by Philip Leigh
By May 1863, Hart had concluded that the only way he could get the required cotton was to impress it, by force if necessary. He wrote Confederate Major General James Magruder, commanding in Texas, for permission to impress cotton. When Magruder did not respond, he wrote Richmond, where his request got tangled up in red tape, although President Davis eventually replied inconclusively that he “never intended to employ such means except as a last resort.”37 By then, however, events in the Trans-Mississippi had already settled the matter.
On May 20, 1863, a British steamer carrying a large load of Enfield rifles for Major Hart arrived off the mouth of the Rio Grande. The skipper demanded prompt payment of two thousand cotton bales before he would release the cargo. Hart again wrote Magruder for an order empowering him to impress cotton. Magruder forwarded the letter to Kirby Smith in Shreveport. Kirby Smith tried to get Magruder to write the order, but when the latter refused, Smith finally yielded on June 27, 1863, and took responsibility for authorizing impressment. He even went further and authorized impressment of wagons and transportation equipment when required. Magruder acted quickly, and by August 1863, there was hardly a bale of privately owned cotton in Texas south of the Nueces River, which was the Brownsville district.
Texas growers were furious because the export market provided much better prices than those designated on the Confederate impressment schedule. Moreover, the export market could pay in specie, whereas impressment was made with Confederate financial instruments. It was partly to address such complaints that Kirby Smith organized the Cotton Bureau under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel William A. Broadwell. Owing to the size of Texas and its large volumes of cotton, Broadwell opened a branch of the bureau in Houston. Although officially a jurisdictional branch of Shreveport, the Houston office acted independently. It announced that Texas growers were required to sell half their crop to the bureau at fixed prices while the other half could be sold on the free market. However, growers were required to provide transportation of all the cargo, including the portion impressed by the army.
The order triggered two unintended consequences. First, many growers rushed to sell available inventories at bargain prices to buyers on the free market. Second, Governor Pendleton Murrah and the Texas legislature responded with a plan to provide planters a legal alternative offering better prices than Cotton Bureau impressment. They organized the Texas State Military Board, which was authorized to supply ordnance and supplies for Texas militia. The board was approved to issue $2 million worth of bonds backed by Texas land, as opposed to depreciated currency. Such bonds could be used to buy cotton because the growers would accept them owing to the real estate backing the securities.
Murrah implemented a policy whereby cotton would be purchased with the bonds and transported across the Rio Grande. Once it was in Mexico, the Texas board would return title to half of the cotton to the original owner. Since all of the cotton was officially “owned” by the state of Texas while in transit, the Confederate Cotton Bureau could not seize it because government-owned cotton was exempt from Confederate impressment. By March 1864, about one hundred thousand bales had already been sold to the state.
In Shreveport, Cotton Bureau leader Broadwell responded by imploring Kirby Smith to impress whatever cotton was needed, even if it was “officially” owned by the state of Texas. The general felt compelled to react with dictatorial regulations. Every cotton grower was required to sell half of his volume to the Cotton Bureau. Only those traders licensed by the bureau could engage in international commerce. Essentially, the general nationalized cotton trade, nearly transforming it into a Confederate government monopoly.
Murrah protested the latest moves by the Cotton Bureau as a usurpation of states' rights. Kirby Smith responded that the conflicting Texas regulations eviscerated the Confederacy's ability to defend itself west of the Mississippi River. Even some Texas newspapers supported the general. Murrah and Kirby Smith met personally in July 1864, after which the governor capitulated. He concluded that the survival of the army and Texas itself required unencumbered importation of military supplies, which the army could not purchase without cotton. Nonetheless, impressment remained unpopular and was sometimes abused by imposters. For example, in May 1864, three bogus “impressment officers” were hanged in Lavaca County, Texas, after seizing property and threatening the lives of unwilling victims.
