by Ron Jaworski
The defensive play call was named “Turkey Zero,” and there was more creativity to its design than simply the surprise element of sending Vrabel. Once the play began, Hamilton took one step forward toward Jones, and then worked his way inside to Seymour in a line stunt. Seymour initially aligned head-up on center Andy McCollum, came to the outside, and drove hard into Jones, which made it impossible for the right tackle to look back outside as Vrabel barreled in. The result was a hurried throw by Warner under intense pressure. “They kind of forgot about me,” noted Vrabel. “I think Kurt was pretty surprised that I was there and free, and just kind of let it go. Ty Law made a great read on it, playing the ball and not the man.” Law cut in front of Isaac Bruce, stole the pass and ran untouched 47 yards for the first touchdown of the game.
But why did Belichick make such a call at this particular moment? The Rams had already run twenty-five plays and New England had shown nothing like it until now. What happened was that Bill took advantage of a perceived weakness in St. Louis’s line. The starting right tackle for most of the year had been Ryan Tucker, but he wasn’t in the game at the time; in fact, Jones started in his place. This was Rod’s first season in St. Louis after five years in Cincinnati. He’d played in only six games all year, so he may have not have been totally certain of his responsibilities. Recognizing this possibility, Belichick went right after Jones, showing him an alignment and pressure scheme he wasn’t used to, then neutralizing him with Seymour’s brutal hit coming off a line stunt. The turnover gave New England the lead, even though its own offense was struggling. The Superdome crowd was absolutely stunned. There would be no blowout, and any remaining aura of Rams invincibility vanished. “The whole mood of the fans changed,” said Milloy. “You heard some of those people who weren’t sure who they wanted to root for start rooting for the Patriots. That play was huge. It put us on the map.”
Rams Series No. 5
2nd Quarter, 8:49 remaining: New England 7, St. Louis 3
The touchdown completely energized the Patriots’ defense. Vrabel continued where he left off, shedding a block by receiver Ricky Proehl to nail Faulk for minimal gain on the first play. The Rams picked up 11 and 9 yards on their next two tries, bringing up second-and-1 at mid-field. St. Louis ran a toss to Faulk, but Bruschi had him in his crosshairs and blew him up with a great open-field tackle. Facing third-and-inches, Martz went with a curious play selection.
Most teams would probably have tried to power their way for the first down, but Mike Martz is a different breed of cat. Given his druthers, Mike usually goes with the pass, and that’s what he called here. He lined up with four wide receivers. Warner went to a five-step drop, with no play-action, so the Rams didn’t even try to give the appearance that they might run the ball. Faulk was offset in the back-field, so once again the Patriots executed their Bull’s-Eye concept. When Faulk released outside, Vrabel gave him another jarring whack. Further back in the pocket, Warner gunned it to Proehl, but Lawyer Milloy read the play perfectly and nearly made the pick. No matter: The Rams were forced to punt again and didn’t get the ball back until after the two-minute warning.
The Patriots wanted the Rams to throw all the time, and that’s pretty much what they did. Even when New England was trotting out seven defensive backs on a play, Martz kept passing instead of running the ball against undermanned fronts. That was the psychology Belichick understood. He believed that, no matter what, Mike had no intention of relying on his running game. Mike’s offensive philosophy was pass, pass, pass. He probably should have run the ball more often, which would have forced the Pats to switch over and play a more conventional defense.
Belichick researches his opponents as comprehensively as any coach in the NFL. I’m absolutely certain that he broke down the coaching tape of the 1999 NFC title game between Tampa Bay and the Rams team that went on to win the Super Bowl. Tony Dungy’s Tampa-Two defense gave St. Louis all it could handle that day. They were really the only team that stopped the Rams that year, and nearly pulled off the upset before falling, 11-6. “They weren’t a patient group,” recalled Dungy. “They went after big plays and made a ton of them. They always felt like they were going to score forty points. We felt that mind-set would play into our hands. We knew if we could pressure Kurt Warner, we’d make some plays and get some takeaways, and that’s what happened. They moved the ball a lot. They did hit some big plays on us, but we tackled well. We kept them out of the end zone until the end, and we got our share of turnovers. Up till then, people thought the Rams were unstoppable.”
