by Ron Jaworski
The Bills dominated the early nineties because they had Hall of Fame players in quarterback Jim Kelly, running back Thurman Thomas, and receiver James Lofton, along with wideout Andre Reed, whose numbers are good enough to put him in Canton. The Bills were also bigger than anyone else in that era. Five-foot-nine, 185-pound special-teams ace and receiver Steve Tasker was himself a midget among monsters. “In 1990 there were only seven guys in the NFL playing at over three hundred pounds,” he said. “We had three of them—and they could all move.”
Rapid motion became the foundation of Buffalo’s attack after head coach Marv Levy copied Sam Wyche’s Cincinnati No-Huddle offense and made it his own. “Jim Kelly ran our two-minute offense so well that we began running it other times in games,” Levy remembered. “Eventually it became our offense for the next decade. The No-Huddle had repercussions we didn’t even realize when we first started. We knew the opposition couldn’t substitute easily. It shortened the period of time they could send in defensive formation signals from the sidelines. And it also diminished the turnovers we committed, because it was so basic. It had fewer plays. It simplified the decisions Kelly had to make on the field, and he loved that. Jim was tailor-made for that style of offense.”
Kelly agreed. “My mom was always telling me to slow down, going all the way back to seventh or eighth grade. But that’s how I’ve always been—just a guy who loves a fast pace, doing things quickly, and being on the go all the time.” The offense even had a distinctive name: the “K-Gun.” “Everyone thinks the offense is named after Kelly,” said Levy. “But actually we had a great receiving tight end in Keith McKeller. When Keith came in, we were pretty much pass oriented, and that was why we called it the K-Gun—K for Keith. Plus his nickname was ‘Killer,’ so there’s another K for you.”
With their streamlined offense, the Bills operated at warp speed. “We had a menu of five plays that were included in our game plan every week,” recalled Tasker. “We ran those against any team and any defense. Then we had another menu of five or ten plays that were specific to that game. Those would be just about all the plays we’d run. Back then, the No-Huddle was still relatively new, and nobody had yet figured out how to defend it. It was so compact that we got very comfortable with it, and because there was no free agency then, it was the same guys every year doing the same thing. And since we ran a new play an average of every sixteen seconds, it forced defenses to line up with virtually the same personnel on every snap. We had too much talent against predictable defenses, and we just killed people with it.”
Fortunately for the Steelers, they could experiment with solutions to the K-Gun twice a year, when they played a division rival whose approach wasn’t much different from Buffalo’s. “We had the advantage of going against the ‘Run and Shoot’ with Warren Moon and all those great weapons on the Houston Oilers,” said LeBeau. The Run and Shoot enjoyed its NFL heyday during the 1990s. It usually consisted of a single back, with no tight end and as many as four wide receivers that were given the freedom to adjust their routes on the fly. Those receivers included Haywood Jeffires, Curtis Duncan, and Drew Hill. They teamed with future Hall of Fame quarterback Moon, the perfect triggerman for this dizzying attack, given his rubber arm, ability to read defenses and the presence of mind to make quick decisions. “One of the only differences between them,” noted LeBeau, “was that the Bills always kept a tight end on the field, while the Oilers didn’t even have one on their roster! But they were both based on spreading opponents out, making you defend the entire field. The evolution of our defense was a reaction to defending the West Coast offense and Run-and-Shoot spread attack. With the defenders we had and later added, that gave us a leg up in defending against Houston. Before we got to Pittsburgh, the Oilers had been boss of the AFC Central. We changed that right away. Those were valuable games as preparation to play against the Bills’ K-Gun.”
Cowher’s first game as Steelers head coach was in the Houston Astrodome against the Oilers, and the team quickly fell behind 14–0. “But then we took control, intercepted five passes, and eventually won, 29–24,” recalled Capers. “When we played them two months later, we did even better. Our players were more comfortable in our system, and we did a lot more blitzing. In that game, Woodson came off the edge and broke Moon’s ribs. If you’re a coach, you don’t want to expose your quarterback to that kind of punishment.”
