Turning to Bach-Zelewski’s diary for this period, we are offered another perspective on the events as they unfolded. Since his promotion to the full command of all Bandenkampfverbände on June 19, Bach-Zelewski had been running a tight schedule. “Cottbus” was implemented prior to his taking command, but its results came under his control. On June 29, 1943, he visited the 1st Police Grenadier Regiment to observe their operational performance. He traveled to Minsk on July 3, to join Korsemann, Gottberg, and SS-Brigadeführer Hermann, commander of 1st SS-Infantry Brigade, while they were preparing “Hermann.” The next day, he attended a meeting with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, arranged by Himmler, to raise a formation of Muslim recruits from the Balkans. The following day, when Korsemann was relieved, he briefed Field Marshal von Kleist on the overall security situation. It is likely that Kleist passed comment on Korsemann’s letter during Bach-Zelewski’s visit. The next day, Bach-Zelewski received news of Schenckendorff’s death by heart attack. As a mark of respect, he secured Himmler’s approval for the Breslau Police band to perform a full military funeral service. This took place on July 9 with due pomp and ceremony and with Bach-Zelewski accepting the march past.90 A week later, after a brief visit to the Balkans, he met with Warlimont on July 16, to plan a large-scale operation in the Polotsk region of Russia. From there, he visited the command of “Hermann” to observe the progress. Apparently satisfied, he flew to Bialystok, to confer with Gauleiter Sauckel, regarding the new quotas for forced labor. On July 19, he flew back to Minsk only to return to Poland (Lublin) the next day to assist SS-Gruppenführer Globocnik in the handling of “Wehrwolf” against the Kovpak band. This travel ranged across Rovno, Lvov, Kraków, Breslau, and Warsaw until he returned to his headquarters at Lötzen on July 26.
In the midst of all this activity, SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei Eberhard Herf arrived on the scene. Eberhard Herf was a member of Himmler’s personal staff and had undertaken what might be loosely termed time and motion studies of SS performance in the east. Herf had already attracted British codebreaking activity in January 1942 when Himmler wrote to him via HSSPF Russia-North. It seems Herf had a quarrel with Zenner, and Jeckeln had been asked by Himmler to investigate the case. Herf had requested a transfer, but Himmler quashed that decision until the investigation had been completed. Himmler was particularly angry because he had expected Herf to report to him with any troubles.91 This was an omen of things to come.
Bach-Zelewski first met Eberhard Herf, on July 1, 1943, in his quarters at Lötzen. They spent the best part of two days together, discussing the command system and meeting with the staff, before Bach-Zelewski departed for Minsk. During Bach-Zelewski’s absence, Herf was presumably left to settle into his prestigious assignment as chief of staff but found the operational procedures did not meet with his standards. On July 19, 1943, in a famous letter first discussed by Hans Buchheim in the 1960s, and often referred to since, Herf wrote to his friend and namesake SS-Obergruppenführer Maxi-millian von Herff, the chief of SS-Personnel Main Office (SS-Personalhauptamt), relating an accusation that there were serious problems within Bandenbekämpfung reporting. From the outset, Herf confirmed his disapproval of German policy in the east and the security measures in particular. He had “misgivings over the colonization process,” which he felt would lead to defeat in the winter of 1943–44 as resentment continued to swell support for the partisans. He was particularly unhappy at the practice of keeping the body count figures “artificially low” to highlight the “successes.” Herf believed the figures sent to Himmler were “cooked.” To add weight to this comment, he said that rumors circulating during his time in the Ukraine were being broadcast by Kube and Lohse as fact. Herf indicated that Kube and Lohse had in fact got hold of secret reports and were openly denouncing the failings of a system that recorded that 480 rifles were found on 6,000 dead “partisans.” In other words, the reports had not been distributed to them through the usual channels. The number of rifles had been fudged, according to Herf, “to swell the figure of enemy losses and highlight our own ‘heroic deeds.’” His investigation of the numbers led to the common excuse that the insurgents destroyed their weapons and disguised themselves as innocent civilians to escape from the police. Herf was not convinced, reflecting on the severity of the fighting. “How easy it must be to suppress these guerrillas—when they destroy their weapons!”92
