by Hughes, Ian
Belisarius did not want the position, but believed that he could manipulate the situation to his advantage. He agreed to the deal in principle, and then dismissed the messenger and called a meeting of his officers. He asked them if the capture of the whole of Italy and the surrender of the Goths would be a good thing for the emperor. When they agreed, he set the wheels in motion for the Gothic surrender.
When the Gothic envoys arrived, they made vague statements about surrender, but in secret asked for pledges from Belisarius concerning both their safety and his acceptance of the kingship. Belisarius gave all of the pledges they required except for the ones about the kingship, stating that these should be made later in the presence of Witigis and the Gothic nobles. As the envoys could not believe that he would refuse the kingship, they agreed to his terms and returned to the town.
For his part, Belisarius did not trust those commanders who had previously followed Narses to accept his plan, and believed that they may make a mistake, either on purpose or by accident, that would ruin the plot. As a consequence, he ordered Bessas, John, Narses the Armenian and Aratius his brother to take their troops and disperse amongst Italy’s towns, both in order to maintain control as well as to ease the burden of supply on the city of Ravenna.
With everything ready, he ordered a fleet full of grain to land their cargoes at Classis, the suburb of Ravenna which included the port, and, with the remainder of the army, Belisarius entered the city in triumph, watched by the Goths. The Goths had told their women that the Byzantines were ‘giants’ and that their army was ‘vast’. When the women saw normal-sized men enter the city, and in such small numbers, they turned on their menfolk and berated them for their cowardice. The date was sometime in May 540: the Gothic War, which had begun in 535, had lasted longer than either Belisarius or Justinian had hoped.
The War Unfinished
Belisarius now put everything in order in Ravenna. Witigis was kept under guard, but treated in a dignified manner, and Belisarius urged the Goths from districts south of the Po to return home in peace. As the Byzantines had garrisons in all of the major towns, such a move did not threaten the security of Italy, since it was unlikely that the Goths would be able to rebel without a central base to store supplies of food and weapons. On the other hand, as a result of this measure the Byzantines now outnumbered the Goths in Ravenna itself. Belisarius also took control of the Gothic treasury and prepared it for transport to Justinian.
When they heard of the fall of Ravenna, those towns still held by the Goths in Italy made haste to surrender, their leaders travelling to Ravenna for meetings with Belisarius. The only exception was Ildibadus of Verona. He agreed to surrender, but, due to circumstances, was never to reach Ravenna. For when they saw Belisarius preparing the treasury for the trip to Justinian, the Goths realised that he was not going to accept their offer of the kingship. Therefore, they sent envoys to Uraias at Ticinum and offered him the throne instead. He refused, both because the Byzantines would treat him lightly as a relative of the defeated Witigis, and also because he would not win favour by usurping his uncle’s throne. He suggested that they offer the throne to Ildibadus, who was energetic, an excellent leader, and, as a nephew of King Theudis in Spain, could expect support from the Visigoths in the ensuing war.
So Ildibadus was summoned to Ticinum to be made the king of the Goths. Although he accepted the throne, he advised the Goths to again offer the throne to Belisarius. When Belisarius refused, stating that he would always be loyal to Justinian, they returned to Ticinum and Ildibadus was recognised as king. Shortly afterwards, at around midsummer 540, Belisarius boarded ship and sailed to Constantinople, ready to go east to deal with the Persians.
Antonina and Theodosius
Whilst in Sicily, Belisarius was approached by a slave called Macedonia and informed of the continued affair of Antonina and Theodosius. Belisarius ordered the death of Theodosius, who fled to Ephesus for safety. However, Antonina managed to convince Belisarius of her innocence, later having Macedonia and her accomplices killed. She also persuaded him to forgive Theodosius and invite him to return. However, Theodosius was worried by the presence of her son Photius and refused. Finally, Antonina pressured Photius into returning to Constantinople and Theodosius rejoined her in Italy.
As the war drew to a close, Antonina and Theodosius, who were continuing their affair, moved with Belisarius into Ravenna. As well as having an affair with his adoptive parent, Theodosius began to gain a reputation for greed. In the wake of the victory in Africa, he made his fortune by dubious means whilst in Carthage. In Ravenna, he continued in a like manner. Fortunately, the stay in the city was to be a short one; when Belisarius was recalled to Constantinople, Antonina and Theodosius returned with him.
The conquest of Italy assessed
The conquest of Africa took less than a year. The conquest of Italy took approximately five years. Yet it is obvious that Justinian expected the war to be over quickly, just like the Vandalic War. This can be seen by the small number of troops allocated and the slow arrival of requested reinforcements. It is possible that the similarities between the events in Africa and the events in Italy prior to the respective invasions had led Justinian to believe that the conquest of Italy would be easy.
The rapid capture of Sicily and the capitulation of Ebrimuth would have been seen as symptomatic of the empty threat of the Goths, hinting that the conquest would be similar to that of Africa. The emperor’s hopes were to be unfulfilled. It would appear that he had underestimated the stubbornness of the Goths, especially in their northern homeland.
