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The twenty more bullish guests at the Soros table that August afternoon weren’t outliers. They reflected the consensus view of corporate America’s top economists. When the Wall Street Journal reviewed the 2008 predictions of America’s fifty-two leading economic forecasters, it found that only one of them had foreseen a fall in GDP. As Dick Fuld, the once lionized Lehman chief, told a congressional committee in October 2008, a month after his firm’s bankruptcy and more than a year after Soros’s lunch: “No one realized the extent and magnitude of these problems, nor how the deterioration of mortgage-backed assets would infect other types of assets and threaten our entire system.”
Alan Greenspan was so wrong-footed by the crash of 2008 that he admitted intellectual defeat. “I made a mistake,” he told a congressional committee on October 23, 2008. “Something which looked to be a very solid edifice, and indeed a critical pillar to market competition and free markets, did break down. And I think that, as I said, shocked me.”
Hindsight makes all of us Einsteins. With the wisdom it bestows, it is easy to mock and malign the actions and the explanations of the Fulds and the Greenspans. But in 2007 and early 2008, inertia—whether you believe it to have been motivated by avariciousness or incompetence—was the normal response. While the bubbles are easy to identify in retrospect, when we are caught up in them, most of us find it difficult to imagine they will ever burst. And even those of us who are intellectually honest and experienced enough to appreciate that, one day, the boom is bound to end, find it tough to act on that realization.
It is not just financial crashes we have a hard time anticipating. Significant paradigm shifts more generally—revolutions in politics and society, as well as those in business and the markets—are notoriously hard to foresee. The CIA famously failed to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union. Less than a year before Hosni Mubarak was toppled, the IMF published a report lauding his economic reforms and the stability they had created. Mike McFaul, a political scientist who was appointed U.S. ambassador to Russia in 2011, believes that “we always assume regime stability and when it comes to authoritarian regimes we are always wrong.”
Even after the revolution has begun—after the first overleveraged bank freezes withdrawals from its riskiest fund, after the protesters win their first important standoff against the soldiers of the ruling regime—most of us are reluctant to admit that the world has changed. As historian Richard Pipes observed, after the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, prices on the Petrograd stock exchange remained stable. And once we recognize that the world has changed, most of us are very bad at adapting our behavior to the new reality.
Instead, according to London Business School professor Donald Sull, most companies respond to revolutionary change by doing what they did before, only more energetically. Sull calls this “active inertia” and he believes it is the main reason good companies fail: “When the world changes, organizations trapped in active inertia do more of the same. A little faster perhaps or tweaked at the margin, but basically the same old same old. . . . Organizations trapped in active inertia resemble a car with its back wheels stuck in a rut. Managers step on the gas. Rather than escape the rut, they only dig themselves in deeper.”
Clayton Christensen, the Harvard Business School professor whose book The Innovator’s Dilemma is the corporate bible on disruptive change, has found that established companies almost always fail when their industries are confronted with disruptive new technologies or markets. And that is not, he argues, because their managers are dumb or lazy. It is because what works in ordinary times is a recipe for disaster in revolutionary ones. “These failed firms,” he writes, “were as well run as one could expect a firm managed by mortals to be—but there is something about the way decisions get made in successful organizations that sows the seeds of eventual failure.”
The rare ability—like Soros’s—to spot paradigm shifts and to adapt to them is one of the economic forces creating the super-elite. That’s because moments of revolutionary change are also usually moments when it is possible to make an instant fortune. And, thanks to the twin gilded ages, we are living in an era of a lot of revolutionary shifts.
One set of changes is in the emerging markets. The broad secular trend since the late 1980s has been for authoritarian regimes to give way to more democratic ones and for closed, state-controlled economies to become more open. Sometimes the transition happens with a bang, as it did in Eastern Europe in 1989 and North Africa in 2011; sometimes it happens more gradually, as in India, China, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa. But in much of the world, the late eighties and the nineties were a time of privatization, deregulation, and the lowering of trade barriers. The result was economic windfalls for the locals and foreigners with the skills, the smarts, and the psyche to take advantage of them.
A second set of revolutions is in technology. New technologies, especially computers and the Internet, then mobile and wireless, are disrupting existing businesses and opening up the chance to create new ones. Like the industrial revolution, which started with mechanization of the textile industry, then the invention of the steam engine, followed by the combustion engine and electricity, the technology revolution isn’t a single discovery; it is wave after wave of related transformations. In 2012, the hot new areas were big data—our ability to collect and analyze massive amounts of information—and machines talking to machines, creating what W. Brian Arthur, the economist who studies technological change, describes as the second, digital economy—“vast, silent, connected, unseen, and autonomous.”
Finally, these two big revolutions, together with a broader global trend toward more open markets in money, goods, and ideas, combine to reinforce each other and create a faster-paced, more volatile world. Twitter and Facebook are the offspring of the technology revolution, but they turn out to have made political revolutions easier to organize. Before the invention of the personal computer, the securitization of mortgages—which turned out to be part of the kindling for the financial crisis—would not have been possible. Nor would the algorithmic trading revolution, in which machines are replacing centuries-old stock exchanges and a couple of lines of corrupt code can trigger a multibillion-dollar loss of market value in moments, as occurred during the “flash crash” on May 6, 2010.
