Norms cannot be derived from facts … [Apel calls this “Hume’s principle”]34
Science, insofar as it provides us with substantive knowledge, deals with facts . . .
. . . For this reason, an intersubjectively valid grounding of normative ethics is absolutely impossible.35
In a word, facts are subject to a rationally motivated agreement; on the other hand, they point to an arbitrary choice, irreducibly contingent and individual. This gap between an objective science and a subjective ethics is not only supported by the most traditional positivism but also by apparently opposed philosophical movements like the existentialism of a Kierkegaard or a Sartre. Paradoxical but objective allies, they indeed insist on the irreducibility of moral choices. Thus, Apel writes:
Analytical philosophy and existentialism by no means contradict each other in their ideological function, but rather they complement one another. They corroborate each other through a kind of division of labor by mutually assigning to one another the domain of objective scientific knowledge, on the one hand, and the domain of subjective ethical decisions on the other.36
There is indeed, Apel concludes, a “complementarity between the value-free objectivism of science, on the one hand, and the existential subjectivism of religious acts of faith and ethical decisions, on the other.”37
From this analysis, Apel undertakes to bring down the myth of a value-free science. He shows that in scientific practice there are “always already”38 presuppositions of a prescriptive and not descriptive nature. “I should like to reconstruct the ethical preconditions for the possibility and validity of human argumentation and, consequently, of logic.”39 The sciences depend upon a number of clearly normative conditions like, for example, the prohibition against falsifying the results of an experiment, the presupposition of equality among participants in an argument, and even the rejection of all physical violence, implicitly included in the very act of wanting to convince with a demonstration, etc. Science implies a number of conditions without which it could not be practiced, but these conditions turn out to be ethical norms, not natural facts. Apel condenses the set of these “always already there” conditions (which I have already detailed when I discussed Habermas’s universal pragmatics—itself, on this point, a clear copy of Apel’s analyses) to a single phrase: “the community of argumentation.” An extension of what C. S. Peirce called “the scientific community”40 and an echo of Kant’s “community of saints,” this “community of argumentation” holds for any discussion whether its purpose is scientific, ethical, political, artistic, etc. This “community of argumentation” is the presupposition—always already made as soon as I begin to argue—that the truth will be attainable, without violence, in an ultimate and universal consensus. When I begin to argue in the factual world, I have always already presupposed the possibility, in an ideal world, of a community of argumentation with all its prerequisites (sincerity, universality, equality among participants, etc.). But, it will be asked, why should we accept rational discussion? If obeying logical norms presupposes an acceptance of ethical norms, why should we be logical? To put it in Kantian terms, aren’t Apel’s ethical norms just simple hypothetical imperatives and not a categorical imperative that demands of morality a foundation in reason? If logic and science presuppose morality, are we only moral if we want to be logical? And why would we want to be?
Apel proposes to answer this formidable question—in which the very notion of an ultimate foundation of morality and its corollaries of an a priori or a “categorical imperative” are at stake—by first working out the central notion of a transcendental condition, that is, of a necessary condition of possibility.
Performative Noncontradiction as the Ultimate Transcendental Condition
Apel’s contribution, with respect to the Kantian sense of a fact’s necessary condition of possibility, is to have conceived the set of conditions starting with the notion of performative noncontradiction. On this point, he thinks that it is important today to carry out a reflection upon the necessary transcendental presuppositions of an argumentative discourse, that is, on what cannot be disputed without performative contradiction. This explanation of the transcendental starting from the pragmatic category of “performative contradiction” clearly confers all its meaning to the juxtaposition effected in the phrase “transcendental pragmatics.” Transcendental necessity becomes synonymous with pragmatic noncontradiction.
