Rapp described Bieringer as “the most intelligent and most cultured individual of all the generals contacted thus far” and as “one of the most outspoken anti-Hitler men in this camp.” Like Elster, Bieringer felt “ashamed sometimes to belong to a nation who had managed to put gangsters into a government seat.” With understandable skepticism, Rapp asked the general why he and his colleagues had not done anything to resist the Hitler regime in Germany if they had long held this attitude in regard to the Nazi government. Bieringer resorted to the now-familiar refrain that “as a professional soldier it was against rules and etiquette to delve into politics” and that the German generals had not awoken to the dangers presented by the Nazi regime until it was too late. While Rapp did not find Bieringer’s response entirely satisfactory, he did recommend this general as a strong candidate for collaborative activity with American authorities.57
Rapp also suggested the possibility of working with Admiral Hennecke and Generals Seyffardt, Badinski, and von Liebenstein. Rapp saw Hennecke as “an impressive individual” with “a rather broad outlook on life and a fairly good cultural background.” Hennecke convinced Rapp that he was adamantly opposed to Hitler’s government but echoed Bieringer in regard to the Wehrmacht officer corps’s lack of opposition to National Socialism, stating that “as a soldier one obeys and does not criticize.” Rapp thought Hennecke might be useful in influencing German naval prisoners in the United States and played an instrumental role in effecting Hennecke’s transfer so the admiral could join other high-ranking naval officers.58
The “congenial and happy go lucky” Seyffardt also favorably impressed the American captain. While he too openly expressed profoundly anti-Nazi sentiments, Seyffardt emphasized how impressed he was by the American prosecution of the war and the considerate manner in which he had been treated at Camp Clinton. Like Seyffardt, the “loudmouthed and unpolished” Badinski showed a great deal of respect for “such an excellent foe” as the U.S. military and openly spoke of his anti-Hitler views. Rapp saw Badinski as less of a prospect for assistance with psychological warfare, however, both because of his lack of education and because he demonstrated no interest in involving himself in politics, Camp Clinton’s or otherwise.59
For the Americans, one of the most intriguing of the anti-Nazi general prospects was von Liebenstein. Rapp’s basic characterization of the general as a cultured and educated man of the arts coincided with that given by the general’s British captors at Trent Park. However, where CSDIC saw von Liebenstein as second only to von Thoma in terms of his explicit opposition to Nazism and his willingness to collaborate with Allied authorities, Rapp found his political expressions somewhat more subdued. In fact, Rapp described von Liebenstein as a “very cautious man” and only “moderately anti-Nazi.” Perhaps the environment of Camp Clinton was less accepting of anti-Nazi sentiments and that attitude made von Liebenstein less comfortable expressing his political views. Perhaps, like a political chameleon, von Liebenstein attempted to blend into his environment. Regardless, Lieutenant Colonel Davison, Rapp’s superior officer in the PMGO’s Special Projects Division, had suggested that Rapp solicit information from CSDIC regarding those generals, like von Liebenstein and most of the others at Clinton, who had previously been in British custody.60 It appears that Rapp followed this advice and, after doing so, attributed von Liebenstein’s cautiousness to insecurity rather than seeing it as an indication of the level of his anti-Nazi political views. That von Liebenstein later emerged as an American favorite suggests that the general must have begun expressing anti-Nazi sentiments more adamantly.