In Super Bowl XXXVI, I think Mike’s ego got in the way, and I’ll use a story I heard from Proehl as an example. Ricky went to Martz during the game and pointed out that New England was putting six and seven DBs on the field, so why not run more often? Mike basically told Ricky to shut up; that he was going to win the game “his way.” Now, I think Mike’s players basically liked this mind-set because, to a man, they were aggressive and loved to pass. But in my opinion, variation isn’t a sign of weakness, and an unexpected play call can open up all kinds of possibilities. At any rate, Belichick knew in his heart that Mike wasn’t going to change, so Bill never really varied his defense all day. Martz has since admitted that he should have run the ball more out of passing formations, especially on third down. But, he also added, “It’s difficult in a Super Bowl to call runs on third-and-four, or third-and-six—even with Faulk as your running back.”
Rams Series No. 6
2nd Quarter, 1:52 remaining: New England 7, St. Louis 3
Starting from their own 15, the Rams began cautiously but were helped by a penalty that put them at the 25 with plenty of time left. New England went with seven defensive backs, leaving only four rushers to pressure Warner. That number dropped by one because, with Faulk aligned in the offset position, Vrabel went right for him again—and jammed Marshall as he went outside. This time, though, the play went away from Faulk, and at first it looked as if the Rams would hit the jackpot. Proehl caught the ball after running an angle route and busted loose for what appeared to be a huge gain. Instead the play ended in disaster for St. Louis.
“We were trying to get down close enough for three points and hopefully pick up some momentum,” Martz remembered. “We hit Ricky on what we call a Z-post. We cleared out, he ran underneath, caught it, and now we’ve got a nice little convoy of players in front of him. Ricky took off, but he didn’t see the tackler [Antwan Harris] come in and put his helmet right on the football. He just made a terrific play, knocking it out—and New England recovers. I don’t know if there was anything you could do about it. Just one of those things that happens, and what can you say?”
Looking at this play, I’m almost at a loss for words myself. During the two-minute drill, with a mere 4-point lead, Belichick stayed committed to his Bull’s-Eye game plan: It was more important to minimize Faulk as a viable option in the passing game than to pressure Warner in the pocket. It was all part of Bill’s overall approach featuring press technique by his cornerbacks, in both zone and man coverage, to disrupt the timing of the Rams’ second-level passing game. Messing with that rhythm would force Warner to look to Faulk as his outlet, but with Marshall also getting smacked around, any ability to get the ball to him in open space was severely compromised. The strategy enabled the double-digit underdogs from Massachusetts to take a 14-3 lead into the locker room. That’s because Tom Brady needed only five plays after Proehl’s fumble to complete a touchdown pass to wide receiver David Patten in the final seconds.
By any measure, Belichick’s decision was proving to be the correct one. He was sacrificing pass-rush pressure to disrupt Faulk whenever he lined up in space. It was more important for the Patriots to minimize the running back as a viable option in the passing game than to harass Warner in the pocket. This was all part of a comprehensive approach that featured press technique on the outside, utilizing both zone and man coverage. The idea was to slow down the Rams’ intermediate passing game. It was a brilliant overall strat
egy from Belichick that worked throughout the first half—and would continue in the second. As a receiver, Marshall Faulk would never be a factor in Super Bowl XXXVI.
Rams Series No. 1
3rd Quarter, 11:58 remaining: New England 14, St. Louis 3
The Superdome crowd was uplifted by an inspiring halftime show from the rock band U2, honoring the victims of the 9/11 attack that had occurred just a few months earlier. A new surge of energy seemed to be emanating from the Rams as well. It was obvious that Martz had made some adjustments in the locker room, because St. Louis came out throwing more effectively in their first drive of the second half. Torry Holt caught an 18-yard pass to start things off, but a holding penalty on Conwell wiped it out. St. Louis quickly erased the mistake, though, with a 20-yard completion to Az Hakim. The play worked because its design called for Warner to roll right, out of his customary dropping point and safely away from New England pressure. I liked that tactic by Martz—changing Kurt’s launch point, which allowed Warner to get comfortable right out of the chute. Hakim, with more time to work his route, beat the press man-coverage by nickel back Buckley, enabling him to make the catch.
