I’ve been reading Attlee’s book and his opinions of some of his associates are as frank as I’d like to be about some of mine! Your statement about Iran, Central America and Cuba pleased me no end. You are as right as rain on “Brains are no substitute for judgment.” Sorry Washington is so depressed. I’m to be there May 27th & 28th. We must have a go around for the benefit of both of us.
The autographed and inscribed copy of your book came and I’ve read it again, and believe it or not so has the “Boss.” There has not been a better one on the people of your and my time. Sometimes I wish I’d gone back (if I could) and sometimes I wish I’d taken the appointment as Senator from Missouri a short time ago. But, I’m glad now that it didn’t happen in either case.
Tell Alice her picture still hangs in my reception room right outside the door to the private office and hundreds of customers have commented on it favorably. Hope Alice will take it as a high compliment from the clod hoppers who come to see me. Their comments are worth more than Churchill’s and all the modern artists, in my opinion.
Best of everything to both of you.
Sincerely,
Harry
June 6, 1961
Dear Mr. President:
Would you be willing to see a Sandy Spring neighbor of mine, his wife and two daughters, who will be in the vicinity of Independence between July 1 and July 5? Mr. William W. Miles is the principal of our Sherwood High School in Sandy Spring, and is a personable and persuasive man. Not only has he prevailed upon me to write you, but he had committed me to speaking to the graduating class on June 19.
He is planning to take his family after school on a motor trip through the Middle West. The Truman Library is one of the places of highest interest on their itinerary, and a chance to greet its high priest would add great joy to the interest. I do not know whether this is the sort of request you feel you can grant. If it is entirely out of line, please do not hesitate to tell me so. But if it isn’t and you would let me know a time when they could come in to see you for a moment—or would tell them to have them call Rose Conway when they arrive in the area—they and I would be most appreciative.
With affectionate greetings.
Sincerely,
Dean
At the end of this letter Truman refers to an agreement he made with a production company, Talent Associates, Ltd., to produce a series of television films based on his life and career.
June 11, 1961
Dear Dean:
Of course I’d be pleased to see Mr. William W. Miles. He must be a great man and a persuasive one! It will be a pleasure to meet him. If he can come on either the 4th of July or the 5th it will be good for me. Tell him if he comes on the fourth, he’ll have to listen to a speech by me! If he comes on the 5th he’ll miss that ordeal.
I’ll be here both days. Tell him on either day I’ll personally give him the $5.00 tour for nothing—and since the tour is free to every teacher and student that is really no inducement. Tell him to call these numbers C.L[.] 21061 or C.L. 23678 and either Rose Conway or I will answer.
Dean, listen to me, you can’t make a request, no matter when, where or what that I won’t break a hamstring to meet. Hope you know about hamstrings.
I’ve been having a hell of a time. I’ve a fantastic offer to teach school on television and radio. If I can do it, it will save me a lot of running to schools and colleges. Hope I can. It will also finish the library building and furnish the Presidential historical gallery. Good things like that just can’t happen to me, but I hope.
My very best to Alice,
Sincerely,
Harry
There ain’t no $5.00 tour!
“My commencement speech” was at Sherwood High School, Sandy Spring, Maryland, near Acheson’s farm. Mr. Miles was the principal. Acheson was working, at the time he wrote this letter, on a report on Berlin for President Kennedy. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had precipitated a crisis over the future of Berlin by announcing that the Soviet Union would sign a peace agreement with the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) in six months if the United States did not negotiate a new agreement regarding the Allied position in West Berlin. The Soviet agreement with the GDR, if signed, would have turned over the access routes into West Berlin to the East German government, which the United States did not recognize. Kennedy had met with Khrushchev in early June in Vienna, Austria, where they spoke openly of war. Acheson submitted his report, titled “The Berlin Crisis,” to Kennedy on June 28. It recommended stern measures, including declaration of a national emergency and an immediate buildup of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces, to demonstrate the determination of the United States and its allies not to be forced out of Berlin.