Although President Davis later restrained some of the harshest Cotton Bureau regulations, the pragmatic effects were minimal. The bureau functioned and prospered until February 1865, when its duties were assumed by the Confederate Treasury Agency in Marshall, Texas.38 Interbelligerent cotton trade in the Trans-Mississippi after the fall of Vicksburg not only enabled Confederates to keep an army in the field but also provided them enough support to turn back two federal offensives and launch an invasion of Missouri during the 1864 presidential elections.39
Although planning started in January, the federal Red River offensive did not get under way until March 10, 1864. Components of three Union armies and one navy flotilla started to converge on Kirby Smith's headquarters at Shreveport. General Banks, with twenty thousand troops, would first combine forces with Admiral Porter and General A. J. Smith with ten thousand soldiers at Alexandria to advance on Shreveport from the southeast. However, Smith's troops were only temporarily loaned from Sherman's army and were supposed to start returning to Sherman by April 15. Union General Frederick Steele was to advance with twelve thousand men from Little Rock and Fort Smith, Arkansas, thereby approaching Shreveport from the northeast.
While Smith and Porter were instructed to “cooperate” with Banks, the Massachusetts general lacked direct authority over them. The force proceeding to Shreveport from the southeast included a total of thirty thousand effectives of all arms, with ninety cannon and Porter's flotilla of thirteen ironclads and nine other vessels. The movement from Arkansas was delayed partly because Union troops were needed to supervise voter ratification of a Union-loyal state constitution and election of a federally recognized governor. Lincoln desired the election so that the state might provide delegates to the June presidential nominating convention. The presence of federal troops nearly assured a favorable vote. The new Arkansas constitution was ratified on March 14, 1864, and Isaac Murphy was inaugurated governor the following month.40 Because of obligations to supervise the election and his own reluctance for the expedition, Steele did not get started until March 25.41 Although he was also directed to “cooperate” with Banks, he would be mostly on his own until the two Union pincers could connect, presumably somewhere in northern Louisiana during April.42
Kirby Smith had been expecting such an enemy offensive for months and was easily persuaded to quickly sell cotton to most any buyer rather than be forced to burn it ahead of a federal advance. Between Louisiana and Arkansas he had at most twelve thousand troops to resist a combined forty-two thousand Union soldiers plus Admiral Dixon's flotilla. While he could call on additional troops from distant points in Texas, few could be expected to arrive rapidly. Thus, it was improbable that his command could climb to as high as twenty thousand men during the present emergency. Given the numbers and resources of the opposing federals, a sizable loss of cotton inventories was a near certainty, whether they were sold, confiscated, or burned.
Prior to the military advance on the Red River, cotton traders and well-connected individuals approached President Lincoln, General Banks, and others with various schemes to get cotton inventories out of the region before Confederates burned them. By February, Banks estimated a combination of proposals could secure as much as two hundred thousand to three hundred thousand bales, which would equal $100 million to $150 million, at an average price of one dollar per pound, to the final textile industry buyers. Given the large sums involved, it's not surprising that nearly all the proposals were self-serving to those originating them, including many who were untrustworthy.43
One example was a secret Confederate sympathizer and director of the Union-loyal
Louisiana State Bank, John Stevenson. On behalf of the bank, he held title to about twenty thousand bales behind Confederate lines in northern Louisiana. He wished to ship them to George Arnold & Company in Liverpool, where they would be sold and the proceeds credited to the Louisiana bank. The bank would first apply such proceeds to an outstanding Stevenson loan. The balance would be credited to his account. However, he secretly agreed that the Confederacy could use his excess credit to buy munitions and supplies in Great Britain. Stevenson obtained a document authorizing the shipment, which was signed by Lincoln, Louisiana military governor Shepley, and the New Orleans customs collector.
