British and American authorities each, at different times, attempted to gauge their prisoners’ respective levels of commitment to the National Socialist government. Both Allies found the prospect of making accurate determinations tricky, at best, and few prisoners better illustrated the complicated nature of this endeavor than the general officers under consideration here. Comparing the captivity and postwar careers of these men reveals both significant similarities and fascinating divergences. After the war, one of the “Nazis” emerged as one of the strongest pro-Western politicians in West Germany, while Allied authorities eventually came to suspect one of the “anti-Nazis” to be a militaristic threat to postwar peace.
Had these men undergone a change of heart? Did opposition to Nazism in an American POW camp represent an opportunistic attempt to land on the right side of Germany after the war? Or was there something more to these stories than originally met British and American eyes? How much did considerations of families living under the Nazi regime affect prisoner behavior? Did the Allies recognize any difference between German patriotic loyalty on the one hand and an actual belief in National Socialism on the other? How much did the Allies’ perceptions of who was and who was not a Nazi influence their decision making? And were the prisoners that Allied authorities deemed to be the most open to a democratic message and perhaps the best suited for postwar leadership positions really the most democratically minded or were they simply opportunists? The story of these generals in American custody suggests that any assessment of an enemy’s loyalties requires very careful, individual consideration.
The broadest of the questions to be addressed deals with why American authorities changed their ideas about the value of the German generals in their custody and how these changes affected the respective Allied relationships with these prisoners. Almost immediately when the war ended, the British seemingly lost interest. While they retained custody of these senior officers for another three years, the British moved the generals’ camp to a different location and ceased all eavesdropping and interrogation operations. The Americans, by contrast, found German generals far more useful after the war than they ever had before.
The end of the war in Europe transformed the American perception of the importance of the German generals. The Grand Alliance of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union had been an uneasy one at best. While the three nations successfully worked together to defeat Nazi Germany, mutual distrust and suspicion had plagued their relationship from the beginning. With the war coming to an end in the spring of 1945, those suspicions resurfaced and led the Americans and British to question who actually posed the greatest threat to Western Allied interests.
The British, likely because of larger concerns about rebuilding their own war-torn nation, now allowed the Americans to take the lead in the two Allies’ relationship with Wehrmacht generals. Despite a lack of interest in these senior officers during the war, U.S. authorities suddenly began to appreciate their potential value to U.S. national security. Thus began a relationship between U.S. civilian and military officials and German general officers that would eventually see the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Central Intelligence Agency make use of former Wehrmacht officers for intelligence, leadership roles in the Federal Republic of Germany, the writing of a comprehensive history of the Second World War, and even a revision of U.S. Army doctrine.
The American perspective on the German generals who had come and gone from the United States between June 1943 and June 1946 changed from one of neglect and disregard to one of respect and admiration. Curiously, these senior officers became far more valuable to American interests after the war ended than they had been before. Indeed, these prisoners of war emerged as allies in the early years of the Cold War. Unlike the British, American perceptions of the value of the generals directly correlated to changes in American beliefs about who the “enemy” was at war’s end. For the United States, the “German question” had been answered and a new threat had emerged.
1
Afrikaner and Französen
The first large group of German generals to arrive in Allied hands came from the massive German surrender in Tunisia in May 1943. In September 1940 Italian dictator Benito Mussolini initiated a campaign against the British in North Africa. He met with only limited success before British forces drove the Italians out of Egypt and into western Libya by early 1941. In an effort to save his ally, German chancellor Adolf Hitler sent German forces to North Africa under the leadership of General Erwin Rommel, who promptly regained most of the territory the Italians had lost. The subsequent struggle between British general Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army and the “Desert Fox’s” Afrika Korps is well documented. The British drove the Germans back through Libya by January 1942 only to have Rommel, freshly reinforced, conquer much of British-controlled Egypt over the next five months. But with Montgomery’s victory at El Alamein in November, Axis fortunes finally entered into a decline from which they could not recover.
