We are aware that the Japanese had frangible glass grenades, but our records suggest that they were charged with hydrogen cyanide (HCN) only. Examples of this type of grenade were captured in Malaya and Burma during the relevant period. The grenades had a practical range of about ten yards and were evidently intended to be broken dose to slits and openings in AFVs or pillboxes. Since HCN is highly volatile at the temperatures prevailing in Malaya and Burma it was hoped that enough vapour might be drawn in to cause at least giddiness or loss of co-ordination of the crews.
There was also the possibility of using the glass grenades in the open when they could be thrown into Bren carriers or other open vehicles. More serious casualties might result from splashes of liquid on the skin or eyes, but it is uncertain how much liquid would reach the skin at these temperatures.
The only other incapacitating agent in the Japanese chemical armoury were the tear gas chloroacetophenone (CAP) and the arsenical dyphenylcyanoarsine (DC). There is no record of either of these having been filled into frangible grenades. We think that in this case the vapour was HCN; this fits the facts as we know them. These grenades were formal Japanese equipment produced and filled centrally and issued to the troops in the normal way. They were not a local contrivance.
It appears, therefore, that the two attacks described above could well be the first attempts ever made to knock out a tank by purely chemical means. I can find no trace of these weapons being used again against tanks during the war in Burma.
During the days that followed, 7th Hussars carried out a variety of small operations, including a heavy raid on the village where the Thais had been encountered, harassing what was now in fact the enemy’s rear areas. Substantial casualties were inflicted, and some transport destroyed, including two staff cars, one of which contained the Japanese chief of propaganda for the area. The regiment was then withdrawn by 17th Division, and moved to an area west of Meiktila on 22nd April.
For 2 RTR, their relief by 7th Hussars on 13 th April had brought little respite, and during the afternoon of that day they had even to run the gaundet of the bridge over the Yin Chaung* east of Kokkogwa, which was covered by a Japanese 75-mm gun firing over open sights from a concealed position approximately 1,000 yards away. After the enemy had hit the bridge several times, those vehicles not across found their way over by a ford to the north.
On their way north, the regiment picked up the KOYLI and ferried them to Milestone 310 where they were to take up positions between the road and the river, and cover the west flank of the withdrawal. The Second, less B Squadron, then proceeded by stages to Milestone 336, where they spent two relatively quiet days.
On 14th April B Squadron, who were still detached, inflicted casualties on the enemy while they were trying to recover transport of the KOYLIs which had been ambushed the night before while trying to reach their infantry. The transport had been abandoned in the village of Tokson, and B Squadron sent one troop, 8 Troop, with the KOYLI drivers.
On approaching the village the tanks came under considerable machine gun fire and it was evident that the village was strongly held. As there were no infantry with the tanks it was not possible to put in an attack. The KOYLI drivers were therefore sent back and the village was engaged by the tanks and the gunners. At least fifty of the enemy were killed. This was confirmed by some of the KOYLI who were at the far side of the village unknown to the tanks. They had tried to contact the tanks to plan an attack on the village, but the tanks had retired before contact was made as the liaison officer from the infantry had gone missing on his way.
On 16th April both B and C Squadrons covered the withdrawal of the two infantry brigades, the 1st and 13th, which were under increasing pressure from the enemy, who ambushed another column of lorries and made B Squadron’s tanks a specific target for their mortar teams, causing them to change position constantly.
Several other enemy columns were reported moving northwards and C Squadron was ordered to assist B Squadron. C Squadron moved off and advanced south from the lateral road running east from Magwe to try and cut the road running north east into Magwe. The Squadron advanced on a front of about a thousand yards so as to try and make contact with the enemy columns moving north and to try and link up with B Squadron on their left. The country in this area had some very thick areas which were interspersed with some large open stretches. Visibility was therefore sometimes only a few yards, and sometimes up to five hundred yards.
