer stated clearly that Bandenbekämpfung and questions of security were solely the matter and authority of the Reichsführer-SS, even in the General-Government.
7. The Führer declined all suggestions to raise Polish formations, following the Katyn propaganda, as some on the German side have suggested. The formation of Galician units from the area of Galician White Ruthenia is acceptable as this had been part of Austria over the last 150 years.4
There were many interests at play in this memorandum, while its style reflected the path taken by the Nazi regime since January 1943. The individual points isolate how important Bandenbekämpfung had become to Himmler. They connect Bandenbekämpfung with the Holocaust. These simple notes also show how a vague agreement could be binding and exploited by one clique of Hitler’s lieutenants against another. However, of particular interest is the background information. This provides further clues of how Bandenbekämpfung policy was formulated, connecting the “bandit situation” in the east to the rest of Europe. Whether the dates of the radio signals were deliberately timed to arrive with Himmler, they reveal how he exploited their contents with Hitler. They also indicate the initial moves in a power play as opportunities were presented. Hans Frank (although ensconced in th
e General Government—an area subject to intense Nazi administration) was locked in a losing battle with Himmler. Analysis of Bandenbekämpfung conducted in Poland is examined in chapter 8. Regarding Dr. Rainer, who was already in place in southern Europe, and Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who probably wished to return to the region, the situation was less clear. That region was in a state of flux made more uncertain following the collapse of Axis forces in North Africa. The impact of Bandenbekämpfung on western and southern Europe is the subject of chapter 9. Himmler’s scene setting also alluded to a “bandit map,” which was a lot more important than might appear and is a central theme of chapter 5. That leaves the question of responsibility and development of Bandenbekämpfung as an operational concept, which is examined in this chapter.
Total War and Fortress Europe
The events leading to Himmler’s memorandum began in January 1943 at a time when the malaise of defeat descended over Germany as pressure mounted from all fronts. Stalingrad caught everyone’s attention, and the atmosphere elicited confusion and petulance from Nazi leaders. Hermann Göring’s panegyric for the enfeebled soldiers of the shattered 6th Army was the army’s “last rites,” given during its final death throes. Defeat at Stalingrad coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Nazis’ coming to power. Hitler took the opportunity to make a proclamation that reinforced his mission for Germany. He reminded the public of what victory would bring. He reassured the people that their eternal struggle, at least since 1933, had been to build a strong nation, which Germany was. Hitler reiterated that the Jews, the supreme enemy of the state, had been the reason for Germany’s downfall in 1918. He comforted the rest of the German people with a promise that this war “would see the final end of Jewry … no longer would nations be infected by its curse.” Hitler dismissed his earlier military victories as insignificant in this struggle against Bolshevism. The war against Russia had been Germany’s, he confessed, but circumstances had transformed it into a European struggle against Bolshevism. Germany, he declared, was the bulwark against the Mongol horde and all that stood between European culture and barbarism. Victory, he explained, would not hail the victor, but the victorious survivors would dictate the future.5 Hitler’s grand scheme for Lebensraum, as envisaged in Mein Kampf, was derailed by Stalingrad, and many scholars have argued Hitler’s Weltanschauung from this point turned self-destructive.
Hitler's Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe Page 16