June 24, 1961
Dear Mr. President,
How thoughtful you are of the simple and good people of this world. Mr. Miles, his wife and two girls are thrilled at the idea of meeting you. They have consulted me about the protocol of addressing you and are, in the current jargon, well briefed. They will call up and make a date for the 4th or 5th. If you should answer the phone and hear a dull thud, it will be because he has fainted. I told him you were likely to do it.
My commencement speech turned out to be a great success because it was to be on a dull subject—“The Political Responsibilities of Young Citizens,” of all things—and I hit on a happy device to deal with it. We have a very beautiful bit of country road leading to our village which is notoriously defaced by motorists throwing beer cans and all sorts of trash along the roadside, despite signs threatening horrendous penalties. I pointed out that the people who did this might technically be citizens but in reality they treated the home country as pigs treat their pen. But, I said, within the week I had seen truck loads of boy scouts, armed with shopping bags, picking up this trash and making land beautiful once more. They were learning the indispensable foundation of citizenship—to love some part of this land with all their heart and treat it with disciplined respect and tender care.
Apparently that meant something to the whole audience, children and parents, which generalities about patriotism and duty did not. They gave me a reception afterwards. On the whole, an interesting evening came out of an expected dull one.
I am working hard on plans to meet a Berlin crisis towards the end of the year. It is grim business, but I think that the Joint Chiefs and the State Department have now got the idea and that we shall make some progress. These Chiefs are not nearly as good as yours: nor are their staffs. In fact I am shocked—and I think the Sec. of Defense is, also—at the shoddy work which comes out of the military. For what we spend on them we deserve something better than what we get.
Kennedy’s performance worries and puzzles me. Somehow, he does not succeed in being a President, but only in giving the appearance of one, though he did do well with Khrushchev. Both Kennedy and Dean Rusk seem to me to be better when they make speeches than when they act. We have heard a lot about the necessity to make sacrifices but we haven’t been asked to make any. There are plenty to make if the Administration would just get started. Time is running out.
With warmest greetings,
Dean
Age was taking its toll on the old President, and he felt unsure of his ability to present himself as he should. In this sad letter, he envies Acheson his ability to make a contribution to the national life. The “Pop” that he’s afraid of is Joseph P. Kennedy, John F. Kennedy’s father. Truman is reported to have said during the campaign, when asked about Kennedy’s Catholic religion, “It’s not the Pope I’m afraid of, it’s the Pop.”
July 7, 1961
Dear Dean:
I am sitting here at the desk and wondering about things political, both nationally and internationally. It is a hell of a thought provoking situation.
Mr. Miles, his wife and the girls came in and I had a good visit with them. At least it was good from my point of view.
There couldn’t be any doubt how your commencement speech would turn out. Wish I cou
ld be as certain how my statement would come out. I have been calling off meeting after meeting on that account.
As you know I wasn’t for Kennedy at Los Angeles. But when the Convention decided that he was “the man,” what could I do but work my head off to elect him. I did just that—I’m still afraid of “Pop.”
I have the same trouble with the “litter bugs” you wrote me about. They throw beer cans, pop bottles, lipstick wipers and anything else for the trash can into my front yard; from sidewalk and the street in front.
As an early riser I pick up the trash and take a walk with most unkind thoughts for the litter bug public!
As to Berlin and Laos and Indo China and Cuba we have problems and problems. May Almighty God help us to solve them! There have been times in the history of the world that I thought “He” was looking the other way. And I suppose “He” should have been!
The performance of our Chief Executive worries me, as the Chiefs of Staff do.
You are making a contribution. I am not. Wish I could.
My best to Alice.
Sincerely,
Harry
Acheson, from his vantage point within the Kennedy administration, is able to compare it with the Truman administration. He was clearly impatient at the fumbling of the new administration. Robert McNamara was President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense. General Maxwell D. Taylor was at this point a military adviser to Kennedy.