In one respect the situation in the north of the peninsula proved to be completely different to that in the south, or even in Africa. The lack of defensible towns in the south resulted in a collapse as spectacular as that in Africa. In the north, many towns had built and maintained walls as a response to the crises brought about by barbarian invasions from as early as the second and third centuries. These required time and troops to reduce, both of which were in short supply for much of the campaign. When the reinforcements arrived, Belisarius was able to take the cities one by one, but he still needed a large amount of luck.
Belisarius as a general
If the invasion of Africa gives an indication of Belisarius’ abilities in the field, the ‘conquest’ of Italy demonstrates his abilities at siege warfare. His conduct in siege operations, both defensive and offensive, shows an imagination and a variety of strategies which is almost completely the opposite of Witigis.
Witigis relied mainly on attempting to starve the opposition into surrender, with infrequent assaults being mounted to test the quality of the defence. In some instances, such as in the occupation of Portus with the simultaneous recognition that Ostia was not suitable for supplying Rome, Witigis did display quality strategic abilities. Yet by allowing the roles to be reversed, with Belisarius trapping his forces within their camps at the siege of Rome, and his almost total inactivity in the later stages of the war, Witigis surrendered the initiative without a fight. He seems to have relied upon capturing Belisarius at Rome, and, when this failed to materialise, he did not devise a viable alternative and so lost the war.
Belisarius, on the other hand, was constantly attempting to take the initiative during the siege of Rome, and managed to achieve it so effectively that Witigis ended being besieged within his own camps. Furthermore, when the war entered its later stages Belisarius attempted to relieve the cities under siege by the Goths and focused upon clearing the approach to Ravenna. The fact that he managed to complete his strategy is a sign of the high quality of his generalship in the war, but we should not exaggerate his achievement: Witigis did not provide him with a high level of opposition, and it is possible that many of Belisarius’ subordinates could have equalled the general’s exploits.
Apart from maintaining the initiative, Belisarius won the war with his realisation that the Goths, like the Vandals, had no answer to his mounted archers, and with his grasp of logistics. Throughout th
e siege of Rome, and when faced with Goths in the open, he relied upon the abilities of his horse archers to weaken and demoralise the Goths. He succeeded so effectively that the Goths became terrified of their abilities and refused to leave their camps. Furthermore, Witigis later refused to meet him in the open, despite having won the Battle of Rome and shown that in the correct circumstances the Byzantines were extremely vulnerable..
In many ways it was Belisarius’ grasp of logistics that helped him to win the war. He managed to keep Rome supplied during the siege, and understood that, by remaining in their camps, the Goths were leaving themselves as vulnerable as if they were actually the besieged, rather then the besiegers. It is quite possible that many of his actions can be interpreted as ways of reducing his own supply problems, as well as putting pressure upon the Goths.
In the war, he made only three mistakes that proved to be costly. The first was in accepting battle outside Rome. Procopius does his best to lay the blame upon the regular troops, claiming that they pressured Belisarius to fight when he did not want to. Yet later, when the Romans demanded that he fight a second pitched battle, he had the strength of will to refuse. Furthermore, the excuse had already been used at Callinicum in the east, where Belisarius again was allegedly pressed by the troops to accept battle against his better judgement. It is probably safer simply to accept that he made a mistake. The Goths had suffered heavy losses, caused by his policy of using small groups of horse archers in hitand-run tactics. It is easy to understand that he believed that Gothic morale was extremely low and that under pressure they would break; after all, a similar thing had happened at Tricamerum in Africa. He made a mistake and lost the battle. Fortunately, the heroics of Principius and Tarmatus, along with a section of the infantry, allowed the Byzantines to retreat with fewer casualties than they may otherwise have suffered.
His second mistake was to accept the invitation to garrison Milan. The city was too far away from the rest of his forces, and so was vulnerable to attack. Furthermore, it was on the far side of a major river, the Po, and was not easy to either reinforce or relieve when besieged. That said, it is easy to show that the occupation of Milan was a mistake in hindsight: in reality, his detaining the envoys over winter can be interpreted as his being unwilling to make the commitment, and it is probable that he only agreed because of the political implications. Along with Milan he gained control of the area of Liguria, one of the most fertile in Italy. If it was a mistake, it was an understandable mistake.
His third, and perhaps his greatest mistake, was that he rushed the end of the war. It was becoming likely that the envoys sent by Justinian would make arrangements to end the war before Belisarius had completed his military conquest. For whatever reason, whether the pursuit of glory, the desire to simply finish the task, or for some other motive, Belisarius was not prepared to allow the Goths to escape without acknowledging their total defeat. The result was to be disastrous for Rome.
