On March 12 I received a personal letter from Mrs. Meir. She said, “It is true that our pilots are very good, but they can be good only when they have planes. Lately some rumors have reached me that your decision may be negative or at best postponed. I absolutely refuse to believe it. If, God forbid, this were true, then we would feel really forsaken.”
Israel had survived only because its people were ready to fight and die for it. I could understand their reluctance to accept our assurances instead of our jet fighters at a time when they faced a possible attack.
As I had told Pompidou, “If you put yourself in the position of Dayan, Rabin, Eban, or Mrs. Meir, who are intelligent and tough people, you must admire them: there they sit, a very few people, surrounded by enemies, and the fact is, they aren’t prepared to take advice even from the President of the United States.” I tried to reassure Mrs. Meir that if it ever came to the test of a crisis—as it did in September 1970 and again in October 1973—then we would be found fully and firmly on Israel’s side. In the meantime, I realized that my new policy would cause much pain and many problems. I also realized that it would be misunderstood and denounced by many on both sides. What I was trying to do, however, was to construct a completely new set of power relationships in the Middle East—not only between Israel and the Arabs, but also among the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union.
One of the main problems I faced in this regard was the unyielding and shortsighted pro-Israeli attitude prevalent in large and influential segments of the American Jewish community, Congress, the media, and in intellectual and cultural circles. In the quarter century since the end of World War II this attitude had become so deeply ingrained that many saw the corollary of not being pro-Israeli as being anti-Israeli, or even anti-Semitic. I tried unsuccessfully to convince them that this was not the case.
There was a wave of criticism in the media and in Congress when my decision to postpone the Phantom deliveries was announced. Israeli Ambassador Rabin knew the decision was coming and complained to Kissinger that we were failing to meet our responsibilities. I was annoyed that a number of the senators who were urging that we send more military aid to save Israel were opposing our efforts to save South Vietnam from Communist domination. I dictated a memorandum to Kissinger describing my feelings and pointing out the danger for Israel of relying on the prominent liberal and dove senators of both parties to come through in the event a crisis arose in which Israel was attacked by the Arabs or was even threatened directly by Soviet power:
What they must realize is that these people are very weak reeds. They will give Israel a lot of lip service, but they are peace at any price people. When the chips are down they will cut and run, not only as they are presently cutting and running in Vietnam, but also when any conflict in the Mideast stares them straight in the face.
On the other hand, their real friends (to their great surprise) are people like Goldwater, Buckley, RN et al., who are considered to be hawks on Vietnam but who, in the broader aspects, are basically not cut-and-run people whether it is in Vietnam, the Mideast, Korea, or any place else in the world. . . .
They must recognize that our interests are basically pro-freedom and not just pro-Israel because of the Jewish vote. We are for Israel because Israel in our view is the only state in the Mideast which is pro-freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet expansion. We will oppose a cut-and-run policy either in Vietnam or Cuba or the Mideast or NATO or anyplace else in the world. This is the kind of friend that Israel needs and will continue to need, particularly when the going gets very tough in the next five years. . . .
What all this adds up to is that Mrs. Meir, Rabin, et al., must trust RN completely. He does not want to see Israel go down the drain and makes an absolute commitment that he will see to it that Israel always has “an edge.” On the other hand, he must carry with him not just the Jewish constituency in New York and Pennsylvania and California and possibly Illinois which voted 95 percent against him, but he must carry with him the 60 percent of the American people who are in what is called the silent majority, and who must be depended upon in the event that we have to take a strong stand against Soviet expansionism in the Mideast. Only when the Israeli leaders realize this fact are they going to have any kind of security which will be reliable. . . .
We are going to stand up in Vietnam and in NATO and in the Mideast, but it is a question of all or none. This is it cold turkey, and it is time that our friends in Israel understood this.
We are going to be in power for at least the next three years and this is going to be the policy of this country. Unless they understand it and act as if they understood it beginning now, they are down the tubes.
Throughout the spring there were sporadic but bitter outbreaks of fighting between Israel and Egypt and Syria. At the beginning of June 1970, Rogers sent me a memorandum proposing a U.S. peace initiative, and on June 25 he announced that we would encourage the parties “to stop shooting and start talking.”
On August 7, an uneasy cease-fire was declared. It was a major accomplishment for Rogers and Sisco. Even though the cease-fire was violated by Egypt almost before the ink was dry, it established the United States as the honest broker accepted by both sides.
On August 17 Kissinger and I met with Ambassador Rabin. He said emotionally that Mrs. Meir and the Israeli government were unsettled because the United States did not seem to accept the evidence that serious Egyptian cease-fire violations were taking place. He said that Soviet surface-to-air missiles had been moved into the forward area along the Suez Canal, changing the entire balance of power in the area. Unless something were done, it would be just a matter of time before the Egyptians attacked. The Israelis therefore wanted to send air strikes against these missile complexes. The attrition of their aircraft would be very high, however, unless we gave them the special electronic jamming equipment and missiles they were requesting.