Lake believed that, in one respect, playing the Bills would be less demanding than taking on the Oilers. “Against the Run-and-Shoot their patterns were executed a lot faster because they used so many receivers. When we played the Bills, where there’s a back and a tight end, the game actually slowed down for defensive backs—and that allowed us to play faster. Our goal was to disrupt the timing of the Bills’ offense. If we could force them out of their comfort zone and rush what they were doing, then mistakes were bound to happen.”
In Cowher’s first season, the Steelers went 11–5 and won the Central Division, earning them a home playoff game in the divisional round. The week before, in the wild-card game, the Bills staged the greatest comeback in NFL history, storming back from a 35–3 third-quarter deficit to beat the Oilers in overtime, 41–38. Capers still winces when he remembers that weekend. “By halftime, I’d already broken everything down and pretty much had our game plan all set. I thought I’d be able to relax the rest of the day, show up the next morning, and meet with the guys. When the Bills made that incredible comeback, I had to throw all my work in the wastebasket, go into the office, and stay up all night putting together a whole new game plan for Buffalo.”
The Bills’ historic rally had been led by backup quarterback Frank Reich, subbing for an injured Jim Kelly, and Jim was still not completely healed when the team arrived in Pittsburgh the following week. To the Bills, it didn’t seem to matter. They were riding the momentum of an historic achievement. And besides, they’d already beaten the Steelers four straight times, including a win in early November. Based on what they knew, the Bills had to feel good about their chances.
This game is unique among those I’ve selected for this book: It’s the only one where the featured team and coach lost. I know what you’re thinking: How can this be an example of coaching genius if their team couldn’t even win the game? In the case of the Steelers, the answer is simple. Pittsburgh’s defense didn’t cost it the victory. Had just one or two breaks gone their way, the Steelers would likely have won. But the greater reason for choosing this game is that it provided a widely viewed forum for a different approach to pressure defense. With the whole football world watching, the Steelers unleashed an innovative system that would frustrate and stifle the most prolific offense of that era.
6 Bills Offensive Possessions
As expected, the Bills came out in their one-back, one-tight-end, three-wide set, a personnel package they would stay with virtually the entire game. Buffalo’s top receiver, Andre Reed, aligned in the slot, where he would stay all afternoon. The Steelers countered with six defensive backs in a dime personnel package, assigning Carnell Lake as slot defender over Reed and Rod Woodson outside at left corner. Linebackers Greg Lloyd and Jerrol Williams set up as the defensive ends of a four-man front, although Williams would stand up during subsequent series in a conventional linebacker’s position.
Pittsburgh went to Zone-blitz principles on the third play of the game, with Lake blitzing off the slot while defensive tackle Donald Evans dropped into coverage. Since the Steelers rushed only four men, this was technically a “zone exchange” rather than a Zone blitz, which calls for five or more rushers. The Bills completed a 5-yard pass to pick up a first down. Frank Reich then connected with wide receiver Don Beebe for 11 yards and another first down. It would be well into the second quarter before Buffalo successfully moved the chains again. The Steelers shut down three consecutive plays by Thurman Thomas, who rushed for 1,487 yards in 1992, the highest single-season total of his Hall of Fame career. On fourth-and-1, Buffalo gambled with a dive by Carwell Gardner. Li
nebacker David Little stopped the fullback cold, and Pittsburgh took over on downs. The Steelers responded with their first and only scoring drive of the day, a nine-play series ending with Gary Anderson’s field goal to put Pittsburgh ahead, 3–0.
Buffalo’s second possession was over in three plays. Pittsburgh deployed its base 3–4 personnel but continued to rely on Zone-blitz tactics. First Lloyd tackled Thomas for a 3-yard loss. On second-and-long, both Lloyd and Jerrol Williams rushed from their outside linebacker spots while nose tackle Joel Steed dropped underneath. Reich avoided pressure and connected with Thomas for 10 yards before Lake brought him down. Facing third-and-3, the Steelers called a rare all-out blitz; this was likely a Capers decision because Cover-Zero is something that LeBeau has historically avoided. Dom picked a winner this time, as the fierce pressure forced a tipped incomplete pass that ended the drive.
