In a series of documents from the surviving police files, it seems a serious proposal was being made to build a specialist Bandenbekämpfung school within Germany. Being within Reich borders, this meant the SS-Police were required to seek permission from other state authorities. In 1944, the SS wanted a purpose-built exercise ground for Bandenbekämpfung training. In November, the SS identified the Tucheler Heide as suitable. The Order Police officially contacted the State Forestry Service (Reichsforstamt) to landscape a Bandenkampfschule in the forest.99 The officer charged with responsibility to see the job through was Oberst der Schutzpolizei Eggebrecht, who wrote to Oberforstmeister von Hammerstein on behalf of Himmler to request the building of the Bandenkampfschule. The request required that the school be camouflaged and secluded within the forest and that earth bunkers and support shelters be constructed around the site. The construction involved cutting the trees from the forest, and the police were required to ask for permission to proceed from the Reichsforstamt. The reply was favorable and included the right to cut down trees, but the Reichsforstamt demanded payment of rent for the land and a formal contract of use. The file remained open until February 1, 1945, without any final decision recorded.100 The teaching programs for Bandenbekämpfung continued until March 1945.
Table 6.1: The Organization of the Bandenschule (1944)
SS-Waldlager Bobruisk
In March 1943, the Soviets launched a campaign since called the “War of the Rails.” In March, “bandits” undertook 404 attacks on the railways and blew up the Desna bridges, cutting the line between Gomel and Bryansk.101 In August, a band attacked the Minsk–Bobruisk railway line. The commander of Einsatzkommando Tatarka, with seven volunteers from an army security detachment (Wehrmachtsstosstrupp), undertook an ad hoc preventative action against the band. According to the 608th Security Regiment’s after-action report, the SS were praised for their actions in preventing serious destruction for the loss of two wounded. During the early days of August, the Bobruisk–Minsk railway line was the scene of further partisan attacks. Reports from trusties indicated that explosives specialists had been gathering in the area. On August 8–9, 1943, Jagdkommando Wald set ambush positions, fought off a strong band, and killed fifteen to twenty “bandits” at the cost of two SS troopers killed. The SS captured one partisan. Through interrogation, they discovered he had moved into the area only that evening to blow up the railway line. According to Pannier, the railway line was closed for months by “bandits,” but through his actions, it was reopened. Operations in the area included the protection of the harvests, maintaining the free access of the railways and the policing of local industries. To these ends, Pannier reported that he had conducted surgical actions against the “bandits” and cleansed the bandenverseuchtes Gebiet. Pannier’s September 1943 report recorded numerous local Bandenbekämpfung operations arising from securing and protecting the harvest in his area of Bobruisk. All the available troops had been deployed for the protection of the harvest.102 In his general appraisal of the situation, Pannier indicated that Stalin had ordered an increased level of “bandit” activity in his area. The “bandits” were using communications to coordinate their actions, part of the centralization of the bands, into brigades with liaison staff working directly under orders from Moscow. The range of “bandit” actions included random machine-gun fire, grenades, surprise attacks, laying mines, and the destruction of railways or extensive use of road blocks sometimes more than 1 kilometer long. Pannier mentioned with some concern that the “bandits” no longer fled from a fight but were now looking for a face-to-face battle. His losses were rising but not enough to prevent the completion of his tasks.
