Anyone who still clings to the canard that Charles Edward Stuart was an unintelligent Italian princeling should ponder that letter: concise, lucid and shrewd. As if to reinforce the point that he still intended to command, he ordered the investment of Stirling Castle. This was eminently feasible now that he had been joined by his second army of 4,000 men.36 While Charles convalesced in Clementina’s arms, his officers bent their energies to this difficult task.
As ever, the town adjacent to the castle presented no problems. Stirling was called upon to surrender on 6 January and did so two days later.37 The problem was the citadel. It would be a tough nut to crack even if Hawley stood idly by. He soon showed he had no such intention.
The Jacobites’ initial problem was that they had to bring heavy siege artillery up the Firth from Alloa.38 But Alloa itself was dangerously exposed. The river at that point was too wide to be commanded by a battery. Indeed an enemy sloop sailed beyond Alloa and landed a force that came close to capturing Lord Elcho.39 If the Jacobites meanwhile erected a battery at a point farther up the river towards Stirling, so that they could command the whole river and blow enemy warships out of the water, it was conceivable that Hawley in turn could land forces at Alloa itself to destroy the Jacobite heavy artillery before it could be moved.40
This was in fact precisely what Hawley planned to do. At a crucial moment Lord John Drummond, guarding Alloa, received a stiffening from Lochiel’s regiment. Hawley’s landing force sheered off.41 The Jacobites then transported their heavy guns to Stirling. They had a battery that commanded the Forth approaches, so could (and did) beat off any enemy probes made in that direction.42 To relieve the castle, Hawley would now have to come overland.
But the siege of Stirling quickly lurched from difficulty to disaster. The so-called French expert on siege warfare, M. Mirabel (who had come over with Drummond), proved to be a spectacular incompetent.43 The men conducting the siege were overworked and poorly fed.44 There was particular strain on Ogilvy’s regiment. Since clan regiments detested siege work, there was little relief for the Lowland battalions.45 It was as much as Lord George Murray could do to get the Atholl brigade to guard the trenches.46 And the whole operation was hampered by heavy, driving rain.47
At this point Hawley made his move overland. He sent ahead an advance screen of cavalry to Linlithgow.48 Hearing this, Lord George Murray took five battalions of Athollmen with Pitsligo’s and Elcho’s cavalry to intercept them and deny them forage and provisions.49 Arriving at dawn, they surprised an advanced patrol of Hawley’s dragoons and took possession of the magazine and military supplies.50
Pursuing Hawley’s outriders beyond the town, Elcho’s Lifeguards collided with a further body of dragoons and chased them off. Yet it was obvious that the main force was not far behind. Retiring for the night to Falkirk, Murray’s forces joined the rest of the army at Bannockburn on the 14th.51
Nettled by what he considered his own failure to achieve very much, Lord George gave vent to his irrational side. He complained to the prince that the Linlithgow operation could have been successful if he had had the Camerons along with him, forgetting that their presence at Alloa was necessary to force Hawley to come overland in the first place. He also complained that the prince’s idyll at Bannockburn was a strain on manpower: it stretched his Athollmen thin, since they had to do guard duty both at Falkirk and Bannockburn.
Hawley’s army marched from Edinburgh to Linlithgow on 15 January. The Hanoverian vanguard under General Huske was at Falkirk on the 16th, to link up with 1,500 Argyllshire militia under Colonel Campbell.52 During these two days the Jacobite army stood to, drawn up in line of battle on a plain to the east of Bannockburn.53
On the 16th the Jacobites dispersed from the field at 3 p.m., again disappointed that the enemy had not come. Their dispersal was carelessly arranged. As Elcho pointed out, a better general than Hawley would have chosen this moment to attack; he could have picked the Jacobite regiments off piecemeal.54
On the morning of the 17th, the implications of this carelessness became clear. Despite precise orders issued the night before, it was almost midday before the entire Jacobite army was assembled. Such a state of affairs could not be allowed to persist into a third day. Since Hawley would not come to them, it was time for the Jacobites to take the offensive. Lord George Murray suggested seizing the high ground to the south-west of Falkirk, a ridge of moorland about a mile from Hawley’s camp.55 For once the prince agreed with Murray.