The Herf to Herff correspondence continued. On July 21, the police general wrote, “since yesterday I am in a completely different position. The RFSS has asked me to write to him about the situation…. I explained starkly with statistics how the situation is deteriorating.”93 Following his return on July 27, Bach-Zelewski discussed matters with all the staff, which was clearly unsatisfactory for Herf. The next day, he wrote again to his friend regarding the meeting. “Bach is back. He said he felt that I wanted to rule here (Ich würde hier die Zügel der Regierung in die Hand nehmen).” Herff replied that as chief of staff he had greater authority than what was being granted. In his diary for July 28, 1943, Bach-Zelewski wrote, “report to the RFSS, my chief of staff is not suitable for the position.” The following day, Herf wrote again to his SS friend, in what was the final letter:
Alea sund [sic] jacta! [The die is cast!] These are the facts I can disappear here. They will find somebody else for this job as they did before. Their explanation was classical “too much commander and not enough chief of staff” who has to be flexible and considerate. “You want to rule yourself. The RFSS needs to have someone to shout at, but you are too old and too old to report to him everyday.” I wrote to you of the real motives. 94
Herf decided to leave, commenting that even his request for genuine reports when they projected no deterioration were denied by the reluctant staffs. “It was openly told to me how everybody could guess the strategy,” he continued. “They offered me a Kampfgruppe.” Herf was fed up but filed Bach-Zelewski’s final comment. “Reconsider your decision said Bach, you can lose reputation and honor, or as well achieve honour.”95 Bach-Zelewski’s final words on Herf are in his diary. “Lectured to by the RFSS. My chief of staff has been recalled, because he has not matched up to the task.”96 Heinz Lammerding (see chapter 9) became Bach-Zelewski’s chief of staff on August 13, 1943, a choice with which he was very content.97 So often depicted as an upstanding German officer in the “Cottbus” case, Generalmajor der Polizei und SS-Brigadeführer Eberhard Herf returned to his position as KdO Minsk. He had been KdO Minsk since 1941 and had received the order from Kube, on January 29, 1942, for the “second wave” of Jewish extermination, of the Minsk ghetto. He was hanged after being found guilty of war crimes during the Minsk trial in 1946.98
What can be gleaned from these events? In the summer of 1943, these incidents represented the most extraordinary behavior. The shopping list of ranks highlights two Nazi ministers (Himmler and Rosenberg), a field marshal, four senior officers (a general from the army and three SS-Obergruppenführer), two Reichskommissars, five general rank or equivalent officers, and at least three senior line officers. The butchers’ bill included one senior officer disgraced, a state secretary killed, and a general dead of a heart attack. New accounting regulations, discussed in chapter 6, were issued to the Bandenkampfverbände on July 12, 1943, three days after Herf’s first letter. 99 As for Rosenberg and his motley crew, their castigation of the SS was hard-faced politics. Their selectivity in highlighting some victims over others is revealed in the telling disclaimer of the letter from June 18, 1943, that “the fact that Jews receive [‘special treatment’] Sonderbehandlung requires no further discussion.” Gerald Reitlinger suggested that not until July 10, 1943, did Himmler receive Kube’s report. This might indicate Himmler had been planning new accounting rules before the “Cottbus” incident. Reitlinger also suggested that “Cottbus” was the clearing of the “Partisan Republic of Lake Palik,” which might have triggered the extreme measures. Later, Kube told Strauch that this action was unworthy of a nation that had produced Kant and G
