by Ian Gardner
View looking south towards the bridge at Son, showing the 88mm gun knocked out by D/506 outside the Aloysius Boys School seen here on the right. (Signal Corps via Tom Peeters)
On September 1, 1944, the air echelon from the US 442nd Troop Carrier Group (TCG) had taken off from their base at Weston Zoyland in Somerset bound for USAAF Station 469 – Ramsbury in Wiltshire. Commanded by LtCol Charles “Mike” Smith, the 442nd were due to participate in a new Anglo-American operation codenamed Linnet, designed to block the German retreat from the French coast.
The Linnet mission for the 442nd TCG was scheduled to begin at Ramsbury Airfield on September 3, where gliders from the 101st Airborne Division were waiting to be towed to landing zones near the town of Tournai in Belgium. The order came at short notice and on Monday September 4, the operation was officially cancelled due to the rapidly altering tactical situation between Gen Sir Miles Dempsey’s British Second Army, LtGen Omar Bradley’s First Army, and LtGen George Patton’s Third Army. Equipped with over 90 serviceable C-47 transport aircraft, the 442nd comprised four operational squadrons – 303rd, 304th, 305th, 306th, plus an HQ element. 1st Lt Landon Cozad, a 303rd Squadron pilot, recalls: “The severe weather that followed our arrival at Ramsbury forced many, including myself, to abandon the cold waterlogged tents and sleep aboard our aircraft. As events began to unfold we started to wonder if the planners could actually figure out what they really wanted us to do.”
The continual rain was a far cry from Italy and the warm shores of the Mediterranean, where the group had recently been assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division for the invasion of southern France. All members of the 442nd took quiet pride in the fact that they had played a vital role in not one but two invasions on French soil (the latter taking place on August 15, 1944, without the loss of a single aircraft). Five days after arriving at Ramsbury, the 442nd were dispatched to a recently vacated bomber base at Boreham in Essex, where they were given two days to prepare for another assignment.
The following day, September 7, provisional orders for Operation Comet were issued primarily on a need-to-know basis, amid much heated discussion and political wrangling between Eisenhower and 21st Army Group Commander, Gen Montgomery.
The 1st Airborne Division and the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade were scheduled for a large-scale parachute and glider assault into the Netherlands. Between late August and September 11, Second Army had advanced 280 miles, from the river Seine in France to the Escault Canal in Belgium. Due to an uncertain supply line, Dempsey had only been able to support and supply a single tactical thrust, by XXX Corps.
Although the German Army had put up a strong resistance in Belgium, Montgomery’s intelligence reports suggested that the enemy were incapable of resisting another determined advance. Once the German front line had been punctured, the Allies doubted that they would have enough remaining strength to stop a breakthrough.
A plan was created to capture bridges at Grave, Nijmegen, and Arnhem before linking up with British ground forces from XXX Corps, commanded by LtGen Sir Brian Horrocks. Part of the Second Army, XXX Corps comprised 50th Northern Division, 43rd Infantry Division, 8th Armored Brigade, and the Blues and Royals. However, due to poor weather and a rapidly deteriorating tactical situation around Breda in the south of the Netherlands, Operation Comet was postponed for 24 hours.
Immediately after Brussels was liberated, Queen Wilhelmina – who was still in exile in London – sent her son-in-law Prince Bernhard to Belgium, where he assumed overall command of the Dutch Forces of the Interior. The Dutch underground was expected to provide guides and security for any Allied POWs. Now placed on alert, resistance groups were instructed to operate clandestinely until contact could be made with Allied ground forces. The resistance were also ordered to hinder enemy troop movement and sabotage fuel and ammunition dumps.
Operation Market Garden
Although XXX Corps decided to postpone Operation Comet for a further 48 hours, more time was still required and the following day (September 10) it was decided to push the mission back to Friday September 15. Later the same week, “D-Day” was changed at the eleventh hour to Sunday September 17, and Operation Comet transformed and reconstituted into Operation Market Garden.