Performative contradictions are by definition always false—not because of their meaning (as in the analytic proposition “every bachelor is married”) but because of the status of their utterance. In addition, as in logic, the contrary of a statement that is always false is necessary. So statements whose contraries cannot be said without self-contradiction would therefore be necessary. Within the category of performative contradiction, defined as statements that cancel themselves out by the fact of being uttered, two types of contradiction can be found: (I) There are “pragmaticoempirical” contradictions, which relate to the empirical conditions of a discourse. In this case, the contents of a discourse and the empirical conditions that make that discourse possible are performatively contradictory, as in the statement “I was on the boat that was shipwrecked with no survivors.” (2) There are “pragmatico-transcendental” contradictions, which relate to the conditions of the actual argumentation itself, for example when I say, “The truth does not exist.” This is the classic self-refutation of radical skepticism, the necessary suicide of the consistent sophist. No discourse can, without contradiction, argue for a refusal of argumentation. In a word, there is only one alternative: accept these transcendental conditions or condemn oneself to silence; to speak is to enter into communication, signifying that one has already accepted these conditions. This refusal of performative contradiction is what gives the “a priori factum of argumentation” its meaning, transcendental philosophy its necessity, and reason its ultimate foundation. On this point, Apel does not hesitate to compare his pragmatico-transcendental argument to the fundamentum inconcussum:
Along with ego-consciousness, a language game is presupposed as the fundamentum inconcussum in the sense of the critically reconstructed and transformed Cartesian tradition of philosophical foundations. In this language game the existence of a real lifeworld and the existence of a communication community are presupposed along with the actual evidence of thinking myself as existing in the sense of paradigmatic language-game evidence.41
In a word, there are no sensible alternatives to our membership in a communication community; in this sense, when we communicate, we actualize a transcendental condition. This is why even the devil, if he were to enter into a discussion, would be obliged to respect a certain number of ethical norms. It follows that the prior acceptance (“always already”) of the norms of argumentation (that is, acceptance of the obligation to seek a motivated agreement rather than resort to violence or to an argument from authority) corresponds to the Kantian “fact of reason,” just as in the second Critique, transcendental reflection brings to light a principle already present in every human being. With Apel, this “fact of reason” becomes the “communicative a priori.”
Before I turn to look at recent objections to Apel’s philosophy, I should underline the extent to which we are dealing with a “strong” version of “pragmatics.” Apel simultaneously radicalizes the insights of standard pragmatics (for example, Searle’s, for whom, as we have seen, while a number of constraints are implied in discourse, they are never given as ultimate conditions of possibility)42 and of the “universal pragmatics” of Habermas’s “second” period. The difference between the two authors can be seen in three terms that echo one another and are implicated in Apel’s reasoning but rejected in Habermas’s: “transcendental,” “a priori,” and “ultimate foundations.” Apel emphasizes this difference in declaring:
Habermas nevertheless continues to reject, as impossible and unnecessary, the demand for an a priori valid ultimate justification of the philosophical validity
claim made in universal-pragmatic statements about the necessary presuppositions of argumentative discourse just mentioned above.
For example, he has disputed an epistemologically and methodologically relevant distinction in principle between the possible statements of the empiricoreconstructive social sciences (e.g., the hypothetical statements made by Chomsky’s linguistics about grammatical universals) and the, in my view, a priori valid universal statements of philosophy (e.g., the above-mentioned statements of universal pragmatics).43
What is peculiar to transcendental pragmatics is an acknowledgement of
presuppositions of mutual understanding that are not historically contingent but are rather incontestably universal[.] Such presuppositions provide the grounds for doubt and mark the limits of possible doubt, and to this extent they provide the grounds—in the sense of a philosophical ultimate justification—of validity claims. In providing such grounds, however, are not such presuppositions transcendental insofar as they transcend in principle the relative background resources of historically contingent forms of life?44
A sharp distinction is drawn between the transcendental (universal and necessary) and the historical (particular and contingent). This refusal to index norms to the course of history, to the lived world, to contingent forms of life clearly allows Apel to avoid the various oscillations of Habermas’s philosophy—all caused, as I have shown, by an ultimate recourse to history and to social reality. But for all that, is this “strong” foundation exempt from aporias and difficulties? We must now turn to this question as we inventory the various objections to Apel’s philosophy.
