Rorke's Drift

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by Adrian Greaves


  8 Bushman paintings. On the east face of the Oskarsberg, in the sandstone terraces of the lower slope, there are some bushman paintings in an overhang. They appear at first to be somewhat damaged and faded, but this is because of their great age. It is quite a trek to get to them and you will need a guide to reach them.

  9 The Oskarsberg terraces, occupied by the Zulu marksmen during the battle. Following the battle, soldiers of the 24th carved their regimental number into the rocks.

  10 The Buffalo river. The Buffalo river at Rorke’s Drift at the time of the Zulu War constituted the border between Natal and Zululand, and an old trading track snaked its way from Rorke’s Drift to Ulundi – the route that Chelmsford intended to follow on expiry of the ultimatum. At midnight on 10 January 1879 the ultimatum that had been issued to the Zulus expired. Chelmsford forded the Buffalo river at Rorke’s Drift at the head of No. 3 column, made up of 4,850 men, 220 wagons and 4,500 oxen. His objective was the Zulu capital, Ulundi, 65 miles (108km) away to the east.

  11 The ‘Old Drift’. The Old Drift is also the site of the infamous ‘Sihayo incident’. In the winter of 1878 the famous Chief Sihayo KaXongo Ngobese (of the Qungebe people who lived in the Batshe river area opposite Rorke’s Drift) had two of his adulterous wives stoned to death in the river crossing there. This incident was seized upon by the British High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, and woven into the preamble of the British ultimatum. It was made to look like a cross-border incident.

  12 Second British Military Cemetery. This site was re-discovered in 1999 by a local Zulu Petros Sibisi and Nicky von der Heyde who were searching for evidence of the wagon track built between 14 and 20 January 1879 linking Rorke’s Drift and Isandlwana. The overgrown cemetery was in the centre of an untended grove of gum tress. The site has since been restored. The cemetery contains graves of soldiers, part of the garrison of Fort Melvill, who died of fever. There are also some more recent civilian graves in this cemetery.

  13 Fort Northampton is still discernible, as it is well cut into the sandstone.

  14 The ferry pool, just upstream from the present day low-level bridge, was where the British established their ponts. This position is commanded on the Natal (western) side by a ridge, upon which the British built a sandbag and palisade fort called Fort Melvill in honour of Lieutenant Teignmouth Melvill VC. This fort was garrisoned after the battle of Rorke’s Drift. About 400 yards downstream from the bridge the river runs over a series of rock shelves which constitute the ‘old drift’ – a natural causeway where people and wagons could gain purchase when crossing – hence the importance of the site. Downstream from the drift on the bend in the river, two old pont stanchions marked with the date ‘1863 Camel steel’ still stand today, but this site was probably used after the Zulu War.

  Note that the road you will take from Rorke’s Drift to Isandlwana is only approximately the route that Chelmsford took. The old track is still visible from the air, and some care was taken when situating the new road not to do too much damage to the old track. It is significant that the old wagon track used to run from the Manzimyama river onto the saddle of Isandlwana. The new road runs to the north of the mountain.

  How to find it

  Route 1. From Helpmekaar on Route 33

  Good and dry weather conditions only. Take the dirt road sign posted to Rorke’s Drift. After descending the steep pass, continue for 3 miles (5km) to the junction; turn right towards Rorke’s Drift. As you approach the Oskarsberg hill, the red roofed buildings at Rorke’s Drift will become visible. Continue to Rorke’s Drift; the Orientation Centre and battlefield are situated on the left as you enter the settlement. Obtain your tickets from the gift shop before entering the Battlefield.

  Route 2. Route 68

  All weather. From Dundee, take route 68 towards Nqutu for 14 miles (20km) and then take the first turning right signposted to Rorke’s Drift. At the first junction, turn left towards Rorke’s Drift. As you approach the Oskarsberg hill, the red-roofed buildings at Rorke’s Drift will become visible. Continue to Rorke’s Drift; the Orientation Centre and battlefield are situated on the left as you enter the settlement. Obtain your tickets from the gift shop before entering the Battlefield.