The earlier plan for Comet was rapidly modified to include a much larger airborne force of over 30,000 men that would now encompass the US 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions. LtGen Frederick “Boy” Browning, commander of the British Airborne Corps, was appointed deputy commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, to assist LtGen Brereton in combining all three forces. If all went well, over 16,500 paratroopers and 3,500 glider men would be on the ground in less than one hour and 30 minutes. At this point the only other people in the American camp who were aware of what was happening would have been the divisional commanders (generals Taylor and Gavin) and their immediate subordinates. All British and Polish airborne units were ordered to remain at their departure airfields, while the Americans were mobilized. A total of seven British and 17 American airfields were used to get Market operational. The 82nd Airborne Division was marshaled around Nottingham, while the 101st Airborne Division was deployed to airfields throughout the Newbury area such as Chilbolton, Membury, Ramsbury, and Greenham Common.
Montgomery was now more determined than ever to advance north across the big rivers of the Maas, Waal, and Neder Rijn, to form a strong bridgehead around Arnhem, before striking east into the industrial heart of Germany and ultimately Berlin. The main route for XXX Corps was to be Eindhoven, Grave, Nijmegen, and Arnhem. As soon as the drop began (H-Hour), the Guards Armored Division was to lead the advance to Eindhoven, ahead of XXX Corps. Initially the 101st Airborne would be under the command of the Corps until reaching Eindhoven, whereupon the Second Army would assume overall responsibility.
Although it was intended to evacuate the 101st and 82nd within a week, the 101st Airborne Division was to seize bridges along the main axis of advance, ensuring that the British had expedient passage northeast towards Grave and the 82nd Airborne Division’s area of operations. In the meantime, XXX Corps was to provide artillery support wherever and whenever the situation permitted.
The Germans were fighting determinedly along the lines of the Albert and Escaut Canals, from Antwerp to Maastricht but they had few reserves. However, the Germans were expected to strengthen the river line through Arnhem and Nijmegen with artillery and flak guns, sited for a dual-purpose role.
Courage and skill
At 1000hrs on Monday September 11, the 442nd TCG received alternative orders and immediately departed Boreham for Chilbolton Airfield. Due to the lightning advance of US armored forces across France, LtGen Patton’s Third Army was desperately in need of transport planes to fly supplies and evacuate battle casualties from the front line. With Comet temporarily postponed, the 442nd, along with all other available Troop Carrier Groups, was dispatched to Verdun to assist with Patton’s request. Afterwards, the group (now assigned to the 53rd Troop Carrier Wing) returned to Chilbolton at midday on September 16, where the exhausted crews began last-minute preparations for Market Garden. Shortly after touchdown, the aircraft were taxied and parked nose to tail, in three rows along the main runway. At 2000hrs, crew briefings began in the Operations Control Room, adjacent to the front entrance of the airfield. Col H. D. Smith, commanding officer of the 53rd Troop Carrier Wing, led each 90-minute briefing.
First to be briefed were the officers from the 305th and 306th Squadrons, commanded by Maj John Crandell, and newly promoted LtCol Royal S. Thompson. The pilots learned that the following morning they would be flying the 3rd Bn battle group to the vicinity of Eindhoven, and then follow up over the next week with glider tows and resupply missions. The 442nd was to be split into two serials: Serial A8, led by LtCol Fred Henry (commanding officer of HQ Squadron); and A10, ably led by “Mike” Smith.
Each serial of 45 aircraft was to deliver approximately one battalion of paratroopers onto one of two separate DZs, designated “A” and “B.” The 303r
d and 304th Squadrons, commanded by Maj Robert Whittington Jr and Maj Kenneth Glassburn, would be dropping 3rd Bn 501st PIR further north onto DZ “A” near Eerde. The 305th and 306th Squadrons would carry Maj Horton’s 3rd Bn, along with one platoon from C/326 Airborne Engineers and 506th Service Company, to DZ “B” near Son.