Due to the need for speed, Belisarius failed to comprehend the Gothic fears for their safety and the depth of their desire to remain in Italy: after all, although seen in Constantinople as ‘Germans’ and foreigners imposing their will on the Italian natives, they had been born in Italy and considered themselves to be ‘of Italy’. If Belisarius had taken more time in the negotiations, he may have listened to and understood their fears and taken steps to allay them After all, the majority of Goths had returned to their homes south of the Po, apparently with no intention of restarting the war. With only a little extra patience the war could have been finished before he left.
He did not take the time, and rushed through the peace negotiations. Convinced that Belisarius was going to accept the kingship, and so ensure that they would not be deported to the east, the Goths accepted their defeat. When Belisarius refused to accept the throne, the situation again became unclear, and the Gothic nobles were uncertain as to their future. With his dismissal of their request to become king, Belisarius alienated the Gothic nobles, as his actions may have been perceived as demeaning the kingship. In these circumstances were planted the seeds for the continuance of the war after Belisarius had been recalled.
There is only one note of caution that remains concerning Belisarius’ abilities as a general. He does not appear to have been confident in his use of infantry, instead relying almost wholly on the cavalry. It would be easy to dismiss this by noting that the infantry were obviously of poor quality and had fled from the field at the Battle of Rome with potentially disastrous results.
Yet this is not the whole story. A portion of the infantry, led by Principius and Tarmatus, fought bravely against the Goths. It is clear that, if they had been properly trained by Belisarius and led by officers who did not run away at the first opportunity, they could have formed a valuable asset to the Byzantines, both in attacking enemy fortifications and by acting as a rallying point for the cavalry. By neglecting these troops, Belisarius diminished the fighting strength of his army by disqualifying a section of his troops from taking an effective part in battle.
Despite these reservations, overall the Italian campaign reinforced his reputation and highlighted his military abilities in a way that they had never been shown before, either in Africa or in the east. Now that he was returning to the Persian front, his abilities would be tested against armies that had already shown that he could be beaten. It remained to be seen if his experiences in the west had given him the knowledge and maturity to master the armies of the east.
Chapter 11
The Return to the East
The Reforms of Khusrow
The so-called ‘Eternal Peace’ that was agreed between Rome and Persia following the defeat of Belisarius at Callinicum is commonly attributed to the desire of Justinian to free troops for the upcoming war against the Vandals. Although there is a large amount of truth in this conclusion, Khusrow also appears to have wanted a peace treaty. However, he understood that Justinian was in a rush and so ensured that he gained the best possible terms.
The reason for the desire for peace was that Khusrow was about to set in motion a system of reforms. In Chapter 4 it was shown that the Persian army was effectively a feudal force consisting of lords who were granted land in return for military service. They in turn conscripted men into the army who thus owed their loyalty to the nobles. Khusrow had determined to change this for a professional force with no loyalty to the nobles, only to the king.
To complete these reforms, Khusrow would have to curtail the power of the nobles. To do this, he enrolled the lesser nobility, the dekhans, into the savaran. This diminished the influence of the upper nobility and allowed his further reforms to pass, since the nobles no longer had the power to stop them. This created a much larger manpower base from which to recruit the savaran heavy cavalry. As a by-product, it correspondingly reduced the number of troops available to serve as light cavalry, especially as horse archers. To overcome the shortage, Khusrow began an active recruitment campaign amongst the tribes bordering the empire, aimed especially at recruiting horse archers.
Possibly due to the dekhans being unable to afford the expensive equipment needed to serve in the savaran, Khusrow instituted a salary for the army and equipped the troops from state arsenals. In effect, Khusrow created a professional fighting force owing loyalty to the king, so further weakening the power and influence of the nobles.
As was shown in the previous disussion, the command of the Persian army was usually left to the eran-spahbad, who was traditionally a member of one of the seven most influential families. The post was now abolished. Instead, command devolved upon four spahbads, each of whom was given control of a specific region within the empire.
The spahbad of the north was responsible for the provinces of Media, Kurdistan, Azerbaijan and Arran, and also the passes over the Caucasus, including the Derbend Pass that had been a bone of contention between the Persians and the Byzantines in the past. The spahbad of the east was responsible for the provinces of Khurasan, Seistan and Kerman. The spahbad
of the south was responsible for the provinces of Persis, Susiana and Khuzistan, including the long coast on the Persian Gulf. Finally, the spahbad of the west was responsible for the most important area of all: Mesopotamia (known to the Persians as Araq, ‘the Lowland’ – modern ‘Iraq’). Each spahbad was responsible for the recruitment and levying of troops within his designated area, and in theory with ensuring that each of them was armed and equipped in the correct manner.
It was only when these reforms had been completed that Khusrow began to look at the situation regarding the Byzantines in the west.
The Second Persian War
It was obvious that Khusrow was going to invade (the political events leading up to the war have already been covered in Chapter 9). In anticipation of the threat, Justinian divided the eastern command: Belisarius was to be given control of the western portion of the command, Buzes control of the eastern portion, up to the frontier with Persia. Until the arrival of Belisarius, Buzes was given command of the whole.