But Stevenson's plans were frustrated by a conflicting agreement between Banks and two men named McKee. Confederate Major Andrew W. McKee, who later disappeared and may have obtained his position under false pretenses, was the ranking purchasing agent in Shreveport's Cotton Bureau. His cousin, J. H. McKee, was a civilian speculator on the Union side. The civilian McKee told Banks that his cousin could delay Confederate orders for cotton burning once the campaign was under way in exchange for payments of eighteen cents a pound on bales turned over to the federal army. Banks planned that cotton secured through the proposal would be auctioned, with proceeds paid to the US Treasury except for fees owed to the McKees. Once Banks began his march, the McKees blocked Stevenson's shipment because the banker's bales were among those the cousins wanted to reserve for Banks.44
Eventually, Major McKee was convicted of multiple charges in a Confederate court-martial, but he was released by a civilian court. It was later learned that the Confederate War Department had no record of a Major Andrew W. McKee and that he had previously arranged numerous transfers of Confederate cotton through the lines. After his release by the civilian court, he jumped bail and vanished.45
Ten days before Christmas Eve 1863, Lincoln signed a pass for former Kentucky congressman Samuel Casey to travel multiple times to Shreveport and be given safe passage when returning with cargo. (Casey was a brother-in-law of General Grant's.)46 While en route, he learned that Porter's flotilla would accompany Banks up the Red River. Casey sent a telegram to Lincoln, stating, “Do not let Admiral Porter send an expedition up the Red River until you hear from me again. If he should, he will defeat all my plans.” Astonishingly, he was trying to require the US military to adjust its plans to accommodate his business proposition.47
Casey found Shreveport to be an active commercial center. Since the occupation of Brownsville in November, Kirby Smith had determined it was more expedient to sell cotton across enemy lines than to export it to Mexico. Contrary to US Treasury regulations, Casey used British pounds instead of the US greenbacks legally required to purchase twenty thousand bales from Kirby Smith's Cotton Bureau. On returning to Washington in February, Casey learned that agents for international buyers in New Orleans were attempting to derail the transaction.
Casey hurriedly met with Lincoln again. This time he secured a signed paper naming Casey and several other men as the owners of the specified cotton and instructing the military to provide any necessary protection required for the shipment. One of the other owners mentioned in the president's note was his friend William Butler. Casey rushed back to Louisiana but only arrived in time to become one of many cotton speculators trailing in the wake of Banks's army.48
Shortly before arriving in Alexandria to meet General Smith's column and Admiral Dixon's flotilla, General Banks settled on a cotton policy. He would allow loyal citizens to ship their inventories to New Orleans so long as none had ever been owned by the Confederate government. Owners would be permitted to sell their bales at New Orleans. However, one-third of the proceeds would be withheld by the US Treasury until it could be determined that none of the cash was to be used in a manner damaging to the United States. All cotton owned by the Confederate government would be seized and sold at auction for the benefit of the US Treasury, except for such fees payable to persons like the McKees for helping to locate and identify it.
When Banks reached Alexandria on March 24, he was shocked to see Admiral Porter's sailors continually loading cotton onto their boats as a prize of war. It was probably the most conspicuous incidence of Porter's earning his “Thief of the Mississippi” nom de guerre. His men scoured the countryside painting “C. S. A.” on any bales they found in order to falsely represent them as property of the Confederate government and therefore subject to seizure under prize law. Next they would strike a line through the “C. S. A.” initials and add “U. S. N.” to signify the change in ownership to the US Navy. Afterward, locals facetiously remarked that Porter's “C. S. A.–U. S. N.” stenciling was an abbreviation for “Cotton Stealing Association of the United States Navy.”
Porter's cotton seizures not only enraged Southern growers, they also demoralized federal soldiers. To review, maritime prize law awarded a portion of captured cargoes to the applicable naval vessel. Such goods could be sold at auction, with the proceeds divided among the crew. Not only were Porter's seizures often miles from the riverbanks and exempt as noncontraband, but federal troops were dispirited to witness sailors profiting personally under the envious eyes of infantrymen who could not participate merely because they served in a different military branch. Animosity intensified on their learning that the admiralty prize court with jurisdiction was in Porter's home base of Cairo, Illinois. Even in official correspondence, at least one army officer grumbled, “every gunboat is loaded with cotton and the officers are taking it without regard to the loyalty of the owners. It looks…like a big steal.” 49
Like those of other officers who seized private property, Porter's actions violated the Lieber Code issued by Lincoln on April 23, 1863, as General Order 100, “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.” Among others, Articles 37 and 38 were violated without consequence:
Article 37. The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by them…strictly private property;…Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously punished.
