Frere believed that war against the Zulus was the sole solution to a number of problems he faced before South Africa was united. Defeating the Zulus, Frere reasoned, would be an easy task for the British. A quick victory would intimidate the black population into accepting white domination, and remind the Boers that British military rule was not to be challenged. It would also reassure the Boer and settler communities that they would be secure and prosperous under British rule, but Frere needed time to allow Chelmsford to concentrate his troops around Zululand. Frere’s civilian administrator, Sir Henry Bulwer, was greatly alarmed by Frere’s quest for war: he argued that military action would severely damage Britain’s reputation, antagonize the neighbouring black nations and damage the colony’s economic foundation. Bulwer proposed an independent commission to examine the border issue. Frere concurred in the belief that such a Boundary Commission would neatly defer the settler problem by adjudicating, once and for all, on title to the disputed territory. The proposal was submitted to Cetshwayo who immediately agreed; his reply shows his grasp of the subtleties of British diplomacy:
Before sending for people across the sea for the settlement of the boundary, Cetywayo would be glad if the Governor of Natal would send his representatives to see what the claims of Cetywayo are, and to hear what he says, and to hear what others say, and if these cannot come to an understanding on the matter, then a letter can be sent across the sea for other people to see what can be done.
All parties generally agreed the notion of a Commission; the principal members consisted of Michael Gallwey, a barrister who, although only 31, had become the Attorney-General of Natal in 1857; Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Durnford RE, a distinguished and experienced army officer who had served in South Africa for many years and who represented the military; and John Shepstone, brother and deputy of the Secretary for Native Affairs. The local Boers were represented by Piet Uys, a farmer who had lost several relatives in skirmishes with the Zulus; Adrian Rudolph, the Boer Landdrost of Utrecht; and Henrique Shepstone who served on his father’s staff in Pretoria. King Cetshwayo was fully consulted; he was also invited to send some of his advisors to attend the Commission and local Zulu chiefs would be permitted to submit evidence. Confident of his people’s case and in the appointed officials, Cetshwayo readily agreed to abide by the Commission’s decision. The actual terms of the Commission were laid down in a letter of instruction to the Commissioners, who were to report on the matter of the disputed border and make recommendations, as they deemed advisable to settle the dispute.6
Sub-Inspector Campbell and a troop of the Natal Mounted Police escorted the members of the Commission to the nominated venue of Rorke’s Drift. The location was ideal, being situated on one of the few crossing points on the Buffalo river that formed the largely unmapped border of Natal with Zululand. It was also just within the disputed territory, making the venue easily accessible to witnesses from both sides. The Commission was provided with eighteen marquees and accommodation tents together with the necessary staff of cooks, servants, scribes and guards, over which the British flag was flown.
The Commission sat for nearly five weeks during which time they considered voluminous verbal and written representations; it was a difficult task because each Boer claim resulted in a Zulu counterclaim. The Boer cause was weakened as their legal case relied on documents that were either unsigned or blatantly fraudulent. Boundaries claimed by the Boers were frequently hand-drawn onto maps, and no two maps concurred. In the final analysis the Commission focused upon two main issues: who owned the land prior to the dispute and whether any land under dispute had been properly purchased or ceded. The Commission also noted that it had long been Boer policy, if policy it may be called, gradually to force the Zulus from their rich pasturelands. The Commissioners concluded:
that no cession of territory was ever made by the Zulu people, and that even had such a cession been made by either Panda [Mpande] or Cetywayo it would have been null and void, unless confirmed by the voice of the nation according to the custom of the Zulus.
The Commissioners held that the Boers never acquired and the Zulus never lost dominion over the disputed territory, and that the disputed territory was still properly a portion of Zululand and, furthermore, the developing Boer settlement at Utrecht must also be surrendered. The Boundary Commission eventually delivered their unexpected verdict in July 1878 to an astonished Sir Bartle Frere who determinedly sought to coerce the Commissioners to amend their findings, without success.
On 24 June Durnford had written home: ‘I think our views will be maintained – at least I hope so. You see we have gone in for fair play’.
Although the Commission’s findings were not legally binding, Frere was nevertheless devastated by the result; again, he secretly sought to have the Commissioners’ findings modified, again without success. Realizing his prime reason for the invasion of Zululand had been annulled by the Commission, he decided to ignore the findings and keep the decision secret so as to allow Lord Chelmsford time to prepare and mass his troops ready for battle. In the meantime another reason for the invasion of Zululand had to be found. Frere requested the British Government to send massive military reinforcements but his request was refused. Hicks Beach made matters worse for Frere by sending him a dispatch that stated: ‘All the information that has hitherto reached them [Parliament] with respect to Zululand appears to them to justify a confident hope that by the exercise of prudence, and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance and reasonable compromise, it will be possible to avert the very serious evil of a war with Cetshwayo’. Clearly, Frere had been warned off declaring war on the Zulus.
