Individually, the three HSSPF in Russia led large formations, but their respective organizational structures were very different. The HSSPF Russia-North, under SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich Jeckeln, organized a highly regimented structure. The total forces under Jeckeln’s command, in October 1942, were 4,428 Germans and 55,562 Schutzmannschaft, of whom 23,758 were serving with Schuma battalions.33 HSSPF Russia-South came under the command of SS-Obergruppenführer Hans-Adolf Prützmann and was a particularly large region. The establishment was organized bureaucratically but suffered under continual border changes. Prützmann’s forces in November 1942, mustered 4,228 German police troops and 15,665 Ukrainian Schuma forces in battalions and regiments; there were a further 5,966 German gendarmerie and 55,094 Ukrainian Hilfspolizei and part-time guards.34 Eventually, this region raised more than sixty Schuma battalions of at least thirty thousand men, and by July 1943, it commanded thirty-five thousand German police troops. The HSSPF Russia-Centre, the most unstable organization, one that lagged behind other SS security structures, turned out to be the most effective model of Bandenbekämpfung. This region had suffered the most war damage, killing, and exploitation, as Christian Gerlach revealed.35
Table 5.1: Prützmann’s Formations
Himmler’s September order stipulated that each HSSPF, in an area designated a Bandenkampfgebiet, was to raise a Kampfgruppe and a Bandenstab. Prützmann issued an example of the internal instructions on the formation of a Bandenstab. His instructions itemized seven points that opened with his justification for doing something this time under Directive 46, the Kampfanweisung of November 11, 1942, and Himmler’s orders. In the second and third points, Prützmann’s appraisal was for the staff to conduct a thorough analysis of “bandit” combat. The staffs were to introduce protocols for analyses, preparations, plans, and command chains. This “leadership staff” was to enhance the SS-Police command system. In point 4, Prützmann listed ten officers and their jobs. The top three positions followed the known pattern of SS and police staffing: Oberstleutnant der Polizei Engelhaupt was chief of staff, SS-Obersturmführer Schmitz was the Ic, and the Ia was Hauptmann der Polizei Schaufler. There were liaison officers to HSSPF Northeast: Reichskommissar Koch, the Wehrmacht commander in the Ukraine to HSSPF Russia-Centre, and an unnamed officer from the Wehrmacht Ukraine command staff. The next three points explained that assistants would be assigned to field operations located from among available police troops. Prützmann ordered that cooperation with the HSSPF Russia-Centre be conducted without complications. He also explained that Bomhard, the former chief of staff of the Order Police, was assigned to undertake Bandenbekämpfung operations.36
Central and Technical Formations
Signals officers from the army, the SS, the railways, the Luftwaffe, and civilian authorities achieved the highest form of cooperation. After the war, while under interrogation, Karl Wolff was questioned regarding how the SS officers involved in extermination received their orders. His response was, “Whatever these persons had to do with each other was always taken care of by telephone.”37 Through the employment of liaison officers and the telecommunications network, Himmler was able to control his organization very effectively. The British made a study of this system after the war.38 In 1938, the police constructed an integrated telegraph and radio network. The majority of its operators were women under the command of an inspector-grade police officer.39 The commander of signals was Generalmajor der Polizei Robert Schlake, who also held the rank of SS-Standartenführer. By June 1941, this network had expanded into a complex structure finally completed in May 1942.40 The network depended on large transmitters of 20 kilowatts, located in Berlin. Each regional center had a radio station (Funkstelle) that used an 800-watt machine and 5-kilowatt machines with ranges of up to 1,000 kilometers. The local stations (Leitfunkstellen) used 100-watt transmitters with ranges of up to 100 to 150 kilometers. The Leitfunkstellen and the Funkstellen could cross-communicate within a region. As telephone cables came increasingly under attack through bombing or the partisans, the radio transmitters were sometimes the only form of telecommunications. The radios used both long-and short-wave frequencies, and in the field, officers carried short-wave radio sets, known as tank sets (Panzergeräte). The army supplied 10- to 20-watt-powered, voice-operated sets, requiring the minimum of training and pedal-power. The Water Police (Wasserschutzpolizei) had special 15-watt sets built into their patrol boats. Mobile communications were organized into companies for battalions and battalions for regiments. The police used radio vans (Funkwagen), which were originally designed for emergencies in the cities but which proved valuable in field operations. The motorized gendarmerie used voice-operated sets with a range of up to 150 kilometers. Eventually, the SS-Police regiments, formed from 1942, received a signals company of sixty to seventy men, deployed in close proximity to the commander and staff.41