To camouflage the movement, Lord John Drummond and the Irish troops were sent along the main road from Bannockburn to Stirling. Marching by detours, side roads and across fields, the Jacobite army approached the high ground. It was now about 8,000 strong, roughly the same size as Hawley’s. The only units of the prince’s troops not engaged were the 1,200 men left with Perth to continue the siege of Stirling.56
The approach of the Highlanders was noticed by the enemy but, amazingly, Hawley considered it inconceivable that his army was in any danger of being attacked.57 At Callendar House (his headquarters) he sat down to his dinner unconcerned, confident with the folly of arrogance.
Between one and two o’clock graver intelligence came through. It was clear that this was no feint. The entire Jacobite army was ascending the high ground. At last Hawley realised the seriousness of his position. Leaving the table in a fluster, he galloped hatless up to the head of his troops. Hurried orders were given to forestall the Highlanders in the occupation of the summit of the moor.58
Falkirk Muir rose steeply from the town. It was a moorland plateau of scrub and heather. Halfway up the hillside a deep ravine cut across the moor. The preliminaries of the battle resolved themselves into a race for the summit. The race was won by the Jacobite right, but Hawley’s dragoons got to the plateau minutes behind them.59 The consequence was that when both armies drew up they were in slanting formation.
The Jacobite centre and left extended down the hillside from the fairly level ground near the summit occupied by the right. Here were the MacDonalds in the front rank, with the Atholl brigade in the second line and Ogilvy’s in the centre. Elcho’s and Balmerino’s horse provided the cavalry reserve in this sector.60 The extreme left was posted near the mouth of the ravine. Here were the Camerons with Lord Lewis Gordon’s cavalry in the second line and Kilmarnock’s behind them. To the south was boggy ground, making encircling movements by Hawley impossible. To the north, towards Falkirk, the salient feature was the ravine or gully that separated the Jacobite left from Hawley’s.61
Such terrain clearly ruled out complex military manoeuvres. But now the elements took a hand. As Hawley’s infantry struggled up the hill, the overcast day turned to storm. A strong wind blew from the south-west and the icy rain beat directly into the faces of Hawley’s troops as a result of the sloping ground.62 They suffered the additional disadvantage of not being able to see all the clansmen above them on the skyline. As the dark of a stormy winter’s afternoon descended, visibility was severely restricted on both sides. There was even doubt about whether powder could be kept dry. Hawley gave the order to fix bayonets.
Seeing that it was impossible to outflank the Jacobite right on account of the marshy ground, Hawley’s dragoons tried to draw the Highlanders’ fire and break up their formation by riding in among them.63 But the MacDonald regiments had been well drilled by Lord George Murray. He had impressed on them that in no circumstances were they to open fire until he gave the word.64
Perceiving that there was no obvious way of shifting the Highlanders, and doubtless fearing that the clansmen would have the edge in confused night fighting, Hawley ordered his dragoons to attack. It was nearly four o’clock.65
Nothing more clearly demonstrated Hawley’s incompetence than an order to 700 dragoons to charge a front line of 4,000 well-drilled clansmen.66 Colonel Ligonier at the head of the cavalry found his orders incredible. But he knew better than to question the command of the savage ‘Hangman’ Hawley. Advancing on the Highland right, the three cava
lry regiments came on at the trot.67
Waiting until the horses were a pistol shot away, Lord George Murray raised his musket as the signal to fire. The dragoons took a devastating volley at a ten-yard range.68 About eighty of them fell dead on the spot. Watchers in Hawley’s rear saw ‘daylight through them’ in several places.69 Two of the cavalry regiments broke and fled, riding over their own infantry as they went. The third was all but annihilated in gruesome manner by clansmen playing the role of berserkers, hamstringing and disembowelling horses with the claymore, pulling and scything their riders out of the saddle.70
The MacDonalds’ blood was up. It was impossible to maintain discipline. Two of the best Jacobite regiments dispersed to plunder the fallen dragoons or maul the weak Glasgow militia.71 The Hanoverian foot was left intact. This created a potentially dangerous situation, for the heavy rain and the fact that they did not use cartridges left the Highlanders unable to return Hawley’s fire. But this was when the clansmen were at their very best. Throwing down their muskets, they charged broadsword in hand into Hawley’s left.72 After a brief resistance four of Hawley’s six front-line regiments on the left broke and fled.