The operational priorities of the harvest, local defense against insurgency and running the sub-camps, influenced the training schedule. The 3rd Company was assigned harvest security duties, while another company served in the complex defense lines and another protected the camps. The men on these duties had not received general training, but the companies on guard duty received further individual training in weapons handling, observation, and information gathering, conducted in an ad hoc manner. The conclusion Pannier came to was that even the smallest amount of training had raised the men’s “bravery” in combat. The proximity to the bands had raised the level of seriousness of the training exercises. According to Pannier, the troops had responded to the challenge; the 6th Company’s performance, in particular, raised the expectations of becoming a solid formation. Pannier’s final assessment of the men was 10 percent good, 70 percent mediocre, and 20 percent useless, stated in the most polite terms.103
On August 12, 1943, an Einsatzkommando from the central strongpoint of SS-Waldlager Bobruisk conducted a reconnaissance in the vicinity. In the village of Tschikili, they met the command squadron of a band and, after a brief fight, killed five “bandits,” one of whom was Senior Lieutenant Pavlo, a scout liaison officer, who had been carrying important papers. The papers included a list of his agents in Bobruisk who were to be arrested. Pavlo had been ordered to employ them in raising a new brigade. The papers also indicated that the bands were being supported by regular groups (Stammannschaft) of parachutists under a Major Scharki. On August 14, 1943, Einsatzkommando Bobruisk spent the day removing roadblocks along the route from Makarovichi to Kozlovichi. On the edge of a wood near Makarovichi, the Einsatzkommando stumbled across five mounted “bandits” in full Red Army uniform. This opened an attack on the village that was met with strong opposition. The bands brought up artillery and fired randomly into the Einsatzkommando. Eventually, after suppressing a heavy machine gun, the area was cleansed (gesäubert), and the Einsatzkommando moved to Tschikili. The band suffered forty dead and wounded, and the SS had three slightly wounded by a mine explosion that occurred when they were removing a roadblock.104
The first section Pannier referenced as falling under the command was the territory called Bandengebiet South Bobruisk. This was a target for concentrated counter-force. On August 18, the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th companies of the SS-Jäger Battalion were deployed to the area Glusk-Kasarichi-Barbarov-Kletno southeast of Bobruisk to secure the harvest. Immediately after their arrival, the “gangs” opened a counter-offensive with all their force. After extensive artillery fire on August 24–25, the “gangs” attacked in several places where the 2nd and 3rd companies were deployed. The “bandits” attacked with two companies, supported by machine guns and tanks. The attack on the 2nd Company was conducted by two tanks and men dressed partially in Red Army uniforms. The 3rd Company managed to force the enemy to stop and retire. They retired from the close-quarter antitank action (Panzernahbekämpfung); this led the 3rd Company, joined by the 2nd Company, to counter-attack, sending the gangs in a southwesterly direction. The “bandits” tried to build a fire and retreat, but caught in a pincer (zangenartige) movement, they fled. The counter-attack reached a hamlet 500 meters from Kasarichi and stopped at an old factory. The casualties had included three German wounded, one severely, for six “bandits” dead and six wounded. The companies captured various weapons and documents.105
The Pannier report also recorded the activities of the SS-Jagdkommando deployed from the Waldlager. They were operating 30 miles east of Bobruisk near the town of Rogachev. An incident, caused by four “bandits” who tripped an alarm at a static security position in the village of Peseva, had flared on August 9, 1943. The “bandits” tried to flee, but one was shot and the Germans captured one of their horses. On the evening August 17–18, the Jagdkommando ambushed what they described as a “bandit” sabotage team leading a Panje wagon. From the ensuing melee, three “bandits” were killed and their equipment was secured, but no explosives were found. Some time later, SS troopers dug out explosives from around the railway line near Kiselevichi. A couple of days later, an SS patrolman (Aussenstreife) was shot and killed in Bobruisk.106 A hunt by the 6th Company of the SS-Jäger Battalion, in the area of Viachovo-Sees located a “bandit” camp. The local collaboration police (Ordnungsdienst Teluscha) had tipped them of
f. The “bandits” retreated under the pressure of SS firepower, which Pannier attributed to their application of advanced training in combat firing.107 On August 18, Jagdkommando Wald was assigned to a harvest security action (Erntesicherungsaktion) in the area of Glusha. Their presence was enough to ward off the bands and collection led to the transportation of twenty-five tons of plundered foodstuffs.
To deny the Germans the harvest, the “bandits” had attacked the roads to the collection centers and the men handling the collection. The Soviets had increasingly employed parachutists; they were explosives experts intent on blowing up the railways around the whole area of Bobruisk.108 The securing of the harvest had taken place inside the band-infected area and thus large quantities of foodstuffs had been denied them. Pannier believed this would force the bands to rely on air supply from Moscow, which could be intercepted. His combating-bands section of the report opened with a summary of the attacks by “bandits” on supply and transportation. They were recorded as using large amounts of explosives to blow up the railway; then they attacked key strongpoints with machine-gun fire and grenades. This slowed down traffic significantly for several days.