Article 38. Private property…can be seized only by way of military necessity, for the support or other benefit of the army or of the United States. If the owner has not fled, the commanding officer will cause receipts to be given, which may serve the spoliated [sic] owner to obtain indemnity.50
No doubt a clever lawyer like Butler would argue that Articles 37 and 38 did not apply because rebellious states like Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas were not “hostile countries.”
Presumably, General Banks was dismayed by Porter's seizure because it ruined his arrangement with the McKees to spare some cotton from the Rebel army torch. No doubt the McKees and Samuel Casey were even more bitterly disappointed. Since Admiral Porter was not his subordinate, Banks could not order him to cease or change his practices, despite the fact that the admiral had been instructed to “cooperate” with the general.51
As a result of military defeats, low water, and supply difficulties, Banks, Porter, and Steele were forced to abandon efforts to capture Shreveport or hoist the flag of the United States in east Texas. Banks's retreat was occasioned by additional civilian property destruction, which likely included cotton. On May 7, Union Major General Canby was assigned command of the Military Division of West Mississippi and was to direct all operations of the Departments of the Gulf and Arkansas, thereby making both Banks and Steele subordinate to him. A few days earlier, Steele had returned to Little Rock with a hungry but intact army. Banks and Porter did not reach safety until May 20, after burning Alexandria and leaving much of central Louisiana in burned-out desolation. As Confederate Major General Richard Taylor, whose army pursued Banks, remembered: “In [the army's] rapid flight from Grand Ecore to Monette's Ferry, a distance of forty miles, the Federals burned nearly every house on the road. In pursuit we passed the smoking ruins of homesteads, by which stood weeping women and children.”52
Banks gathered a total of only about four thousand cotton bales, of which twenty-five hundred went to C. A. Weed & Company in New Or
leans. Earlier, Weed had been a business partner of General Butler's shady older brother, Andrew. The privileged cotton owned by Samuel Casey and Lincoln's friend William Butler fell victim to an unexpected military emergency. When Porter attempted to return downstream after Banks was defeated at the battle of Mansfield, he discovered that the water on the Red River had dropped so low he could not get his ships across the rapids at Alexandria. He was saved by an enterprising Wisconsin engineer who hurriedly constructed a series of dams that provided a channel deep enough for the vessels to get through. Like those of many others, Casey's cotton bales were appropriated for use as dam construction materials. As a result, Porter sent only about six thousand bales to the prize court.53
Porter's unrestrained confiscations at Alexandria early in the campaign are probably largely responsible for Banks's failure to return with much cotton. The admiral's methods persuaded Southerners upstream from Alexandria to burn most of their cotton. About one hundred fifty thousand bales were burned to avoid letting the Yankees get them for free.54
When Porter later testified before the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, he artfully, but falsely, characterized the entire campaign as an enterprise to obtain cotton for Banks and people connected to him. When asked about the cotton seizures under naval prize law, he simply lied: “It was seized as government cotton and sent to the courts without any application on the part of the navy as prize law at all.” Nonetheless, about two months after the campaign ended, Congress passed a law stipulating that no property taken on inland waters could be considered a maritime prize. Porter is estimated to have collected over $90,000 personally before the change.55
The allegations of personal corruption and profiteering against Banks, who returned with little cotton and was defeated militarily, were unjust. The congressional committee needed a villain. Porter's successful military record unfairly gave him immunity and conferred a false credibility on his accusations against Banks. Those subordinates who were sensitive to the direction of the political wind merely piled on with more false or one-sided accounts. Author Michael Thomas Smith concluded, “Whatever the hopes of merchants in New Orleans and elsewhere…Banks did not intend that he or anyone else in his army should make a profit from Red River cotton.”56