  Route 3. Route 68 from Babanango to Nqutu

  All weather. When 8 miles (13km) from Nqutu, take the signposted dirt road to Isandlwana. This road follows the route of the attacking Zulu army and descends onto the Isandlwana battlefield from the Nqutu plateau. As the road drops down onto the plain, the Conical Hill will be immediately to the front with Isandlwana to the right. Follow the road into Isandlwana village and proceed past the Isandlwana mountain towards the signposted road to Rorke’s Drift. After 3 miles (5km), turn left towards Rorke’s Drift. After crossing the Buffalo river, turn left at the junction. On approaching the Oskarsberg Hill, the red-roofed buildings at Rorke’s Drift will become visible. Continue to Rorke’s Drift; the Orientation Centre and battlefield are both situated on the left as you enter the settlement. Obtain your tickets from the gift shop before entering the Battlefield.

  Recommendations

  Employ a reputable guide to obtain maximum benefit. Allow a full day to see everything at Rorke’s Drift and the graves of Lieutenants Coghill and Melvill at Fugitives’ Drift only 5 miles (8km) away – but do remember that this is on a game reserve – get permission from Fugitives’ Drift Lodge before entering the reserve. If walking directly to the Buffalo river crossing, good walking shoes are essential. Spray legs and ankles against ticks if walking around in long grass.

  APPENDICES

  With regard to the reports by Chard, Bromhead and Glyn, a facsimile of the original document follows each transcript. These facsimilies have been included so that the reader can compare and contrast the handwriting in which each report is written and the signature at the end.

  APPENDIX A

  The Two Chard Reports

  The first ‘Chard Report’ became the official report concerning the Zulu attack on the mission station. It was this report that Chelmsford forwarded to the War Office in the attempt to lessen the impact of the British defeat at Isandlwana. Towards the end of 1879, when Chard was safely back in England, he was commanded to submit a further report to Queen Victoria. Chard was required to include greater detail although nothing is known of the preparation or research that went into this second report, other than the fact that apologies for a delay were given to Queen Victoria as Chard claimed to have ‘lost his notes’. The identity of the author of the two reports remains unknown although both documents were signed by Chard (see Chapter 9 for further details). Both reports are unabridged.

  The second ‘Chard Report’ is reprinted by kind permission of HM The Queen.

  The First ‘Chard Report’

  Rorke’s Drift,25th January, 1879.

  I have the honour to report that, on the 22nd instant, I was left in command at Rorke’s Drift by Major Spalding, who went to Helpmakaar to hurry on the company 24th regiment ordered to protect the ponts.

  About 3.15 p.m. on that day I was at the ponts, when two men came riding from Zululand at a gallop, and shouted to be taken across the river. I was informed by one of them, Lieutenant Adendorff, of Lonsdale’s regiment (who remained to assist in the defence), of the disaster at Isandhlwana camp, and that the Zulus were advancing on Rorke’s Drift. The other, a carbineer, rode off to take the news to Helpmakaar.

  Almost immediately I received a message from Lieutenant Bromhead, commanding the company 24th regiment at the camp, near the commissariat stores, asking me to come up at once.

  I gave the order to inspan, strike tents, put all stores &c., into the wagon, and at once rode up to the commissariat store, and found that a note had been received from the third column to state that the enemy were advancing in force against our post, which we were to strengthen, and hold at all costs.

  Lieutenant Bromhead was most actively employed in loopholing and barricading the store building and hospital; and connecting the defence of the two build
ings by walls of mealie bags and two wagons that were on the ground.

  I held a hurried consultation with him, and with Mr Dalton, of the commissariat (who was actively superintending the work of defence, and whom I cannot sufficiently thank for his most valuable services), entirely approving of the arrangements made. I went round the position, and then rode down to the ponts and brought up the guard of 1 sergeant and 6 men, wagon &c.

  I desire here to mention the offer of the pont-man, Daniells and Sergt. Milne, 3rd Buffs, to moor the ponts in the middle of the stream and defend them from their decks with a few men.

  We arrived at the post about 3.30 p.m. Shortly after, an officer of Durnford’s Horse arrived, and asked for orders. I requested him to send a detachment to observe the drifts and ponts, to throw out outposts in the direction of the enemy and check his advance as much as possible, falling back upon the post when forced to retire, and assisting in its defence.

