According to 'Alice' the technical problems had two sources. Firstly, the site chosen to house the multi-force joint enquiry - the old Moss Hey Police Station - was one of Manchester's oldest police stations. Once a Divisional Headquarters but now housing only the local community policing team, it easily met the enquiry's needs space-wise, (at the time it was established it comprised some ninety-plus detectives and a similar number of civilian support staff.) What it lacked, however, was the upgraded technical infrastructure that is essential to modern, large-scale police investigations. In the early stages, Alice told me, the rooms allocated to the enquiry team even suffered from a severe shortage of electrical sockets.
Similarly, for a significant part of its lifetime, Operation Ford suffered from a shortfall in the number of HOLMES-trained staff needed to service just its day-to-day demands. The history leading up to Operation Ford's inception is relevant here.
Whether by design or chance, the sites were Hart claimed his first three victims were geographically distant from each other and covered by three separate police forces - Lancashire, Greater Manchester, and West Yorkshire. It wasn't until three months after the third murder, that of Stretford-based escort Irena Ivanova, that investigators finally agreed that all three murders were linked. (They had initially considered, then discounted the theory several weeks earlier.) In the interests of fairness, it should be recognised that at various times during this period each of those forces was also running one or more other Major Crime Investigations of varying size and duration. By the time the links between the girl's murders were confirmed, the three enquiries had been running for several months - fifteen in the case of Hart's first murder, that of Francesca Yap in Preston. During that period, each of the enquiries had amassed a huge amount of investigative data. All were classed as a Tier 1 Investigation, (the most serious.) According to Alice, problems first arose when attempts were made to merge the three existing data bases to serve the new, joint enquiry, Operation Ford, being set up by the collaborating forces. First, a technical 'glitch' resulted in a large amount of data being 'lost', (some 'glitch' you may think, and you'd be right.) The result was that during the first three months of its existence a significant proportion of the enquiry's resources were allocated to re-investigation and the recovery of lost information, (sightings; witnesses; suspects, etc.). The impact may have been exacerbated by a top-level decision to use the merging of the three databases as an opportunity to 'weed out extraneous data' that had the potential to clog up the system. The end result was a Major Crime Enquiry where for several weeks no-one was quite sure what was relevant, or who was doing what. As Alice recounts, "Duplication of effort was a day-to-day problem. It led to hundreds, if not thousands of investigation-hours being wasted."
But the worst impact of these difficulties was the effect it had on the moral of the men and woman who were part of it. An enquiry such as Ford thrives on clear direction from its SIOs. In turn, this (usually) contributes to building and maintaining a momentum in which investigators feel positively about what they are doing, including a firm belief that simply by following 'the system' they will, eventually, succeed in their mission.
Alice describes how during the middling twelve months of the enquiry, (before Jamie Carver's arrival), the level of moral amongst the investigators was in her words, 'As low as I have ever experienced on an enquiry of this nature. And I've worked on a lot.' She wasn't alone in this view.
A Detective Sergeant of several years standing who also worked on the Ford investigation - "Jock" - spoke of a feeling amongst experienced investigators that they were on the receiving end of, "piss-poor leadership". 'The thinking among a lot of us,' Jock told me, 'Was that, apart from making public appeals for information, those leading the enquiry seemed to have little or no idea of how to go about tracking down a killer operating in and familiar with the murky world of escorts, pimps and deviant sex.'
It is neither my intention nor my place to speculate as to the causes of any of the problems perceived by the likes of Alice and Jock. Nor can I judge if they were justified. For all that those I interviewed were happy to confide in me, it was always on the understanding that the purpose of my research was not to amass ammunition that may be later used against any individuals, but rather to gain insights into the day-to-day realities of working as part of a Major Crime Investigation.
And it needs to be acknowledged at this point that Operation Ford was Major - in every sense of the word. Apart from the sheer size of the enquiry, its logistics, its mass of accumulated data, public and political opinion played an important part at every stage. For three years, those living in the areas in which the killer was operating - basically the whole of North West England - lived in fear. For three years, politicians, national as well as local, and leading Police figures demanded and expected results. The pressures on those leading the investigation were enormous and extreme, twenty-four-seven. That said I would not be doing justice to the information disclosed to me if I did not refer to at least one episode which may or may not have some relevance to the issues raised by the likes of Alice and Jock, as well as others.
On a fine, early September morning, four months after the multi-force Operation Ford Investigation was established, the body of Joanna Linklater was discovered by her cleaning lady in her apartment on the outskirts of the small, upmarket-Cheshire town of Wilmslow. The first CID officers on scene quickly recognised signs indicating it could be part of the 'Ford' series. Not wishing to be later accused of failing to follow any established protocols, the senior detective present, an Area Detective Inspector by the name of Jamie Carver, made immediate contact with the Operation Ford Murder Control Room.
According to my sources, at the time the call was received, the Ford SIO, Detective Chief Superintendent Clive Robinson, was not at his desk. Attempts were made to contact him, but without success. By strange coincidence, Robinson's deputy, Detective Superintendent Paul Slattery was also absent. Like his boss, he also was not answering his telephone. In the absence of Ford's two senior investigators, the question was asked, (not least I suspect by Carver), 'Who the Hell is running things?' From my understanding, no clear answer was forthcoming at that time.
