The uprising surprised Hitler if not the SS leadership.25 It is in this context that the relevance of the Bandenkampf und Sicherheitslage June 1943 memo, discussed in chapter 4, is made apparent.26 Stroop inadvertently hastened Jewish extermination by highlighting the importance of preemptive strikes to prevent future resistance. Point 5 of the memo reflected Hitler’s mood to see the security mission through. Within Nazi circles, thwarting a general Jewish uprising compared closely with preventing a 1918-style internal collapse. The consequential review of security measures served to undermine the ill-fated Bialystok ghetto resistance and highlighted the thinking behind “Zauberflöte,” discussed in chapter 7. According to Lucy Dawidowicz, the Germans had changed their tactics: “Everywhere the Germans employed lies, surprise and stealth to liquidate the ghettos. Sudden encirclements at night, or at dawn, prevented organised combat groups from mobilising and coordinating their units.”27 These events signified that the combined efforts to eradicate “banditry” alongside the extermination of the Jews was the crux of the Bandenbekämpfung operational concept.
Lublin
The incidents in Warsaw and Lemberg, continued criticism of Hans Frank, and increasing resistance of Jews and Poles caused Hitler and Himmler to instigate radical decisions. On June 21, 1943, the General Government of Poland and former Polish territories annexed into the Reich, renamed the Warthegau and Weichsel-Pommern, were declared Bandenkampfgebieten.28 Since March 1943, Richard Wendler, governor general of Lublin, had urged Himmler to remove Globocnik:
Above all, I thank you for clearing the air regarding the SS and Police Leader Lublin and trust you will transfer him somewhere else. This is the only noble and possible solution. I must even ask you today, to transfer Gruppenführer Globocnik within the shortest time to his new field of activity and to remove him from here.29
The suppression of the Warsaw ghetto uprising was followed by the Bialystok ghetto revolt. On August 15, 1943, Globocnik sent small teams of police into the ghetto to take control of the SS factories. The following day, fighting broke out, and the Germans rapidly succeeded in reducing the resistance into small pockets. It spelled the end of the revolt although troubles continued into September, and the last Jewish captives were deported in November.30 Globocnik’s performance in combating the Kovpak incursion was also less than inspiring.31 Himmler’s concerns grew. The Jewish uprisings and the escalating resistance, reinforced by the Treblinka revolt (August 1943), finally sealed Globocnik’s fate.32 He was replaced by an officer at the pinnacle of SS professionalism.
In January 1943, Himmler had ordered Pohl’s concentration camp system to absorb the intake of “bandit suspects,” mentioned in chapter 7. The prisoners were sent to camps in Lublin and Auschwitz, placing pressure on the facilities and their working efficiency. By November 1943, given the troubles, these camps were bulging with prisoners. The appointment of SS-Gruppenführer Jakob Sporrenberg, as SSPF Lublin, was opportune. Sporrenberg was captured by the British in Norway, in 1945, and was eventually turned over to war crimes investigators.33 He spun tales that his trained interrogators found difficult to believe. He had served in the SD and, in 1937, took command of the security police in Königsberg. On April 10, 1941, he lunched with Himmler, Bach-Zelewski, and SS-Gruppenführer Schmauser.34 During the proceedings, he was confirmed as SSPF Minsk, under Bach-Zelewski.35 He later served in the Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei to study police procedures in preparation for the invasion of Russia. His period of service at the SSPF Minsk was from July to August 1941. Then, he served as SD special assignments officer attached to Gauleiter Koch until March 1943.