  I requested Lieutenant Bromhead to post his men; and, having seen his and every man at his post, the work once more went on.

  About 4.20 p.m. the sound of firing was heard behind the hill to our south. The officer of Durnford’s returned, reporting the enemy close upon us, and that his men would not obey his orders, but were going off to Helpmakaar; and I saw them, apparently about 100 in number, going off in that direction.

  About the same time Captain Stephenson’s detachment of the Natal Native Contingent left us, as did that officer himself.

  I saw that our line of defence was too extended for the small number of men now left us, and at once commenced a retrenchment of biscuit boxes.

  We had not completed a wall two boxes high, when, about 4.30 p.m., 500 or 600 of the enemy came in sight around the hill to our south, and advanced at a run against our south wall. They were met by a well sustained fire; but, notwithstanding their heavy loss, continued the advance to within 50 yards of the wall, when they met with such a heavy fire from the wall, and cross-fire from the store, that they were checked; but, taking advantage of the cover afforded by the cook house, ovens, &c., kept up a heavy fire. The greater number, however, without stopping, moved to the left, around the hospital, and made a rush at our north-west wall of mealie bags, but after a short but desperate struggle, were driven back with heavy loss into the bush around the work.

  The main body of the enemy were close behind, and had lined the ledge of rock and caves overlooking us, a bout 400 yards to our south, from where they kept up a constant fire, and, advancing somewhat more to their left than the first attack, occupied the garden, hollow road, and bush in great force.

  Taking advantage of the bush, which we had not time to cut down, the enemy were able to advance under cover, close to our wall, and in this part soon held one side of the wall, while we held the other. A series of desperate assaults were made, extending from the hospital along the wall as the bush reached, but each was most splendidly met and repulsed by our men, with the bayonet; Corporal Schiess, Natal Native Contingent, greatly distinguishing himself by his conspicuous gallantry.

  The fire from the rocks behind us, though badly directed, took us completely in reverse, and was so heavy that we had suffered very severely, and about 6 p.m., were forced to retire behind the retrenchment of biscuit boxes.

  All this time, the enemy had been attempting to force the hospital, and shortly after set fire to its roof.

  The garrison of the hospital defended it room by room, bringing out all the sick who could be moved, before they retired.

  Privates Williams, Hook, R. Jones, and W. Jones, 24th regiment, being the last men to leave, holding the doorway with the bayonet, their own ammunition being expended.

  From the want of interior communication, and the burning of the house, it was impossible to save all. With most heartfelt sorrow, I regret we could not save these poor fellows from their terrible fate.

  Seeing the hospital burning, and the desperate attempts of the enemy to fire the roof of the stores, we converted two mealie bag heaps into a sort of redoubt which gave a second line of fire all round – Assistant Commissary Dunne working hard at this, though much exposed, and rendering valuable assistance.

  As darkness came on, we were completely surrounded, and after several attempts had been gallantly repulsed, were eventually forced to retire to the middle, and then inner wall, of the kraal on our east. The position we then had we retained throughout. A desultory fire was kept up all night, and several assaults were attempted and repulsed;the vigour of the attack continuing until after midnight. Our men firing with the greatest coolness, did not waste a single shot, the light afforded by the burning hospital being of great help to us.

  About 4 a.m. 23rd instant, the firing ceased, and at daybreak the enemy were out of sight, over the hill to the south-west. We patrolled the grounds, collecting the arms of the dead Zulus, and strengthened our position as much as possible.

  We were removing the thatch from the roof of the stores, when, about 7 a.m. a large body of the enemy appeared on the hills to the south-west.

  I sent a friendly kafir, who had come in shortly before with a note to the officer commanding at Helpmakaar, asking for help.

  About 8 a.m. the third column appeared in sight, the enemy, who had been gradually advancing, falling back as they approached. I consider the enemy who attacked us to have numbered about 3000 (three thousand). We killed about 350 (three hundred and fifty). Of the steadiness and gallant behaviour of the whole garrison, I cannot speak too highly..