The drops were to be spaced two minutes apart, with the first scheduled to arrive over DZ “B” around 1312hrs. As the UK was one hour ahead of Europe, owing to double-British Summer Time, at the end of each briefing, all watches were set back one hour to be in harmony with Dutch time (codenamed Zone “A”). Col Smith also delivered a hearty “good luck” message from the commanding officer of IX Troop Carrier Command, MajGen Williams:
This is the knockout blow to an already staggering enemy. The results of this great test of all-important operations are now firmly in your hands. Let’s put our comrades down so they can quickly end this damnable war. I am confident in your ability and determination.
That night, around 300 Lancaster and Mosquito bombers from the Royal Air Force attacked enemy airfields across the Netherlands, destroying over 200 aircraft. The following evening diversionary drops of dummy paratroopers were also carried out close to Rotterdam and Utrecht.
The marshaling area, D-2
The 3rd Bn advance party arrived at Chilbolton Airfield on Thursday afternoon. Derwood Cann surveyed the mass of Nissen huts surrounding the tarmacadam runways and selected a large building with a sturdy concrete floor for a briefing room. Bill Galbraith set to work erecting the sand tables in the center of the room and hung the map boards with bright spotlights.
Several hours later, Capt Kiley arrived with further detailed information concerning Market and confirmed that the remainder of the battalion would be arriving the next morning. “While the section continued to work on the briefing room,” recalls Derwood Cann, “Captain Kiley and I studied the battalion and regimental missions as well as the enemy intelligence reports and it was late into the night before we finished drafting our plans.”
Around 1000hrs on September 15, the troops arrived from Ramsbury. Each company was shown to the marshaling area, located on the eastern edge of the airfield along Martins Lane, close to the aircrew briefing rooms, water tower, and main entrance. The battalion was split over several fenced compounds; the largest (now Stonefield Park industrial estate) contained the airfield’s mess hall, situated directly opposite Middlebarn farm.
After the battalion had settled in to its hutments and tents (separate from the 501), Maj Horton gathered the S-2 and S-3 together to study the details of the coming operation. Several changes were made to Kiley and Cann’s first-draft plans before the final orders were posted in the briefing room. “Overlays were drawn and photographs pasted together,” recalled Bill Galbraith. “Rapidly the walls of the briefing area became covered with a plethora of notes and maps and the sand tables transformed into rolling flat countryside studded with green fields, canals, roads, bridges, and small villages.”
While these last preparations were being made, Derwood Cann walked around the area contacting the company commanders concerning maps and security measures: “I couldn’t help but notice that everyone seemed to have a casual attitude toward the operation and were going about their duties in a most cheerful and determined manner.”
The troops were earnestly occupied packing equipment bundles with extra ammunition, K rations, medical supplies, and antitank mines. The place was a hive of activity as machine-gunners assembled belts of ammunition, mortar men uncased round after round of 60mm and 81mm mortar shells, while the rifleman were unboxing grenades and adjusting the pins. A few people were writing last-minute letters to wives, mothers, and sweethearts. Mortar man James Martin (G Co 2 Ptn) had a different opinion about the mood: “There was very little bragging and the atmosphere very subdued. We had ‘been there and done that,’ so to me there was almost an air of foreboding.” Ray Skully had time on his hands and recalls, “Unlike my predecessor, I wasn’t involved at all with the S-3 and stayed close to Major Horton.”
The battalion ate late in the evening at the large mess hall, which was staffed and operated by area service troops. The enlisted men were relieved not to have KP or any other labor details forced upon them. The food was excellent, with large steaks served and plenty of ice cream for dessert. Operational orders were issued to all company commanders, who, with the briefing room now open, were ready to plan their own small-unit operations. A briefing schedule was prepared for the next day allocating specific time periods for each company. The first briefing was for Oliver Horton, to orientate his senior officers. The second was assigned to the company commanders to prepare their platoon leaders and NCOs. Next, the platoon leaders would inform their own individual units and the last period was geared towards squad leaders and their 12-man teams. Even at this late stage random personnel like Len Schmidt were being reassigned and sent to the airfield. “The night before the jump, I reported to Captain Morton who immediately assigned me to the machine-gun platoon.”