C Squadron advanced about two miles but found great difficulty in linking up with B Squadron who were withdrawing on their left. B Squadron were continually reporting enemy moving north and north-east up the road to Magwe. One troop of B Squadron was fired on from a village near the main road, one tank being hit by a 75-mm. The tank was not knocked out and managed to shoot up the crew of the gun and damage it. At the same time the centre troop of C Squadron was fired on from a village a short distance to the west. 2/Lt Timmis’s tank was hit six times at very close range by a 75-mm, and Timmis, with the remainder of his crew, was killed. The driver, Tpr Russel, was seen to get out after the first shell and try to get a rifle off the side of the tank to engage the enemy before the second shell killed him.
Both B and C Squadrons remained in observation for the remainder of the afternoon engaging small parties of the enemy who were seen moving in the area. At 1700 hrs the regiment received orders to retire to the area north of Yenaungyaung for a few days rest and maintenance, but to leave one squadron to act as rearguard to 1st Burma Division.
Accordingly, having detached A Squadron for this purpose, the regiment moved off at 1830, B Squadron following Brigade HQ, followed in turn by E Troop Essex Yeomanry and C Squadron. The move through the gathering darkness was illuminated by the glow of the burning oil wells and installations at Yenaungyaung, which had been destroyed over the past two days by the Burma Oil Company’s own civilian demolition teams.
4 The battle of Yenaungyaung
Passing through Yenaungyaung itself, the light from the raging fires made it possible to read inside the turrets of the Stuarts.
A little north of the town, Sgt Gibbs of C Squadron reported that his tank was suffering from a petrol stoppage, and Major Rudkin told him to clear this and follow on as soon as he was able. It was now about 2300, and most of the tank crews were riding on the outside of their vehicles, enjoying the cool night air and unwinding after the action during the afternoon. After retiring 25 miles they had reason to feel safe, and the column was now travelling with lights on.
A few miles beyond Yenaungyaung lies the Pin Chaung, almost dry at this time of year, and here came the first hint of trouble when the Military Police controlling the crossing advised the crews to get back inside, since there had been a good deal of sniping in the area.
As the tail of the column was crossing the chaung there was a burst of machine-gun fire from somewhere up ahead, followed by a heavy explosion. The column halted, and all lights were switched off.
Very soon, a B Squadron crew came down the road and reported that their tank had had a track blown off, probably by mortar fire, as they were passing a burning staff car. Brigade HQ and half of B Squadron had passed the same spot without incident.
Infantry patrols from the Burma Frontier Force were sent out to reconnoitre, and it was decided to await their reports before making any plans. The column was now concentrated in the space of a mile, with tanks, guns, infantry and lorries, some parked three or four deep, all mixed up together.
At 0230 Sgt Gibbs reported by radio to Major Rudkin that whilst he had cleared his petrol stoppage, he had bumped a road block not far north of the chaung. Rudkin told him to destroy the tank and make his way back to the regiment, keeping to the west of the road. An hour later the Japanese set fire to the B Squadron tank that had been knocked out earlier in the night.
With the first streaks of daylight, the enemy began to shell the column sporadically, whilst from the south heavy firing could be heard from the Yenaungyaung direction, indicating t
hat 1st Burma Division, and A Squadron, were in their turn cut off. The various interdictions placed by the enemy across the line of retreat thus created a tactical picture something like this, reading from north to south.
7th Armoured Brigade HQ
½ B Squadron 2 RTR
1 Company West Yorkshire Regiment
_____
Japanese
_____
C Squadron & ½ B Squadron 2 RTR
Burma Frontier Force
Miscellaneous Units
_____
Japanese
_____
1st Burma Division
A Squadron 2 RTR
_____
Japanese
The situation, therefore, possessed all the potential of a major disaster, and General Alexander at once arranged with Lt-General Joseph W. Stilwell, the American officer commanding the Chinese forces in Burma, that the newly arrived Chinese 38th Division should move into the Yenaungyaung area at once, coming under the command of Lt-General William Slim’s 1 Burma Corps.