July 14, 1961
Dear Boss:
This, as you say, is a worrying situation. I find to my surprise a weakness in decisions at the top—all but Bob McNamara who impresses me as first class. The decisions are incredibly hard, but they don’t, like Bourbon, improve with aging.
There is also a preoccupation here with our “image.” This is a terrible weakness. It makes one look at oneself instead of at the problem. How will I look fielding this hot line drive to short stop? This is a good way to miss the ball altogether. I am amazed looking back on how free you were from this. I don’t remember a case where you stopped to think of the effect on your fortunes—or the party’s, for that matter—of a decision in foreign policy. Perhaps you went too far that way, but I don’t think so. Our government is so incredibly difficult to operate that to survive in the modern world it needs the most vigorous leadership.
I will say for Kennedy that getting any good clear work out of the present Joint Chiefs is next to impossible. But McNamara and General Taylor can help him mightily; and, as Holmes said, every day we must make decisions on imperfect knowledge.
The great point is that we ought to be acting now to bring home to Khrushchev that we are in deadly earnest about Berlin, which is only a symbol for our world position. This is what Khrushchev has under attack.
Affectionately,
Dean
Truman believes his campaign appearances in several Southern states and Missouri may have helped Kennedy win those states.
July 18, 1961
Dear Dean:
I don’t know when I’ve had a letter I appreciated as much as yours of the 14th.
Your discussion of the “image” approach is correct and to the point. If you can’t field that “hot drive to the short stop,” no one can. Of course you pay me the high compliment of a tried and true friend—but, you must remember that I had no “yes” men around me, particularly was that true of the great Secretary of State.
I am frankly worried about the situation. When the young man came to see me before the Democratic Convention in L.A. I asked him if he felt he was ready for what faced him. There was no answer. When the rigged convention was over he came back and asked for help in the election. Since the Democratic Party had given me everything I ever aspired to from precinct to President, I did what I could.
I am egotistical enough to think that No. Carolina, Alabama, Louisiana and Texas were helped a little in their anti-Catholic attitude, and Missouri was just saved by an inch. The State ticket went over by about 330,000 majority—Kennedy by 35,000 or there about. Same happened in No. Carolina by about the same difference. Half the electoral vote was saved in Alabama and Huey Long’s La. went in toto as did Texas. As you remember, I told the Baptists in Waco what I had in mind about their bigotry. Since I’m one myself they had to take it.
You know all this but I like to talk about it. It is like the old 88 year old who was being prosecuted for rape by a 20 year old. He made no defense. The Judge asked him why. “Well,” he said, “it sounded so nice and I was wishing so much it could happen that I enjoyed it.” He was not convicted!
Keep writing, it keeps my morale up—if I have any. My best to Alice—tell her I didn’t say Mrs. Acheson!
I told Bess I was writing and she wants to be remembered to you both.
Sincerely,
Harry
Acheson’s involvement with the Kennedy administration on the Berlin crisis continued through July. On July 25, President Kennedy, who had essentially accepted Acheson’s recommendations regarding Berlin, announced on live television and radio that the United States would immediately strengthen its conventional forces and take other measures to resist any Soviet attempt to force a change in the Allied position in West Berlin. Acheson submitted his final report on Berlin to Kennedy, titled “Berlin: A Political Program,” on August 1. After this, Acheson, as he tells Truman in this letter, decided to take a holiday from government work. He could not stop thinking, though, of all he had experienced in recent weeks and about what the future might bring. Shortly after Acheson left Washington for his vacation on Martha’s Vineyard, the Soviet Union began construction of the Berlin Wall. In addition to Berlin, Acheson is also concerned about American policy toward Portugal and its African colonies. Besides his belief that the United States should support its NATO allies, including Portugal, he was personally fond of Portugal, and apparently also of its dictator, António de Oliveira Salazar, with whom he had had extensive dealings during World War II. Early in the Kennedy administration, the United States began supporting United Nations resolutions that denounced Portugal’s policies in its African colonies. Acheson strongly opposed the American position. Adlai Stevenson was at this time United States ambassador to the United Nations, and G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Both advocated American opposition to Portugal’s colonial policies. Acheson deplores the new President’s indecision and delay in foreign-policy decisions. David Bruce was U.S. ambassador to the U.K. “Mr. K” is Khrushchev, and Franz Josef Strauss was the leader of the Christian Social Union in West Germany.