“Israel must understand that I have no illusions about Soviet motives,” I said. “Perhaps I even understand them better than Israel itself. We have launched our cease-fire initiative with no preconceived notions as to Soviet good will. On the other hand, it was important that the initiative be made so that it is on the record.”
I pointed out that American public opinion would be very important if another war began in the Middle East. This was why I had wanted America to be the prime mover of the cease-fire proposal, and why I wanted Israel to be scrupulously careful in observing it. “If our peace initiative fails, everyone should be able to recognize who is at fault,” I said. “And I hope that it will not be Israel.”
I said that I would approach the Soviets through special channels concerning their involvement in the current crisis. “I completely agree with you,” I said, “that the Soviets are the main cause of Middle East tensions, and that if they were removed from the situation Israel would be able to handle matters without difficulty.”
A month later our policy of building a new balance of power in the Middle East was put to the test of war.
At the beginning of September, the extremist Palestinian guerrillas became increasingly active. One group of them hijacked four commercial airliners and blew them up after holding the hundreds of passengers, most of them Americans, hostage for several days. It seemed likely that a serious showdown was going to be unavoidable, so I decided to revoke my earlier order and to send more military aid and more Phantom jets to Israel.
On September 15 a full-blown crisis erupted in Jordan. The Palestinian extremist leaders, backed by Syrian arms and aid, had stirred up the Palestinian refugees living in Jordan and threatened to provoke a civil war against Hussein’s regime. When Kissinger reported this news to me, he said, “It looks like the Soviets are pushing the Syrians and the Syrians are pushing the Palestinians. The Palestinians don’t need much pushing.”
The situation was confused, and until we had reliable information or intelligence about what was really going on, I felt it was important to keep as cool as poss
ible. I was scheduled to leave on a two-day trip to Kansas City and Chicago, and I decided to keep to the schedule.
However, one thing was clear. We could not allow Hussein to be overthrown by a Soviet-inspired insurrection. If it succeeded, the entire Middle East might erupt in war: the Israelis would almost certainly take pre-emptive measures against a Syrian-dominated radical government in Jordan; the Egyptians were tied to Syria by military alliances; and Soviet prestige was on the line with both the Syrians and the Egyptians. Since the United States could not stand idly by and watch Israel being driven into the sea, the possibility of a direct U.S.–Soviet confrontation was uncomfortably high. It was like a ghastly game of dominoes, with a nuclear war waiting at the end.
The next morning the phone rang at 8:00 in my Chicago hotel suite. It was Kissinger, calling with the news that civil war had broken out in Jordan. Palestinian rebel forces were fighting Hussein’s troops, and Syrian tanks were poised and ready on the border. That afternoon, I talked to a group of reporters and editors and told them that we might have to intervene if Syrian tanks or troops or any of the Arab League Iraqi troops already encamped in Jordan moved against Hussein. When the afternoon newspapers appeared, headlines announced: Nixon Warns Reds: Keep Out.
The next day, September 18, we received a note from the Kremlin stating that the Soviets had no intention of intervening in Jordan, urging us not to intervene, and suggesting that we discourage others—in other words, Israel—from doing so.
I had one of my regular breakfast meetings with Mike Mansfield that morning. Mansfield strongly opposed any American military involvement in the Mideast, and I was able to tell him that, based on the Soviet note, I was optimistic that we could work things out without a confrontation. He raised his hands over his head and slowly brought them down to the table as he closed his eyes and said: “Praise Allah!”
At eleven o’clock that same morning I had an appointment with Golda Meir, who was in the United States on an unofficial visit.
When Mrs. Meir was ushered into the Oval Office, I could see from her fixed smile that she was in a very stern mood. I opened by saying that I was not naïve about Soviet intentions and that I was aware of the difficulties that cease-fire violations had caused Israel.
“In my view, Mr. President,” she replied, “the American response to our reports about cease-fire cheating was slow, and your initial acquiescence encouraged additional violations.” She asked Rabin to explain, and on the rug he spread out three large Israeli intelligence maps pinpointing the specific violations.
Mrs. Meir said that Israel’s problems were not caused primarily by the Arabs. They were the direct result of the Soviet presence and Soviet military equipment. The Egyptians did not even know how to operate the surface-to-air missiles the Soviets had given them, and Soviet personnel had had to be interspersed at all levels within the Egyptian military. She said that Israeli pilots had already met Soviet pilots in air-to-air combat over the Suez Canal.
Mrs. Meir continued. “Now, in my opinion, I think you should go to the Soviets directly and demand an adjustment of the situation if the negotiations are to continue.”
I assured Mrs. Meir that we had already sent several strong notes to the Soviets through diplomatic channels. I said that I wanted her to understand the major principles underlying American policy in the Mideast. We were under no illusions concerning the Soviet intent and involvement in the region, and we recognized that something had to be done about Egyptian cease-fire violations. We did not intend to permit the military balance in the Middle East to be disturbed, and we were prepared to work with her in developing a military aid program that would be appropriate for the strategy the Israelis adopted.
Mrs. Meir said that Israel would not move precipitately into Jordan; she agreed that it was preferable to have Hussein solve the problem himself.
