During the operation, on April 19, Bach-Zelewski met Fritz Sauckel in Minsk to hold discussions on foreign labor, as mentioned in chapter 4.19 The overall result was 76,000 persons processed, 52,000 persons taken to collection points for further processing, and another 22,400 rail travelers inspected for traveling without a ticket as “black travelers” (Schwarzfahrer). Five hundred and fifty people were sent to Germany as laborers, 712 regarded as unsuitable to be sent to Germany were sent as laborers to Minsk, 39 were arrested, and 2 suffered “special treatment” (Sonderbehandlung). The police confiscated materials identified as saboteur materials, including acid, batteries, copper and fuse wire, rifles, gas masks, cameras, and medical kits, as well as a miscellaneous selection of clothing. To mark the completion of the operation and acknowledge their resounding success, a closing ceremony was arranged for 11:00 a.m. on April 23, 1943. Bach-Zelewski declared “Zauberflöte” a bandit operation (Bandenunternehmungen), remained in Minsk to preside over a march-past of 136 officers and 3,705 non-commissioned officers, and men of the “SS- und Polizeiverbänden,” and then gave a speech.20
Security Cannae
An almost perfect example of Cannae occurred in an operation named “Nasses Dreieck” (“wet triangle”), which took place by the River Desna and close to Kiev. Himmler had ordered Prützmann to take charge of cleaning the area of a significant bandit incursion.21 A band led by a Russian farmer named Naumenko was reputed to be eight hundred to one thousand strong. At first, the members of the band had been drawn from local villages and were volunteers. Post-operation interrogations discovered that “Band Naumenko” had in fact three hundred men armed with rifles, six machine guns, fifteen light machine guns, four mortars, and thirty automatic weapons. The Germans learned that Naumenko had forced locals into a second detachment of about 250 and were led by his brother or sister, though neither was certain. A Captain Spenatzky, a Red Army officer, organized another detachment of about 250 with heavy and light machine guns, automatic rifles, and Russian rifles. The regional bandit commissar was said to be Lieutenant Kim, a thirty-five-year-old specialist sent by Moscow and openly declared the overlord of the rayon (district). This band was known but its strength was not recorded. An element of confusion was added to the assessment of the “bandit” forces by the disappearance of the collaboration Cossack Battalion 121, which was believed to have joined the bands.22
The field commander assigned to eradicate the bandits was Oberst Römer, the local Luftwaffe garrison commander. The terrain bisected the River Desna, included forested swampland, and came under the command of the regional authorities of the Wehrmacht and SS-Police. The intelligence on the bands, prior to Operation “Nasses Dreieck,” indicated to the Germans that they required larger forces. Römer planned a coup de main with a three-sided encirclement using the river as a barrier to “bandit” mobility. He also incorporated deception into the plan to conceal his shortfall of troops and heavy weapons. The bluff appeared to work. “Our strength was overestimated,” Römer boasted later. “The bandits believed that we had 2,000 Cossacks and several regiments.” The troops available allowed the formation of the ad hoc Kampfgruppe Römer. On May 6, Römer organized the Kampfgruppe into five attack detachments (Stosstrupps), three deploying antitank and anti-aircraft weapons. Constrained by manpower, he elected to eschew clearing the forest and avoided the swamp to maintain his operational mobility. During the preparation phase, Römer received reports that the “bandits” had occupied four villages, Darniza, Wysschaja Dubetschnja, and Lebedov Chutor and were in control of crossing points over the river. He decided that they would become his first and priority objectives. Römer called on Wasserschutzpolizei Kiev to form a riverine force of three motor patrol boats and retake control of the river crossings.23
Römer chose the classical Cannae tactic, incorporating the river to anchor the progress of his mobile units, making them perform a closing door maneuver. The operation began on May 9, 1943, with the units moving into their designated positions. One group occupied positions to the north near to the occupied villages, while a detachment of Cossacks rode hard to close the southern flank. A third detachment formed up a screen at the front of the forest to prevent any of the “bandits” from escaping. The last maneuver involved the Wasserschutzpolizei patrol boats moving into position to close off the river crossing points. This confirmed a loose encirclement. For security purposes Römer designated one detachment to secure the march, by protecting the supply routes and guarding signals land lines. The 120th Luftwaffe Signals Regiment set up the operational communications network and began monitoring bandit communications. The encirclement was then strengthened on May 10, when the Germans brought up heavier weapons to reinforce the northern detachment positioned near the villages. A heavy mortar detachment took up positions on the far side of the river. Realizing their predicament, the bandits tried to force an escape by attacking the bridge, but they were repulsed. This caused damage to the bridge, and operations waited for five hours, while German army engineers carried out repairs.