Warner followed this with a deep-drop progression that ended with a 22-yard completion to Bruce, who beat single coverage from Ty Law. On its surface, you’d look at this play as simply another successful intermediate St. Louis throw. But to me, it also underscored the Patriots’ commitment to their overall defensive goals. Here it was, first-and-10, the second play of the half. The Rams were aligned in base personnel, yet the Patriots were in a nickel package. The inference here is plain as day: For Belichick, it was critical to defend the pass, first and foremost. You could argue that he was daring Martz to run, but I believe Bill had already made the tactical judgment that the Rams’ passing attack was far more dangerous, and therefore more critical to stop. This jibes with one of Belichick’s most sacred coaching concepts: You take away what the opposing offense does best.
One wrinkle I noticed on this play was that defensive tackle Richard Seymour ignored pass-rushing chores and dropped into the flat to pick up Faulk. Bruschi was also converging on Marshall, so I’m not sure whether Seymour made a mistake in his coverage responsibilities. But his unconventional move was certainly consistent with previous New England defensive calls. It wasn’t a factor on this play, and the Rams now seemed to be looking more like the team that had scored over 500 points in the regular season. After a Patriots pass interference call, St. Louis was at New England’s 41 and clearly on the move.
Belichick deserves a ton of credit for his defensive game plan, but it’s also important to remember that key plays from great players can be just as big a factor in winning. That’s just what happened on the next call. Up to this point, New England’s defenders had been playing primarily in two-man and man-free coverage, but on this play they switched to a two-deep zone scheme, one of the few times it would be deployed all game. In two-deep coverage, all the defenders are responsible for areas on the field—not individual receivers.
Following the snap, safety Tebucky Jones mistakenly stayed too far inside, not getting enough width in his two-deep coverage responsibility. This allowed Holt to get wide open down the left sideline, in the outside void between Jones and the underneath zone corner. Warner saw him and set up to make the throw. Martz had made the perfect call. The Pats were caught flat-footed in busted coverage. But seconds later, with the play concluded, Kurt was on his back, and St. Louis had been handed a 7-yard loss.
What the heck happened? I’ll tell you what happened. Rookie Richard Seymour made an incredible individual play. He overpowered veteran guard Adam Timmerman, a very reliable 310-pound pass-blocking lineman, and sacked Warner before he could pass.
In my view, this was as big a game changer as the Vrabel blitz that brought about Law’s touchdown interception. The Rams were rolling. If Warner had been in a clean pocket, this would have been a touchdown. Kurt didn’t miss these kinds of throws. But he didn’t get to make this one, thanks to Seymour. What he did had nothing to do with any Belichick scheme but had everything to do with a young athlete beating a more experienced blocker to make a terrific play. Stuff like this sometimes gets lost in the shuffle, but I assure you that this was as critical a moment as any in the game.
On the next play, Warner saw that New England was once again in two-deep zone coverage, so what the heck, he figured: let’s go back to Holt in the same area. Patriots linebacker Roman Phifer was in Cover-Two, running down the middle seam, so it was essential for Tebucky Jones to play his assignment correctly. He didn’t, failing to get enough depth or width, so Holt beat him badly down the left sideline. But Warner threw the ball too far outside, and Holt could not stay in bounds for the completion. Another missed opportunity for the Rams.
The next call killed the drive for good. New England went into dime coverage, with all four corners in press position. Belichick called for a safety blitz from Lawyer Milloy toward Faulk’s side. Once again, Faulk was in offset alignment. Any chance that Marshall could possibly be a pass target quickly went up in smoke. He had to stay in and pick up Milloy, or Warner would be on the turf again. Meanwhile, Phifer, who originally had Faulk man-to-man in the coverage scheme, now was free to go after the quarterback. Roman not only knocked the ball down but also laid some wood on Warner. The result was an incomplete pass and another Rams punt. End of promising drive, no points, Patriots’ ball.