A large part of the reason that Camp Clinton may not have been as hospitable toward the expression of anti-Nazi sentiments as Trent Park has to do with the Mississippi camp’s composition. First, by late 1944, Clinton held over thirty general officer prisoners, as compared to the thirteen men at Trent Park during the majority of von Liebenstein’s time there. This may well have affected the willingness of individual prisoners to speak out. Perhaps of more significance, however, was the way senior officer and camp leader von Arnim exercised “a very severe command over the rest of the officers” at Clinton.61 At Trent Park, the pro-Nazi views of von Arnim and his sycophant Crüwell had been largely opposed by the majority of their peers, with the Nazi stalwarts including only about four of the thirteen generals interned in the camp. At Clinton, von Arnim wielded a great deal more influence. First, among the eighteen generals that Rapp had occasion to evaluate during his month at Clinton, the American captain found only six of them willing to openly express opposition to the Hitler regime, whereas eight of them were openly pro-Nazi or at least staunch defenders of the German government, regardless of who was in charge. Five were unwilling to commit themselves. This decidedly different prisoner environment, coupled with von Arnim’s espionage network and threats of retaliation or court-martial after the war, may have hushed a number of otherwise vocal Nazi opponents.
Consequently, the Americans viewed von Arnim as being considerably more sinister than did the British, who had largely seen him as pathetic. Rapp described von Arnim as “very much pro-Nazi” and possessing “a rather genuine dislike for everything the United States stands for.” Rapp did not find von Arnim to be particularly intelligent or well educated and concluded that he would never have reached such a high rank in the Wehrmacht if he had not been such “a good Nazi and only took command after everything was lost in Tunisia.” General von Sponeck concurred with Rapp’s assessment. In his memoirs, he ridiculed von Arnim’s support of the Hitler regime and claimed that he never understood why von Arnim had been chosen to succeed Rommel in North Africa. “I disliked [von Arnim] from the beginning,” wrote von Sponeck. Apparently, von Sponeck was not alone. Despite von Arnim’s control of the officers’ compound, there appears to have been some internal resistance to his authority. Rapp reported that “the instigations of many officers personally opposed to General von Arnim” succeeded in having him replaced as camp spokesman by General Neuling in late November 1944. The aging, perhaps somewhat senile Neuling, while declaring no political affiliations whatsoever, was at least extremely well liked by his fellow generals. He immediately improved relations with the American camp administration by cutting down on the number of petty requests made to Mc-Ilhenny and his staff.62
This change in camp leadership, however, appears to have been an isolated incident. The majority of the prisoners either remained committed National Socialists or kept their political persuasions to themselves. One prisoner, von Aulock, feigned a lack of interest in politics in order to keep a low profile. Some of his fellow prisoners informed Rapp that von Aulock had only recently been an SS-Obergruppenführer (the SS equivalent to a three-star general) but had been “transferred ‘in grade’ to the Army to avoid possible detection and punishment.” Unfortunately, Rapp’s informants did not make clear what von Aulock may have done to warrant possible punishment after the war.63
Two of the generals continued to puzzle Allied observers. Carl Köchy had been the most vocal opponent of the Nazi regime among the general officer prisoners questioned by American interrogators at Byron Hot Springs in June 1943. At Camp Clinton in late 1944, Köchy was still “very dignified and polished” and appeared to “choose his friends from amongst the ‘pro United States’ generals.” Yet Rapp contended that the German airman had “lost contact with reality” during the year and a half in which he had been a prisoner of war and that Köchy had become reluctant to share his true political opinions, if he had any at all.64
Generalmajor Hubertus von Aulock (Courtesy of the Mississippi Armed Forces Museum)
Generalleutnant Carl Köchy (Courtesy of the Mississippi Armed Forces Museum)
Ludwig Crüwell remained the greatest mystery. The CSDIC operatives who evaluated him at Trent Park held him in extremely low regard, on one occasion even using the term “moron” to describe him. They saw him as a rabid supporter of the Nazi regime and one of the British camp’s biggest troublemakers. Curiously,