Objections to Transcendental Reconstruction
A. OBJECTIVE NECESSITY AND INDIVIDUAL DECISION
The most immediately apparent objection to Apel’s “foundationalism”45 bears on the notion of individual liberty with regard to an actualization of transcendental presuppositions. Recourse to performative necessity could seem to make morality,46 in the particular sense of ethical norms underlying discussion, inescapable and necessary. The example of the devil (a frequent figure in Apel), forced regardless of his intentions to obey ethical norms if he will engage in discussion, only serves to fuel this simple question: where in all this is an individual’s free choice? To answer this first classic objection concerning the claimed necessity implied by “transcendental pragmatics,” we should distinguish, with Apel, between objectively necessary actions and their subjectively contingent realization. Indeed, I can always refuse discussion. I could hit someone instead of arguing. Recourse to violence is still obviously a historical and human possibility, without which good would already have been achieved for eternity. To understand this as something other than an ad hoc distinction, we must recall the structure of Apel’s “system.” I use the term “system” on purpose, for, in contrast to Habermas, Apel’s philosophy is presented as a systematic enterprise. Indeed, from 1973 to 2005, whether he is in dialogue with Heidegger, hermeneutics, Searle, Rorty, or Hans Albert’s fal libilism, whether he is addressing first philosophy or more immediately concrete problems (like the education of children), he has always maintained the same structural orientation, which he summarizes in “Limits of Discourse Ethics?”47 It is important
that a universal ethics in the age of science be grounded in reason (what Apel terms option A of ethics) and
that we reflect upon the application of ethical principles to history in a concrete community (what he terms option B of ethics).
All his books, articles, and lectures exemplify this clearly systematic organization, which takes its inspiration, without inhibition, from the great reconstructions of German idealism, like Fichte’s, for example, who in The System of Ethics48 just as in the Foundations of Natural Right49 first asks about the necessary conditions of possibility of the field under study (“deduction of the general principle” of ethics or of right), then asks about the applicability of these conditions to concrete communities or to real historical processes. In its very form, Apel’s philosophy revives the Kantian demand for systematic organization and runs counter to the entire contemporary doxa, for not only does he not hesitate to use the notion of an ultimate foundation but he also retains a systematic structure for philosophy in which diverse elements are integrated into a unified whole. And this systematic structure, organized in two large levels (A and B), allows us to respond to the initial question. Indeed, for Apel, there is and always has been a difference between grounding ethical norms in reason and understanding their application to history. The foundation (A) is necessary; the application (B) is aleatory. The individual’s freedom of choice remains whole and historically conclusive. Here, Apel is back in a typically Kantian structure that leaves space for individual action and does not understand moral achievement as a historical necessity. For all that, Apel protects himself from falling into certain Kantian pitfalls relative to the question of principles’ applicability. That a principle must be applicable to a real historical process does not mean that we must go back to the impasses of “On a Supposed Right to Lie.”50 We can recall that, under the pretext that any universalization of a lie destroys it as such (demonstrating that to tell a lie is not moral), Kant moves without mediation to the application of this maxim to a real situation and deduces that he must never tell a lie regardless of the contingent circumstances. We know the possibly horrendous consequences of this intransigence from a now-classic example: on the pretext that I must never lie, must I tell a potential murderer where to find his intended victim? In Apel’s eyes, Kant’s error here is due to the still too “metaphysical” character of his doctrine, which remains imprisoned in the philosophy of subjectivity.51 In order that ethics can be an ethics of responsibility and not merely one of belief, some sort of limitation for the ideal principle must be found. The principle, while it may be universal, is applicable to a complex and multiform reality; it therefore must not be applied without mediation as Kant had done. We can say that it is a matter, for Apel, of finding a schema or a mediator between the condition (the universal principle) and the conditioned (the historical situation). Not only his Diskurs und Verantwortung (1988)52 but also all his articles written in the 1990s about concrete ethics are consecrated to developing and illustrating this principle of limitation. Let’s briefly summarize this aspect of his work that addresses