Pannier’s August report also mentioned Bandenbekämpfung in yet another area, north of Osipovichi, which also concerned the harvest-security action. On August 7, the chief of the Ordnungsdienst in Lapichi requested assistance, and a section from 4th Company, SS-Jäger Battalion, under the command of SS-Hauptsturmführer Reigl, formed up to counter-attack. The detachment chased a band to Pogoreloe, capturing a “bandit” bakery and then proceeded to cleanse the village. The villagers said the “bandits,” including the leader, a man called Vorobev, were suffering. Seven days later, on August 14, a scout troop (Spähtrupp) advanced toward Greblia, whereupon the “bandits” fled in a northeasterly direction, the Germans following them. Suddenly the band counter-attacked with more than two hundred “bandits,” which forced the SS-Jäger Battalion to move back into Greblia, allegedly to cleanse the village. During the firing of the village, explosions were recorded as supposed bandit weapon stores blew up. Twenty bandits were counted dead, but it was known at the time that their losses were greater. The SS suffered one missing, a trooper set upon by eight bandits and presumed dead, and four wounded. On August 31, the Ernteeinsatzkommando of the 4th Company of the SS-Jäger Battalion moved on to the neighboring village of Gomanovka, where they came up against strong “bandit” action. Their own losses included four dead and ten wounded; the losses of the “bandits” were unknown.
According to Pannier’s report, operations around Brosha began on August 19–20, 1943, when the strongpoint Bobruisk initiated an action for the rounding up of cattle and agricultural products. This led to a series of firefights near Chikili, which had become the center of band activity, although the “bandits” suffered six wounded. Between August 23 and August 27, the Ernteerfassungsaktion continued in the area of Nazdane. This move had allegedly taken the “bandits” by surprise because there had been no interference in the collection process.109 The gangs attempted to blow up the rails preventing the foodstuff from being transported out, but that failed. They then tried to machine-gun down telephone masts on August 30, hoping to cut German communications. Following an air reconnaissance of the area, the SS instigated a series of bombing decapitation flights. Bandenbekämpfung operations in Brosha caused one band forty dead and wounded, while the SS suffered three slightly injured owing to a mine being removed from a roadblock. On August 24, six airplanes carrying 3,000 kilograms of incendiary bombs and 6,000 kilograms of explosives in an attempt to destroy the headquarters of the brigades bombed the villages of Podgusty-Selenkovichi and Subarevichi. Four days later, Podgusty was attacked with twelve bombs, a combined weight of 1,400 kilograms. On August 31, the village of Berkov was attacked as a probable brigade headquarters with 500 kilograms of explosive bombs.110
On August 26, the bands attacked again, this time the Germans held them with well-placed fires. Three days later, elements of the 2nd and 3rd companies, under SS-Untersturmführers Rothmayer and Hassenkamp, approached the village of Zamostosche, which was heavily defended by “bandits.” After an hour-long firefight, the village was “captured” at the cost of two dead and three wounded. One of the wounded was Rothmeyer, who subsequently died of his injuries. The “bandits” suffered eleven dead, several weapons and documentation. While this was happening, a brief firefight developed between a scout unit and “bandits” near the hamlet of Podelje. There were no known losses on either side. The papers collected by the SS indicated that the “bandits” were under orders to prevent the Germans from collecting the harvest (Erfassungsaktion) at all costs. They were fully aware of the planned SS operation for delivering the harvest (Ernteeinbringungsaktion). Two “bandit brigades” composed of Polish-Russian border volunteers were joined by the 225th Brigade. This brigade included under its command the “Bogdanovitsce” detachment noted for causing extensive railway damage in the northern area. The bandits had relayed the order to conduct operations against the harvest and carry out large-scale mine-laying activity. They caused the death of SS-Sturmbannführer Beilhack, the SS commander of the Ernteeinbringungsaktion. The brigade had suffered reverses through the deaths of several of its veteran explosives experts. The SS result for the period August 18–31, 1943, was the transportation of a hundred tons of grain and cereals.111