The armored trains (Panzerzug) came within the military railway system, under the chief of transportation, and were regarded as critical in Bandenbekämpfung with the emphasis on railway security. The railways formed a unique role within German military traditions: they were the basis of the Etappe system and the single feature of occupation from 1871 to 1945. There were eighty-five armored trains in one configuration or another, with three regimental staffs and a headquarters command.42 The armored trains were employed in large operations and in independent combat missions within enemy territory, for artillery support and participation in rapid-reaction operations requiring armored cars, an infantry platoon, mortars, and the engineer soldiers.43 They were deployed to prevent partisans from escaping across railway lines. The radio and signals equipment made armored trains particularly suited for headquarters functions and for serving as the command staff in large operations. They also carried out small and independent security sweeps. The Germans believed they were effective in keeping “bandits” in a permanent state of “nervousness” through their reconnaissance and ambush patrols. Their duties included convoy guard, replacing crews in strongpoints, evacuating wounded, aiding damaged trains, bringing medical assistance, relieving stations under attack, securing construction sites and labor, and distributing propaganda material along the line.
During the July 16, 1941, meeting discussed in chapter 2, Göring suggested the Junkers JU52 transport planes could be configured as bombers to attack the partisans, just as they had been in Spain. The Luftwaffe ground attack airplanes were the Henschel HS126, Junkers JU87, and the Henschel HS129. These airplanes achieved a fearsome reputation for inflicting destruction and panicking civilian refugees. The most important airplane to Bandenbekämpfung was the close liaison Fieseler Fi156, designated Storch (Stork). Designed in 1935, the Storch first saw operational service with the Legion Kondor in Spain. William Green described the special features of this monoplane, which included its high degree of cockpit visibility and the special undercarriage to absorb the shock of short stretch landings from “high vertical descent rates.”44 The few Luftwaffe records to survive the war indicate that the 54th Fighter Group flew round-the-clock missions on the Eastern Front, against partisans. In one report from July 8, 1942, the flyers in fighter-bombers were ordered to angle their bombing precisely. The type of bombs included the single 50- and 10-kilogram fragmentation antipersonnel bombs (Splitterbomben).45
The Luftwaffe conducted interdiction, strafing, and close air support and also supplied signals and communications monitoring capabilities. Bombing was recommended against fortified strongpoints and camps and to breakup strong concentrations of partisans (Bandenansammlungen). In cases in which the “bandits” had only weak anti-aircraft capability, the air force flew strafing attacks against “living targets” (lebende Ziele). Dropping propaganda material by air was assumed the best means for turning the population against the bands. All aircrew were instructed to fly with hand weapons to help evade capture and almost certain execution in case of being shot down. Employing parachute troops or air landing forces to encircle the “bandits” or box them in wa
s accepted in special cases.46
Cooperation between ground and air forces was also heavily emphasized in the Bandenbekämpfung regulations of 1944. Points 129–139 explained close support from the air force. The physical use of air assets in security operations has received little attention in the copious histories of the Luftwaffe.47 The guidelines for liaison between ground troops and the air force in Bandenbekämpfung were collected in instructional pamphlets titled “Cooperation Air Force-Army on the Battlefield” (Zusammenarbeit Luftwaffe-Heer auf dem Gefechtsfeld). Gerhard Weinberg identified the influence of the Luftwaffe in operations and, in particular, interdiction raids against the bands.48 For the Luftwaffe, rapidly free-falling into decline, the introduction of Directive 46 was opportune.49 Tactical air support, in the form of ground-to-air liaison, had been fundamental to mechanized Cannae.50 German prowess in tactical operations and especially the coordination of combined arms were refined during the Spanish civil war. The German expeditionary force, the Legion Kondor, was an integrated Kampfgruppe of bomber squadrons, armored units, and signals troops.51 In operational methods, air superiority was regarded as a prerequisite for close liaison operations. The Germans facilitated air-to-ground communications allowing instructions to pass between ground troops and fliers. Luftwaffe liaison officers took to the air to coordinate the signals and strike missions. They mapped and identified the partisans, marked them with colored flares or smoke markers, and directed air strikes.