The “bandit” action triggered a German attack, and the Germans soon captured several villages. Slowly they began crushing the bandits like an anaconda slowly constricts its prey. The lack of air support forced the Germans to press the “bandits” in a direction that brought them within range of the mortars. This singularly successful tactic caused serious losses for the “bandits” and drove them deep into the swamp.24 After this climactic fighting, the Germans proceeded with a slow and deliberate cleanup action. On May 11, a detachment proceeded in a north-northwesterly direction systematically clearing bandits from houses and cellars of villages. That evening Römer recorded that a flight of Stuka dive-bombers joined in an attack on one of the villages, to “cleanse it of enemies and return to its legal standing.”25 The cleanup of the area continued the next day, with the Technische Nothilfe locating and marking minefields. The encircling troops were briefly stalled in the swamp by resistance and another minefield near the villages of Nowosselki-Oschitki. Elsewhere, the Wasserschutzpolizei cleared the river islands and executed fourteen captured bandits without trial. Reports to Römer indicated that the main body of the band had fled deep into the woods and swamps. Over the next two days, supporting Hungarian troops captured high ground. This gave Römer time to prepare his forces for the final Schwerpunkt. On May 15–16, the “bandits” were officially recorded as destroyed:
With short pauses, the bandits up to their necks in water in the swamp were unmercifully attacked by mortars, heavy artillery and heavy machine-guns. The result was that many bandits tried to escape but were destroyed in the process. A large number were found dead caused by iron and swamp water.26
Römer wrote in his operational report that “in the period the May 9–16, approximately twelve hundred bandits and bandit-helpers were shot, more than 50 percent during the attempt to break out of the swamp.” He added, “one must add to this the large number shot during the fighting in the swamp morass of at least 800 to 1,000.” He noted that 843 “bandits” were killed in the fighting and two hundred apparently unaccounted for in the swamp. Römer surmised that “all the armed bandits had fled into the swamp, the prisoners had confirmed this. There are still individual bandits attempting to evade capture seeking protection as refugees.” He ordered the woods combed for escapees and any found were punished.27 The question of “bandit” weaponry came into the report: “According to the calculation, there was only a small amount of captured weapons, only 10 guns and other equipment. This is explained because the bandits were in the swamps and they either lost their weapons or buried them.”28 Also in passing Römer acknowledged the presence of the GFP and the execution by shooting of 205 Bandenverdächtigte.
Römer reserved his highest praise for the Cossacks in both their reconnaissance and combat roles. They were “the perfect troops for pacification,” in his opinion, because “they ride fast and fight hard.” He commended the excellent relationship with community leaders and a local schoolmaste
r. They assisted in the efficient deportation of civilians and two thousand cows. Römer finally judged the shortfall of German propaganda to be at fault. “The reason for the rise in banditry,” he said, “was the failure of our own propaganda that the civilians were to be slaughtered or sent to Germany, which was worse than Siberia,” Römer judged. “Our propaganda failed. In Wypolsowo, the propaganda detachment played music and distributed leaflets of pictures of the Führer. The inhabitants said if our propaganda had worked, then Naumenko would never have been able to develop.”29 Römer’s observations partly explain the nature of the relationship between political killing and military capability within a Bandenbekämpfung operation. However, they do not explain Bach-Zelewski’s apparent rant against the operation. In his diary, after the completion of the operation, he complained that Prützmann was not militarily trained. He ranted that it was alright for the Reichsführer to pass on orders to others while passing the responsibility for the nation on to him but that sometimes leaders had to rise above their careers and do the right thing. He argued that under this dictatorship, the nation accepted authority from above, but had no real idea of the uninterrupted fight for power that was taking place below. He was in a powerful position but struggled to maintain his influence.30 Bach-Zelewski should not have been so paranoid: a month later, he was promoted to Ch.BKV.