Buffalo made a defensive play of its own to regain possession when Nate Odomes intercepted Neil O’Donnell’s pass about four minutes later. The Bills took over at their own 34 but didn’t travel very far, as they were held to a second straight three-and-out series. Pittsburgh’s defense returned to its dime package, allowing a short gain to halfback Kenneth Davis on first down. A throw by Reich was flicked aside by corner Richard Shelton, and then the Steelers really made the Bills look bad on third-and-long. The zone exchange was called, with Lake and Shelton rushing, while tackles Evans and Gerald Williams dropped off. Nobody picked up Lake, who breezed through untouched to sack Reich for a 4-yard loss. This was the zone pressure concept at its best: three confused Bills offensive linemen blocking Lloyd, while Lake came in cleanly off the edge. “What the Steelers were running was like Chinese to me,” Bills center Kent Hull confessed sheepishly. “I directed our offensive line, and I looked at it like ‘A-B-C.’ The only problem was it turned out to be the Chinese alphabet. We simply didn’t know who to block.”
Pittsburgh’s offense began the second quarter with a promising drive that got all the way down to the Buffalo 25 before O’Donnell was sacked for a huge loss, putting the Steelers out of field goal range. A Pittsburgh punt pinned the Bills back at their own 5, but a Reich-to-Beebe pass gained a dozen yards and gave Buffalo some breathing room. Staying in dime personnel, the Steelers swatted away two more pass attempts to Beebe and dropped Thomas for a loss on a running play, forcing Buffalo to punt once again. Four consecutive series had ended badly for the Bills, with the last three going no farther than their own 35-yard line. Pittsburgh’s defense was dominating every facet of the game.
Current Bengals head coach Marvin Lewis coached Pittsburgh’s linebackers in ‘92 and could easily understand the confused expressions on the Bills’ faces that afternoon. “We had to have enough different defenses in our game plan so we could defend the No-Huddle. Since substitution was difficult, we’d try to mix things up with the personnel we already had on the field. We wanted the Bills to have identification problems, trying to figure out the different pressures we’d apply. One play someone could be considered a linebacker, then be a down lineman on the next snap.”
Tasker voiced the Bills’ obvious displeasure. “We’d always gone into games thinking we could do whatever we wanted. We had our set offense in the K-Gun, and we ran it as we liked. The Steelers were the first team we went up against where we were going to have to counter what they did to us. This was the first defense we played against that could control a game. We needed plans in place that deviated from what we normally liked to do. The Pittsburgh defense changed how we prepared.”
Unfortunately for the Steelers, their offense was struggling as much as Buffalo’s. Pittsburgh’s next possession ended when defensive end Bruce Smith, a perennial All-Pro, forced a fumble by sacking O’Donnell. The Bills took over on their own 41, where their slumbering offense came to life. It took nine plays, but they finally scored when Reich hit Mitch Frerotte on a tackle-eligible touchdown pass from the 1-yard line. Oddly, Pittsburgh did not run a single Zone blitz scheme during the drive—and maybe it should have. Buffalo now had a 7–3 lead and held it into halftime after Bills corner James Williams intercepted O’Donnell at the one-minute mark.
Clearly the Steelers were frustrated, having played so well defensively through most of the half but having so little to show for their effort. Successful Zone blitz schemes had limited the Bills to just 121 net yards and 7 points—and this was the same Bills offense that had scored 41 the week before in their historic comeback win over Houston. Pittsburgh’s problems did not end there. Late in the first half, Woodson left the game because of dizziness suffered from an earlier hit he’d taken on a punt return. Rod knew he was in trouble when he had to ask teammates for his coverage assignment. “I was in la-la land,” he recalled. “It was just like being in a cartoon—trying to get your memory back.” His replacement was backup Sammy Walker, who was legally blind in one eye. Even with perfect vision, Walker would not have been capable of playing at Woodson’s All-Pro level. After the game, Steelers linebacker Hardy Nickerson told reporters, “As soon as he went out, you could sense Buffalo felt a little relief and started working to the spot where Woodson was.”
3 Bills Offensive Possessions
Pittsburgh opened the second half in its dime package, so the Bills temporarily shelved the pass and ran the ball against the Steelers’ less fortified front. Their first two runs netted 18 yards. Then Reich finally threw, connecting with James Lofton for a dozen yards and a first down. At this point Pittsburgh returned to the Zone blitz, but Woodson’s absence was painfully evident. Reich went to Lofton again, and the veteran receiver drew a pass interference flag against the clearly overmatched Walker. Two plays later, Walker was victimized again when Beebe hauled in a 9-yarder for another first down.