The 38th Division had the reputation of being one of the best in the Chinese Army. In spite of being entirely deficient in artillery, tanks, transport and indeed any heavy equipment, they were considered to be a very brave and valuable fighting force, and what they lacked in skill they made up for in guts. Their officers made a point of being conspicuous in action, with the result that their casualties were high amongst the commissioned ranks. Morale and discipline were excellent, and they regarded evacuation through wounds or sickness to be a form of disgrace.
As the light began to increase, the details of the enemy’s blocking position became clear. About 1,000 yards to the north the road climbed through a steep cutting to the top of a ridge, and along this the Japanese could be seen in strength, especially east of the road. At about 0700 the Frontier Force patrols returned and pointed out further enemy positions they had encountered during the night. A plan was then made with Brigade HQ to exert pressure simultaneously on the enemy from north and south.
At 0800 the Essex Yeomanry’s 25-pounders began to plaster the ridge from the north, whilst C Squadron, which had shaken out off the road, added their fire to that of the Frontier Force from the south. A 3.7-inch AA gun, which had been protecting the Pin Chaung crossing, opened up from just behind Major Rudkin’s tank, which was ‘most disconcerting when it fired, as the end of the muzzle was within ten feet of the turret of the tank.’ After the gun had fired half a dozen rounds, Rudkin was not sorry to pass on Brigadier Anstice’s request that the gunners should desist at once, since their powerful weapon, engaging at what amounted to something less than point-blank, was bouncing its flat trajectory shells off the ridge and into Brigade HQ beyond.
By 1100 it was considered that sufficient preparation had been made, and the West Yorkshire company, supported by half of B Squadron, attacked from the north. The Yorkshiremen seem to have been in a fine vindictive mood, and indeed they had many grudges to settle, for they swarmed onto the Japanese position and closed with bayonet and butt, boot and fist, hunting the enemy along the ridge until, for all their medieval belief in the nobility of combat, they fled.
The trapped vehicles now began to move northwards, preceded by a troop of tanks, and for a while all went well. However, the Japanese from the ridge, rallied and reinforced, now began to engage the column from the east with heavy and accurate artillery and machine-gun fire. The drivers of the remaining lorries at once abandoned their vehicles, and since there was little the tanks could achieve without them, they moved off over the ridge and formed a close leaguer with Brigade HQ.
During the afternoon the Essex Yeomanry engaged the enemy on the south bank of the Pin Chaung, and the Chinese began to arrive in large numbers, taking up a position on the ridge. It was agreed that 38th Division, with C Squadron, would attack across the chaung the following morning, to try and relieve pressure on the still trapped 1st Burma Division.
Accordingly, at 0615 hours on 18th April, Major Rudkin reported to 38th Division HQ.
‘There was little activity except for the cooking of breakfast and it seemed most unlikely that the attack could start on time. I asked the British liaison officer with the Chinese what was happening and he informed me that as the Chinese realized that they would not be ready to attack at 0630 hours, they had put their watches back one hour, so that officially they were still attacking at 0630 though the time would in reality be 0730. They had, therefore, not lost “face ” by being late.
‘The plan was that a troop of tanks would follow the leading troops of the leading Chinese battalion and give what support it could. Another troop was to follow the leading infantry battalion and assist the leading troop if required. The tanks would be almost entirely road-bound owing to the going off the road.
‘At 0730 the assaulting Chinese moved forward off the ridge on a front of about four hundred yards, the leading troop keeping very close behind on the road. On foot near the tanks was a Chinese interpreter who carried out liaison between the tanks and infantry.
‘After advancing about half a mile the leading tank was hit by a Japanese 75-mm gun situated on the road just north of the Pin Chaung which was firing straight up 300 yards of road. The tank was disabled but there were no casualties.