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Revolution is the new global status quo, but not everyone is good at responding to it. My shorthand for the archetype best equipped to deal with it is “Harvard kids who went to provincial public schools.” They got into Harvard, or, increasingly, its West Coast rival, Stanford, so they are smart, focused, and reasonably privileged. But they went to public schools, often in the hinterlands, so they have an outsider’s ability to spot the weaknesses of the ruling paradigm and don’t have so much vested in the current system that they are afraid of stepping outside it.
Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg (New York State public school, Harvard), Blackstone cofounder Steve Schwarzman (Pennsylvania public school, Yale undergraduate, Harvard MBA), and Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein (Brooklyn public school, Harvard) are literal examples of this model. Most of the Russian oligarchs—who were clever and driven enough to get degrees from elite Moscow universities before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but were mostly Jewish and therefore not fully part of the Soviet elite—have a similar insider/outsider starting point. Soros, the worldly and well-educated son of a prosperous Budapest lawyer, who was forced by war and revolution to make his own way in London and New York, is another representative of the genre.
The Citigroup analysts who coined the term “plutonomy” go one step further. They argue that responding to revolution is a biological trait, genetically inherited, and that one way to be sure your society is good at it is to open your borders to immigrants, on the theory that moving to a new country is an example of responding to revolution. They write, “Dopamine, a pleasure-inducing brain chemical, is linked with curiosity, adventure, entrepreneurship, and helps drive results in uncertain environments. P
opulations generally have about 2% of their members with high enough dopamine levels with the curiosity to emigrate. Ergo, immigrant nations like the United States and Canada, and increasingly the UK, have high dopamine-intensity populations.” Responding to revolution—and the economic rewards it brings today—they argue, isn’t just something we can learn by reading the works of business school professors like Christensen or Sull, or the result of an insider/outsider background. It is, they believe, hard-coded in our DNA.
The economic premium on responding to revolution not only helps to create the super-elite, it is one of the forces widening the gap between the super-elite and everyone else. The revolutions that those Harvard public school kids capitalize on create outsize rewards for the winners and, in the medium term, usually make the world a better place for everyone.
But in the short run, they also create a lot of losers: new technologies destroy old jobs and, according to extensive research by MIT’s David Autor, have significantly hollowed out the U.S. middle class; Russia’s market transition created seventeen billionaires in a decade, but also led to a 40 percent drop in GDP; Soros profited from the 2008 crash and it made John Paulson a billionaire, but millions lost their jobs, homes, and retirement savings. For the winners, revolutions can bring a windfall; for the losers, disaster.
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By any measure, private equity tycoon David Rubenstein is a plutocrat. Forbes estimated his personal fortune in 2012 to be $2.8 billion. Carlyle, the private equity group he cofounded, manages $150 billion. The atrium of New York’s premier cultural venue, Lincoln Center, is named after him. Former president George H. W. Bush served as a senior adviser to Carlyle; James Baker, the former secretary of both the Treasury and state, was a partner. John Major, the former British prime minister, was chairman of Carlyle Europe.
One afternoon in 2007, when Rubenstein noticed that the last privately held copy of the Magna Carta was being auctioned off by Sotheby’s, he was suddenly struck by the idea that the Magna Carta wasn’t just the founding document of Britain’s constitutional monarchy, it was the founding document of American democracy, too. The United States, he thought, really should have its own copy of this seminal agreement. So he bought it. For $21.3 million. When he tells this story, with a mixture of pride and lingering incredulity at his own impetuosity, Rubenstein’s favorite moment is talking to his wife at the end of the day and offering a humdinger of a punch line to the classic conjugal question “What did you do today, darling?” Rubenstein’s answer: “I bought the Magna Carta.”
All of which is to say that Rubenstein is no stranger to super-wealth. But the first time I met him, he was fascinated by the years I had spent chronicling the rise of the Russian oligarchs. Now that, he told me, was a time and place where you could make some real money.
Rubenstein is right. Responding to revolution has been particularly profitable in those parts of the world where there has been a real revolution, either overthrowing the ancien régime, as in the former Soviet bloc, or just a shift in the economic system, from central planning to the market. The most dramatic transition—and the biggest opportunity to earn a windfall—was in Russia, where twenty years of capitalism has created around a hundred billionaires, 8 percent of the world’s total. The personal wealth of this group of Russians could buy roughly 20 percent of their home country’s annual economic output.