Dom Capers could see what was happening. Without Woodson, he had to compensate with his coverage schemes, and that cut down his more aggressive play-calling choices. Walker obviously needed help, so Capers gave him safety support, but it ended up costing the Steelers. With the Bills facing a third-and-10 at the Pittsburgh 25, Capers played safety Larry Griffin over the top of Walker. Reich read the coverage and dropped off a screen pass on that side to Thomas. With fewer defenders in position up front, there was ample room for the play to develop. Thomas gained 11 yards and another first down.
On the next play, Capers switched back to his 3–4 base personnel, placing Shelton instead of Walker at left corner. Two plays later, Shelton was handed the opportunity to make that substitution look like a stroke of genius. Reich made his worst throw of the game: a ball headed straight for Shelton. “I just made a bad read,” Reich confessed after the game. “I thought Shelton was dropping off to cover [tight end] Pete Metzelaars. I don’t know if I telegraphed it, but if Shelton had caught it, there was no way I was going to catch him.” Unfortunately for Pittsburgh, the ball caromed right off Shelton’s hands and hit the turf. Not a soul stood between him and the Bills’ end zone. Afterward Shelton made no excuses. “I tried to run with it before I had it and dropped it. Maybe things go different there for us if I make the play.”
Given this reprieve, Reich redeemed himself after the next snap. First Capers put Walker back in as part of the dime package. He then ran a Zone blitz, with Lake coming off the slot in a five-man rush, while tackle Donald Evans dropped off. But Lake couldn’t get to Reich in time. The veteran quarterback feathered a pass to Lofton, who beat the bewildered Walker to the outside for a 17-yard touchdown. During the drive, the Bills made all three of their third down conversions, torching Walker on every one of them. Woodson’s absence had changed everything. Buffalo led 14–3 with only a few minutes left in the third quarter.
Conditions only got worse for Pittsburgh on its next series. A promising drive quickly fizzled, and the Steelers had to kick away. Punter Mark Royals fumbled the snap and lost 15 yards, handing the ball back to Buffalo. Woodson returned to the game, looking to bolster his team’s shaky pass coverage. “If it had been a regular-season game, I wouldn’t have gone back in,”
he admitted. “I’d gotten my senses back and felt much better, but I didn’t last very long because I broke my hand a few plays later and had to come out again.” The Steelers were in real trouble. “I don’t want to diminish what the Bills did that day, but we were pretty beat up at that point,” said Capers. “We weren’t the same defense we were from earlier in the season. A scheme can only take you so far.”
With Woodson finished for the afternoon, the Bills moved swiftly into Pittsburgh territory and seemed on the verge of punching it in, but a textbook example of Zone-blitz pressure prevented another touchdown. From their 3–4 alignment, the Steelers rushed both outside linebackers, while nose tackle Steed dropped into coverage. A reverse from Andre Reed was quickly diagnosed by the charging Jerrol Williams, who dropped the Buffalo receiver for an 8-yard loss. The Bills settled for a field goal. Later they tacked on one last touchdown to wrap up the 24–3 win.
It was the Steelers’ fifth straight loss to the Bills, but it had clearly marked a turning point in the series. For the first time, Pittsburgh had significantly incorporated zone-pressure concepts into its defensive game plan. The foundation of what is now recognized as the NFL’s quintessential Zone blitz was firmly in place: blitzes out of dime personnel, pressures off the corner, the exchange of rush and coverage responsibilities, three-deep coverage—all the tools necessary to pressure a passer with far less risk at the back end. And it had been achieved against the best team in the AFC. The ‘92 Bills went back to the Super Bowl a few weeks later and made an unprecedented fourth straight Super Bowl appearance the following year. But their championship run would end there, and a significant reason for their fall was that the Steelers finally hit on the formula to contain Buffalo’s prolific attack. The ‘92 playoff loss was the springboard to a string of dominant Steelers wins over Buffalo, wins that eventually propelled Pittsburgh to its own Super Bowl appearance in 1995.