I have no hard information concerning the precise chain of events that followed, (when I eventually got to speak with Carver, he would not be drawn on the matter,) but suffice to say that it was not until late in the afternoon that an officer from the Ford Enquiry Team finally made face-to-face contact with the detectives dealing with the Wilmslow scene. This at a time when the Cheshire officers were desperate to know if they needed to defer to the Ford Investigators, or get on with setting up their own enquiry, as they were ready to do. This at a time when, as Police Major Crime protocols and procedures aim to ensure, the need for clarity, direction and speedy action in terms of securing, managing and assessing a major crime scene is of the highest priority if it is not to impact, detrimentally, upon the subsequent investigation.
What the effects of these delays if any were on the management of the early stages of the investigation into Joanna Linklater's murder, I cannot say. If they had any knock-on-effect on what happened later, I have no evidence that testifies to it. What I do know, is that later that day, members of the Cheshire Police Chief Officer team were, as someone described to me, 'incandescent with rage' over the fact that for a significant period of that day, at a critical time in the force's attempts to get to grips with a major crime, the investigation with which it was seeking to establish contact was, to all intents and purposes, leaderless. I also know that later that day phone conversations took place between the respective forces' Chief Constables, as well as their Crime Commissioners. Some of those calls have been described as 'prickly'.
To my knowledge, no one has shone any light on the precise reasons for the unexplained absences of both the Senior Investigating Officer and the Deputy SIO to what was the biggest enquiry of its type in the UK this century. I am not aware of any enquiry, official or otherwise, into
the matter. What I can do however, is present you with the following facts, all of which I can verify.
The day Joanna Linklater's body was discovered, a Pro-Am-Celebratory Golf Tournament was taking pace at the prestigious Mere Golf and Country Club, just over Manchester's border in Cheshire, (not far, coincidently, from Wilmslow itself). It attracted participation of a large number of household names from the worlds of golf, sport and TV/Movie entertainment.
Both Clive Robinson and Paul Slattery were, and still are, members of the Mere Golf and Country Club. Both have been described by members of the club with whom I have spoken as, "keen on golf, to the exclusion of everything apart from their wives. And not them if we're being honest."
The tournament that day started with a champagne breakfast, during which more bottles of champagne were opened and consumed than had been planned for. According to one of the club staff on duty, by the time participants left to go out on the course to play, many were in, 'high spirits.'
Mere Golf course is renowned for its beautiful but undulating landscape. Many of the greens and fairways are surrounded by or cut through heavily-wooded areas. At that time, mobile phone reception around large parts of the course ranged between poor and non-existent, though my understanding is that it is now improved, significantly.
In response to a direct question, a paid-up member of the club who is also a local councillor and who was present at the tournament at first informed me that both Slattery and Robinson were present during the champagne breakfast. He also stated that he had seen them both, though not together, out on the course during the morning session. Within fifteen minutes of me speaking with him he rang me back to retract his account stating that he had, 'Made a mistake,' and that he had, 'confused the occasion subject of my enquiry with a previous, similar event," though he could not say, 'with certainty', which event that was.
No others among the twenty-plus club members with whom I have spoken, provided me with any evidence to support the suggestion that either Robinson or Slattery were there that day. Curiously, and equally, none of them were prepared to go on record as categorically denying they were there either.
Finally, though there is no objective evidence to support the view, it is clear from the interviews I have conducted, that there is a general perception amongst members of the Operation Ford Investigation Team, (police and support staff), that it was during the two-to-three week period following Joana Linklater's murder, (during which Ford was being expanded to encompass it,) that moral amongst staff fell, drastically. Some have described to me hearing, on several occasions, 'shouting matches' between the Senior Investigating Officer Team emanating from the SIO's offices. As one detective put it when describing this period to me, "There was a general feeling among us all that unless someone gets a grip, we're never going to catch this bastard."
Then something happened.
Cheshire Police, being now part of the joint-force Operation Ford Investigation, confirmed the level of its contribution in terms of finance and, more importantly, personnel. The personnel comprised several fully-HOLMES-trained support staff, and a cohort of experienced detectives. They included two Detective Inspectors. One of them was Jamie Carver.
Next Week: In Part 2 of his fascinating insight into the running of a major crime enquiry, Andrew Jackson describes what happened following Jamie Carver's secondment onto Operation Ford, as well as some of the organisational changes that occurred and that would eventually lead to the investigators identifying a possible suspect - a man called, 'Eddy'. In doing so he poses the question, "Is Jamie Carver the UK's foremost Serial Sex Crime Investigator?"
Don't miss it.
PART II
Continuing Andrew Jackson's insightful account of the running of Operation Ford, the multi-force Major Police Crime Investigation into the murders of female sex workers in and around North West England and which came to be known as, The Escort Murders. It culminated in the arrest followed by the trial and conviction of the serial killer, Edmund Hart. Following Hart's conviction, Operation Ford was hailed as, 'A vindication for good, solid, old fashioned, local policing.' Andrew Jackson spoke to many officers and staff who worked on the investigation. Not all share that sentiment.