Pursuit
The least desired eventuality for an SS-Police operation was a pursuit. This was in contrast to the army, which considered pursuit a positive outcome. The pursuit offered the “bands” some chance of escape, a burden for the SS because it extended their operational commitment, placed strains on men and equipment, and heightened the potential for casualties. Operation “Wehrwolf” involved a pursuit that turned out to be one of the most dramatic episodes of all SS-Police Bandenbekämpfung operations in the east. The matching sources of evidence from German reports and the partisan leader’s memoirs heighten the drama.31 Soviet partisan policy for the Ukraine changed in 1942, and one plan was to employ long-range raids deep inside German occupied territory.32 One such raid was led by Maj. Gen. Sidor Artemevich Kovpak. It resembled a Mongol invasion rather than a modern insurgency force.
The objective of the raid has been the subject of speculation. Armstrong believed they planned to destroy oil fields. Another opinion suggested that it was an attempt to assess the condition of the Ukrainian partisans on their home ground, although Kovpak himself noted strong resistance from the UPA, one of several Ukrainian nationalist resistance groups, to his presence in their region. Captured “bandits,” under interrogation, stated their objective was to reach either Hungary or Rumania. The Germans could not determine if the raid was to re-establish Soviet power and authority in the minds of the people of the occupied zones or if it was planned as a military-style operation. The German files contain handwritten remarks that indicate some among the staffs believed the raid was an attempt to link up with Tito. The Kovpak band adopted a quiet routine until it reached the Galician borders, even passing strategic oil fields without any attempts at sabotage. The band adopted “hit-and-run” tactics while continuing westward and retaining the initiative.
Kovpak was a long-serving member of the Communist Party and a veteran of the Russian civil war. In the interwar years, he had served as mayor of the Poltava municipality. When the German army arrived in 1941, Kovpak formed a partisan band of more than three thousand well-armed men and women. His deputy was the ruthless political commissar Gen. Semyon Rudnev, who ordered execution for any partisan found plundering during the raid. The regimental organization and logistics of the raid were based on mobility and self-sufficiency. The band’s order of battle included five battalions of partisan infantry and an artillery company with nine field guns (76mm and 45mm caliber guns). Each battalion received twenty machine guns. The flak detachment was armed with 20mm anti-aircraft guns, and the mortar section carried medium-size mortars. Each battalion was assigned up to fifteen explosives experts for sabotage. The cavalry squadron, with more than one hundred twenty mounts, carried out the regiment’s advance reconnaissance and screening patrols. Signals were the responsibility of a Red Army officer and his two daughters, who expertly maintained contact with Moscow and liaised with the Red Air Force. The Germans’ signals monitoring service reported that the bands maintained strict radio routines and never deviated from preset security procedures. Female partisans walked along lanes pretending to be simple country folk while identifying landmarks, suitable air-landing fields, and regimental collection points. The headquarters staff, together with a scout company, and the supply function pooled three hundred motor vehicles. The band’s march route took it through communities and villages. The inhabitants were required to work for the band in gathering supplies and scouting. Wounded were flown out from air-landing points when air support was available. The supply formed forage teams to locate and acquire provisions. Like a nomadic tribe, the band drove three hundred head of cattle and many more sheep and carried crates of chickens. Once airdrops became unavailable, the regiment resorted to replenishment by attacks on police stations and small military depots.
On March 26, 1942, Kovpak set off from Bryansk, and after a brief fire fight with the Germans, his band found sanctuary in the Smolensk forest and took up residence. Months later in October, at the head of his band, Kovpak set off toward the west. By early 1943, they had passed Rovno and then Dubno and arrived on the Galician border. Along the way, the band liberated Jews from the Skalat labor camp and absorbed a group of young people into the “Jewish company.” To disguise the breakthrough, the bandits dressed in German uniforms and so passed villages without interference. All captured Axis troops were stripped and killed. After the raid, the Germans found a collection of different uniforms and papers. The march was disciplined, with quiet routines and the skirting of German strongpoints. They crossed into Galicia via forests, traveling at night and resting under camouflage. For seven months, the incursion failed to attract any serious attention from the Germans.