Russia, of course, gives plutocracy a bad name. The Kremlin version of capitalism has been exceptionally good at producing billionaires—Russia has the world’s highest ratio of billionaires relative to the size of the economy—but the country’s overall performance has been less impressive. The economy shrank by 40 percent in six years and male life expectancy dropped nearly to the levels of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s—the decade when most of today’s oligarchs got their start. It has been growing more robustly for the past ten years, but has been outpaced by China, India, and Brazil, and remains largely dependent on natural resources. By 2011, per capita income was $12,993, well above emerging markets like China and India but below Lithuania, Chile, and Barbados, and male life expectancy is a mere sixty-two. Russia remains a tough place to do business: the World Bank rates it at 120, below Nicaragua, Yemen, and Pakistan.
But, as Rubenstein recognized, if you knew how to respond to revolution, there was no better place to be than Moscow in the 1990s. The conventional wisdom, even in Russia, is that the winners of the great privatization windfalls were Kremlin insiders. But that isn’t quite true. Of course, onetime apparatchiks have done extremely well in Russia’s transition to a market economy—one of the country’s richest men is probably Vladimir Putin. But in the former Soviet Union, as in the United States, many of the plutocrats have turned out to be the Russian equivalent of public school kids who went to Harvard: close enough to the levers of power to take advantage of the market transition, but also far enough away that they understood that the regime was crumbling.
Mikhail Fridman, an oil, banking, and telecom magnate worth $13.4 billion in 2012, is an archetypal oligarch. He was born and raised in L’viv, in western Ukraine, one of the Soviet Union’s freest and most cultured cities, but also far from the center of political power. Fridman was smart enough to make it to an elite Moscow polytechnic institute, where he earned a degree in physics. But Fridman was both unconnected and Jewish, which blocked him from becoming a total insider. He wasn’t allowed to do graduate research work, as he wanted, and was instead assigned a job in a provincial factory 150 miles outside Moscow.
With hindsight, that exclusion was a blessing. Fridman had been an energetic college entrepreneur, organizing ventures ranging from window washing to a theater ticket purchasing system, and he had accumulated enough rare goods (mostly jeans and caviar) to bribe his way into a choicer work assignment in Moscow. But the experience made him skeptical about his chances to prosper inside the Soviet system and determined to focus on opportunities outside it. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, and the really big business opportunities materialized, he was already a millionaire, a powerful starting position.
“What I really, really wanted to do, my childhood dream, was to be a physics professor,” Fridman once told me. “If I had been born in America, that is what I would be. Thank goodness for Soviet anti-Semitism.”
The early biographies of the other oligarchs are uncannily similar. Viktor Vekselberg, a metals and oil oligarch, is another Jew from western Ukraine who got a PhD in math from an elite Moscow polytechnic. But he was enough of an outsider that in the late 1980s he decided to supplement his family income—“I really wanted a car,” he told me—by writing and selling computer programs. Again, by the time the Soviet Union collapsed, he was poised to pounce. Boris Berezovsky, an oil, industrial, and media magnate before he lost a power struggle with Putin, was an obscure mathematician and apparatchik when perestroika was first declared, bringing its attendant business opportunities. Vladimir Gusinsky, Russia’s most powerful media baron before he, too, lost a power struggle with Putin, was a Jewish theater impresario who never made it into the first circle of state-supported Soviet cultural intellectuals and who supplemented his income by trading consumer goods like jeans, copper bracelets, and Sony Walkman players in the black market.
In fact, of the seven men who between them controlled half of the entire Russian economy in 1998, and who became known as the oligarchs, six were Jewish and few of them were privileged. The only oligarch who was a real insider, a member of a group known as “the gilded youth” because of their privileged upbringing as the children of the nomenklatura, was Vladimir Potanin, the son of an official in the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Ultimately, that network and that pedigree were a great help to Potanin as he built his metals and banking empire, including control of Norilsk Nickel, the world’s largest nickel producer. And it is no accident that Potanin is the only oligarch who served in the cabinet.
But at the moment of transition, Potanin’s elite background almost blinded him to the biggest economic opportunity in
his country’s history. In the late eighties and early nineties, while men like Fridman, Vekselberg, and Gusinsky were experimenting in the small space for private business permitted by Gorbachev, Potanin was still climbing the Soviet political ladder, earning his degree in foreign relations, and winning a coveted job at the Ministry of Foreign Trade. He sensed that the world was changing, and he had just about summoned the courage to start his own trading firm when he was offered a post in Brussels, a plum assignment at a time when travel to the West was highly restricted.
“I was proud and excited and I accepted the assignment,” Potanin told me. “But then, at the last minute, I realized things were changing so quickly in Russia and I had to be part of the change. Everyone thought I was crazy.”
A lot of responding to revolution is about luck. Not just being at the right place at the right time, but also reading the one book or having the single conversation that allows you to spot a nascent opportunity in a fast-changing world. And sometimes, you might have the misfortune to read the wrong book or watch the wrong movie. That is what happened to Kakha Bendukidze, a Georgian-born biologist (yes, another smart outsider) who parlayed his scientific skills and connections into a small manufacturing empire, including ownership of Uralmash, a legendary Soviet heavy machine–building factory.
Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else Page 18