Pannier filed his report on September 6, 1943. In all reports, there were evaluations of the German performance. Attached to Pannier’s report and his SS personnel file is a letter referring to the death of Rothmeyer. Inaccuracies in reporting were known to happen; whether they were deliberate or not depended on the circumstances. In Pannier’s SS personnel file there was a letter dated July 4, 1944, from SS-Untersturmführer Helmich. The letter referred to the Bandenbekämpfung operations the previous year that were covered in page three of the Pannier report. Helmich’s letter suggested that the report, which included the death of Rothmeyer, was incorrect. Almost a year later, he felt compelled to draw attention to the inaccuracy of the report. The letter stated that he had been assigned as adjutant to the action on August 26 when Rothmeyer had been killed. With suitable warnings from an Oberleutnant Brockmann about these kinds of actions, they were under the reconnaissance ordered by Pannier. While it attempted to move around the village of Polianki and avoid resistance, a scout troop was surprised and forced to retreat. It was during this clash that Rothmeyer, the troop leader, died of his wounds. With both the officers down, an NCO (SS-Rottenführer) led the scout troop back. In the subsequent report, Pannier suggested that the officers of the 2nd and 3rd companies of the SS-Jäger Battalion had shown cowardice in front of the enemy and during the Erfassung of the village of Kasarichi. Helmich suggested this was not so, that in fact the officers accused fell back under “bandit” pressure. Helmich accused Pannier of using the term pinch (kneifen) to imply they had been caught in a pincer movement and run away. The word was erased. Helmich suggested he could still see the imprint of the word on the original report. Helmich posed the question, if both officers were so poor, why were they granted the honor of leading the finest scout troops? To this day, his question remains unanswered.112
7
DIE
BANDENUNTERNEHMUNGEN
In this chapter, the spotlight comes to rest on the Bandenbekämpfung operation. The term Bandenunternehmungen could equally mean the “operations of the bandit” and “antibandit operations”; the context determined the interpretation. Bandenunternehmungen involves a hodgepodge of tactics and techniques from sport hunting, conventional warfare, colonial pacification, police actions, and security warfare. Once organized into standard operating procedures and shuffled into a strict code of conduct, Bandenunternehmungen followed the basic principles of warfare.1 Keith Simpson identified five levels of operations: the defensive measures of strongpoints for local protection (Einzeldienst); the smaller operations (Klein-unternehmungen); the large-scale operations (Grossunternehmungen); the pacificatio
n operations; and the cleansing operations (Säuberungsaktion).2 His model conforms to the hierarchy of Bandenbekämpfung operations except in three cases. Bandenbekämpfung was fundamentally different because of the inclusion of the “Jewish action” (Judenaktion), the “round up of labor action” (Erfassungsaktion), and the “harvest-collection action” (Ernteerfassungsaktion). The emphasis of these “actions” distinguished Bandenbekämpfung from Partisanenbekämpfung.
Tactical Doctrine—Tactical Order
The tactical centerpiece of the Bandenbekämpfung operation was the encirclement (Einkreisung or Einkesselung). There were other forms of offensive operation, including the flank attack (Flankangriff), the envelopment (Umfassungsangriff), the frontal attack (Frontangriff), the wing attack (Flügelangriff), and the penetration (Einbruch), but the pièce de résistance remained the encirclement. The encirclement was not only Schlieffen’s legacy but also the red thread that ran through all German operational thinking. The opening section of the regulations stated, “We shall always aim for extermination by encirclement.” All set-piece security operations were organized to encircle the enemy. There were sound, obvious reasons why the tactic of encirclement suited SS-Police operations. First, encirclement accounted for all the “bandits”; few escaped and then only by chance. Second, this exercise placed the least strain on SS-Police resources, and third, it resulted in fewer German casualties. This standard operating procedure against small and large bands called for the blockading of all escape routes so that the “bandits” were “exterminated systematically.” The size of the units deployed were precise, “a thin line of skirmishers is on no account sufficient for encirclement”; hence the size of the combat commands.
Hitler's Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe Page 28