Rapp’s assessment of Crüwell was quite different. Like the British, Rapp noted that Crüwell suffered from “barbed wire disease.” But Rapp portrayed Crüwell as “very well read” and “very interested in English and American literature.” In contrast to allegations that Crüwell was a “snake-in-the-grass” instigator at Trent Park, Rapp found the general to be a “cautious and careful man” who refused to openly proclaim his political views. And where the British continually remarked on Crüwell’s pro-Nazi stance and his sycophantic relationship with von Arnim, Rapp wondered if Crüwell might actually harbor some anti-Nazi sentiments and thought the general was “certainly worth watching” for potential willingness to collaborate with the American authorities.65
Following the conclusion of Rapp’s secret mission at Camp Clinton, U.S. War Department officials articulated a new program for the German prisoner-of-war generals in February 1945. Washington now found it imperative to segregate the potentially cooperative generals from those deemed uncooperative or even hostile to American ideals. Indeed, Major General Archer L. Lerch, the provost marshal general, argued that the cooperative prisoners needed to be transferred to an entirely different camp in order for the program to be successful. While a number of possible locations for this special camp were considered, including Logan Field Camp, located on the harbor in Baltimore, Maryland, the PMGO ultimately chose the newly commissioned Camp Dermott, Arkansas, in part because it believed the camp’s accommodations could easily be made to exceed those provided at Camp Clinton.66
The next order of business involved selecting the “cooperative” prisoners to be transferred. Washington based its general perspectives of each of the senior officer prisoners on Captain Rapp’s earlier evaluations. Yet, considering Rapp’s short stay at Clinton and his inability to properly assess all of the compound’s occupants, the PMGO needed further information in order to make appropriate choices. Ludwig Bieringer must have continued to impress American authorities after Rapp’s departure. Not only was Bieringer included in the group to be transferred to Arkansas, but Washington officials heavily relied on his opinion in choosing which of his fellow prisoners of war would accompany him. Ultimately, five general officer prisoners from Camp Clinton were chosen for transfer to Camp Dermott: Bieringer, Elster, von Liebenstein, von Sponeck, and von Vaerst.67
Considering Rapp’s high opinion of Bieringer and Elster, their selection was not surprising. Rapp found these two men to be the most cooperative generals at Camp Clinton and the most vocal opponents of National Socialism. Rapp found von Liebenstein to be cautious but likely to be cooperative as well. So the addition of his name to the list should be no surprise either, especially considering that he was a favorite at Trent Park and Rapp consulted his British counterparts at some point in the selection process. The selection of von Sponeck and von Vaerst is a bit more surprising, perhaps because neither man had been evaluated by Rapp. Von Sponeck had shown some opposition to Nazism while at Trent Park, although he had largely restricted his comments to his closest confidants, whereas von Vaerst had declared himself a Nazi while at Byron Hot Springs. The only evidence to suggest that von Vaerst might have harbored anti-Nazi sympathies was his earlier request for books by Walter Lippmann. The selection of these five men also undermines Rapp’s conclusions about Afrikaner generals being Nazi sympathizers and Französen generals being defeatists. Of these five, two were Französen and three were Afrikaner.
The final aspects of the program for the generals involved the use of “specially selected media,” including newspapers, magazines, books, and films, to politically reorient the generals remaining at Camp Clinton. The program also involved university lecturers, a carefully chosen prisoner-of-war chaplain, and a suitable officer prisoner to conduct English courses in the generals’ compound. Curiously, as late as March 1945, the proposal to replace Colonel Mc-Ilhenny as Clinton’s commanding officer with a more qualified American general officer was still circulating, but it never came to fruition.68
The Allied victories in Normandy had brought significantly more general officer prisoners to Camp Clinton. The quadrupling of the camp’s population had in turn prompted Washington to reconsider its relationship with these men. Could they be useful in ending the war more expeditiously through psychological warfare? Would they be influential in turning the thousands of lower-ranking German POWs in the United States away from National Socialism? American officials initially thought so. They finally addressed the many criticisms of Camp Clinton and sought to make a more favorable impression on the German generals in their custody. Washington even carefully selected a handful of these men for special reeducation purposes. Yet, while the American relationship with Wehrmacht general officers would continue to expand as the war came to an end, it would not be along the lines laid out by Washington officials in February 1945. Instead, new faces would arrive that would push the collaborative efforts of American captors and German captives in a new direction.