At about 0700hrs on September 16, Oliver Horton assembled the officers in the briefing room. There was no loud talking or cheerful greetings but a willingness to absorb every last detail. Maj Horton orientated the group with the high-level plans behind the operation and discussed the Regimental mission, which was to capture Eindhoven and four bridges over the river Dommel by 2000hrs on Sunday September 17. At the time of the invasion, the river Dommel divided into two channels near the basin of the Eindhoven Canal. A pair of bridges dissected the river at Stratumseind, while another two bridges spanned the waterway 300 yards further downstream at de Wal and Elzentbrug, adjacent to the Van Abbe Museum of Art. The bridge at Elzentbrug acted as sluice gate for the local factories and more importantly, as part of the city’s flood defenses.
“After the major had finished it was my turn to present the S-2 picture,” recalls Derwood Cann.
Using maps and aerial photographs, I pointed out my understanding of the enemy situation before delivering a short report on the battlefield.
The entire area was dissected by deep drainage ditches and canals, sprinkled with patches of dense woodland. The sector straddled one of the principal road routes converging on Nijmegen. A railway ran south to north through Valkenswaard to Eindhoven (Belgisch Lijntje the Little Belgian Line), with another connecting Veghel and Uden making the only feasible enemy approaches by either road or rail. Communications depended on bridges or waterborne transport so all canals and rivers presented a serious obstacle. Concealment and cover would only be available in woods and villages or behind the dikes and ditches. However, the fields of fire opportunities were superb but observation could only be available from elevated places such as church steeples or polders. Gaining possession of all canal and river crossings leading to Groesbeek and Nijmegen would in effect block the enemy route of withdrawal to the east, forcing the German Army further north through a 30-mile-wide “kill zone” between the river Maas and the Zuider Zee. Put like this everything seemed so simple but there was little known about the enemy disposition in the area around Eindhoven. The Regiment was aware of a small number of German Security, Pioneer, and Headquarters troops garrisoned in Eindhoven and a Luftwaffe Officers Candidate School located somewhere in Son.
Ultimately the bulk of German troops encountered by the 506th PIR came from the German Army Parachute School at Den Bosch but no major enemy combat units had been reported in Son or Greater Eindhoven, and they were not expected to be on the drop zone either. After Lt Cann finished his briefing, aerial photographs and several 1:25,000-scale maps including northwest Eindhoven and southwest Oirschot were issued. One of the more specialist maps given to key personnel was a 1:5,000-scale photolithograph plan of the Philips factory at Strijp.
It was now for Capt Kiley to explain the mission plans for the Division and Regiment, which according to Cann were as follows:
Third battalion will spearhead the assault and land on DZ “B” shortly after 1300hrs tomorrow afterno
on. The planes will fly over the DZ at 110mph, at an altitude of 600 feet. The red light will come on five minutes before the green and a series of white panels will mark our DZ. Immediately after landing, we will assemble on a red smoke signal and bugle call, reorganize and secure the immediate area. Following us onto the drop zone will be the First battalion, whose job is to capture three bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son. They will be closely followed by Regimental Headquarters Company and 2/506 who will assault Son from the north. When both battalions have completed their primary missions, the entire Regiment will attack to the south, capture the city of Eindhoven, and wait for the British tanks to arrive.
After Kiley’s briefing, the officers walked around studying the operational maps, photos, and overlays. Throughout the night, the briefing room bustled with platoon activity but despite this many soldiers went away with only a vague idea of what they would be doing after the drop. More importantly, because so little was known about the Dutch resistance, many were unable to identify or even distinguish between bona fide underground workers and opportunistic time wasters.
The resistance and the Special Operations Executive
Through Dutch expatriate soldiers exiled in the UK, Special Operations Executive (SOE) was able to put together four specialist teams for Market Garden. Known as “Jedburgh” or Jeds, some of these four-man units were augmented by British servicemen. Jedburgh selection was rigorous and continuation training for the successful applicants began in the winter of 1943. Before undergoing individual specialist tuition at Milton Hall in Peterborough, all candidates underwent a three-day parachute course at RAF Ringway near Manchester.