The Allies initiated a pincer movement in November 1942 with Operation Torch, landing sixty-five thousand men at Oran, Algiers, and Casablanca on the western coast of North Africa. The Germans initially responded well to the Allied offensive, crushing previously untested American forces at Kasserine Pass in February 1943. However, insufficient resources and a dispute between Rommel and General Hans Jürgen von Arnim, commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, halted the German advance. Following the British attack on the Mareth Line in March and Rommel’s departure from North Africa because of his declining health, von Arnim’s remaining Armee Gruppe Afrika found itself hemmed into a small area around Tunis and Bizerte. Short of supplies and unable to retreat any further, von Arnim finally capitulated on May 12, 1943, surrendering all of Germany’s forces in Tunisia.
Hans Jürgen von Arnim (Courtesy of the Mississippi Armed Forces Museum)
The end of Germany’s campaign in North Africa began with the surrender of Lieutenant General Gustav von Vaerst, a recipient of the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross, one of the highest honors bestowed by the German military.1 Von Vaerst had only been in command of the Fifth Panzer Army for two months when he was forced to surrender his unit to American general Omar Bradley on May 9, 1943. In the next three days, sixteen of von Vaerst’s fellow general officers would follow suit.
Later the same day, Brigadier General Fritz Krause, commander of the 334th Infantry Division, sent three members of his staff bearing a white flag to the headquarters of the American First Armored Division and negotiated his surrender.2 Krause arrived at American headquarters only shortly ahead of another of his colleagues, Major General Willibald Borowietz. Borowietz had earned rapid promotion as commander of the Fifteenth Panzer Division due to his superb leadership during the last days of the German Tunisian campaign. He was promoted to brigadier general on January 1, 1943, and then major general a scant four months later, on the first of May. Already a decorated soldier bearing the Knight’s Cross, he received the Oak Leaves on May 10, 1943, for having counterattacked and destroyed two-thirds of a large British tank force in Tunisia with a depleted tank force of his own. Yet, despite this earlier success, he now found himself a prisoner of war.3
German prisoner-of-war generals at Trent Park, November 1943. Front row, left to right: Generalleutnant Friedrich von Broich, Generalleutnant Theodor Graf von Sponeck, Generalmajor Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein, and Generalmajor Gerhard Bassenge. Back row, left to right: Oberst Hans Reimann, Generalmajor Georg Neuffer, Generalmajor Fritz Krause, Oberst Otto Köhnke, and Oberstleutnant Ernst Wolters. (German Federal Archive [Bundesarchiv], Bild 146-2005-0130 / Photographer: Unknown)
Major General Karl Robert Max Bülowius quickly joined von Vaerst, Krause, and Borowietz as an Allied POW when he too surrendered his unit, the Manteuffel Division, on May 9, 1943. As the North African campaign continued to collapse, other German generals from Armee Gruppe Afrika arrived in Allied hands as well, including Major General Carl Peter Bernard Köchy. This L
uftwaffe general and Afrika Korps air commander’s previous experience in the German navy made him a particularly interesting and potentially valuable prisoner. The communications specialist and former commandant of Tobruk, Brigadier General Ernst Schnarrenberger, and the Austrian captain Paul Meixner, chief of staff for the German and Italian naval command in Tunisia, also found themselves prisoners of war of the British and Americans.4
Of the seventeen German generals who fell into Allied hands from the Tunisian surrender, Brigadier General Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein and Major General Theodor Graf von Sponeck seemed to raise the greatest interest in both London and Washington. The well-heeled “Baron” von Liebenstein, with his prominent mustache and Knight’s Cross, surrendered to the Allies in the final hours of the North African campaign. Earlier in his career he served as chief of staff for the renowned panzer leader Colonel General Heinz Guderian and commanded the 164th Light Division from December 1942 until he too was forced to surrender to the Allies on May 12, 1943.5