4
Reeducating Hitler’s Generals?
With the prospect of Germany’s defeat on the horizon, Washington finally decided to put its captive enemy generals to use. Generals Gustav von Vaerst, Ludwig Bieringer, Botho Elster, Theodore Graf von Sponeck, and Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein departed Camp Clinton on March 28, 1945. American personnel drove the prisoners almost 150 miles from the generals’ compound in Mississippi to the newly established officers’ camp outside Dermott, Arkansas.1 Despite the intention of the Provost Marshal General’s Office to accommodate the most cooperative German generals in a camp that rivaled Britain’s Trent Park, these prisoners found life in Arkansas worse in some respects than their life in Mississippi.
The transfer of these five men constituted the first step in American plans to use German general officers for psychological warfare and for the purpose of influencing lower-ranking German POWs in American custody. The U.S. War Department specifically chose Camp Dermott, a former relocation center for Japanese Americans in the custody of the War Relocation Authority, because it “provided an opportunity to better the internment conditions of these general officers without excessive expenditure.” In fact, Washington initially believed that accommodations at Dermott compared “favorably with the buildings occupied by the German generals in England.”2
In the fall of 1944, officials from the PMGO met with War Relocation Authority personnel to develop a plan to convert the existing facilities into a functioning prisoner-of-war camp. Camp Dermott was built on almost a thousand acres of relatively flat land a few miles south of Dermott, a town of a few thousand people in southeast Arkansas. The PMGO designated thirteen buildings, with four apartments each, “for possible future occupancy by German prisoner of war general officers.” Each apartment consisted of one or two bedrooms, a living room, kitchen, bathroom with a shower, and both a front and a back door and had hardwood floors. In light of the contentions over the condition of the generals’ quarters at Camp Clinton, it was especially significant that the walls and ceilings of all of the apartments at Dermott were completely insulated. Given the camp’s layout and specifications, Dermott could easily house dozens of general officer prisoners with their aides and orderlies in adjoining quarters. This feature appeared especially appealing considering the trouble at Clinton related to the generals’ aides moving between the compounds and sharing information with the rest of the camp.3
Despite these features, American authorities quickly discovered that Camp Dermott’s accommodations were not as impressive as they originally believed. The land surrounding the buildings was unattractive, most of it having been overtaken by weeds, and most of the wooden walkways connecting the buildings had fallen apart. The biggest problem was that the War Relocation Authority had stripped the camp of most of its material and equipment when the relocation center, previously designated “Camp Jerome,” had closed a few months earlier. A November inspection by PMGO officials declared that, in its present state, Camp Dermott did not compare favorably with Camp Clinton, much less Trent Park, and
estimated that it would take at least three months to bring facilities up to an acceptable level for housing general officer prisoners.4
Authorities in Washington were undeterred. War Department officials believed that Camp Dermott would make an excellent site for the cooperative general officer prisoners and simply delayed their plans to relocate these men until the buildings and grounds in Arkansas could be renovated. Yet, because of the number of POWs coming to the United States in the months following the invasion of Normandy in June, the PMGO activated Camp Dermott immediately and placed almost two thousand lower-ranking officer prisoners there by mid-November 1944.5
Initially, Camp Dermott was a different kind of POW camp. American officials sought to foster a more democratic environment, not only through prescribed intellectual diversions for the prisoners but also in the way the camp was constructed. Frank Stoltzfus of the Y.M.C.A., who inspected the camp in mid-December 1944, praised Dermott’s open atmosphere, saying that one could move “over a wide area within the wire fence without the annoying additional blocked-off areas of barbed wire enclosures.” The officers’ camp was divided into four compounds “but one would not know of it,” claimed Stoltzfus, “because there [were] no fences to block passage from one to another, and the movement everywhere [was] free and easy for one and all.”6
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