Politically, the raid was a serious challenge to Bach-Zelewski’s authority. The route of Kovpak’s march not only triggered a response from the respective spheres of SS competence but had touched on the highly sensitive issue of the extermination program in Poland. Bach-Zelewski’s field commanders were the unlikely pairing of Globocnik and Krüger. The plan the SS concocted called for a rapid series of maneuvers to decapitate the bandit leadership. The SS placed a rich bounty on Kovpak’s capture, turning him into a Robin Hood figure. To match the SS projection of initiative with available forces, the SS command initially chose to pump units into the area like a drip feed, collecting them at strategic points, but all they did was commit units piecemeal and sustain losses. They thought this might reduce Kovpak’s options while allowing them to concentrate their forces, but Kovpak foiled their plan with his continuous movement.
A distinctive feature of Operation “Wehrwolf” was the SS-Police order of battle, which crossed several nationalities including Russian, Italian, German, Ukrainian, Polish, and Hungarian. The first Kampfgruppe Dorsch, a total of 16 officers and 267 men, included a gendarmerie squadron, the Tarnopol Schutzpolizei, the 3rd Battalion 23rd SS-Police Regiment, and a detachment of Ukrainian police. These units were later joined by the SS-Police Battalion Breslau and the Galician Cavalry Squadron. This Kampfgruppe was broken up on July 11, 1943, and replaced by Kampfgruppe Hauptmann Karl, which contained Landesschützen Battalion 543, an SS-Police signals detachment (Kraków), the surviving members of Kampfgruppe Dorsch, a squadron of reconnaissance airplanes, and troops from the army’s Reserve Grenadier Battalion 425. The total complement including staff was eighteen officers and 622 men. On July 12, the 4th SS-Police Regiment as a complete formation joined the fray. The SD-Einsatzgruppe Piper was dispatched from Reichskommisariat Ukraine with seven officers and 450 men.
The Germans first realized the implications of the raid on July 7, 1943, when aircraft from Luftwaffe Regional Command (Luftgau) VIII located the band 30
kilometers southeast of Tarnopol. The band ran for cover 15 kilometers southeast into the forest of Ivankovce, but the Germans were already prepared and attempted encirclement. Kovpak later wrote that a German or Axis ally blocking force countered his every move. “Having paved highways and motor transport at their disposal, the Hitlerites quickly sealed all the exits from the mountains and began to close the ring of encirclement.”33 Although the Germans had insufficient numbers they continued to attempt encirclement, and the bandits kept escaping. The breakout of the evening July 12–13 led to the decisive commitment of the Luftwaffe.
From the beginning of the German reaction, the 7th Special Flying Group was committed with 6 Fieseler Storch airplanes. The commander of Luftgau VIII ordered the Luftwaffe School Deblin to assign two flying groups. 34 The first was a ground-attack group (Schlachtflieger-Gruppe) with five of the newly arrived Henschel HS129 airplanes. With its heavily armor-protected cockpits, a 20mm cannon, and four machine guns, the HS129 was a deadly opponent for a bandit force. The other group, flying nine of the old heavy-type fighter aircraft, the ME110 destroyer (Zerstörer), was recorded as pilots under training for night-fighter duties.35 Both aircraft types had twin engines, and this led Kovpak to recall being continuously under observation and attack from Messerschmitts. Monitoring the results of these sorties, a Luftwaffe command team made up from senior officers flying an HS129 or a Fieseler Storch observed the attacks. Using their wireless location devices and plotting ranges on their 1 to 100,000-scale maps, the Luftwaffe again found the band under cover in a forest south of Tarnopol. The air attacks inflicted on the band caused high losses, which were confirmed by a local SIPO officer but not detailed. The band moved on, through forests and across the River Dniester, blowing up the bridge in their wake.
Hitler's Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe Page 30