‘The Chinese advance continued and by afternoon had almost reached the line of the ford on the Pin Chaung which was still held by the enemy. The Chinese had had heavy casualties, especially amongst officers, as it was the custom for Chinese officers to lead, whatever their rank. It was finally decided to hold positions about half a mile north of the crossing and continue the attack next day.’
Throughout the day it had been possible to hear A Squadron on the forward regimental frequency. Major Bourne’s tank troops had given support to both 1st and 13th Brigades, but now 1st Burma Division’s advance northwards to Yenaungyaung was stalled by a road block in the village of Myaunghla. The divisional commander, Major-General Bruce Scott, had put forward a plan to General Slim that the division should abandon its transport and break out on foot during the night, but it was decided to await the result of 38th Division’s attack the following day.
On the 19th April it was the turn of B Squadron to support the Chinese, but 38th Division HQ informed Major Bonham-Carter that the attack would not be made until noon, and this was later postponed until 1300.
It was therefore decided that B Squadron would carry out a preliminary attack across the ford in company with the West Yorkshire’s D Company. This went in at 1150, the infantry riding on the tanks, with the support of the Essex Yeomanry, who fired concentrations on likely areas. Halfway up the slope on the south side of the chaung the Japanese infantry counter-attacked, but were shot flat by the combined fire of the Stuarts and D Company. At this point, with all going well, D Company was withdrawn and sent hurriedly northwards with C Squadron to deal with a reported attack on Kyaukpadaung. This left B Squadron stranded south of the chaung, which was particularly annoying since the report turned out to be false.
However, at 1500 the Chinese began their own attack, which made good progress and soon cleared the southern slopes of the chaung. The advance continued for the remainder of the day, reaching Thwingon, a village on the northern outskirts of Yenaungyaung, early in the evening. This was attacked and taken with the help of B Squadron, numerous Japanese being killed and two hundred British and Indian prisoners being released.
During the day, 1st Burma Division had received a much needed piece of luck. A friendly Burmese had given A Squadron an obscure route round the enemy’s eastern flank, and the tanks had found it clear and just passable for wheeled vehicles. In the event, when the division’s transport was sent along it, the leading vehicles became bogged in, and because the others were unable to pass, all the lorries were burned. The division itself came through on foot, with its animal transport, and although it had also lost its field artillery, considered itself fortunate to have escaped. It had suffered very severely during the past three days, and at
one time had almost been forced to surrender for lack of water. Throughout the afternoon and evening it continued to pass through the Chinese and across the Pin Chaung northwards.
Tired but happy, A Squadron rejoined the regiment. In three days fighting they had supported most units in 1st Burma Division, and if they had not been present at least some of these would have been overrun, with inevitably harsh consequences for the remainder. At one stage the Japanese had pressed their attacks so hard that they had got within yards of the tanks, and had only been beaten off with the greatest difficulty, the tank commanders having to resort to their revolvers to protect themselves. With A Squadron came three members of Sgt Gibbs’s crew who had been captured on the first night of the battle, and subsequently escaped. For his part in the escape of 1st Burma Division Major Bourne was awarded the DSO.
During 20th April the 38th Division was involved in further fighting south of the Pin Chaung, but by evening a state of stalemate had been reached, and the Battle of Yenaungyaung was clearly at an end.
The following day the Chinese began to withdraw to the Kyaukpadaung area, as they were anxious not to overreach themselves. The withdrawal was covered by 2 RTR, A and B Squadrons then moving to Meiktila to turn tracks, which had become very worn by this time. C Squadron remained with 38th Division until the 26th, carrying out patrols and acting as divisional rearguard.
On their last day with 38th Division, Major Rudkin was asked by the second-in-command how many men there were in the squadron. Rudkin told him approximately eighty-five, and a little later was handed eighty-five rupees, one for each man. A collection had been made, and the gesture was very touching, especially as the Chinese were paid next to nothing. So ended the only occasion in history when British troops were directly under Chinese command.
Tank Tracks to Rangoon Page 7