Looking at this play again, I am still astounded at Belichick’s defensive choice. It’s third-and-17, a situation where many coaches play the percentages and go with safe coverages: Play zone, force a short throw, make the tackle well short of the first down, and get the ball back. Instead Bill had his guys attacking with pressure, calling a safety blitz with the rest of the secondary staying stride for stride with receivers who were better skilled than the people covering them. This all went back to Bill’s basic belief that Faulk was the key to the offense and had to be neutralized, one way or another, on every down. A great way to accomplish that was to force him to stay in the backfield as a blitz protector.
Rams Series No. 2
3rd Quarter, 6:40 remaining: New England 14, St. Louis 3
In this game, there was only one offensive series during which Mike Martz departed somewhat from his basic principles—and this was that drive. He ran Faulk four straight times to start things, picking up 30 yards on the first three carries and none on the fourth. After a pass play to Holt picked up 5 yards, St. Louis faced a third-and-5 at the Patriots’ 45-yard line. Martz could have chosen to run Faulk again. Belichick gambled that he wouldn’t, calling for a dime package in the secondary, but this time with three corners and three safeties, not four corners and two safeties. He also had defensive end Willie McGinest line up wider than normal. After the snap, Milloy came crashing through on another safety blitz.
The Rams immediately faced a truckload of problems. Because Faulk once again aligned in the offset position, McGinest was able to line up at this wide angle and was free to blitz. This meant tackle Ryan Tucker had to rotate outside to block Willie, so he couldn’t help with Milloy. Martz’s called formation had no tight end on that side to block Milloy, either. Guess who got stuck with that chore? Yep, Faulk had to stay in and block, so he was eliminated from yet another play. Then St. Louis got more bad news. “Holt slipped coming out of his break on a slant route, and Kurt threw a pick over there on the sideline to Otis Smith,” Martz recalled. “Otherwise we’d have had a nice pickup and kept driving.” The turnover was especially damaging to St. Louis, because Smith ran it back 30 yards, which put the Patriots in range to convert a field goal.
Rams Series No. 3
3rd Quarter, 1:18 remaining: New England 17, St. Louis 3
Up to now, the Patriots defenders had performed far beyond anyone’s expectations, but they were starting to wear down. These guys had played their hearts out but knew how dangerous the Rams still were. It would have been virtually impossible to hold down St. Louis for a who
le game.
Martz also liked his chances, even trailing by two touchdowns. “Look, we’d moved the ball up and down the field, but all we’d done is pick up what I call ‘empty yards,’ “ he acknowledged. “We gained over four hundred yards in the game, and until late in the fourth quarter, I don’t think New England had more than one hundred twenty to one hundred forty yards in total offense. So statistically it was lopsided in our favor. What killed us were the turnovers. Sure, they stopped us on some plays, but we also stopped ourselves.
“The thing that’s remarkable about my players was that they were so resilient. We get into the fourth quarter, and Kurt says to them, ‘Okay, let’s go, let’s get it back, let’s do it.’ Sure, there was a sense of frustration, but not panic. They felt they had enough time to get the points we needed and that now was the time to get it done.”
As expected, St. Louis went into its hurry-up offense, but I didn’t know until Martz told me later that he seriously considered utilizing it much earlier. “We thought about starting the Super Bowl in the two-minute drill to kind of put them on their heels and take them out of their complex defensive schemes,” he disclosed. “Once we finally did get into the No-Huddle offense, we went down the field pretty quick and really got into a rhythm.”
This drive was the Rams’ best of the game, covering 12 plays and 77 yards, and eating up about five and a half minutes. Martz continued to tinker with his adjustments, and those changes paid off. At the same time, the Patriots’ defense was getting tired. Their offense hadn’t given them many breathers, and the talent differential between St. Louis’s skill players and New England’s patchwork quilt of free agents and long-in-the-tooth veterans was finally starting to show.