On February 1, 1943, Sporrenberg alleged he was posted again to serve with Bach-Zelewski, in Minsk. During a meeting with Bach-Zelewski, Sporrenberg said he was told not to regard service in Bandenbekämpfung as a punishment. It was explained that he would serve in the ranks of the 2nd SS-Police Regiment. He was to receive the temporary police rank of Oberwachtmeister for the duration of his Bandenbekämpfung service. Sporrenberg recalled that during one operation his battalion was surrounded and the officers killed. The troops pleaded with him to take command. He did so and saved the battalion, and Bach-Zelewski praised him. Sporrenberg told the British that he served six months combating the partisans. Bach-Zelewski’s diary is silent on all these matters. Sporrenberg alleged he went home on compassionate leave as his wife was suffering from cancer of the face. Himmler, however, recalled him for improperly taking leave and posted him as SSPF Lublin as a punishment. Bach-Zelewski did record that on September 8, 1943, a meeting was held with Dr. Wendler, Lublin governor general, and Sporrenberg.36 On October 19, Frank convened a meeting with Krüger, Sporrenberg, SS-Oberführer Bierkamp (BdS Lublin), and Generalmajor der Polizei Hans Grünwald (BdO Lublin). Krüger presented them with the fait accompli, Himmler’s orders confirming executions:
The Jews in the Lublin District have developed into a serious danger. This state of affairs must be cleared up once and for all. I have charged the “unit Globocnik” with the execution of this matter. The Higher SS and Police Leader East, and the SS and Police Leader Lublin, are requested to assist Globocnik with all resources at their disposal.37
The resulting operation began on November 3, 1943, and lasted for two more days. Aktion Erntefest represented a startling new level of security capability and a frightening determination to complete the destruction of the Jews in quick time. The action called for the rapid extermination of Jews in the Lublin district, incarcerated in the Trawniki, Poniatowa, and Majdanek concentration camps. On the evening of November 2, Sporrenberg brought together all his commanders and detailed how the killing operation was to be conducted. The manner of execution was mass shooting. The SS-Police units were to conduct themselves as in a Bandenbekämpfung exercise, first surrounding the camps. The Jews were then led from the camps to pits already dug for the purpose, made to undress, and then shot. Music was played to smother the sounds of shots. The slaughter lasted three days and was regarded as a major achievement by the SS-Police in Poland. Christopher Browning identified the units employed in the operation.38 They included the 22nd SS-Police Regiment (Kraków) and the 25th SS-Police Regiment (Lublin), Waffen-SS detachments from Warsaw, the Lublin police, and experts from the SS-Totenkopfverbände controlling the camps. Sporrenberg’s position in Lublin was as absolute as Globocnik’s had been. He personally commanded the 25th SS-Police Regiment and Security Police. Browning found witnesses who stated that during the action, Sporrenberg monitored progress by flying around in a Fieseler Storch. Aktion Erntefest concluded, with the SS-Police having executed 42,000 people in three days.
Gerhard Weinberg observed, “When murdering 42,000 Jews in three massacres in the Lublin area during a few days in November 1943, the Germans made certain to catch their victims completely by surprise and returned to the procedure of mass shootings that had characterized the early stages of the killing program in 1941.”39 In recompense for the deed, Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger was assigned to the SS Division Prinz Eugen in November 1943 to train for command of an SS division. Jakob Sporrenberg and members of his team were transferred to Norway. One can only surmise why Sporrenberg packed off to Norway, but perhaps more important, one wonders why Himmler did not repeat Aktion Erntefest.
Kovel
Today, Kovel is a Ukrainian city, part of territory annexed from Poland by Stalin after the Second World War. Between 1919 and 1939, Kovel was a Polish city on the Soviet border, a strategic railway junction. Kovel’s terrain is bisected by the River Styr, surrounded by forests, and located on the southwest tip of the Pripyat marshes. In the winter of 1943–44, the mild weather caused the ground between the forests to turn swamp-like. The roads were impassable even for tracked armored vehicles. Kovel was first occupied by the Red Army in 1939 and then by the Wehrmacht in 1941. Alexander Werth referred to the Soviet occupation of Kovel on September 20, 1939, noting that it had caused internal hostilities.40 The German occupation can be measured by the crimes of two former German police officers
, Erich Kassner and Fritz Manthei, both of whom received lifelong prison sentences after the war. Between 1942 and 1943, they were responsible for the civil administration of the District of Kovel (Zivilverwaltung Gebietskommissariat Kowel) and the gendarmerie in Kovel. Their crimes included mass killing, destruction of the Kovel ghetto, and hunting down escapees in hiding. They committed a reprisal action against a local community when a Ukrainian militia unit defected to the partisans.41 In January 1944, Kovel became the key strategic junction of the Eastern Front. The railway lines linked Germany with Hungary and Rumania; Kovel was a supply hub and part of the central German defense line. The situation in Kovel, threatened by Soviets, was deadly for Hitler, who feared the loss of allies and resources.