Airpower granted the SS-Police an advanced capability originally explored in Prussia through the Inspectorate of Flying Troops (Inspektion der Fliegertruppen), in August 1919. The Prussian police flying squadron (Polizeifliegerstaffeln) began operations with 11 officers, and 106 NCOs and men, and 27 airplanes. They were based in Berlin with outposts in Königsberg, Brieg, Paderborn, and Gotha. The Security Police formed detachments and from their coastline bases operated flying boats. The mission of the Air Police (Luftpolizei) was to conduct reconnaissance patrols over the communications network, to participate in combat missions providing morale for the police forces on the ground, to undertake propaganda missions (leafleting, etc.), and to coordinate liaison between different units during an operation. It also worked for the criminal police and the marine police in combating smuggling, solving serious cases of criminal banditry, and hunting escaped prisoners and murderers. In 1920, this service briefly expanded, as was recorded in the diary of Polizei-Hauptmann Erhard Milch, later secretary of state and Luftwaffe field marshal.52 However, the Allies imposed the Versailles restrictions on the police squadron and forced its disbandment. The police attempted to camouflage the aircraft across Germany. The force survived in a piecemeal format through civilian airplanes until Daluege resurrected the squadron. In 1941, the senior SS-Police commanders used light airplanes to increase their operational capability during Operation “Barbarossa.”
In August 1942, discussions were initiated between Himmler and Göring over the centralization of all aircraft under the Luftwaffe, following a rationalization proposal by Unruh. In recompense, Göring offered Himmler support for new aviation missions. This proved to be a weak promise; Himmler was able to acquire a new Fieseler Storch for the new HSSPF Caucasus, but when he requested a Junkers JU52 for flying in poor weather, Göring refused because of the shortages. Only travel space on an airplane could be guaranteed.53 A decoded message from August 1942 confirmed that the 7th Special Flying Group (Fliegergruppe z.b.V. 7) was transferred to the Luftwaffe. The known structure of the 7th Special Flying Group was its headquarters in East Prussia in Marienwerder (Malbork: Poland) and squadrons (Staffeln) dispersed to Cracow, Riga, Minsk, Radzwillow, Agram, Ljubljana, Cottbus, and Oslo. Little is known of its history although considerable reference to its operations can be found in police radio signals intercepted by the British. 54
The orders for the subordination and operations of the 7th Special Flying Group were issued by Himmler in September 1943. Himmler stated that Bandenbekämpfung and the enlargement of his command into the south and southeast led him to issue these orders. The 7th Special Flying Group came under his direct command; its commander joined his staff. It had certain prescribed objectives to fulfill. The subordination of the flying group to an HSSPF during a reconnaissance or combat operation depended on the Ch.BKV. The concentration of several squadrons within a single operation also depended on the Ch.BKV. Larger transport and reconnaissance planes were set aside for use by main offices and senior commanders. One courier plane was kept at the Lötzen headquarters of the KSRFSS at all times. Himmler’s control over the use of the planes was an attempt to restrict them from private use in order to conserve fuel. On the fifth day of each month, the commander of the flying group was to submit a complete log of flights, with details, to the KSRFSS. The flying group was reorganized to maintain its capacity in Bandenbekämpfung, hence the expansion of squadrons in the east and southeast of Europe.55
The offices of the RFSS, the CdO, the CdS, and the Ch.BKV each received a Junkers JU52. Each HSSPF was assigned a liaison plane, Storch, while each BdS and BdO within that command shared a Storch. The 7th Special Flying Group eventually moved to Strausberg near Berlin, where the senior’s aircraft were maintained and the special duties planes working out of Lötzen (Fi156) were controlled, under the orders of the central offices (four planes, including the FW58) and for training purposes (three Fi156). Some areas like HSSPF Russia-Centre and the other Russian based HSSPFs received an FW58 utility airplane, which could be employed in reconnaissance as well as bombing strikes. The first squadron was based in Kraków, Poland, with eight airplanes; the second squadron was based in Riga, with seven aircraft; the 3rd Staffel was based in Minsk with thirteen aircraft. One airplane (Hs126) was a glider tug for covert operations. Three FW189 were used for reconnaissance and bombing, and five Fi156 were assigned to Bandenbekämpfung. The 4th Staffel was based in Rovno with fifteen airplanes.56 The expected order of battle for the 7th Special Flying Group was to raise its firepower and standardize the machines. The Staffel were renumbered and were to carry nine airplanes. The 8th Staffel (Minsk) received ten JU87 Stuka airplanes with long towing cables for pulling DFS 230 gliders.57