“Count” von Sponeck, whose uniform was also adorned with a Knight’s Cross, had assumed command of the 90th Light Africa Division in September 1942. He “performed brilliantly” in the German retreat, fighting “nearly 2,000 miles from Egypt to Enfidaville.” On May 12, 1943, after being informed that he must surrender unconditionally, von Sponeck first replied that his men would fight to the last bullet. Given time to further contemplate his alternatives, however, von Sponeck surrendered to the British Eighth Army’s New Zealand Division. He later explained, “Most of my tanks were immobile through lack of fuel and our air support was negligible. I held out for 48 hours, but by then, we had received such a terrific battering, that I thought ‘Hitler or no Hitler,’ I will surrender. There’s no sense in prolonging this needless slaughter.”6
By contrast, British and American authorities would later take a dimmer view of Generals Heinrich-Hermann von Hülsen and Gotthard Frantz. Von Hülsen assumed command of the 21st Panzer Division near the end of April 1943 and received a promotion to brigadier general only a few days later on the first of May. Thus he was forced to surrender after having been in command of the 21st Panzer for less than two weeks. Likewise, Gotthard Frantz had recently been promoted to major general at the time of his surrender in May 1943. Frantz, however, had commanded the 19th Flak Division for six months before its surrender on May 13, 1943.7
The biggest catch and the senior officer among the generals captured in North Africa was Colonel General Hans Jürgen von Arnim. At the time of his surrender, he was one of the most prominent German prisoners of war in Allied hands. Von Arnim, descended from a long line of Prussian military officers, was a highly decorated veteran of both fronts in the First World War. In spite of having no previous experience with armor, he was given command of the 17th Panzer Division in autumn 1940 and distinguished himself on the Eastern Front. Field Marshal Ernst Busch praised von Arnim’s “strong relationship with the troops” and his ability to remain “unruffled and strongnerved . . . in the most difficult situations.” He too was awarded the Knight’s Cross in September 1941 and promoted to full general a little more than a year later. Upon awarding von Arnim command of the Fifth Panzer Army in North Africa, Hitler promised the general that he would receive all the supplies necessary for his operations in the desert, a promise soon to be broken and one that von Arnim would not forget.8
Despite von Arnim’s earlier success in Russia, the North African campaign revealed the limits of his command skills. Indeed, historian Correlli Barnett characterizes von Arnim as an “excellent tactician” who was responsible for a number of “important local victories” but an overly conservative officer who “had been promoted above his ceiling.” Part of the problem was the aristocratic von Arnim’s relationship with Erwin Rommel. Rommel intended to use their combined forces in an offensive strategy against the Allies in the spring of 1943. Von Arnim, who envied the success and notoriety of the Desert Fox while disdaining his middle-class background, refused to cooperate. Complicating matters, Berlin had established no clear chain of command before von Arnim arrived in North Africa. Consequently, on the third day of the generals’ coordinated attack in February 1943, von Arnim withheld parts of the Tenth and Twenty-First Panzer Divisions instead of following a prearranged plan. Despite Rommel’s pleas to the German military command and its subsequent reprimand of von Arnim, the Prussian would not release all the tanks necessary for the operation and Rommel’s offensive had to be aborted. Von Arnim’s subsequent “ill-conceived and unsuccessful” Operation Ox Head resulted in heavy losses and only served to further delay Rommel’s attack against the British. Eventually, having been stymied by both von Arnim and the British Army, Rommel departed North Africa on March 9, 1943, exhausted and in poor health.9
This left von Arnim, Rommel’s replacement, in command of Armee Gruppe Afrika, which was outnumbered and lacking the necessary provisions to face the Allies—Hitler’s promises notwithstanding. Von Arnim notified Berlin that he would require 140,000 tons of supplies per month to mount a successful defense against the Allies in North Africa. In January 1943 von Arnim had received approximately 46,000 tons of supplies, considerably less than he had expected. This figure dropped even further, to about 33,000 tons the following month, owing to Allied bombing of Axis supply ships in the Mediterranean and Hitler’s focus on the Eastern Front. When Berlin criticized von Arnim for “squinting over [his] shoulder,” referring to the general’s conservative retreat in Tunisia, von Arnim bitterly replied that he was “squinting at the horizon” for ships that never arrived.10