Frere would also have known that he was now acting illegally. As recently as the Ashanti War Britain had found itself in a remarkably similar ‘ultimatum’ situation when its Gold Coast Governor unilaterally threatened war. The response of the Home Government was unambiguous and stated that the principle of military proceedings:
… should be that of defence and not aggression. It is upon this principle alone that the Governors are authorized to make war, and no invasion of neighbouring territories can be sanctioned unless it can be shown that it is really a defensive measure, safer, and less costly in blood and money, and more likely to be decisive in its results, than waiting for an attack that is being prepared, and which no measure can ward off without loss of that position and dignity which are essential to our security.
(Hansard 27 March 1879)
Furthermore, Frere would have been fully aware of Regulation 35 of the Colonial Service, which stated that Governors of Colonies are ordinarily expected to confine themselves to the internal government of their colony, and distinctly forbids them to proclaim war against foreign states. It reads:
General Powers of an Officer appointed to conduct a Colonial government.
He is not to declare or make war against any foreign state, or against the subjects of any foreign state. Aggression he must at all times repel to the best of his ability.
(Functions and duties of High Commissioner. C–2242)
Unable to alter the results of the Boundary Commission, Frere knew that he could not delay the publication of the Commission’s findings beyond a few months. He was also aware that the eventual publication of the findings would seriously antagonize the Boers; worse still, there was every likelihood that the Boers would be required to surrender their farms in Zululand. Frere realized that the Boers might retaliate by taking military action against British-controlled Natal. From his days in India, Frere also knew only too well that at a time when Britain faced war in Afghanistan, Russia would be watching events in South Africa. If Russia detected any British weakness, there was the distinct possibility that Russian warships would arrive off the Cape and sever Britain’s supply line to India and beyond; Frere had to act decisively.
On 28 July a minor incident occurred which Frere used to generate widespread anti-Zulu sentiment. Two of Chief Sihayo’s sons crossed the river into Natal to capture two of t
heir father’s adulterous wives. One wife was duly returned across the border at Rorke’s Drift and clubbed to death in sight of the Mission Station. The following day the second wife was recovered and suffered the same fate. Adultery in Zululand was a serious offence against Zulu tradition, especially when committed by the wives of an important chief, and the punishment for being caught was invariably instant death. This situation was widely accepted by the Zulus and, prior to current times, would have been ignored by the British on the grounds that matters within Zululand were outside their jurisdiction. On this occasion the incident received officially orchestrated publicity throughout Natal in order to inflame public opinion against Cetshwayo. On 9 October a further incident occurred; a local chief of Swazi origin, Mbilini, led his warriors through the Pongola valley in the very area under dispute. Immigrant Boers and local natives were attacked and their herds of cattle were driven off. This action played straight into Frere’s hands; he was already preparing the terms of an ultimatum and he secretly made Mbilini’s raid the third item in the ultimatum.
Frere and Shepstone both encouraged the press to promulgate the belief that Cetshwayo possessed a standing army of 50,000 warriors, which was poised to invade the developing British colony of Natal and its principal towns of Pietermaritzburg and Durban. The civilian population was encouraged to believe that a quick campaign was all that was needed; after all, the British Army had wide experience gained during several years of suppressing native insurrections. King Cetshwayo would quickly be defeated and obliged to understand that Queen Victoria ruled all of Africa and, furthermore, relationships between the British and Boer communities could be mended – all this could be achieved once the Zulu army which ‘threatened’ both white communities was defeated.
The Ultimatum
Frere reasoned that a British invasion of Zululand would solve the majority of the growing ‘problems’ relating to Zululand. Not only would the defeat of the Zulu army facilitate confederation, it would also placate the argumentative Boers and a display of British military might would deter other Bantu-speaking nations from hindering Britain’s territorial and commercial expansion. Defeat of the Zulu army would also eliminate the long-standing threat to Natal while at the same time freeing the Zulu men to work for both British and Boer commercial ventures. Frere ordered his General Commanding British Forces in South Africa, Sir Frederic Thesiger (shortly to become Lord Chelmsford), to prepare his forces secretly for an immediate and brief war against the Zulus. Both men were fully aware that success on the battlefield, even a quick and easy result, would bring them considerable personal success. Frere had enjoyed a truly glittering career and another success could advance his position even further. Chelmsford was already secure in every respect but he remained a relatively poor man; he was popular, both with his men and his Queen. Chelmsford knew that a victory would enable him to return home with even greater glory and acclaim. Frere knew that to achieve his objectives, war against the Zulus was necessary. He accordingly decided to deal with the Boundary Commission’s findings by initiating a policy of inactivity; the files were placed in a locked drawer and even his staff officers were not permitted to discuss the subject.