Himmler lost control of the fleet in May 1944 and was obliged to issue further instructions on the use of aircraft. He stated that Göring had ordered a reduction in air operations and that this had been communicated to the HSSPFs. He then pointed out that the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) had placed checks on fuel usage. He demanded that airplanes be used only in Bandenbekämpfung. Alternatives of motor and railway transportation were to replace the use of airplanes. All flights were to be monitored and examined by Luftwaffe personnel. The control of air missions was confined to the decision of the 7th Special Flying Group’s commander.58
Covert operations were not new to the SS. In August 1939, they staged a Polish attack against the Gleiwitz radio station before the invasion of Poland.59 In 1943, SS-Gruppenführer Walter Schellenberg was typical of the youthful, intelligent, and highly motivated SD officers. He came under Heydrich’s influence and became the “young Turk” of the SS intelligence faction. He was party to the Heydrich-Wagner agreement that was central to the illegal “Barbarossa” directives. He formed Operation “Zeppelin” (UZ) as a covert RSHA counterintelligence initiative to infiltrate trusties behind Russian lines and within the bands. The British learned all about UZ operations and their commander never realized their secrecy was breached. Alan Bullock once wrote of The Schellenberg Memoirs (1956) that, if nothing else, it made a good spy story. Recently, the subject was raised in an article by Perry Biddiscombe focusing on the clandestine activities of spying and sabotage missions.60 Following the assassination of Heydrich, Schellenberg appears to have stayed in contact with Himmler, awaiting a new boss. Kaltenbrunner proved a disappointment, and Schellenberg had a rocky relationship with him. Kaltenbrunner encouraged Skorzeny to undermine and irritate the upstart intelligence officer at every opportunity. In the last days of the war, Kaltenbrunner succeeded in
removing Schellenberg from office, but it was a hollow victory. Schellenberg and other SD evidence presented at Nuremberg contributed to Kaltenbrunner’s sentence and execution for war crimes.61
Bach-Zelewski and Schellenberg formed a working relationship and met on several occasions. According to Bach-Zelewski’s diary, they first met on November 25, 1942, to discuss the subject of trusties.62 From March 1942, UZ came to play a significant part in the counter-espionage activities of Bandenbekämpfung. The plan behind Zeppelin was to place German agents who were natives in the partisan bands. Each HSSPF in Russia received a detachment of UZ. They worked closely with the Luftwaffe pilots who flew them into drop zones behind the Red Army lines.63 UZ operations fell between the formation of yet another private army and genuine counterintelligence work. This is confirmed by the rather strange case of the Druzhina I and Druzhina II. The former was a group of former Red Army POWs, trusted to return, and employed in Bandenbekämpfung operations within the German rear area. The latter was a group trusted to conduct subversion operations behind the Russian lines. Colonel Rodionov (known as “Gil”) commanded Druzhina I, which gradually grew to battalion size. Deployed under HSSPF Russia-Centre, the formation joined Gottberg’s order of battle. In the summer of 1943, they turned on their erstwhile SS comrades, killing more than sixty before deserting back to the Soviets.64 On June 8, 1943, British codebreakers intercepted an SD signal: “Von dem Bach is informed by RSHA Amt A that the Russian officers company of UZ, Amt VI C Z with 125 Russian officers is ready to set out. Von dem Bach is to inform them of their destination.”65 That same month, Rodionov and Gottberg held further discussion in Berlin, a few days after Bach-Zelewski’s promotion. They met on August 21, 1943, to discuss large-scale operations behind Russian front lines.
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