On January 14, 1944, Hitler ordered Bach-Zelewski to form a rapid reaction command and assault group, Stossgruppe von dem Bach, to defend Kovel.42 The command team included SS-Standartenführer Gustav Lombard (chief of staff), Oberstleutnant der Gendarmerie Reimpel (operations officer), and SS-Standartenführer August Zehender (commander of 17th SS-Cavalry Regiment).43 The Stossgruppe was composed of the 17th SS-Cavalry Regiment, an army pioneer battalion, an army self-propelled assault-gun detachment, and an army artillery detachment. Hitler’s orders granted Bach-Zelewski the authority to act “ruthlessly, with brutality, and to act with strength of personality.” Bach-Zelewski arrived in Kovel on January 16 from Warsaw and remained in command until March 16. Within the remit of his command, he took control of the city’s troops, placing them on a defensive posture after a tactical meeting with the army’s Feldkommandantur and local Nazi Party bosses. On January 23, his team completed the building of their tactical headquarters. His Fieseler Storch was used to ferry Lombard and Reimpel to meet with the commanders of the Hungarian army, the German army’s XIII Corps, and the HSSPF Russia-South.44 On January 29, he was briefly caught up in the fighting and came under machine-gun fire.
At first the Russians advanced rapidly, pushing north and south of the city, crossing the railway line toward Sarny. After capturing the rail junction, the Soviets concentrated their forces. German reinforcements made a timely arrival, were hastily detrained, formed into a weak Kampfgruppe, and hurled against the Russians. The shock stalled the Soviets and halted their efforts to concentrate. The Kampfgruppe withdrew and prepared for the defense. To protect the city, the main body of Bach-Zelewski’s troops formed a security line across the central railway embankment. While the Germans conducted their defensive preparations, Soviet partisan bands increased their attacks along the railway lines. Bach-Zelewski described the numbers of partisan attacks, “in masses of red lines” covering his maps. The Germans received continual reports from local informers identifying Soviet attempts to concentrate to the north of the city. The Red Army pressed three rifle divisions to force a way through to the northeast riverside. They directed their drive through the swamps to capture the main road severing connections with the west. In coordination with this drive, the partisans attempted a double encirclement of Kovel, masking their intentions by marching more than 30 kilometers north and sweeping around the city.45 German reconnaissance overflights disclosed the Soviet intentions. This situation indicated to Bach-Zelewski that he had no choice but to deliver a spoiling attack against the Soviets. His decision plunged the Stossgruppe into bloody fighting but proved the correct decision as the Soviets withdrew. Bach-Zelewski placed troops on either side across the river, forming a bridgehead. The Stossgruppe continued to repulse Soviet attacks but was once again forced to withdraw across the river. The post-action report concentrated on the west bank defensive line at Zareéje because it encompassed old First World War fortifications.46
In February, the Germans attempted to counter-attack and push forward to Lutsk. A strike force of SS-Cavalry, combat engineers, and flak batteries attempted to breakthrough Soviet lines. During the attack, Soviet counterattacks halted the Germans. When the SS-Cavalry stopped to rest, they were surprised by hundreds of partisans. This led to intense house-to-house fighting. The remaining troops of the Stossgruppe, supported with tanks, were forced to rescue the cavalry. The casualties counted on February 23 and on February 26 amounted to forty-five enemy dead.47 On the Central Front, the Soviets collected strong forces against the river railway bridge, while infantry concentrated in the forests. Heavy defensive fighting held off the Russians supported by a German armored railway train that was brought forward. Bach-Zelewski later alleged the Red Army had a 10 to 1 advantage and was, therefore, able to complete the encirclement of the city. The Germans likened the Soviet attack to a door being levered with the gendarmerie and supply troops desperately protecting the right wing of the Stossgruppe.