After the Allies launched their final offensive on May 6, Hitler sent word that von Arnim’s forces were to fight to the last man. The general chose to interpret this directive as requiring them to fight to the last bullet or, more specifically, the last tank shell. Thus, with the supply of tank shells exhausted on May 12, 1943, von Arnim destroyed what was left of his tanks and guns and surrendered. For the official ceremony, von Arnim donned his finest uniform and submitted his pistol and knife—although grudgingly and in French, despite his proficiency in English—to the British. He packed his remaining personal items, delivered a brief speech to his subordinate officers, and concluded by shaking each of their hands and exchanging salutes. He was then escorted through long lines of his devoted men chanting “Von Arnim! Von Arnim! Von Arnim!”11
The British initially received von Arnim with a great deal more cordiality than did the Americans. In fact, von Arnim’s surrender serves as an interesting comparison of the two Allied nations’ initially differing attitudes toward their captive German generals. American general Dwight Eisenhower broke with customary protocol and refused to meet von Arnim or accept his sword in surrender, citing Germany’s wartime atrocities and apparent unwillingness to resist the leadership of a man like Adolf Hitler. By contrast, British field marshal Harold Alexander hosted von Arnim in his tent and later expressed regret that he had not been “more chivalrous” and complimentary of the German general’s forces.12
Following his meeting with Alexander, von Arnim and his subordinate generals remained in temporary camps in North Africa for three days awaiting their transportation to England. Due to the Anglo-American arrangement regarding the German general officers, the British first took custody of all of these senior prisoners of war. Before departing North Africa, the generals enjoyed a three-hour excursion through a valley famous for its wildlife and a tea party at the residence of an anonymous English lady. General von Sponeck later recalled how much the generals appreciated these friendly gestures.13
The British began transferring the generals from North Africa to north London on May 15, 1943. While en route, they passed through Gibraltar, where the military governor, Lieutenant General Frank Macfarlane, accommodated von Arnim in the governor’s palace. The other generals stayed in rooms prepared for them in the local military hospital. The following day von Arnim proceeded to England alone, with his fellow officers scheduled to follow within a few days. He arrived on Ma
y 16, a day when Britain happened to be celebrating the Allied victory in Tunisia by ringing church bells all over England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. It must have added insult to von Arnim’s injury to be driven from Hendon Airport south of London to Trent Park in the north part of the city to the sound of a national celebration honoring his defeat.14
Generaloberst (Colonel General) Hans Jürgen von Arnim (far left) arrives at Hendon Airport south of London to begin his stay as a British prisoner of war, May 16, 1943. He is accompanied by Oberstleutnant V. Glasow and General der Panzertruppe Hans Cramer. (German Federal Archive [Bundesarchiv], Bild 146-2005-0132 / Photographer: Unknown)
Once in England, the British interned the German generals at Camp No. 11, located at Trent Park, a private estate in the north London suburb of Cockfosters. British authorities organized Camp No. 11 as part of the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, the agency charged with the interrogation of important prisoners of war. Considering the number of potentially valuable German and Italian prisoners, CSDIC commandeered several splendid homes, including Wilton Park and Latimer House. The British hoped these stately accommodations would alleviate some of the prisoners’ anxiety and coax them into cooperating. German general officers sometimes temporarily transited through Wilton Park, but Trent Park remained the generals’ designated residence throughout the war.15
The Trent Park estate, a remnant of the once-vast Enfield Chase royal hunting grounds, featured a stately mansion dating to the end of the eighteenth century. Numerous renovations and additions over the years had enlarged the mansion and the estate, culminating in the luxurious touches added by Philip Sassoon, the owner for almost three decades before his death in 1939. Sassoon constructed a terrace and a swimming pool and located Renaissance statues around the grounds to complement the existing airfield and nine-hole golf course. The palatial grounds had hosted the likes of Winston Churchill, George Bernard Shaw, Charlie Chaplin, Lawrence of Arabia, numerous members of the English royal family, and the king and queen of Belgium, as well as once serving as a honeymoon retreat for the Duke and Duchess of Kent.16
Hitler's Generals in America Page 3