oethe. In response, Strauch accused Kube of not handling disciplinary charges against Jews properly and of not removing the electrician who had bugged his telephone line. Kube was blown up by his chambermaid on September 23, 1943; Strauch had all seventy Jews under Kube’s control killed in reprisal, and another thousand Jews were slaughtered in Minsk. Adding a final twist to the remarkable series of coincidences, Himmler told Bach-Zelewski that Kube’s assassination was “a boon to the German people.”100
The timely death of Schenckendorff on July 6, during the investigation of the falsification allegations, was a perhaps too fortuitous coincidence.101 Field Marshal von Kluge wrote to Schenckendorff’s wife for the first time in years with condolences for his former comrade. The heart of the case was between Korsemann, Gottberg, and the position of HSSPF Russia-Centre. Were the real culprits Gottberg in league with Dirlewanger to prevent the timely release of reports? From the perspective of the Nazi’s total war effort, this incident caused the highest loss, decapitating the German security command in the east for the entire war. From the standpoint of professionalism, we discover that the etiquette of careerism, based on the principles of social Darwinism, was not confined to the SS organization. All the ranting and reengineering brought superficial success but failed to unhinge the Allies’ grand strategy or to hamper the long-term direction of the war. In many ways, rationalization, professionalization, and standardization were highly successful at perpetuating Hitler’s war. Internally, the Nazis were unable to overcome their character traits or behavioral patterns. Personal greed and self-gratification were the reaction to calls for total war and collective effort received a short-sighted response. Nazism was undone by its social Darwinist motivations. In 1943, Hitler’s empire was like a giant sand-castle facing the incoming tides. As the tides breached the walls, the Nazis worked like ants to rebuild their barriers. In this process, sand suffers from liquefaction and eventually becomes useless. The real breaches in the Nazi edifice dissolved from within. Thus, as the regime grandstanded total war, a new round of polycratic competition and opportunism opened between the hangers on.
The only person to succeed from the affair was Gottberg. He was awarded the German Cross in Gold, a highly cherished medal that was regarded as political recognition for services to the state. The award of the German Cross in Gold for Gottberg (July 1943–August 25, 1943) led to a service epistle by Bach-Zelewski: “von Gottberg with the SS-Polizeiverbände, army and Luftwaffe has carried out effective operations against the bandits. The show piece was the Grand Operation ‘Cottbus’ [Grossunternehmen Cottbus] where in critical days it was his leadership that saw it through.” Thus:
NÜRNBERG: November 19–25, 1942, between Glebokie and Vilno; 1st SS-Infantry Brigade, 14th SS-Police Regiment, 2 Schutzmann-schaft-Battalions, and local gendarmes.
HAMBURG: December 10–12, 1942, in forests north of Slonim; 2nd SS-Police Regiment, 1st Battalion 23rd SS-Police Regiment, and 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, 3 Schuma Battalions; 3,186 combined enemy dead; 3 tanks, 7 artillery pieces, 5 sub-machine guns, 12 light machine-guns, and 367 rifles captured; 19 bandit camps destroyed.
ALTONA: December 22–23, 1942, south of Slonim; 1,059 enemy dead.
FRANZ: January 5–14, 1943, east of Osipovichi; 1,349 enemy dead; 280 rifles, 3 cannons, and large amounts of ammo captured; 9 camps destroyed
ERNTEFEST: January 18 to February 5, 1943, military road MinskSlutsk; 3,721 enemy dead; 433 rifles, 2 artillery pieces, mortars, and 28 machine guns captured.
HORNUNG: February 8–26, 1943, Pripet marshes south of Slutsk; 2 SS-Police Regiments, 2 SS-Police Battalions, and 5 Schuma; 9,662 enemy dead.102
The last entry of Gottberg’s accreditation list was Operation “Cottbus.” Bach-Zelewski listed that it took place from April 28 to June 21, 1943, to the north of Borissow. He called it the largest operation in HSSPF Russia-Centre involving 16,662 men from the Wehrmacht and police. The enemy suffered 6,042 killed in action, 3,709 “bandit suspects” executed, and 599 prisoners. The Germans suffered 127 dead (3 officers) and 535 wounded (10 officers). The captured booty included 29 pieces of artillery, 18 mortars, 61 machine guns, 16 antitank guns, 45 submachine guns, but, most revealing of all, only 905 rifles.