a too-often-heard objection, for clearing out erroneous objections will allow us to concentrate on the real ones. If we consider the example of lying, it is clear, for both Apel and Kant, that a lie as a universal principle is a performative contradiction. Its contrary “Do not tell a lie” is thus a necessary statement. Nevertheless, we should not absolutize a single concept of reason, and we should recognize that sometimes the only reasonable way to realize the principle is to have recourse to a strategic action directly contrary to the rational principle. In a word, there are historical situations in which telling a lie is better in conformity with reason than refusing to do so. Thus, in the case of a Nazi who is searching for a victim, I must exercise a counterviolence in the face of this real violence. We can see, in this case, that the mediating principle consists in attempting to eliminate the obstacles to a future application of the universal principle. The obstacle here is the Nazi regime that denies universality. To eliminate this obstacle, I must implement a strategic action, in this case, I must lie. This movement from a morality of belief (“Do not lie.”) to a morality of responsibility (“Lie, in light of the given historical circumstances.”) can only be accomplished on the basis of a dual refusal: refusal of an unavoidable accession of morality in history (a rather Hegelian schema), and refusal of the terroristic application of principles in the mode of Fiat justitia, pereat mundus53 (a rather Kantian-Fichtean schema).
That said, having brought objective necessity and subjective action into agreement, without for all that reiterating Kant’s mistakes on the question of application (one does not move from the principle to its application without mediation nor without taking a given historical situation into account), Apel s
eems to be confronted by a much more serious objection, posed by a certain form of decisionism.
B. OPTING FOR REASON AND CONTINGENT DECISION: APEL VERSUS POPPERIAN FALLIBILISM
I have said that if we actualize a transcendental presupposition in argument, we still have the empirical possibility to refuse to argue. But what is the status of this refusal? Can’t we say, with Karl Popper, that the first commitment for or against reason would be, in the final analysis, irrational? Hans Albert would thus be correct in asserting, in his Treatise on Critical Reason,54 that Apel’s project for an ultimate deduction of reason cannot exclude a decisionist moment. Reason can no more found itself on itself than the “hilarious baron” could get himself out of a swamp by pulling himself by the hair. The first, initial, original commitment in favor of reason would thus be itself without reason; it follows that the project of ultimate foundation would be condemned to defeat, the actualization of a categorical imperative would be null and void, and the very notion of transcendental necessity would be vain. Apel directly answers this strong argument by analyzing the presuppositions implied in the objection.55 The principal presupposition is that the objector forgets that the first fact is the discussion and covertly supposes that a decision can be made before any discussion. But the factum of which Apel speaks, which he means to account for, is discussion and nothing other than discussion. But to say that a choice for reason would be preceded by an irrational decision, which would be its condition of possibility, has no meaning unless one first abstracts from the discussion. This surreptitious abstraction shows that Popperians sink into the most banal solipsism in implicitly supposing a subject prior to the discussion, before the intersubjective exchange, a sovereign and voluntary subject, deciding for or against reason. A pure metaphysical myth, this subject opting for reason or not, is in fact the answer to a question devoid of meaning after Wittgenstein and the “linguistic turn,”56 namely, “What is there before discussion?” This question, the implicit presupposition of the objection, clearly does not enter into Apel’s philosophical horizon, as he takes care to specify that a decision in favor of reason is “the only decision possible” for “anyone who does not make this choice but instead chooses obscurantism, for instance, terminates the discussion itself and his decision is, therefore, irrelevant for the discussion.”57 That Apel takes care to italicize the expression “for the discussion” shows the extent to which he is speaking only of an ultimate foundation relative to the project of accounting for the phenomenon of discussion, and shows how he is not at all invoking a foundation in itself, an original act, first decision, irreducible choice, the cause of itself and everything else. There is no choice stricto sensu, and if, to be sure, the devil’s choice is empirically possible (once again, I can hit someone instead of speaking with him), this choice is without meaning in accounting for the factum of discussion and for understanding its conditions of possibility.
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