August 4, 1961
Dear Boss,
I have just finished a job which I volunteered to do for Dean Rusk and am now going—in the current jargon—“to phase out” for a while. To work for this crowd is strangely depressing. Nothing seems to get decided. The job just finished was to get up a program of international political action—negotiation with its public opening, fall back, and very private position on Berlin and Germany, together with a propaganda campaign. The State Dept. has all sorts of suggestions but no definitive recommendations. This Rusk now has and I have bullied him into giving the President a copy. But I cannot get them to decide on this—or anything else—as our program to present to our allies. Rusk wants to approach everything piecemeal. But how you lead anyone unless you first know where you yourself want to go, I do not know.
I am told that the President wants to talk with me. But the man he ought to talk with is his Secretary of the Treasury (a curious slip) State; and he ought to demand a written program of action which he could approve, change or disapprove. Instead of this everything is kept nebulous. This is a good way to drift into trouble wholly unprepared. What is the new word? Disenchanted. I am becoming disenchanted.
So Alice and I are getting out of town. Our daughters are both going to be on Martha’s Vineyard for the last half of August and we have decided to be with them but at the other end of the island so as not to be breathing down their necks. In the autumn we might go abroad.
The Chancellor wants me to come to Bonn and I would like to see the Bruces and other friends in England. Finally it just might be possible to get both Salazar and Kennedy to make a little more sense about Angola. We are about to alienate a most essential ally by our silly attitude in the U.N.; and our ally is about to go bankrupt trying to suppress an uprising which it probably can’t suppress. I think that we could help by trying to quiet things down on the basis of more participation in government by the blacks and economic development in both Portugal and Angola. This means some give by Salazar and a silencer on Soapy and Adlai.
But over all of this hangs Berlin. I don’t want to be abroad if I have to defend action of which I do not approve. I do not agree with an alleged remark of yours that Mr. K is bluffing. He has, I believe, sensed weakness and division in the West and intends to exploit it to the hilt. It wouldn’t take more than an error or two on each side to carry us over the edge into nuclear war. Or we could panic into an abject acceptance of K’s terms. “We” includes our allies. Last weekend I had over seven hours of talk with Joseph (Frantz Joseph, to be correct) Strauss. It was not reassuring. Not that he was ready to quit, but rather he just hadn’t thought the crisis through and was full of fears at one moment and utterly extravagant expectations of our nuclear power. In my judgment we shall have to run grave danger of war by preparations for ground action—in which most soldiers (Max Taylor excepted) do not believe—to convince K that by pressing too far he might force us into a nuclear response. Only in this way do I think that he can be brought to a truly sensible and tolerable negotiating state of mind.
With affectionate greetings
Dean
Acheson’s outlook here is gloomy. Fortunately his fears were not realized, because of good luck. The three European leaders who Acheson feels are going to give in to Soviet demands regarding Berlin are Paul-Henri Spaak, the foreign minister of Belgium; Halvard Lange, the foreign minister of Norway; and Konrad Adenauer, chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). John J. McCloy, a former U.S. high commissioner for Germany, was an adviser to President Kennedy at the time, and Walter Lippmann was the venerable Washington columnist.
Affection and Trust: The Personal Correspondence of Harry S. Truman and Dean Acheson, 1953-1971 Page 31