PART THREE
CLIMATIC DECLINE
8
POLAND
Wither Bandenbekämpfung? In July 1944, Victor Klemperer observed, “We had now not three, but five fronts: Russia, France, Italy, also the home front of the bombing attacks and the bandit-front.”1 Chapter 4 explains how Nazi national security was reengineered by the SS, through institutional machinations and political opportunism, to turn Bandenbekämpfung into an operational concept. The subsequent chapters explain how Bandenbekämpfung developed in an effort to eradicate the Soviet partisan. Outside of the war against the Soviet partisan, there was a more complex situation than even Klemperer could encapsulate. Hitler’s strategy did indeed incorporate five central fronts, among them Bandenbekämpfung, but each engendered a different set of priorities and agendas. In terms of operational security policy, the last years of the war saw Bandenbekämpfung adapted as a catchall solution for a range of issues, not all related. The exponents of Bandenbekämpfung struggled to maintain consistency against differing territorial conditions and the interests of rival agencies. Their greatest problem was uncertainty caused by Hitler’s continual reinterpretation of how victory might be achieved. This uncertainty swept through Nazi organizations. Military setbacks inflicted by the Red Army, the bombing of German cities, and the allied invasions in the west were answered by faith in static fortifications and concrete obstacles, the ongoing extermination of the Jews, and the determined pacification and eradication of resistance. Hitler’s war was turning in on itself.
In the summer of 1944, Poland once again attracted the attention of the world. Poland’s geo-political position made it the key buffer against Soviet invasion and incursion. Since 1939, Poland had been exposed to a combination of occupation, genocide, and corruption. From April 1943 to January 1945, Poland was on the receiving end of intensified Bandenbekämpfung, including blocking or preventing Soviet thrusts into Poland to destroy strategic junctions, securing and participating in the continued extermination of Jewry, and destroying Polish nationalism by eradicating the resistance movement. The underlying operational factor in these tasks was the SS reliance, even piggybacking, on the traditional Wehrmacht occupation structure, which enabled extensive administration of genocide, enslavement, and exploitation. Bandenbekämpfung tasks were completed despite obstacles. There were hurdles from leadership quarrels regarding the regime’s policy toward Poland, but the Bandenkampfverbände developed a dynamic capability for multitasked command, coordinating and completing ideological, political, and security tasks within their operations. The SS ingeniously organized operations by interweaving them with older security methods. In addition, the SS internalized “Hitler’s will” as the logic of command. The abundance of the “Führer’s will,” in real terms translated as faith and fanaticism, substituted for the lack of replacement armies and equipment shortages and was supposed to bolster the troop’s sagging morale. The presence of this faith and fanaticism coincided with a growing expectancy for high-end results from operations. The demands by Hitler, the SS, the Nazi Party, and German institutions lost all semblance of reality except the administration of destruction and revenge. Germany, so it seemed, was fighting a different kind of war from the other belligerents.
SS-Police in Poland
Revenge was a common Nazi slogan. The Nazis reaped “revenge” against Poland for the Versailles Treaty, the war-guilt clause, and the creation of the “new” Poland. After dismantling Poland, the Nazis used the rump, the General Government, as their base to prosecute their ongoing race war against the Jewish people and the eradication of Polish national identity. Himmler held Poles in utter contempt and was only concerned for Poland’s fate insofar as it undermined internal security in the wake of Germany’s waning fortunes. Himmler’s id
ea of security regarding Poland rarely wavered from widespread killing. In 1940, in a speech to Hitler’s Waffen-SS bodyguard, he explained how killing actions were fraught with hardship. In freezing weather, he recalled, “we had to haul away thousands, tens thousands, hundred thousands … to shoot thousands of leading Poles, where we had to have the toughness, otherwise it would have taken revenge on us later.” Additionally, he did not differentiate between SS-Police security actions and military operations:
[I]t is much easier to go into combat with a company than to suppress an obstructive population of low cultural level in some area with a company or to carry out executions, or to haul away people, to evict crying and hysterical women, or to return our German racial brethren across the border from Russia and to take care of them.2
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