This was the moment when defeat could have turned to rout. Two things conspired to rob the Jacobites of an overwhelming victory. On the Hanoverian right the three regiments under General Huske did not break but held up well.73 And, though the prince had been asked by Lord George to appoint a commander on the left, he had neglected to do so.74 The bad consequences of the Bannockburn/Falkirk separation now made themselves felt. To overcome the determination of Huske on the right, the Jacobites needed someone of Murray’s verve. In fact, incredibly, there was no overall commander there.
To make things worse, the sloping battle line meant that the Jacobite left could hear the sounds of battle behind them. It was impossible in the gathering gloom to get a clear line on what was happening. The obvious conclusion from Huske’s firmness was that Hawley must be winning the battle on the Jacobite right. The regimental commanders on the left did not therefore feel like trying conclusions with Huske.75 In this way the opportunity for total victory was lost.
After twenty minutes, with dusk descending rapidly, and with a large part of both armies having already quit the field, Lord George decided that he no longer had enough men to deal decisively with Huske. But he was determined to occupy Falkirk at once, lest the enemy recover and make a stand behind gun emplacements.76 The defeat suffered by Hawley and the consequent Hanoverian panic enabled Murray to do so. Falkirk was a victory, but it was not the crushing destruction of Hawley it could have been after the ‘Hangman’s’ initial dreadful mistake. Jacobite losses had been about 50 killed and 70 wounded. The Hanoverians sustained casualties of some 20 officers and 400 men killed.77
The prince had once again not seen much of his victory. He had been in the rear of the second line with the Irish battalions and came up with Lord George Murray only in the closing minutes of the battle. At one stage it seemed that a detachment of dragoons had seen the royal standard and was attempting a snatch raid on Charles.78 But the resolution of the Irish picquets soon dispersed them.
The problem was that in the driving rain and excessive gloom, everyone was dispersing, Jacobite clansman and Hanoverian regular alike. The prince tried in vain to rally his men.79 Then he conferred with Murray. They agreed that it would be folly to make a night attack on Falkirk if Hawley was still there; if he was not, a pursuit on such a dreadful winter night was also out of the question. The prince’s men had been stood to arms since 7 a.m. and were already soaked to the skin. The pools of water on the sodden ground were already hardening into ice.80 In the end, they decided to enter Falkirk tentatively, Drummond from the east and Murray from the west.
The battle of Falkirk might have been thought likely to lift Charles’s spirits, but never was a victory so much attended by gloom in the post-mortem. A great opportunity had been lost: this was the consensus on all sides. All that remained was to find culprits on whom to fasten the inevitable recriminations. It was plain that Hawley, though mauled, would soon recover. He had got away to Linlithgow with most of his troops; the new arrivals pouring into Edinburgh from London would soon more than make good his losses.
The Jacobites, on the other hand, had been handed victory on a plate and had failed to clinch the issue. They had had the advantage of the ground, the rain was blowing into the enemy’s faces, Hawley had given his dragoons a suicidal order to charge; and yet the decisive victory that should have come had eluded the prince’s men.81 In the Jacobite camp accusations and attributions of blame proliferated. Lord George Murray alleged that it was clearly Drummond’s job to take command of the left wing; Drummond pointed the finger at Murray for his caution and restraint in not allowing the clansmen full rein in pursuit, and even for fighting on foot.82 The prince was also piqued by d’Eguilles’s praise for Lord George’s generalship at Falkirk. To ‘set the record straight’, he instructed Sheridan to write a letter to Versailles, balancing the French envoy’s account by exaggerating O’Sullivan’s role.83
The gloomy feelings in the Jacobite camp were accentuated next day. Charles Edward arose from his bed in Hawley’s rapidly vacated quarters (where he was said to have eaten the dinner left untouched by Hawley)84 to find that an event of singular ill-omen had occurred. Young Glengarry (Angus) had been accidentally shot dead in the streets of Falkirk by the careless discharge of a musket by a Keppoch MacDonald.85 Despite Glengarry’s dying pleas, the Keppoch clansman was executed forthwith as an example. This foolish decision merely alienated the Keppochs while doing nothing to restore Glengarry morale.86 The immediate consequence was a string of desertions that was to set in train the Jacobites’ ultimate disaster.