It is only with a good deal of hindsight that I recall some of the changes that I as a member of the covering press team began to notice in the day-to-day running of Operation Ford in the weeks following Jamie Carver's arrival and his subsequent appointmen1t as an Assistant Senior Investigating Officer, (ASIO).
Most of us first came across him when he began appearing at the daily press briefings, sometimes alongside his immediate boss, Detective Superintendent and Deputy SIO Paul Slattery, sometimes on his own. But as the weeks went by, Slattery's involvement diminished while Carver's grew until he became the de-facto presenter. For most of us, this was a welcome change, having witnessed a distinct shift in the focus of these briefings over the previous eighteen months. In the early days, they consisted of little more than a statement, read out by whichever member of the SIO team was available. They contained little more than updates and/or details of lines of enquiry the investigators were happy to share with the public. Questions were not encouraged and interaction between deliverers and receivers was virtually non-existent. Then Paul Slattery took over, when initially, things changed for the better. A confident and relaxed public speaker, Slattery comes across as a graduate of the Modern School of Policing; media savvy, open in his manner and not afraid to tackle difficult questions head-on - even if he does have the clever knack of turning them into ones he can answer comfortably, leaving the enquirer somewhat bemused as to whether they have simply missed the answer, or been bamboozled. But as time went on, it became increasingly noticeable that the briefings were becoming more and more about Slattery himself, rather than an occasion for sharing relevant information with the press. Within the press corps, we even began referring to them as, 'The Slattery Show.' Instead of purely factual updates, Slattery's statements started to sound more and more like Henry V-style calls to arms. Sometimes they bordered on personal rants. His manner also evolved. Relaxed from the start, he began to embellish his delivery with jokey asides, to the point where many of us began to suspect they'd been scripted. We all know that the police learned long ago the importance of building and maintaining 'good relations' with the media, particularly when dealing with major incidents. But as laughter and jokey-banter started to become a more-than-just-occasional feature of the briefings, I began to wonder if Slattery was trying too hard to show us the 'Human' side of policing. My suspicions hardened further when he started bringing in other, usually more junior members of the investigation team to deal with subjects that lent themselves to being handled by someone with specialised knowledge or experience, issues such as Scene Management, or matters pertaining to technical or scientific investigation. Fair enough, one might think - until you realise he was using the occasion to show everyone - police and media - just how 'inclusive' he was. He even developed the habit of introducing his 'guests' by referring to their experience and expertise, but in a way that left the impression they had picked it all up from him.
Thankfully, as Jamie Carver's involvement in these briefings increased, a more appropriately-balanced approach began to reassert itself. The qualities we had come to value - openness, relevant and factual information, interaction - and which to be fair Slattery had ushered in, were still there. But now the emphasis was back on what the media needed to know, as well as what the enquiry wished to share that might draw in help from the public. References to individual investigators and/or their personal qualities no longer featured. With Carver at the helm, briefings returned to being professional and businesslike. More importantly they were useful - to both sides.
How much of all this was the result of any deliberate change in policy as opposed to differences between Slattery's and Carver's personal qualities or even a balance of the two is impossible to gauge. But I suspect someone in the police hierarchy, probably someon
e who knew Carver became alert to the danger in what was happening and threw the right switches. Either way, most of us in the press were grateful, even if many us viewed the official explanation for Slattery's withdrawal, "pressure of investigatory commitments", with a degree of cynicism.
But briefings were not the only area where we began to sense changes following Carver's arrival. Most of us had become aware that when it came to communicating with anyone outside the investigation team, the prevailing attitude within it was one of utmost secrecy. Our sense was that staff were being constantly reminded of the 'dangers' of speaking about the investigation to 'outsiders'. Of course confidentiality is an important part of any police investigation, however serious. But when even an enquiry as mundane as asking for confirmation of the number of detectives working on the operation full-time is met with the standard response, "Bring it up at the next briefing,' one suspects that a culture geared towards non-disclosure may be prevailing.
But that iron grip, if it was a grip, also appeared to loosen after Carver's arrival. Along with his open manner at briefings, we began to notice that staff generally were responding to enquiries more positively. They even began returning our calls - something previously unheard of. And where before they seemed scared of speaking to anyone bearing the label, 'media', we began to find them much more relaxed, almost to the point of being eager to do so. Over the space of Carver's first three months, the veil of secrecy that had hung over the enquiry to that point seemed to lift and didn't come back, at least not until after Hart's arrest, about which more later.
Whatever the cause, there was no doubting that the press corps became aware of a developing mood change within the investigation team over this period. In Part I of this series, I referred to the problems of low morale and lack of confidence in its leaders, as described to me by the likes of Alice, Jock and others. As with the communication issue described in the previous paragraph, this prevailing mood also began to change for the better, as if they had a renewed self-belief in what they were doing. References to a time when the killer might be caught changed from, 'If we ever…' to 'When..'. It may be a cliche but it is no exaggeration to report that in the months following Carver's arrival my colleagues and I perceived that there was a definite, 'new spring in the investigators' footsteps.'
The Carver Articles Page 2