  I wish especially to bring to your notice the conduct of Lieut. Bromhead 2–24th regt., and the splendid behaviour of his company, B,2–24th; Surgeon Reynolds, A.M.D., in his constant attention to the wounded under fire where they fell; Acting Commissary Officer Dalton, to whose energy much of our defences were due, and who was severely wounded while gallantly assisting in the defence; Assistant Commissary Dunne; Acting Storekeeper Byrne (killed); Colour Sergeant Bourne, 2–24th; Sergeant Williams, 2–24th, (wounded dangerously since dead); Sergeant Windridge, 2–24th; Corporal Schiess, 2–3 N.N.C. (wounded); 1395 Private Williams, 2–24th; 593 Private W. Jones, 2–24th; Private McMahon A.H.C.; 716 Private Jones, 2–24th; Private Hook, 2–24th; Private Roy, 1–24th.

  The following return shows the number present at Rorke’s Drift, 22nd of January, 1879:

  The following is a list of the killed:

  Sergeant Maxfield, 2/24th; Private Scanlon 2/24th; Private Hayden, 2/24th; Private Adams, 2/24th; Private Cole, 2/24th; Private Fagan, 2/24th; Private Chick, 2/24th; 1398 Private Williams, 2/24th; Private Nicolls, l/24th; Private Horrigan, l/24th; Private Jenkins, 1/24th; Mr. Byrne, Com. Department; Trooper Hunter, N.M. police; Trooper Anderson, N.N.C

  Private (native) N.N.C

  Total 15

  12 wounded* of whom two have since died, viz:

  Sergeant Williams, 2/24th; Private Beckett, l/24th

  * List already forwarded by medical officer.

  Herewith is appended a plan of the buildings, showing our lines of defence. The points of the compass referred to in this report are as shown in sketch approximately magnetic.

  I have, &c.

  (Signed) John R. M. Chard

  Lieutenant R.E.

  To Colonel Glynn, C.B., commanding 3rd Column.

  Chelmsford added the following comment to Chard’s report:

  Sir,

  It is with much satisfaction that I have the honour to forward the report of the successful defence of Rorke’s Drift post on the 22nd and 23rd January.

  The defeat of the Zulus at this post, and the very heavy loss suffered by them, has, to a great extent, neutralised the effect of the disaster at Isandhlwana, and no doubt saved Natal from a serious invasion.

  The cool determined courage displayed by the gallant garrison is beyond all praise, and will, I feel sure, receive ample recognition.

  As at the present moment the lesson taught by this defence is most valuable, I have thought it advisable to publish for general information the report in question which I
trust will meet with your approval.

  Chelmsford

  Lieutenant-General

  The report was then urgently forwarded to the Secretary of State For War, The Right Hon. Frederic Stanley, who promptly replied to Chelmsford:

  From; The Secretary of State For War

  20-3-79

  To; Lt. Gen. Lord Chelmsford, K.C.B.

  My Lord,

  I have received with great satisfaction your despatch of the 8th Feb. last, and its enclosure from Lt. Chard, R.E., containing a narrative of the heroic defence of the Post at Rorke’s Drift on the night of the 22nd Jan. last.

  Having laid these documents before the Queen, I have received her Majesty’s Commands to express to you her admiration of the gallantry of all who took part in that brilliant defence. The fertility of resource displayed in improvising defences and the cool and determined courage by which they were guarded and maintained have been especially remarked by her Majesty and will worthily take a prominent place in the annals of the British Army.

  I have conferred with H.R.H. The F.M.C. in C., as to the recognition which those officers, N.C.O.’s, Privates and others who are specially mentioned should receive, and I shall lose no time in making the necessary recommendations to Her Majesty on the subject.

  Fred Stanley

  The Second ‘Chard Report’

  RORKE‘S DRIFT

  The Defence of Rorke’s Drift, 22nd-23rd January 1879

  An account of the defence of Rorke’s Drift, written by Major J. R. M. Chard, V.C., R.E., at the personal request of Queen Victoria, and submitted to Her Majesty at Windsor Castle on 21st February 1880.

 

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