This was a moment when decisive leadership was called for. The Jacobites should have pursued Hawley to Edinburgh and reoccupied the city. Initially, of course, there could be no question of pursuit. The Jacobite troops were too tired even to harry Hawley as far as Linlithgow. But on the 18th there were calls for the reoccupation of Edinburgh and even for a second invasion of England.87 Undoubtedly the prince should have opted for the former of the two, so as to prevent Hawley from recovering his balance.88
But the unsatisfactory result of Falkirk and the disarray among his officers that followed disturbed Charles Edward. He suffered a relapse of his illness and returned to Bannockburn to Clementina’s ministrations; the Lowland troops went with him as bodyguard.89
In the decision-making vacuum that ensued, during the crucial days when the clansmen should have been pressing home their advantage and snapping at Hawley’s heels, all that was done was to accelerate work on the pointless siege of Stirling Castle.90 This was already a hopeless enterprise. Mirabel was by now adding drunkenness to his other deficiencies.91 Even Lord George, who had been inclined to defend the Frenchman against his detractors, eventually admitted he was impossible.92 And when the long-awaited Jacobite battery was finally ready and directed its salvoes at the castle, it was answered by a devastatingly accurate cannonade that very soon silenced the battery, not without considerable loss of life.93 Moreover, morale among the Scots undertaking this thankless task was not improved by the fact that Charles Edward saw fit to pay one visit only to the trenches around the castle.94 Finally, news came in that Cumberland had arrived in Edinburgh to take over the command from Hawley. He brought with him three new regiments.95
During this critical period, when the fate of the rising was virtually decided, everything conspired to dampen morale in the Jacobite army and to underscore the gloomiest prognostications of the growing band of pessimists in the ranks of the officers. The prince’s absence at Bannockburn at this juncture was one of his most signal self-destructive acts. True, he was ill, but the illness itself was part of the internal sabotage, increasingly in evidence since Derby. While he was closeted with Clementina Walkinshaw at Bannockburn, a tide of opinion was building up among the clan leaders that would prove impossible to reverse.
The
prince was finally spurred into activity by news of the presence in Edinburgh of his rival and contemporary Cumberland.96 Since it was clear that George II’s second son would immediately try to relieve Stirling Castle – and it was equally obvious that Mirabel was as far away from completing the siege as ever – the prospect of another battle loomed.97
The prince’s spirits lifted at the thought. He sent Murray of Broughton to Lord George with orders to prepare to engage Cumberland at Linlithgow or Falkirk. Lord George appeared to accept the command without demur. But on the evening of the 29th the lieutenant-general sent Hay of Restalrig to Bannockburn with a document signed by Murray and six clan chiefs (Lochiel, Keppoch, Clanranald, Ardshiel, Lochgarry and the Master of Lovat). This document strongly urged retreat to the Highlands in view of the critical rate of desertion taking place in the army.98 Lord George’s remonstrance claimed that 2,000 clansmen had already deserted, that the number of absconders increased not just daily but hourly. If they faced Cumberland now, it would be their 5,000 men pitted against twice that number under the duke’s command. There was, however, an honourable alternative to continuing the siege of Stirling. If the Highlanders chased Loudoun from Inverness and captured the northern forts so as to open communication with Ross and Caithness, they could reasonably expect fresh accessions from Jacobites in those counties.99 Together with the deserters, whom the clan chiefs would round up in their own country, it was reasonable to assume that an army of 10,000 could be put in the field for a spring campaign. Murray also sent a verbal message with Hay which said: ‘We are sensible this will be very unpleasant, but in the name of God what can we do?’100
What caused this remarkable defeatism? Undoubtedly morale among the Highlanders had taken a severe blow in the limbo period after Falkirk. The failure to follow up the victory, the continued frustration of the incompetent siege of Stirling, the demoralisation of the MacDonalds after the shooting of Angus Glengarry, all played their part.101 The key to it all was inertia. Clan armies needed ceaseless momentum of a purposive kind or they tended to fall apart. In fallow periods, especially after a victory, the temptations to slip away to home and hearth with booty were irresistible. Fear of desertions, it will be remembered, was one of the key reasons for the decision to invade England.
Bonnie Prince Charlie: Charles Edward Stuart (Pimlico) Page 28