Reports from Jordan indicated hard fighting throughout the country, with Hussein’s troops holding their own or better. Then, on September 18 word was flashed to the White House Situation Room that Syrian tanks had crossed the border into northern Jordan. The next day we learned that the invasion force had numbered at least a hundred tanks. We moved quickly and decisively on the diplomatic front. Kissinger drafted a very stern note and delivered it to the Soviets; Rogers issued a strong public statement calling on Syria to halt its invasion. By early evening it appeared that about half the Syrian tanks had returned to Syria.
“They’re testing us,” I said to Kissinger, “and the test may not be over yet.”
On the night of September 21 at around ten o’clock another message was received in the Situation Room: about three hundred Syrian tanks had crossed the Jordanian border. They had broken through the Jordanian defenses and were rumbling almost unopposed along the roads toward Amman. By the next morning, however, most of these tanks had also been pulled back. The testing was continuing, moving a few notches higher each time. We would have to decide what to do very soon, or it might be too late to do anything.
We decided to pursue a very hard but very quiet line. I authorized Kissinger to call Ambassador Rabin and suggest that he inform his government that we would be fully in support of Israeli air strikes on Syrian forces in Jordan if this became necessary to avoid a Jordanian defeat. I decided to put 20,000 American troops on alert and moved additional naval forces into the Mediterranean.
In the end Jordan under Hussein’s courageous leadership saved itself. By the morning of September 22, the Syrian tanks were once again heading back toward the border. Rabin called early in the afternoon to confirm that the tanks had left Jordan and that the rebel forces were in disarray. He ascribed Hussein’s victory to the tough American position, the Israeli threat, and the superb fighting by Hussein’s troops.
CRISIS IN CUBA
On Friday, September 18, while I was waiting for Golda Meir to arrive for her meeting in the Oval Office, I received an urgent memo from Kissinger. It was headed “TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY.” Its first sentence stated: “Analysis of reconnaissance flight photography over Cuba has this morning confirmed the construction of a probable submarine deployment base in Cienfuegos Bay.” If the intelligence was correct, it meant that the Soviets were building a nuclear submarine base on Cuba.
So far the details were very sketchy. On August 4 Yuli Vorontsov, the Minister Counselor of the Soviet Embassy and Chargé in Dobrynin’s absence, had delivered a note to Kissinger expressing concern over alleged anti-Castro activity by Cuban revolutionary groups in the United States. The note stressed that the Soviets were adhering to the understanding President Kennedy had agreed to in 1962, which included a provision that the Soviets would not put nuclear weapons on Cuban territory in return for our assurance that we would not undertake or support military action to overthrow Castro.
Regular U-2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba in August showed nothing unusual. In September, however, the photographs revealed that construction had begun on the shores of Alcatraz Island, a tiny dot of land off Cuba’s southern coast in the middle of Cienfuegos Bay. A submarine tender was anchored to four buoys in the deep-water basin, and submarine nets were strung across the harbor. A large complex of barracks, administrative buildings, and recreation facilities was almost completed on Alcatraz Island.
When a U-2 had discovered Soviet missile sites in Cuba in October 1962, President Kennedy revealed their presence in a nationwide television speech and had Adlai Stevenson display the enlarged photographs at the UN General Assembly. These actions placed Khrushchev in an almost impossible situation in terms of his international prestige. He was able, however, to use the universal fear of war to put pressure on Kennedy, thus making himself appear responsible for resolving the crisis and reaching a peaceful settlement. So instead of dealing with Khrushchev from the position of immense nuclear superiority that we still held in 1962, Kennedy ended up by agreeing to refrain from any anti-Castro activities in return for Khrushchev’s removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba.
In view of
what had happened in the 1962 crisis, I decided that I would not force a public confrontation unless I had no other choice, and I would not deal with the Soviets from anything less than a position of unyielding strength.
I wrote a note to Kissinger: “I want a report on a crash basis on: (1) What CIA can do to support any kind of action which will irritate Castro; (2) What actions we can take which we have not yet taken to boycott nations dealing with Castro; (3) Most important, what actions we can take, covert or overt, to put missiles in Turkey—or a sub base in the Black Sea—anything which will give us some trading stock.”
During the next few days further U-2 flights confirmed our worst fears. The construction was proceeding at a rapid pace, and unless we acted quickly and decisively, we would wake up one morning to find a fully functioning nuclear-equipped Soviet submarine base ninety miles from our shores.
Not all my advisers agreed on the need for immediate action. Bill Rogers was particularly forceful in an NSC meeting on September 23, urging that we keep the situation completely quiet until after the November elections. I did not feel, however, that the crisis would keep that long, and I directed the NSC to work on a contingency plan.
On September 24 Dobrynin requested an appointment with me to deliver the Kremlin’s reply concerning proposals we had made recently regarding a possible summit meeting. I was surprised by the boldness of this request. The Soviets apparently thought we were still unaware of what they were doing in Cuba, and were clearly planning to take us by surprise with a fait accompli, just as they had in 1962. Kissinger and I agreed that he should meet with Dobrynin and see what the Soviets were up to.
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