Frere forwarded a new request for troop reinforcements to protect Natal and those Boer families still within the disputed area; the request went to Sir Michael Hicks Beach. Frere also sent a short dispatch to the home government in which he stated that he would make ‘certain demands’ of the Zulu king. Curiously, the last four points of the ultimatum served on Cetshwayo were omitted from Frere’s dispatch. Sent on 13 November, this dispatch did not reach Hicks Beach until 2 January; neither did it specify the nature of the demands. Frere justified his troop request and ‘demands’ in two short paragraphs:
Zululand is surrounded landward by the territory of the British Government or its allies. They are all peaceful, non-aggressive people, and would never interfere with Cetywayo, nor attempt to harm him or his subjects, unless Cetywayo first meddled with them, but whilst he keeps up a large standing army, useless for all but purposes of tyranny or aggression, it is quite impossible for his peaceful neighbours to feel secure. The English Government is forced to keep large numbers of her Majesty’s troops in Natal and the Transvaal, and even then the people do not feel secure that Cetywayo will not attack them to ‘wash his spears’.
It is, therefore, absolutely necessary for the peace and quiet of Natal or the Transvaal that Cetywayo should alter his military system, and reduce the size of his army to such dimensions as shall be considered by the Great Council of Zulus and the British Government sufficient to secure the internal peace of the country.7
The average time taken for a return message to travel between London and Natal was six weeks; Frere therefore knew that Hicks Beach’s official reply could not reach him before his British troops invaded Zululand. Likewise, the home government would remain in the dark about the ultimatum and Frere’s intentions until 25 January 1879, three days after the invasion of Zululand by Chelmsford’s invasion force. The War Office and numerous politicians would later protest that Frere’s primary purpose of his journey to Natal was solely to arbitrate on the boundary dispute under the instructions of the Secretary of State; he had no authority to wage war. Meanwhile, on 11 December 1878, Zulu representatives were summoned to the site of a shady tree on the Natal bank of the Tugela river to learn the result of the Boundary Commission’s deliberations. Cetshwayo sent three of his senior generals together with eleven chieftains and their retainers to listen to the findings, which were interpreted by Mr Fynney, a Border Agent and Zulu-speaker. John Shepstone, brother and deputy of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, was appointed to announce the findings on behalf of Britain. John Shepstone was a curious choice, as the Zulus knew he was one of the Boers’ representatives during the Boundary Commission’s deliberations. He was also despised by the Zulus for having once led a party which tracked down a wanted Zulu chief, Matyana; Shepstone had arranged a truce with Matyana’s followers but on meeting Matyana, Shepstone drew a hidden revolver and shot the chief causing him a minor wound. Matyana escaped and John Shepstone’s reputation with the Zulus was lost for ever.
During the morning session, the findings of the Boundary Commission were relayed to the Zulu officials but in heavily worded terms designed to cause confusion. Writing was unknown to the Zulus, who were accomplished at memorizing even lengthy speeches. Nevertheless the Zulus realized they had ‘won their case’ and were well satisfied with the final judgement that defined the Blood and Pongola rivers as the border between Zululand and the Transvaal. Any Zulus located on the Transvaal side of the new border, who might wish to move back into Zululand, and British or Boer subjects located on the Zulu side wishing to move back across the border, would be permitted to do so, in peace, and with compensation where ‘circumstances warranted the expenditure’. At midday the Zulu dignitaries were invited to remain for a lunch of roast beef and their favourite sugar-water as a prelude to a further ‘short announcement’. This was to be Frere’s ultimatum; worded in such terms that it would be impossible for Cetshwayo to accept. Frere knew the ultimatum would render the Boundary Commission’s report obsolete and Cetshwayo’s non-compliance would justify his war against the Zulus.
When the time came for the announcement, both groups reassembled and the content of the hitherto secret ultimatum was then read to the astonished Zulus, translated again by Mr Fynney. In customary style the Zulus listened impassively, until in the midst of the proceedings the noted Durban photographer, Mr James Lloyd, took their photograph, when they became agitated by the intrusion.
The main requirements of the ultimatum included:
1 The surrender of Chief Sihayo’s brother and two sons (for crossing the river border into Natal, abducting and then murdering two of Sihayo’s adulterous wives) to the Natal Government plus a fine of 500 cattle for not complying with the original order for their surrender, made in August 1878.
2 A fine of 100 catt
le for having hustled and insulted two British surveyors, Deighton and Smith, at the Middle Drift border crossing.
3 The surrender to the Transvaal Courts of the Swazi chief, Mbilini, (for cattle raiding in the (now) British territory).
4 That the king should observe promises made by him at his coronation to the British Government. These promises were:
i Indiscriminate executions should cease.
ii No Zulu should be condemned without open trial and the public examination of witnesses, for and against, and there should be a right of appeal to the king.
iii No Zulu’s life should be taken without the previous knowledge and consent of the king, after a trial and after the right of appeal to the king.
iv That for minor crimes, the loss of property should be substituted for the death penalty.
v A number of prominent Zulus were to be surrendered for trial (no names were specified).
5 The Zulu army was to disband and every Zulu was to be free to marry [see here for Zulu controls on marriage].
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