Supporting the Stossgruppe was the 7th Special Flying Group, which conducted a variety of sorties throughout January and February. The flying group commander, Oberstleutnant Heinzius, was based in Lublin and reported daily to Himmler. A continuous period of mild weather enabled the Germans to exploit aerial reconnaissance without Red Air Force intervention. There were transport and glider-towing missions bringing in supplies and reinforcements. The ground fighting allowed the airmen to pinpoint enemy movements during bombing missions. Air attacks were directed at breaking up the bands, destroying their camps, or interdicting their supply routes. A message from January 16 referred to “special-operation Bach” (Sonderunternehmen Bach), which included at least six squadrons. In February, Bach-Zelewski’s diary referred to the opening of an extended period of air force operations. On February 7, signals emanating from a squadron of Stukas were deciphered by the British.48 Five days later, signals confirmed an attack squadron of Stuka airplanes had joined these air operations.49
By March 11, Bach-Zelewski’s defensive battle was over; his efforts proved reasonably skillful, employing bluff, diversions, and counterstrokes. Gustav Lombard passed Bach-Zelewski’s Kovel defense report to Fegelein, Hitler’s representative. The report fulfilled the Führer’s order to stop the Soviet advance and defend Kovel. Bach-Zelewski attributed his success to the assault-gun (Sturmgeschütz) detachment, which he used to bluff the Red Army. Captured Soviet POWs divulged that they had estimated the number of German tanks at two hundred. Bach-Zelewski also praised the 662nd Pioneer Battalion, 17th SS-Cavalry Regiment, and the artillery. Lombard added to the report. He recalled a counter-attack by the German army’s XIII Corps in an attempt to close the gap between Prützmann and Bach-Zelewski. It was stalled because of a Soviet offensive that began at the same time. The Russians threw back the weak German forces but were in turn assaulted by the full weight of an attack led personally by Bach-Zelewski. The Red Army swarmed against the Stossgruppe.50 After Bach-Zelewski departed from Kovel, the Soviet operations intensified. Eventually, the Red Army passed north and south, reinforcing the encirclement by March 17. SS-Obergruppenführer Gille was ordered to defend the city, and the encirclement was broken by the 5th SS-Panzer Division Wiking.
During the Kovel operations the Polish resistance movement conducted incursions in the area that attracted SS-Police reactions.51 Two SS troopers confessed to shooting civilians in Kolki and in another village near Kovel:
Our squadron took part in the shootings of civilians in the small town of Kolki. I personally participated in shooting three civilians. Then we burnt down part of the town. During the retreat, after crossing the River Styr, we burnt down the first village beyond the river. In that village our second platoon under Untersturmführer Korn shot 25 persons. I myself shot two persons. Women were among those shot. Of the men of our platoon, those particularly active in the shootings were Rottenführer Waneck, Unterscharführer Polin, Unterscharführer Steikdel, troopers Schirmann and Faut. The shootings were done on the orders of Regimental commander Standartenführer Zehender.52
Andrew Borowiec has suggested there was communication between an SS general and the Polish resistance in March 1944. This area came under the Polish 27th Resistance Division, highly regarded for its fighting ability. The division suffered grievous losses at the hands of the
Wiking. Later, en route to the Warsaw uprising, it was surrounded by Soviet troops and disarmed.53
Although it is difficult to identify real or lasting friendships within the SS, it does appear that Himmler and Bach-Zelewski shared a common bond. Another bout of Bach-Zelewski’s health problems provides evidence of some bonding. Prior to his Kovel assignment, a medical examination in December passed Bach-Zelewski as fit. The doctor even commented that his energy made it difficult to prevent him from being at the front.54 On March 12, Himmler wrote to Bach-Zelewski,
I can only acknowledge that in spite of this heavy health handicap you stood so outstandingly with your Kampfgruppe. Lombard will give you the plan in detail. In general it might be said that SS-[Obergruppenführer] Gille will command the re-building of the SS-Division Wiking and he will in the next few days takeover your Kampfgruppe. Lombard will stay on for “special tasks.”55
Bach-Zelewski was examined again on March 22, and the diagnosis indicated a return of his bowel problems although his hemorrhoids operation remained a success.56
Hitler almost certainly held Bach-Zelewski in disdain for leaving Kovel on the spurious grounds of his ill health. The change of command in Kovel caused problems between the remaining Bandenkampfverbände team and the incubant Waffen-SS staff. On April 15, Reimpel wrote to Bach-Zelewski,
My position has seen a change because of the arrival of the SS-Wiking, no longer the deputy, and have to be loud to be heard. The Gruppenführer [Gille] is a man to look up to but he is not quite what it takes. The influence of the young-blood staff officers is a problem. My tasks are finished and I wish to leave as fast as possible. As long as my men are bleeding here, this is my place. The co-operation of the staff in the first days was great. The Führer has interfered and sacrificed that capability.57
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